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PREFACE 
I n t h i s paper we are mainly concerned w i t h the 
l e g a l s t r u c t u r e and scope of the Borrowing Scheme. 
The need f o r the f o r m a t i o n of an arrangement l i k e 
the Borrowing Scheme was economic; i t s necessity was, 
i t i s "believed, due to the emergence of a new phenomenon 
i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l monetary a f f a i r s , v i z . , short-term 
c a p i t a l movement. 
The short-term c a p i t a l movement i t s e l f was p a r t l y 
due to the f a c t t h a t a f t e r the i n c e p t i o n o f the 
Fund's operations, a considerable number o f i t s members 
accepted the commitments of A r t i c l e V I I I of the Fund's 
A r t i c l e s of Agreement. That i s to say, they accepted 
the o b l i g a t i o n s of c o n v e r t i b i l i t y of t h e i r currencies, 
subject-matter o f Sections.. 2, 3 and h of A r t i c l e V I I I . 
I t was, i n a sense, the acceptance of t h i s 
commitment, by the key member States o f the Fund, 
t h a t caused the above phenomenon ( t h a t i s , the s h o r t -
term c a p i t a l movement),, f o l l o w i n g which the Fund f e l t 
i t necessary to set up the Borrov/ing Scheme. 
Another f a c t o r which c o n t r i b u t e d to the f o rmation 
of the Borrowing Scheme was, i t i s suggested, shortage 
of means of i n t e r n a t i o n a l l i q u i d i t y . The f a c t t h a t , 
since the Fund's A r t i c l e s o f Agreement came i n t o 
e f f e c t , the volume, as w e l l as the p r i c e o f , almost 
a l l commodities has increased considerably; whereas 
the means f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l l i q u i d i t y have not "been 
increased accordingly. 
The shortage o f means o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l l i q u i d i t y 
had, t h e r e f o r e , to "be coped \cth i n one way or another. 
Some of i t s aspects were resolved by way o f increases 
i n the member States' quotas, and l a t e r by way o f 
s e t t i n g up the s o - c a l l e d Special Drawing Rights. 
Another step to supplement the above measures, was 
the formation o f the Borrowing Scheme. 
What we are t r y i n g to suggest here, i s t h a t 
although the c h i e f o b j e c t i v e o f the s e t t i n g up o f the 
Borrowing Scheme was t o cope w i t h short-term c a p i t a l 
movement, t h i s does not n e c e s s a r i l y mean t h a t the 
Borrowing Scheme has had no other impact on i n t e r -
n a t i o n a l monetary a f f a i r s . For instance, another 
purpose to be achieved under the Borrowing Scheme 
was, i t i s b e l i e v e d , to o f f e r the U.S. Government the 
op p o r t u n i t y to cope w i t h i t s recent balance of payments 
d i f f i c u l t i e s by v/ay of using i t s drawing f a c i l i t i e s 
on a l a r g e r scale. Therefore i t i s perhaps an economic 
view, per incuriam, to suggest t h a t the only o b j e c t i v e 
of the Borrowing Scheme was to deal w i t h the s h o r t -
term c a p i t a l movement. These are, however, matters 
of concern o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l economists, and thus out 
of scope of t h i s paper. 
So f a r as short-term c a p i t a l movement was con-
cerned, i t had to "be coped w i t h i n a s p e c i f i c way; 
f o r , as we may n o t i c e , the movement o f "hot" money 
u s u a l l y a f f e c t s the monetary s t a b i l i t y of key member 
States of the Fund, p a r t i c u l a r l y the so - c a l l e d Group 
of Ten Countries. I t TO u l d f o l l o w t h a t the p a r t i c i -
p a t i o n i n the Borrowing Scheme had to be l i m i t e d to 
the key member States of the Fund, t h a t i s , the Group 
of Ten I n d u s t r i a l c o u n t r i e s . 
Under the Borrowing Scheme, the Group of Ten have 
agreed t o supplement the Fund's resources up to the 
equivalent of U.S. % 6 B i l l i o n o f t h e i r own currencies. 
These currencies are to be borrowed only by the 
p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the Borrowing Scheme and n o t by other 
member States o f the Fund. 
The t h i n g which i s t o be mentioned here, i s t h a t 
before any agreement could be reached as to the contents 
of the Borrowing Scheme, various proposals were put 
forward and s t u d i e d by the a u t h o r i t i e s concerned. 
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Two d i s t i n c t approaches could he t r a c e d i n 
n e a r l y a l l these proposals: 
(a) The approach under which i t was b e l i e v e d 
t h a t the Fund could achieve i t s o b j e c t i v e s by b r i n g i n g 
about necessary,amendments to the e x i s t i n g p r o v i s i o n s 
of the Fund's Articles of Agreement. 
(b) The approach under which i t was suggested 
t h a t the Fund could achieve the same o b j e c t i v e s without 
g e t t i n g i n v o l v e d i n the amendment o f the Fund's A r t i c l e s 
of Agreement; but by s e t t i n g f o r t h some supplementary 
arrangements under some o f the e x i s t i n g p r o v i s i o n s of 
the Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement. 
There i s , however, s u f f i c i e n t evidence to b e l i e v e 
t h a t the above second approach has won the favour of . 
the Fund and other i n t e r e s t e d bodies. This i s perhaps 
the reasons why the Borrowing Scheme has been set up 
under A r t i c l e s V I I (2) o f the Fund's A r t i c l e s of 
Agreement; because A r t i c l e V I I (2.) i s formulated w i t h 
a view t o dealing w i t h scarce currencies something 
which has never been used f o r t h i s purpose. Yet, 
suddenly i t has been nominated as the l e g a l basis f o r 
dealing w i t h short-term c a p i t a l movement, which 
movement was uncontemplated at the time o f the d r a f t i n g 
o f the Fund's A r t i c l e s o f Agreement. I t would, 
t h e r e f o r e , f o l l o w t h a t the d r a f t e r s of the Borrowing 
* J i 2 
Scheme may have loaded on A r t i c l e V I I (2) something 
t h a t i t can h a r d l y bear the weight. 
S e t t i n g up of the Borrowing Scheme without 
attempting any corresponding amendment to the F.A.A. 
has brought about some l e g a l and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
d i f f i c u l t i e s . This was one of the reasons prompted 
us to r e l a t e our work to the l e g a l aspect of a c t i v i t i e s 
of the Group of Ten. However, due to the f a c t t h a t the 
nature o f a c t i v i t i e s o f the Group of Ten demands i t be as 
c o n f i d e n t i a l as p o s s i b l e , the m a t e r i a l a v a i l a b l e has 
not been as ample as expected. . To t h i s may be added 
the f a c t t h a t so f a r no formal dispute has a r i s e n out 
of the a c t i v i t i e s of the Group of Ten which could throw 
l i g h t on the meaningand scope of the contents o f the 
Borrowing Scheme. I n consequence o f t h i s , our study 
w i l l be l i m i t e d to the understanding o f meaning and 
scope o f the Borrowing Scheme i n the l i g h t o f 
pronouncements of the Fund and the Group o f Ten, 
coupled w i t h the comments by w r i t e r s on i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
lav/. 
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However, before l e a v i n g t h i s prefa.ce, l e t us have 
a few more words as t o how the accepteaice by the Group 
of Ten of commitments of A r t i c l e V I I I has brought about 
the n e c e s s i t y f o r s e t t i n g up of the Borrowing Scheme. 
By 1961 the key member States of the Fund had acc-
epted the undertaking to convert t h e i r currencies h e l d 
by "non-residents 1" i n t o gold or i n t o another c o n v e r t i b l e 
currency. This c o n v e r t i b i l i t y of "reserve" currencies 
gives the speculators the o p p o r t u n i t y t o move t h e i r cash 
from one c o u n t y t o another. 
There are v a r i o u s motives f o r the movement of s h o r t -
term c a p i t a l from one country to another, among which are: 
i n t e r e s t a r b i t r a g e ; forward exchange t r a n s a c t i o n s ; higher 
i n t e r e s t r a t e s i n one country compared w i t h another; spec-
u l a t i o n i n f o r e i g n s e c u r i t i e s ; and above a l l s p e c u l a t i o n i r 
f o r e i g n exchange. And i t i s t h i s l a s t element which can be 
most harmful to the balance of payments and reserve pos-
i t i o n of. the Group of Ten c o u n t r i e s , and which has f o r c e d 
these Countries t o come t o g e t h e r to set up the Borrowing 
Scheme. 
Most economists b e l i e v e t h a t the balance of payments ,. 
and reserve p o s i t i o n of the main i n d u s t r i a l Countries i s a 
m a n i f e s t a t i o n of t h e i r economic success or f a i l u r e . And anj 
economic success or f a i l u r e would sooner or l a t e r a f f e c t 
the balance of payments and reserve p o s i t i o n of these coun-
t r i e s . This, i n t u r n , n e c e s s i t a t e s , from time t o time, 
changes i n economic p o l i c y and adjustments i n the balance 
of payments and reserve p o s i t i o n . These changes and a d j u s t -
ments could u s u a l l y be achieved by way of i n f l a t i n g or def-
l a t i n g the economy. For in s t a n c e , a country faced w i t h b a l -
ance of payments d e f i c i t may choose to f o l l o w an in f l a t i c a a r j 
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p o l i c y , x his p o l i c y can be implemented by way of e i t h e r : 
(a) r e d u c t i o n of taxes and (b) increase i n p u b l i c expendi-
t u r e ; or by way of (a) increa.se i n supply to the economy 
of money and (b) r e d u c t i o n i n i n t e r e s t r a t e s ; or by way of 
(a) r e d u c t i o n i n money wage r a t e s and (b) d e v a l u a t i o n of the 
currency. 
I f , on the other hand, a country i s faced w i t h balance 
of payments s u r p l y s , i t may choose to f o l l o w a d e f l a t i o n a r y 
p o l i c y . T h i s p o l i c y i n turn, may be a c h i e v e d by way of 
e i t h e r : ( a ) increase i n taxes and (b) decrease i n p u b l i c 
expenditure; or by way of (a) decrease i n supply t o the 
economy of money, and ( b j increase i n i n t e r e s t r a t e s ; or by 
way offci)increase i n money wage r a t e s and {~b) u p v a l u a t i o n of 
the currency. 
The o b j e c t of i n f l a t i n g or d e f l a t i n g an economy can be 
achieved by employing one, two, several or a l l of the[above 
economic measures. The degree t o which an economy should be 
i n f l a t e d or d e f l a t e d i s a matter o f economic judgement. _ T h i s 
i s , a t the same time, something on which one cannot f i n d 
concensus of o p i n i o n among the economist. The main c r i t e r i a 
f o r making any d e c i s i o n i n t h i s respect, however, are whether 
the country i n question i s {1) a surplus country w i t h a 
d o m e s t i c slump; (2) a surplus country w i t h a d o m e s t i c boom; 
(3) a d e f i c i t country w i t h a domestic slump; (4) a d e f i c i t 
country w i t h a domestic boom. 
Another c r i t e r i o n here i s c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the r e a c t i o n of 
other i n d u s t r i a l c o u n t r i e s t o the above changes, and. adjus-
tments. Forjinstance, i f a given coimtry i s i n t e r e s t e d i n 
a t t r a c t i n g more f o r e i g n c a p i t a l f o r improving i t s o v e r a l l 
balance of payments, i t could do so by an increase i n i t s 
i n t e r e s t r a t e s . The success of such a p o l i c y i s , however, 
dependent on not only many favourable i n t e r n a l f a c t o r s , but 
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also the r e a c t i o n of other main i n d u s t r i a l c o u n t r i e s . For 
example, t h i s p o l i c y may not be successful i f other members 
of the Group of Ten choose t o increase t h e i r i n t e r e s t r a t e s , 
thus curbing the o u t f l o w of c a p i t a l from t h e i r t e r r i t o r i e s . 
One i n c i d e n t a l i n f e r e n c e from the above economic process 
i s t h a t there e x i s t s , a t any given time, considerable amount 
of cash which can e a s i l y move from one country t o another. 
The above movement of "hot" money may expose the balance of 
payments and reserve p o s i t i o n of the Group of Ten t o serious 
d i f f i c u l t i e s . 
As we have seen, one of the choices open to theGroup of 
Ten t o avoid balance of payments and reserve d i f f i c u l t i e s 
(and t o stop the s p e c u l a t i o n ) i s to change the par value of 
t h e i r currency. For instance,, i f a country i s t n balance of 
payments d e f i c i t , and t h i s d e f i c i t has caused s p e c u l a t i o n 
i n t h a t currency, then the country i n question can deal w i t h 
i t by r e s o r t i n g t o the d e v a l u a t i o n of i t s currency. Deval-
u a t i o n i s n o t , however, an easy d e c i s i o n to take. I t u s u a l l y 
would be taken when other economic measures t o p r o t e c t the 
balance of payments p o s i t i o n have n o t , f o r one reason or an-
other, been su c c e s s f u l . 
I t i s a t t h i s stage t h a t the country i n d e f i c i t i s f o r c e d 
to change the value of i t s currency w i t h a view t o achieving 
the same o b j e c t , t h a t i s balance of payments e q u i l i b r i u m . ' 
When a d e f i c i t country reaches t h i s stage when ; d e v a l u a t i o n 
appears i n e v i t a b l e , the speculators w i l l wish t o convert any 
c a p i t a l h e l d i n t h a t currency i n t o other c o n v e r t i b l e c u r r e n -
c i e s , malting the d e c i s i o n t o devalue the more l i k e l y . This 
they w i l l not h e s i t a t e t o do becausefthey are sure t h a t under 
the circumstances, one of the f o l l o w i n g would happen: 
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(1) e i t h e r they w i l l l ose almost no money i f the currency 
i n t r o u b l e were not devalued. A l l t h a t has happened i s 
t h a t they have changed one c o n v e r t i b l e currency i n t o another, 
w i t h the same purchasing power; (2) or they w i l l earn con-
s i d e r a b l e amount of w i n d f a l l p r o f i t , i f the currency i n 
t r o u b l e were devalued. And l a t e r , they can convert t h e i r 
cash i n t o the devalued currency, and have more u n i t s of the 
devalued currency, as they had before, w i t h more purchasing 
power. 
Nov/, l e t us see why States always r e s i s t d e v a l u a t i o n 
of t h e i r currency. There are many reasons f o r t h i s , among 
which are: 
(1) Devaluation i s p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y not much help f o r the 
par value of a currency; and recent experience i n t h i s 
has be<?n 
respect has shown t h a t once a given currency w s s A f o r c e d t o 
devalue, then i t arouseS the s u s p i c i o n of the wo r l d monetary 
centres, and s p e c u l a t o r s . This s u s p i c i o n , i n t u r n , puts t h a t 
currency i n a p o s i t i o n t h a t the appearance of the s l i g h t e s t 
s i g n of weakness i n i t prompts the speculators t o convert 
t h e i r cash h e l d i n t h a t currency i n t o some other c o n v e r t i b l e 
currency, and t h i s not i n f r e q u e n t l y paves the way f o r another 
d e v a l u a t i o n of t h a t currency. 
(2) As r e f e r r e d t o e a r l i e r , d e v a l u a t i o n i s said t o be 
one of the means by which States could achieve balance of 
payments e q u i l i b r i u m . A l l economists, however, do not 
b e l i e v e t h a t d e v a l u a t i o n i s a cure f o r balance of payments 
e q u i l i b r i u m , but an i n e v i t a b l e step t o be taken i r r e s p e c t i v e 
of i t s advantages or disadvantages. As such, i n economic 
c i r c l e s and amongst the p r i v a t e holders of means of l i q u i d i t y , 
the d e v a l u a t i o n o f a currency w i l l be i n t e r p r e t e d as a 
step t o prevent f u r t h e r weakness i n i t s par value;and they 
w i l l c e r t a i n l y n ot consider i t as a s i g n of s t r e n g t h of t h a t 
currency. 
For these reasons, any State faced w i t h "balance of 
payments and reserve d i f f i c u l t i e s w i l l r e s i s t a d e v a l u a t i o n 
as f a r as p o s s i b l e . This r e s i s t a n c e , however, can only be 
sustained i f the country i n t r o u b l e has got enough currency 
of o ther members of the Group of Ten t o defend the par value 
of i t s currency. I n other words, under the new c o n d i t i o n s of 
c o n v e r t i b i l i t y of A r t i c l e V1TI, the country i n t r o u b l e 
r e q u i r e s considerable amount of reserves to meet the demand 
of speculators t o convert i t s currency i n t o the currency of 
other members of the Group of Ten. 
I f the monetary a u t h o r i t i e s i n the d e f i c i t country were 
successful i n meeting a l l the demands f o r conversion of i t s 
currency i n t o another; andjif other economic requirements f o r 
a h e a l t h y balance of payments were e x i s t i n g , then the country 
i n q uestion has r e s t o r e d confidence to t h a t currency and there 
w i l l be no need f o r devaluing i t . 
But i f other economic requirements f o r the p r e s e r v a t i o n 
of the par value of t h a t currency d i d not e x i s t , and i f the 
s p e c u l a t i v e pressure on t h a t currency were ever i n c r e a s i n g , 
then the monetary a u t h o r i t i e s would be f o r c e d t o devalue the 
currency andto accept an a p p r o p r i a t e new par value f o r i t . 
At the same time, they w i l l have l o s t a considerable amount 
of reserves. 
What i s again c l e a r from the above economic process, 
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i s t h a t whether or not the country i n t r o u b l e i s going 
t o r e s i s t a d e v a l u a t i o n , there i s i n e v i t a b l y a need f o r 
a considerable amount of reserves f o r t h a t country. This 
need f o r a vast amount of c o n v e r t i b l e currencies i s a new 
phenomenon i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l monetary a f f a i r s , and some-
t h i n g unthought of a t the time of the d r a f t i n g of the 
Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement. I n other words, the 
"drawing, r i g h t s " of the Group of Ten (under the Fund's 
A r t i c l e s of Agreement) were q u i t e l i m i t e d and was not 
s u f f i c i e n t t o meet t h e i r balance of payments d i f f i c u l -
t i e s under the new c o n d i t i o n s created by the convert-
i b i l i t y of t h e i r c u r r e n c i e s . I t was these c o n d i t i o n s 
which f o r c e d the Group of Ten t o set up the Borrowing 
Scheme, and to r e p l e n i s h the Fund's h o l d i n g s of scarce 
c u r r e n c i e s . I n a sense i t was the o b l i g a t i o n of the 
main i n d u s t r i a l c o u n t r i e s (which e f f e c t i v e l y c o n t r o l 
the world's means of l i q u i d i t y ) t o step i n t o help any 
member of the Group i n . trouble.; because under the new 
co n d i t i o n s of c o n v e r t i b i l i t y , a l l i n d u s t r i a l c o u n t r i e s 
would b e n e f i t , and one of the steps necessary to m a i n t a i n 
such a b e n e f i t i s t o help each other i n time of d i f f i -
c u l t y . 
Furthermore, i t i s w i d e l y b e l i e v e d t h a t the amount 
of reserves l o s t by any member of the Group (as a r e s u l t 
of movement of hot money) i s e q u i v a l e n t t o the amount 
o f N r e s e r v e s gained by other members of the Group. There 
are even some economists who b e l i e v e t h a t the d e f i c i t 
i n balance of payments of one of the members of the 
Group i s surplus i n the balance of payments of another; 
and i f the i n t e n t i o n of the Group of Ten i s to 
ma i n t a i n the new c o n d i t i o n s of c o n v e r t i b i l i t y , then 
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they must a c c o r d i n g l y t r y to. have a s o r t of m u l t i -
l a t e r a l "balance of payments, by way of r e - c y c l i n g the 
surpluses of surplus Countries t o d e f i c i t Countries, 
or a t l e a s t by way of p r o v i d i n g necessary loans to 
the d e f i c i t Countries i n t r o u b l e . What happened a t the 
end of a s e r i e s of c o n s u l t a t i o n s was t h a t the Group of 
Ten, by s e t t i n g up of the Borrowing Scheme, agreed t o 
stand ready t o r e p l e n i s h the Fund's h o l d i n g of a scarce 
currency up t o the amount of ^ 6 b i l l i o n . 
As a r e s u l t , whenever the Fund sees t h a t any 
member of the Group of Ten i s i n need of considerable 
amount of resources, and t h a t the Fund's own resources 
are not s u f f i c i e n t enough t o meet such a demand, then 
the Fund w i l l c a l l on other members of the Group to 
provide the Fund w i t h the e x t r a amount, and the Fund 
w i l l then lend i t t o the member i n need, w i t h a very 
low r a t e of i n t e r e s t . 
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ABSTRACT 
I n t h i s paper we have f i r s t s t u d i e d the c o n s t i t u e n t 
instruments of the Borrowing Scheme and the s t a t u s of 
p a r t i e s t h e r e t o . Next, we have s t u d i e d i n t e r n a l laws 
governing two of the p a r t i e s t o the Borrowing Scheme, which 
are c e n t r a l "banks of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e Countries. T h i r d , we 
have s t u d i e d the f i n a l clause of Paragraph 3(c) of the 
Borrowing Scheme, t o see whether i t has o b l i g a t e d the 
Group of Ten t o give the f o r c e of law t o the contents of 
the .Borrowing Scheme i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e Countries, we 
have then, i n the i'ourth Chapter, d e a l t w i t h the a c t u a l 
machinery of the Borrowing Scheme. I t i s i n t h i s Chapter-
t h a t we s h a l l see how the Borrowing Scheme works.'.in 
p r a c t i c e , and what are the procedures to he f o l l o w e d , 
before any "borrowing arrangement" can he worked out. 
The l a s t Chapter deals w i t h the v o t i n g machinery of the 
Borrowing Scheme. Although i n t h i s Chapter an attempt 
has "been made t o describe the mechanism of the v o t i n g 
of the Borrowing Scheme, y e t the main o b j e c t has been the 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the l e g a l e f f e c t s which i t could b r i n g 
about. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
CONSTITUENT INSTRUMENTS OF THE 
BORROWING SCHEME 
I - INTRODUCTION 
I t may be known t h a t the general p a t t e r n f o r 
c o n s t i t u e n t instruments of i n t e r n a t i o n a l engagements 
has "been a main s i n g l e document. And t h i s s i n g l e 
document has u s u a l l y been kept i n a de p o s i t o r y , 
accompanied by si g n a t u r e s , instrumentsjof r a t i f i c a t i o n 
acceptance, accession and so on. 
Further , there can h a r d l y be seen any d i f f i c u l t y 
h i d e n t i f y i n g the sponsors and the p a r t i e s t o those 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l engagements. And the question whether 
they are duly a u t h o r i s e d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e i r 
r e s p e c t i v e c o u n t r i e s can be d i s t i n g u i s h e d w i t h the 
help of the p o s i t i o n they h o l d , and w i t h the help of 
instruments such as f u l l powers and the l i k e . 
I n the case of the 'Borrowing Scheme', however, the 
case i s not as s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d as t h a t . For instance 
1. The c o n s t i t u e n t instruments of the Borrowing Schern 
are more than one document; i t contains a t l e a s t two 
main documents ('The L e t t e r ' and 'The D e c i s i o n ' ) , 
2. Two out of ten p a r t i e s t o the Borrowing Scheme 
are the c e n t r a l "banks of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e Countries, 
and t h e i r i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t a t u s r e q u i r e s f u r t h e r 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n . 
i'or t h i s reason we have "been prompted t o 
consider s t r u c t u r e and scope of the Borrowing 
Scheme, as w e l l as the s t a t u s of p a r t i e s t h e r e t o , 
under a separate Chapter. This we w i l l attempt i n 
the f o l l o w i n g way: 
F i r s t l y w i l l come the Headings of 'The L e t t e r ' 
and 'The Decision', under which we s h a l l study the 
s t r u c t u r e and scope of these two documents. 
Then w i l l come the Headings of " P a r t i e s t o 
'The L e t t e r ' " , and " P a r t i e s t o 'The Decision'", under 
which we s h a l l study the s t a t g s of the p a r t i e s t o these 
two documents. 
Now l e t us t u r n t o the f i r s t of the above headings. 
I I - THE LETTER 
Before any agreements could be reached concerning 
the Borrowing Scheme, i t was necessary t o c a r r y out a 
s e r i e s of s t u d i e s and discussions, mainly a t the Fund's 
headquarters, Vienna and P a r i s . 
1. See Statement "by the Governor f o r France, Jacques 
Brunet i n " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund - Summary 
Proceedings", 1962, p.56, where he considers the 
Borrowing Scheme as "The Paris Agreement",, Cf. the 
term "Paris Club" i n - t h e same p e r i o d i c a l , year 
1963 p. 37'. Cf. also the same p e r i o d i c a l year 
196k, p. k8. 
2. For the background, d i f f e r e n t discussions and 
proposals concerning the Borrowing Scheme, see 
gen e r a l l y , " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund - Summary 
Proceedings", year 1956, pp. 18, 19; year 1958, 
pp. 90, 91; year 1959, pp. 30, 31, 129, 130; year 
1960, pp. 23 - 28; year 1961, pp. 11+ - 16, 20 - 32, 
h i - k6, 53 - 55, 58 - 6k, 73 - 78, 111 - 118, 121, 
157 - 158; year 1962, pp. 17 - 22, 33; year 1963, 
pp.16, 17, 28 - 30, 285, 286. See also " I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Monetary Fund - Annual Report", year 1958, pp. 51 -
53; year 1959, pp. 82 - 83, 9k - 95; year 1960, pp. 
78 - 82, 8k - 88, 90 - 93, 96 - 100, 102 - 10k; 
year 1961, pp. 18 - 19; year 1962, pp. 32 - 39, 
172 - Uk, 232 - 2k5; year 1963, pp.((28 - 29; 
" I n t e r n a t i o n a l F i n a n c i a l News S.ur.ve.y!|- ;,year 1961, 
pp. 15k, 225; year 1962, pp 1 - 2, kk, 110 - 111, 
3kl, year 1963, pp. 89, 111 - 112, kk5; year 196U, 
p. 2U5; " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund, 19U5 - 1965", 
Twenty Years o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Cooperation, 
Edite d by K e i t h H o r s e f i e l d , I.M.F., Washington, D.C. 
1969, volume, I , pp. 193, k91 - k92, 502 - 518, and 
5ki - 5k5; volume I I , pp. 29 - 31, 3k - 35, 29k -
296, 373 - 377, k5k - k5S, 521, 532, 539 - 5kl and 
686 - 688. 
I n a sense p a r t of a c t i v i t i e s o f the P a r t i c i p a n t s 
i n the Borrowing Scheme came i n t o o peration before 
the Borrowing Scheme i t s e l f took e f f e c t . See, e.g., 
" I n t e r n a t i o n a l F i n a n c i a l News Survey", 1961, -p. 
225; " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund - Annual Report", 
1962, pp. 6 - 7; " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund, 
19U5 - 1965",op. c i t . , volume I , pp. L'r82 - k8k. 
2* One of the r e s u l t s of tnese" discussions was the d r a f t 
of an agreement, known as the l e t t e r of M. W i l f r i d 
Baumgartner, 1 ( h e r ^ n a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o as 'The 
L e t t e r ' ) . ~ 
The l e t t e r contains elaborate terms and c o n d i t i o n s 
f o r the borrowing of s i x b i l l i o n U.S. d o l l a r s , by the 
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Fund, of the currencies of the Group of Ten Countries. 
With a view t o g i v i n g l e g a l e f f e c t t o i t s 
contents, the L e t t e r was then sent t o a l l the 
prospe c t i v e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the Borrowing Scheme,^ 
1. The then M i n i s t e r o f Finance, France. 
2. The term 'The L e t t e r ' f o r thelabove l e t t e r of M. 
W i l f r i d Baumgartner has been adopted by Hans 
A u f r i c h t , i n h i s ' I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund'. 
See, Hans A u f r i c h t ' s 'The I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary 
Fund 1, London, Stevens & Sons, 1964, p.67. 
3. The term, 'Group of Ten Countries' i s a popular, 
name used i n the press and economic c i r c l e s t o 
denote e i g h t P a r t i c i p a t i n g Countries and two 
P a r t i c i p a t i n g I n s t i t u t i o n s of the Borrowing 
Scheme. They are also sometimes c a l l e d 'the 
Group of Ten r i c h e s t ( i n d u s t r i a l ) c o u n t r i e s 
( o f the w o r l d ) ' . 
4. By the term 'Borrowing Scheme' i n t h i s paper, v/e 
mean a l l the r e l e v a n t arrangements set out t o reg-
u l a t e the c r e d i t arrangements of equi v a l e n t of s i x 
b i l l i o n U.S. d o l l a r s . This term was app a r e n t l y 
f i r s t used by Reginald Maudling, the then Governor 
of theFund, f o r the United Kingdom. See, 
" I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund - Summary Proceedings 1 1, 
1962, p.64. 
"by W i l f r i d Baumgartner on l b December, 1961. 
Every prospective p a r t i c i p a n t i n t u r n sent a 
separate l e t t e r to the French M i n i s t e r of Finance, 
confirming the r e c e i p t o f 'The L e t t e r ' and s t a t i n g 
t h a t i t was i n agreement w i t h i t s contents. These 
r e p l i e s are. known as 'the l e t t e r s of c o n f i r m a t i o n ' . 
F i n a l l y , M. W i l f r i d Baumgartner, i n another 
series of l e t t e r s despatched t o the prospective 
p a r t i c i p a n t s , confirmed t h a t he had received 'the 
l e t t e r s o f c o n f i r m a t i o n ' concerning 'The L e t t e r ' from 
a l l the Group of Ten. I n this, l e t t e r , he also informed 
them t h a t he would n o t i f y the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary 
Fund "of the general agreement thus r e a l i s e d w i t h 
respect to the.understandings reached during 
the recent discussions i n P a r i s " . ^ 
1. For- the f u l l t e x t of 'The L e t t e r ' , see 
Appendix I . 
2. For the t e x t o f one o f the l e t t e r s of 
c o n f i r m a t i o n , see Appendix I I . 
3. For the t e x t o f one o f the above l e t t e r s of 
M. W i l f r i d Baumgartner, see Appendix I I I . 
A study o f the way these documents have "been 
exchanged would c o n s t i t u t e a prima f a c i e case f o r 
considering them as an "Exchange o f Notes". ^  The 
t i t l e of "Exchange of Notes" f o r 'The L e t t e r ' would 
not probably reduce i t s e f f e c t i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law; 
because i n some d e f i n i t i o n s , the term ' t r e a t y ' embraces 
"Exchange of Notes" also. 
For instance, A r t i c l e s 2(a) of the "Vienna 
Convention on the Law o f T r e a t i e s " , s t a t e s : -
"( a ) " t r e a t y " means an i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreement 
concluded between States i n w r i t t e n form and 
governed by i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, whether 
embodied i n a single' instrument o r i n two 
or more r e l a t e d instrument and whatever i t s 
1. Cf. " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund - Summary 
Proceedings", 1962, p;y 19 where i t i s s a i d : 
"... i n an exchange o f l e t t e r s 
among themselves, the...ten l e n d i n g 
countries have set down the procedure 
they v / i l l f o l l o w i n making the 
supplementary resources a v a i l a b l e to 
the Fund ... " 
p a r t i c u l a r designation;" 
Another term which might s u i t the s t r u c t u r e 
and scope of 'The L e t t e r ' seems to be ' M u l t i l a t e r a l 
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D e c l a r a t i o n s 1. 
1. See "Vienna Convention on the Law of. Treaties"/ 
w i t h P i n a l Act o f the Conference, Declarations 
and Resolutions, Vienna 28 May, 1969. H.M.S.O., 
Cmnd. Ull+O, Law o f T r e a t i e s , Miscellaneous No. 
31 (1969), p.3. Cf. "Reports o f the I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Law Commission on the Second Part o f i t s Seventeenth 
Session, January 3 - 28, 1966, and on i t s Eighteenth 
Session, May k - J u l y 19, 1966, i n the (1967}, 61, 
A.J.I.L., p. 287, e t . seq.; Comments by the 
Government o f the United States of America on Parts 
I , I I and I I I of the D r a f t A r t i c l e s on the Law o f 
Tr e a t i e s Drawn up at i t s Fourteenth, F i f t e e n t h and 
Sixteenth Sessions, I d . , pp. 1123 - 112k. Cf. also 
A r t i c l e s 1 and 2 o f the D r a f t A r t i c l e s o f the 'Report 
on the Law of T r e a t i e s ' o f the I.L.C., U.N. Document 
A/CN. k/63-2li March 1953, discussed by J.E.S. Fawcett 
i n h i s "The Legal Character o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Agreements", (1953), 30, B.Y.I.L., p. 382. J.E.S. 
Fawcett, i n t h i s A r t i c l e - seems to doubt t h a t 
"exchange of notes" could be accorded the status 
of " t r e a t y " . See I d . p. 385. Cf. the same w r i t e r , 
"The Law of Nations", A l l e n Lane, The Penguin Press, 
London, 1968,,p. 91. 
2. See Lord McNair, "The Law o f T r e a t i e s " , Oxford 
U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1961. p. 22. For some other 
terms employed i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law to nominclate 
d i f f e r e n t i n t e r n a t i o n a l engagements see I d . pp. 22-
25. Cf. J.E.S.Fawcett, "The Lav/ o f Nations", o p . c i t . , 
pp. 91 - 92. Cf. also (1967), 61, A.J.I.L., pp. 290, 
112k. 
On the other hand, due to the nature of the 
understandings, spoken of i n 'The L e t t e r ' , i t 
could "be construed as a " L e t t e r o f I n t e n t " . ^ 
This i s so "because i t , g e n e r a l l y , speaks of 
"understandings" reached during the recent "discussions".. 
and "procedure" to "be f o l l o w e d "by the p a r t i c i p a n t s , and 
so on; and thus i t avoids, as f a r as p o s s i b l e , b r i n g i n g 
about any c l e a r cut l e g a l o b l i g a t i o n thereunder. For 
instance, preamble to 'The L e t t e r ' , i n guarded 
language, s t a t e s : -
"The purpose o f t h i s l e t t e r i s to set f o r t h 
the understandings reached during the recent 
discussions i n P a r i s r w i t h respect to the 
procedure to be f o l l o w e d by the P a r t i c i p a t i n g 
Countries and I n s t i t u t i o n s ... i n connection w i t h 
borrowings by the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund of 
Supplementary resources ... which we expect W.1 
be e s t a b l i s h e d pursuant to a d e c i s i o n of the 
2 
Executive D i r e c t o r s o f the Fund." 
1. See J.E.S. Fawcett, "The I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary 
Fund and I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law", (196k), kO, B.Y.I.L., 
P. 7k. 
2. See Appendix I . 
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Thus, the p a r t i c i p a n t s seem to have attempted 
to avoid the formation of any l e g a l o b l i g a t i o n , 
v i s - a - v i s each other, under 'The l e t t e r 1 . Therefore, 
there seems to be no l e g a l d i f f i c u l t y i n c o n s truing 
'The L e t t e r ' as a l e t t e r o f i n t e n t i n general sense. 1 
Nevertheless, i f one i s going to consider 'The 
L e t t e r ' as the 'Letter o f I n t e n t ' , used by the Fund's 
member States, f o r the drawing o f currencies, then 
t h i s suggestion deserves more co n s i d e r a t i o n . So l e t 
us f i i s t see what i s meant by the 'Letter o f I n t e n t ' 
i n the Fund's terminology. 
J. K e i t h H o r s e f i e l d , the Chief E d i t o r of the Fund, 
has attempted a d e f i n i t i o n f o r the 'Letter o f I n t e n t ' 
as f o l l o w s : 
1. Cf. however, the Statement issued on 2 October, 
1963, by the Secretary o f the Treasury o f the 
U.S., on b e h a l f of the p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the 
Borrowing Scheme, e s p e c i a l l y where he c a l l s 
'The L e t t e r ' an 'agreement'. This Statement 
i n p a r t says:-
"1. I n the course of the annual meeting 
of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund, the 
M i n i s t e r s and Central Bank Governors o f 
the ten countries ... p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the 
agreement of December, 1961 ('The L e t t e r ' 
t h a t i s ) , to supplement the resources o f 
the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund met i n 
Washington ...." 
The parenthesis and emphasis added. 
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' L e t t e r of I n t e n t . A member seeking 
t o make a drawing from the Fund, w i t h i n the 
c r e d i t tranches, or t o enter i n t o a stand-by 
arrangement, i s u s u a l l y i n v i t e d t o describe t o 
the Fund, i n a " l e t t e r of i n t e n t " , the p o l i c i e s 
which i t i s undertaking i n order t o overcome 
the d i f f i c u l t i e s which have caused i t s need f o r 
1 
the drawing or stand-by 1 
Now, i f one i s going to confer the s t a t u s of 
' L e t t e r of I n t e n t ' (as described i n the above d e f i n i t i o n ) 
upon 'The L e t t e r ' , the f o l l o w i n g d i f f i c u l t i e s may a r i s e : 
1. That a ' L e t t e r of I n t e n t ' should be r e l a t e d only 
to 'drawings*from the Fund, and should not be r e l a t e d t o 
both l e n d i n g and drawing t o and from the Fund as 
2 
i s t he case w i t h the contents of 'The L e t t e r ' ; 
2. That the 'drawing* described i n a ' L e t t e r of 
I n t e n t ' must be w i t h i n the ' c r e d i t tranches' of the 
Fund's member State; 
1. See J. K e i t h H o r s e f i e l d , " I n t r o d u c t i o n t o 
the Fund", I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund, Washington, 
U.C., Second E d i t i o n , 1965, p.28. 
2. Cf. " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund - Annual 
Report", 1961, p.19. 
whereas the drawings envisaged i n 'The L e t t e r ' may 
exceed the ' c r e d i t tranches' o f the Fund's member st a t e s ; ' 
1. The term " c r e d i t tranches" has been described by 
J. K e i t h H o r s e f i e l d as f o l l o w s : -
"Drawings are sa i d to be i n the c r e d i t 
tranches i f t h e i r e f f e c t i s to increase the 
Fund's holdings o f a member's currency to an 
amount greater than i t s quota ... A drawing 
i n the " f i r s t c r e d i t tranche" increases the 
Fund's holdings o f the currency to an amount 
greater than the member's quota, but not 
greater than 125 per cet o f the quota; i n the 
"second c r e d i t tranches " i t increases the Fund's 
holdings to an amount greater than 125 per cent 
of the quota, b u t not greather than 150 per 
cent; and so on". See J. K e i t h H o r s e f i e l d , 
" I n t r o d u c t i o n to the Fund", o p . c i t . , p.2k. 
For more d e s c r i p t i o n o f the term " c r e d i t tranches", 
as w e l l as terms "gold tranche", "super g o l d trance" 
and d i f f e r e n c e s e x i s t i n g between these terms and 
t h a t of "drawings" under the G.A.B., see "Report 
of the Study Group on the Creation of Reserve 
Assets", Rome, Bank o f I t a l y Press, 1965, Paragraphs 
57 - 61. For an i l l u s t r a t e d example i n t h i s respect, 
see Rinaldo Ossola, "On the Creation of New Reserve 
Assets: the Report of the Study Group of Ten", (1965), 
18, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, Roma, Via V i t t o r i o , 
Veneto, p. 279, Cf. Id. j P.28l. 
2. See I n t e r n a t i o n a l F i n a n c i a l News Survey", 1965, 
pp. 169 - 170. See also " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund -
Press Release", No. 695, June 19, 1968; and No. 7k3 
June 27, 1969; " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund, 19k5~ 
1965", op'.cit., volume I I , p. 1+57, Cf. I d . pp. 530 -
532. For the bodies (other than the Group o f Ten) 
which could c o n t r i b u t e currencies, under a borrowing 
arrangement o f the Borrowing Scheme, see i n f r a , under 
the Chapter "Consultative Arrangements o f the 
Borrowing Scheme". 
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That f o r every i n d i v i d u a l 'drawing' a new 'Letter 
of I n t e n t ' d e s c r i b i n g the circumstances under 
which the drawing i s requested seems to be 
necessary, and t h i s 'drawing' should be governed by 
A r t i c l e V of the Fund's A r t i c l e s o f Agreement; whereas 
'The L e t t e r ' has been .an arrangement of a general nature, 
d e s c r i b i n g the ways and means by which the Fund's holdings 
o f 'scarce currencies' should be replenished, and, f u r t h e r 
i t i s to be governed by A r t i c l e V I I o f the Fund's 
A r t i c l e s of Agreement. And f i n a l l y ; 
*t. That i f a 'Letter o f I n t e n t ' i s intended to describe 
circumstances under which a drawing i s requested, t h a t 
i s something to be achieved so f a r as the Borrowing 
Scheme i s concerned — r by way of "discussion" between 
a "drawer" on the one side and the Fund (and other 
p a r t i c i p a n t s ) on the o t h e r . ^ As such, i t does not 
r e q u i r e any w r i t t e n document, known as the 'Letter of 
I n t e n t ' . 
1. See, e.g., paragraphs .A, B and C of 'The L e t t e r 1 . 
Cf. paragraph (6) of 'The Decision'. For more 
discussion i n t h i s respect, see i n f r a , under 
Chapter " C o n s i t a t i v e Arrangements o f the 
Borrowing Scheme". 
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Therefore, a p r e f e r a b l e c o n s t r u c t i o n here i s 
t h a t 'The L e t t e r 1 can "be regarded as "Exchange of 
Notes.* 
I l l - 1 THE DECISION' 
A f t e r the contents of 'The L e t t e r 1 were agreed 
upon by the Group of Ten, the Fund took another step 
to complement i t s terms and c o n d i t i o n s . This step was 
i n the form of a Decision of the Fund's Executive 
D i r e c t o r s . 
The Fund's Executive Board, i n i t s Decision No. 
1289 -(62/1 ) dated 5 January, 1962 , set out another 
d e t a i l e d set of r u l e s and procedures to be f o l l o w e d f o r 
2 
"borrowing arrangements!', under the Borrov/ing Scheme.-
The Fund's Decision No.-1289- (62/1 ; ( h e r i n a f t e r 
r e f e r r e d t o as 'The Decision') was n o t , of course, 
un expected. 
1. As amended by the Fund's Executive Board Decisions 
No.1415-(52/47), and No. 1362-(62/32). 
2. For the t e x t of the above Decision of the Fund's 
Executive Board, see Appendix IV. 
3. The term 'The Decision' f o r the Fund's Executive 
Board Decision No..1 2S9-( 6 2 / l ) , has also been 
adopted by Hans A u f r i c h t j see Hans A u f r i c h t , 
" I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund", o p . c i t . , p.67. 
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I n f a c t , when the contents o f 'The L e t t e r ' were 
formulated, i t was a n t i c i p a t e d t h a t the Fund's 
Executive Board would'set out terms and co n d i t i o n s 
to complement the r u l e s and procedure of 'The L e t t e r ' . 
The contents o f paragraphs o f 'The Decision' are 
more elaborate, as compared w i t h the contents of 
p aragraphs o f 'The L e t t e r ' . A comparison between the 
contents o f the two documents would r e v e a l some 
s i m i l a r i t i e s "between t h e i r p r o v i s i o n s . This i n i t s e l f 
would mean t h a t there can "be traced some overlaps i n 
the contents of the two documents. This would also 
mean t h a t there can "be found some in c o n s i s t e n c i e s 
p 
"between the p r o v i s i o n s o f the two. 
I t i s not, however, clear t h a t i n the case of 
inco n s i s t e n c i e s "between the contents of the two 
documents which one i s to p r e v a i l . I t i s p a r t i c u l a r l y 
apparent i f a comparison "be staged "between the preamble 
to 'The Decision' and the preamble to 'The L e t t e r ' , 
which comparison may reveal a s o r t o f c i r c u l a r 
argument. 
1. See Preamble to 'The L e t t e r ' , Appendix I . 
2. See, f o r instance, under the Chapter 
"Consultative Arrangements o f the Borrowing 
Scheme", i n f r a . 
On the one hand we have Preamble to 'The 
Decision' s t a t i n g t h a t : i n order to give e f f e c t to 
the ' i n t e n t i o n ' o f the main i n d u s t r i a l c o u n t r i e s 
(which i n t e n t i o n has "been manifested i n 'The L e t t e r ) 
the terms and c o n d i t i o n s of 'The Decision' have been 
adopted. I t says:-
"the main i n d u s t r i a l countries have agreed 
t h a t they ... w i l l stand ready to l e n d t h e i r 
currencies to the Fund ... I n order to give 
e f f e c t to these i n t e n t i o n s , the f o l l o w i n g terms 
and c o n d i t i o n s are adopted 
On the other hand, we have Preamble to 'The 
L e t t e r ' , t a l k i n g o f the understandings reached during 
the recent discussions i n P a r i s , w i t h respect to the 
procedure which " w i l l "be esta b l i s h e d " by the Fund's 
Executive D i r e c t o r s i n 'The Decision'. I t says:-
"the purpose of t h i s l e t t e r i s to set f o r t h 
the understandings reached during the recent 
discussions i n Paris w i t h respect to the procedure 
to be f o l l o w e d ... i n connection vith borrowings 
by the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund of Supplementary 
Resources ... which we expect w i l l be e s t a b l i s h e d 
pursuant to a de c i s i o n o f the Executive D i r e c t o r s 
of the Fund ('The Decision', t h a t i s ) . 1 
1. See Appendix I . Parenthesis added. Cf.»International 
Monetary Fund - Annual R eP°rt", 1962, p.35-
I t eould, however, be argued t h a t due t o 
the f a c t t h a t the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund possesses 
" o b j e c t i v e I n t e r n a t i o n a l P e r s o n a l i t y " , ' 
1. See J. Gold, "The I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund and 
Non-Member States, Some Legal E f f e c t s " , I.M.F., 
Washington, D.C., 1966, pp.37-38. As to other views 
concerning the p e r s o n a l i t y of the Fund, see 
e.g., C l i v e Parry, "The Public|Corporative 
Symposium", The Carswell Co.Ltd., Toronto, 
Canada, 1954, p.591; C. H. Alexandrowicz, 
"World Economic Agencies, Law and P r a c t i c e " , 
London, Stevens and Sons, 1962, pp.111 - 112. 
F. A. Mann, " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Co-
op e r a t i o n " (1945), 22, B.Y.I.L., p.252; 
"Money i n Pu b l i c I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law", Academie 
de D r o i t I n t e r n a t i o n a l Recueil des Cours, 
volume 96 ( I ) , 1959, pp.22-23. 
to which the Group of Ten are g e n e r a l l y p a r t i e s 
i n the case of an inconsistency between the p r o v i s i o n s 
of 'The Decision' and the p r o v i s i o n s o f 'The L e t t e r ' , 
the p r o v i s i o n s o f 'The Decision' would p r e v a i l . 
Nevertheless, i t should be borne i n mind t h a t i f 
any inconsistency can be discovered i n the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
of the two documents, i t s r e s o l u t i o n would, prima f a c i e , 
be a matter o f r e c o n c i l i a t i o n o f them. And matters of 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , r a i s e d i n connection w i t h 'The Decision', 
are t o be resolved to "the mutual s a t i s f a c t i o n o f the 
Fund, the p a r t i c i p a n t r a i s i n g the question, and a l l 
2 
other p a r t i c i p a n t s " . Therefore, as such, the p r i n c i p l e 
of unanimity envisaged i n Paragraph (20) o f 'The 
Decision' may v i r t u a l l y outweigh the argument t h a t , 
i n the case of the above inconsistency, the p r o v i s i o n s 
of 'The Decision' should p r e v a i l ; because the Group of 
Ten are p a r t i e s to both 'The Decision' and 'The L e t t e r 1 ; 
and i f i n c i d e n t a l l y a p a r t i c i p a n t ' s i n t e r e s t touches 
the argument t h a t , e.g.>Paragraphs A, B and C o f 'The 
L e t t e r ' are to p r e v a i l over Paragraphs 6 and 7 of 
1. Cf. J. Gold i n " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund, 
19^-5-1965", o p , c i t . , volume I I , p. 518. Cf. also 
(1967), 61, A.J.I.L., p. 3U6. 
2. See paragraph (20) o f 'The Decision', Appendix IV. 
'The Decision', i t can achieve t h i s o b j e c t by invoking 
the p r i n c i p l e o f unanimity of Paragraph 20; and thus 
p 
f r u s t r a t e the understanding o f the Fund or other 
p a r t i c i p a n t s i n t h i s respect. For instance, i t can 
argue t h a t : Paragraphs o f 'The Decision' are to give 
e f f e c t to the " i n t e n t i o n s " o f the p a r t i c i p a n t s as 
manifested i n Paragraphs o f 'The L e t t e r ' ^, and thus 
i n the case of an inconsistency between the Paragraphs 
o f the two documents, the Paragraphs o f 'The L e t t e r ' are 
to p r e v a i l . ^ 
1. See "Pre-Call Con s u l t a t i v e Arrangements of 'The L e t t e r ' 
i n f r a under the Chapter "Consultative Arrangements 
of the Borrowing Scheme". 
2. Cf. "Report o f the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Commission 
on the Work o f The Second Part o f I t s Seventeenth 
Session", Monaco, January 3-28, 1966 /in (1967), 
61, A.J.I.L., p. 335. 
3. See the Preamble to 'The Decision', discussed above. 
Cf. F. A. Mann, "The I n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Uniform 
S t a t u t e s " , (191+6),y 62,- L.Q.R., p.281. Cf. also 
I . M. S i n c l a i r , "Vienna Conference on the Lav/ o f 
T r e a t i e s " , (1970), 19, I.C.L.Q., pp. 60 - 66. 
1+. Cf. however, Joseph Gold, where he says:-
"... The l e t t e r s ('The L e t t e r ' , t h a t i s ) , 
are res i n t e r a l i o s acta from the viewpoint 
o f ' t h e Fund ..." 
See J. Gold, " I n t e r p r e t a t i o n by the Fund", I n t e r -
n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C.. 1968, 
p. 57. Parenthesis added. Cf. also (1967), 6 l , 
A.J.I.L., pp. 365 - 373 esp. at p. 366. 
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Hans A u f r i c h t , however, w i t h regard to r e l a t i o n s 
"between 'The L e t t e r ' and 'The Decision', has f a i r l y 
p o i n t e d out t h a t : -
"... The contents of the two documents 
supplement each other. The Fund i s n ot a p a r t y 
t o the L e t t e r ; however, the p a r t i c i p a n t s regard 
the L e t t e r an i n t e g r a l p a r t of the Borrowing 
arrangements, as amongst themselves, as evidenced 
by the f o l l o w i n g paragraph (Preamble to 'The L e t t e r ' , 
t h a t i s ) , ^ 
However, as i n the case of 'The L e t t e r ' , i t could 
be of some i n t e r e s t to have a look at the l e g a l s t r u c t u r e 
of 'The Decision', under contemporary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. 
Ao-wo havo r e f e r r e d to earlier-, 'The Decision', i s b a s i c a l l y 
a Decision o f the Fund's Executive Board. I t contains 
twenty Paragraphs and an Annex. I t s Annex bears the 
names o f P a r t i c i p a n t s and the amounts of t h e i r c r e d i t 
arrangements. The f u l l t i t l e t o 'The Decision' reads 
2 
"General Arrangements to Borrow". 
1. See H. A u f r i c h t , ' I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund', 
o p . c i t . , p. 67. Parenthesis added. Cf. J.E.S. Fawcett 
" I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund .and I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law", 
o p . c i t . , pp. 7U-75. Of. also " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary 
Fund - Annual Report", 1962, p.35. 
2. The term "The General Arrangements to Borrow" has 
occa s i o n a l l y been used i n t h i s paper also. The term 
has sometimes been abridged by w r i t e r s , and quoted 
as "General Arrangements". I t has also been 
abbreviated and quoted as "G.A.B.". 
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'The D e c i s i o n * envisages terms and c o n d i t i o n s • 
under which c e r t a i n c o u n t r i e s , as w e l l as c e r t a i n 
I n s t i t u t i o n s can adhere t o - i t . For i n s t a n c e , Paragraph 
3(a) of 'The D e c i s i o n ' s t a t e s : -
" ( a ) Any member or i n s t i t u t i o n s p e c i f i e d 
i n the Annex may adhere to t h i s D e c i s i o n i n 
accordance w i t h Paragraph 3 ( c ) " . ^ 
1. See Appendix IV. The contents of the above 
Paragraph 3(a) would imply t h a t the p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
i n the a c t i v i t i e s of the Borrowing Scheme i s not 
open to a l l member S t a t e s of the Fund or t h e i r 
" f i s c a l a g e n c i e s " . C f . Sub-Paragraph ( b ) of the 
same paragraph. F o r the c r i t i c i s m made i n t h i s 
connection see " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund -
Summary Proceedings", 1961, pp. 58, 60 and 78; 
" G u i d e l i n e s f o r Improving the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary 
System", Report of the Sub-Committee on I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Exchange and Payments of the J o i n t Economic Committee, 
Congress of the U n i t e d S t a t e s , U.S. Government 
P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , Washington, D.C. 19-65, p. 17. 
C f . however, statement by P e r Jacobsson, the 
F.M.D., i n the " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund -
Summary Proceedings", 1961, pp. 26, 158; Statement 
by the Governor f o r the United Kingdom, Reginald 
Maudling, I d . , y e a r 1964, pp. 166 - 167; 
Statement by the Governor f o r B r a z i l , I d . , pp. 
117 - 119; " I n t e r n a t i o n a l F i n a n c i a l News Survey", 
1962, p . I l l ; " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund, 1945-
1965", op. c i t . , volume I , p. 512; volume I I , pp. 
376-377 and 532; (1967), 61, A . J . I . L . , pp. 312 -
313. 
Sub-Paragraph, ( c ) o f the same Paragraph, s t a t e s : -
" ( c ) A member or i n s t i t u t i o n s h a l l 
adhere to t h i s d e c i s i o n by d e p o s i t i n g with, 
the Fund an instrument s e t t i n g f o r t h t h a t 
i t has adhered i n accordance w i t h i t s law and 
has taken a l l steps necessary to enable i t t o 
c a r r y out the terras and c o n d i t i o n s of t h i s 
D e c i s i o n ...." ^ 
Then, Paragraph ( 4 ) o f the same document, i n 
respect of the date o f e n t r y i n t o f o r c e o f 'The 
Decision', s t a t e s s -
"This D e c i s i o n s h a l l become e f f e c t i v e 
when i t has been adhered to by a t l e a s t seven 
members o r i n s t i t u t i o n s i n c l u d e d i n the Annex 
w i t h c r e d i t arrangements amounting i n a l l to 
not less .than the e q u i v a l e n t of f i v e and one 
h a l f b i l l i o n U n i t e d States d o l l a r s of the weight 
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and fineness i n e f f e c t on 1 J u l y , 1944- ...." 
1. Pursuant to the above Sub-Paragraph ( c ) , every 
p a r t i c i p a n t has deposited v/ith the Fund an 
instrument known as "Instrument o f Adherence", 
which bears the undertakings spoken of i n t h a t 
Sub-Paragraph. For the t e x t of one of these 
Instruments o f Adherence, see Appendix V. 
2. 'The Decision' came i n t o e f f e c t on October 24, 
1962. See the Fund's Selected D e c i s i o n , p.66. 
With regard to the s t r u c t u r e and scope o f 'The 
Decision', w r i t e r s vary considerably. J.E.S. Fawcett 
takes a cautious l i n e i n t h i s respect. He considers 
'The Decision' as "pactum de contrahendo", at most. 1 
Joseph Gold, however,. considers 'The Decision' as an 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreement. He says:-
"... The arranagements t h a t were ne g o t i a t e d 
by the Fund and the ten members, c o n s t i t u t e an 
elaborate i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreement, c a l l e d the 
2 
General Arrangements to Borrow ... 
1. See J. E. S. Fawcett, 'The I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary 
Fund and I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law', o p . c i t . , p.75. J. E. 
S. Fawcett was the General Counsel o f the I n t e r -
n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund during the years 1955 -
1960. 
2. See J. Gold, ' I n t e r p r e t a t i o n by the Fund', o p . c i t . , 
p.5l+. Cf. the same, i n h i s 'The Reform o f the 
Fund', where he c a l l s 'The Decision' as "a decis i o n 
of the Fund which i s also a m u l t i l a t e r a l agreement 
between the Fund and the p a r t i c i p a n t s " . See J. 
Gold, "The Reform o f the Fund", I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C., 1969, p. 15. 
See also h i s ^ "The next stage i n the Development 
of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund Law: The Deliberate 
Control of L i q u i d i t y 1 ; (1968), 62, A.J.I.L., p. 376, 
f o o t n o t e 35. J. Gold i s the present General 
Counsel o f the Fund. 
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Hans A u f r i c h t seems t o go even one step 
f u r t h e r i n t h i s respect. He argues t h a t not 
only i s the General Arrangements to Borrow an 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreement, but i t also has mo d i f i e d 
the Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement. He says:-
5,The m o d i f i c a t i o n of the (Fund's A r t i c l e s 
o f ) Agreement can be tr a c e d hack p r i m a r i l y 
t o ... r i g h t s and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of 
the Fund conferred on the Fund by other 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l Agreements such as ... the 
General Arrangements t o Borrow ( G A B ) " 
1. See Hans A u f r i c h t , "The Fund Agreement : 
L i v i n g Law and Emerging P r a c t i c e " , P r i n c e t o n 
U n i v e r s i t y Press, P r i n c e t o n , New Jersey, 
U.S.A., 1969, p.1. Parenthesis added. 
Here i t may be added t h a t one can h a r d l y 
deny the f a c t t h a t the Fund's A r t i c l e s of 
Agreement has been p r a c t i c a l l y m o d i f i e d by 
the General Arrangements t o Borrow. See, 
e.g., the statement of Herr F. J. Strauss, 
quoted i n 'The Guardian', January 20, 1969, 
p. 10. Cf. F r i t z Machlup, "Plans f o r Reform 
of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary System", 
P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press, P r i n c e t o n , New 
Nersey, U.S.A., 1962, p.22. 
One t h i n g , how ever, should be c l e a r . I f other 
requirements f o r considering 'The Decision' as an 
' i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreement' are e x i s t i n g then the f a c t 
t h a t i t was f i r s t a d e c i s i o n o f the Executive Board 
of the Fund, would not di m i n i s h i t s i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y . ^ 
I n a sense, i t would increase i t s value i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law; f o r , 'The Decision', has i n f a c t been twice 
endorsed by the Group of Ten. 
The f i r s t time was when i t was agreed upon by 
the Fund's Executive D i r e c t o r s , whose de c i s i o n the 
Group of Ten have the power to ca r r y ; because they 
h o l d the m a j o r i t y o f the weighted votes of the d e c i s i o n -
2 
making bodies o f the Fund. 
The second time i t was endorsed was when they 
(the P a r t i c i p a n t s ) a c t u a l l y adhered to i t , i n accordance 
w i t h Paragraph 3(c) o f 'The Decision'. 
1. Cf. U.N. Monetary Documents, pp. 52 and 1+22. 
2. Cf. Rudolf Kroc, "The F i n a n c i a l S t r u c t u r e o f 
the Fund", I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund, 
Washington, D.C., Second E d i t i o n , 1967, p. 
3h - 37. As regards the status of the Executive 
D i r e c t o r s o f the Fund, however, see C. H. 
Alexandrowiczj "World Economic Agencies: Lav/ 
and P r a c t i c e " , op. c i t . , p.189. 
Furthermore, t h i s set of agreements t h a t 
i s , the agreement adopted by an intergovernmental 
o r g a n i s a t i o n , and then adhered to by some sovereign 
States; has precedent i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s , 
( i t has a place i n the Lord McNair's book, "The Lav; 
of T r e a t i e s " . He, under the t i t l e "Adoption by League 
Assembly or approval by United Nations Assembly 
f o l l o w e d by Accession", shows the p r a c t i c e developed 
( i n t h i s respect:) during the p e r i o d o f the League cf 
Nations, which p r a c t i c e i s s t i l l developing i n the 
p e r i o d of the United N a t i o n s ) . 
Therefore a t t h i s stage t h i s much we can say 
of ' 
that'The Decision' has the p o t e n t i a l i t y A f S 3 * being 
considered as an " i n t e r n a t i o n a l engagement". However, 
due to the f a c t t h a t the status of p a r t i e s to the 
instruments o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o t e n t i a l i t y a f f e c t s the 
1. See McNair, "The Law of T r e a t i e s " , o p . c i t . , pp. 
123, 12k, Cf. 'Conventions' and 'Recommendations' 
i n the p r a c t i c e of the I.L.O. See D. W. Bowett, 
"The Lav/ o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l I n s t i t u t i o n s " , London, 
Stevens & Sons, 197.0. pp. 127-129. Cf. also 
A r t i c l e s 1, 2 ( l - a ) , 3 and 5 o f the "Vienna 
Convention on the Law of T r e a t i e s " , Cmnd. hlkO, 
1969; "Resolution R e l a t i n g to A r t i c l e I of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of T r e a t i e s " , I d . 
p. 38; (1967), 61, A.J.I.L.jpp. 293, 39k; 
"Comments of the Government o f the United States 
on the D r a f t A r t i c l e s on the Law of T r e a t i e s Drawn 
up by the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Commission", (1968), 
62, A.J.I.L., pp. 567-68. 
s t a t u s of the instruments themselves, and since we 
have n o t y e t p r o p e r l y considered the status of a l l 
p a r t i e s to 'The Decision' and/or 'The L e t t e r ' , 
t h e r e f o r e i t would be an attempt i n v a i n to come 
to any d e f i n i t i v e understanding i n t h i s respect at 
t h i s stage. 
Thus l e t us at t h i s stage which stage we 
are more or le s s acquainted w i t h the s t r u c t u r e of 
the Borrowing Scheme , break down our argument 
and f i r s t consider the status o f p a r t i e s to 'The 
L e t t e r ' and 'The Decision'. Then we s h a l l r e t u r n 
to the status of 'The L e t t e r ' and 'The Decision' 
themselves. This process would at the same time, 
be of some help i n f i n d i n g out a more appropriate 
d e f i n i t i o n f o r these two documents. 
IV ~ PARTIES TO 'THE LETTER' 
With regard to 'The L e t t e r ' i t s contents were 
f i r s t sent by M. W i l f r i d Baumgartner ^ to nine member 
States o f the Fund, i . e . , U.S.A., United Kingdom, 
West Germany, France, I t a l y , Japan, Canada, Netherland 
1. The depository a u t h o r i t y . 
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and Belgium. I t was also sent t o the Deutsche 
-| Bundesbank andthe Sveriges Riksbank. 
The r e p l i e s received by M. W i l f r i d Baum-
ga r t n e r were, as expected, from the above member 
States of the Fund; as w e l l as from the Deutsche 
2 
Bundesbank and the Sveriges Riksbank. 
what sets of l e g a l o b j e c t s were t o be achieved, 
by the way i n which the above instruments have been 
exchanged, i s not q u i t e c l e a r . Tfe=3Amay be also added thsfc: 
1. As we may n o t i c e , the Deutsche Bundesbank and 
the Sveriges Riksbank are the Cen t r a l Banks of 
the Federal Republic of West Germany and the 
Kingdom of Sweden, r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
2. See, e.g. the Deutsche Bundesbank's " M i t t e i l u n g 
n r . 7002/62" i n which the German v e r s i o n of 
both 'The L e t t e r ' and the ' L e t t e r of Confirmation' 
(sent by the Deutsche Bundesbank to M. W. Baum-
ga r t n e r , on 27 December, 1961) have been produced. 
I n ths above " M i t t e i l u n g No. 7002/62'" , i t i s 
po i n t e d out t h a t the contents of 'The L e t t e r ' 
have also been r e c e i v e d by the Federal M i n i s t e r of 
Economics of west Germany. I t i s a.lso p o i n t e d out 
t h a t a r e p l y t o t h i s e f f e c t has been sent, from 
the Federal M i n i s t e r of Economics, to M. W. Baum-
ga r t n e r , on 28 December, 1961 ( f o o t n o t e : Cf. 
Swedish "Eungl*Maj:ts p r o p o s i t i o n n r 102 ar 1962", 
B i l a g a B.. pp. 26-30). As such, i n the ca.se of West 
Germany two copies of 'The L e t t e r ' have been sent 
one t o the M i n i s t r y of Economics and another 
to the Deutsche Bundesbank; whereas i n the case of 
Sweden, only one copy of 'The L e t t e r ' has been 
sent there, t h a t i s t o the Sveriges Riksbank. 
Cf. Appendix XXVII. 
48 1. When 'The L e t t e r ' was sent t o the above mentioned 
Countries and Banks, i t was not s p e c i f i e d t h e r e i n t h a t 
'The L e t t e r ' was being sent to the Deutsche Bundesbank 
and the Sveriges Riks'bank. I t was simply s a i d t h a t 
'The L e t t e r ' was being sent to the above mentioned 
Countries. For instance the copy of 'The L e t t e r 1 sent 
by Monsieur W. Baumgartner, to the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer o f the U n i t e d Kingdom, ends w i t h : 
" I s h a l l appreciate a r e p l y c o n f i r m i n g t h a t 
the f o r e g o i n g represents the understandings which 
have been reached w i t h r e s p e c t to the procedure 
to be f o l l o w e d i n connection w i t h borrowings by 
the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund under the c r e d i t 
arrangements to which I have r e f e r r e d . I am 
sending i d e n t i c a l l e t t e r s to the o t h e r p a r t i c i p a n t s 
t h a t i s , Belgium, Canada, Germany, I t a l y , Japan, 
tine Netherlands, Sweden- and the Uni t e d States .... 
I s h a l l n o t i f y a l l of the p a r t i c i p a n t s of the con-
f i r m a t i o n s r e c e i v e d i n response to t h i s l e t t e r " . ^ 
2. As r e f e r r e d t o e a r l i e r , a f t e r 'The L e t t e r ' was sent 
to the p r o s p e c t i v e p a r t i c i p a n t s , and a f t e r 'the l e t t e r s 
o f c o n f i r m a t i o n ' were r e c e i v e d by M. W. Baumgartner, 
from the r e s p e c t i v e P a r t i c i p a n t s , he f i n a l l y sent h i s 
1. See "Arrangements f o r Borrowing by the I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Monetary Fund", 1962, H.M.S.O., Cmnd. 1656, p. 15. 
Emphasis added. 
l e t t e r of 9 January, 1962, to them, p o i n t i n g out 
t h a t he has received the " l e t t e r s of c o n f i r m a t i o n " 
from a l l the prospective P a r t i c i p a n t s , and t h a t he i s 
now n o t i f y i n g the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund o f the 
agreement thus r e a l i s e d . 
But, i n h i s He t t e r of 9 January, 1969, i t i s 
pointe d out t h a t two o f the " l e t t e r s of c o n f i r m a t i o n " 
have "been received "by him from (a) The President of 
the German Federal Bank and. ("b) the Governor o f the 
Na t i o n a l Bank of Sweden; and no reference has "been made 
th e r e i n , to the M i n i s t e r of Economics of West Germany 
who had received a copy o f 'The L e t t e r ' . The copy of 
t h i s l e t t e r , sent to the Chancellor o f the Exchequer 
of the United Kingdom, i n p a r t , reads:-
"You have "been k i n d enough to confirm to 
me your agreement regarding the procedure to he 
f o l l o w e d i n connection w i t h "borrowing by the 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund of Supplementary 
Resources from the P a r t i c i p a t i n g Countries and 
I n s t i t u t i o n s . 
I have the honour to inform you t h a t I have 
received s i m i l a r confirmationslfrom the M i n i s t e r 
of Finance o f Belgium, the M i n i s t e r o f Finance 
of Canada, the President of the German Federal 
Bank, the M i n i s t e r o f the Treasury of I t a l y , the 
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M i n i s t e r of Finance of Japan, the M i n i s t e r 
of Finance of the Netherlands, the Governor 
of the N a t i o n a l Bank of Sweden, and the Secretary 
of the Treasury of the United States. 
I should also l i k e t o c o n f i r m t o you the 
agreement of the French Government rega r d i n g 
i 
the terms of my l e t t e r of December 15,. 1961..." 
3, The Preamble t o 'The L e t t e r ' does not s p e c i f y 
who were the o r i g i n a l p a r t i e s t h e r e t o . I t simply 
says:-
"The purpose of t h i s l e t t e r i s t o set f o r t h 
the understandings reached dur i n g the recent 
discussions i n P aris w i t h respect t o the proc-
edure to he f o l l o w e d by the P a r t i c i p a t i n g 
Countries and I n s t i t u t i o n s sl 
4. The Preamble t o 'The Decision', however, 
speaks of the agreement reached between the main 
i n d u s t r i a l " c o u n t r i e s " , r e g a r d i n g the contents of 
'The L e t t e r ' ; arid no reference has been made, t h e r e i n , 
t o the e f f e c t t h a t some of the p a r t i e s t o 'The L e t t e r ' 
were or were not Sovereign States. I t says:-
1. See "Arrangements f o r Borrowing by the 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund", o p . c i t . , p.17. 
Emphasis added. 
"... the main i n d u s t r i a l countries have 
agreed t h a t they w i l l , i n a s p i r i t of "broad and 
w i l l i n g co-operation, strengthen the Fund "by-
general arrangements under which they w i l l 
stand ready to lend t h e i r currencies to the 
Fund ..." 2 
Therefore, so f a r w.e can ..nat^see c l e a r l y who were 
a l l sponsors and o r i g i n a l p a r t i e s to 'The L e t t e r ' . I t 
i s t r u e t h a t now two o f the a c t i v e P a r t i c i p a n t s i n the 
Borrowing Scheme are (a) the Deutsche Bundesbank, and 
("b) the Sveriges Riksbank; "but i t must also "be "borne 
i n mind.that, e.g., M i n i s t r y o f Economics o f West Germany 
i s e x e r c i s i n g some f u n c t i o n s i n the c o n s u l t a t i v e 
arrangements o f 'The L e t t e r ' ^. 
The problem here i s , had there "been access to the 
travaux p r e p a r a t o i r e s and some other r e l a t e d instraments 
1. Take note of the term " c o u n t r i e s " i n the above 
context. 
2. See Appendix IV. 
3. The issue of f u n c t i o n s to be performed by the 
M i n i s t r y o f Economics of F.R. o f West Germany, 
has been considered under the Heading "Reservations 
and C o n s u l t a t i v e Arrangements of the Borrowing 
Scheme". See i n f r a under the Chapter 
"Consultative Arrangements o f the Borrowing 
Scheme". 
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i n t h i s respect, i t would have re s o l v e d the question 
1 
of sponsors and r e a l p a r t i e s t o 'The L e t t e r 1 . 
V ~ PARTIES TO 'THE DECISION• 
With regard t o p a r t i e s t o 'The Decision', the 
question i s more or l e s s s i m i l a r t o t h a t of 'The 
.better'. For i n s t a n c e , i n the f i r s t t e x t of 'The 
Decision' (dated 5 January, 1962), the name of Sweden 
2 
ha.s appeared i n the Annex to 'The Decision'. 
On 7 June, 1962, the Sveriges Riksbank sent an 
"Instrument of Adherence" t o the Fund, t o the e f f e c t 
t h a t the Sveriges Riksbank i s adhering t o 'The Decision' 
on "behalf of Sweden.^ 
1. Here we may add t h a t we have attempted t o have 
access t o these instruments, which are being kept i n 
the M i n i s t r y of Finance, France ( f o o t n o t e : See 
Appendix XXIV), hut we were answered t h a t tlm.se. 
instruments are not a v a i l a b l e to the p u b l i c . 
( f o o t n o t e , see Appendix XXV) 
2. See "Supplement toi I n t e r n a t i o n a l F i n a n c i a l News. 
Survey", V o l . I , XIV, No.1, I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary 
Fund, 12 January, 1962, p.12. Cf. Kangl M a j r t s 
p r o p o s i t i o n nr 102 ar 1962, p.25. Cf. a l s o 
" I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund - Annual Report", 1962^ 
pp.I-55i2.$5. 
3. See Appendix V I . Cf. " I n t e r n a t i o n a l F i n a n c i a l 
News Survey", 1962. p.245. 
Yet, l a t e r on we see, s u r p r i s i n g l y , t h a t i n s t e a d 
of the name' of Sweden, the name' of Sveriges Riksbank 
has appeared i n the Annex to 'The Decision'." 1" This i s 
s u r p r i s i n g , because i f the Sveriges Riksbank i s adhering 
to 'The Decision' on beha l f o f the Kingdom of Sweden, 
then the p r i n c i p a l and r e a l p a r t y t o 'The Decision' 
should be the Kingdom of Sweden, and not the Sveriges 
Riksbank. Accordingly, the name of Sweden i n the Annex 
to 'The Decision' should not be replaced by t h a t o f 
the Sveriges Riksbank. 2 
Whatever the above s i t u a t i o n may be the Sveriges 
Riksbank i s now an a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a n t i n the Borrowing 
Scheme. 
1 . See the Fund's Selected Decisions, p. 66. Cf. 
" I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund - Summary Proceedings", 
1962, p. 20. 
2 . The above replacement has been e f f e c t e d by the 
Fund Executive Board's Decision No. 1362 ( 6 2 - 3 2 ) . 
This Decision has neb been published i n the Fund's 
"Summary Proceedings" of 1962. I n order to have 
a look at i t s contents, we a p p l i e d to the Fund f o r 
a copy thereof. But, the ac t u a l contents of t h i s 
Decision i s apparently not a v a i l a b l e to the p u b l i c . 
See Appendices V I I and V I I I . Gf. " I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Monetary Fund, 19U5 - 1965", op. c i t . , volume I , 
P.512. 
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So f a r as the Deutsche Bundesbank TB concerned, 
from the outset i t has been a p a r t i c i p a n t i n 'The 
Decision.'; f o r , even i n the f i r s t t e x t of 'The 
Decision', i t s name (and not t h a t of the Federal 
Republic of West Germany) has appeared i n the Annex 
1 
t o 'The Decision', Furthermore, i t , i n i t s 'Instrum-
ent of Adherence' has stated, t h a t the Deutsche Bundes-
p 
bank i s adhering to 'The Deci s i o n ' . " 
V I - PARTIES TO 'THE LETTER AND 
' THE DECISION' FURTHER 
CONSIDERATION 
What i s c e r t a i n , however, i s t h a t the p a r t i c i -
p a t i o n of the Sveriges Riksbank andthe Deutsche Bundes-
bank i n the Borrowing Scheme, i s not an i n c i d e n t a l and 
1. See the Fund's Selected Decisions, p.66., 
Cf. " I n t e r n a t i o n a l F i n a n c i a l News Survey", 
Vol XIV. No.1, January 12, 1962. p.1. 
See Appendix V. Cf., however, J. Gold. ' I n t e r -
pr.e.taM on by the Fund', o p . c i t . , p. 54., where 
he seems to suggest t h a t 'The Decision' was f i r s t 
" n e g o t i a t e d " by member States o f t h e Fund (and 
not by the P a r t i c i p a n t s ) ; and then adhered t o by 
the P a r t i c i p a n t s . And, as we may n o t i c e , the 
term " P a r t i c i p a n t s " here i s intended t o i n c l u d e 
the above two " I n s t i t u t i o n s V , 
unexpected p a r t i c i p a t i o n . And, the approximate 
status and capacity of the s o - c a l l e d ' P a r t i c i p a t i n g 
I n s t i t u t i o n s ' , as p a r t i e s to the Borrowing Scheme, 
has been w e l l a n t i c i p a t e d i n both 'The L e t t e r ' and 
'The Decision'. 
For instance, Preamble to 'The L e t t e r ' i n t h i s 
respect says:-
"The purpose of t h i s l e t t e r i s to set 
f o r t h the understandings reached during the 
recent discussions i n Paris w i t h respect to the 
procedure to be f o l l o w e d by the P a r t i c i p a t i n g 
Countries and I n s t i t u t i o n s ( h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d 
to as "the p a r t i c i p a n t s " ) . . . " ^ 
And the Fund's Executive Board, i n Paragraph ( l ) 
o f 'The Decision' has also defined the ' P a r t i c i p a t i n g 
Countries'and ' P a r t i c i p a t i n g I n s t i t u t i o n ' i n an elaborate 
way. I t says:-
"... ( i i i ) ' P a r t i c i p a n t ' means a p a r t i c i p a t i n g 
member or a p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n ; 
1 . See Appendix I . Cf. "National Advisory Council 
on I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary and F i n a n c i a l Problems", 
Special Report to the President and the Congress 
on Special Borrowing Arrangements of the I n t e r -
n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund, U.S. Government P r i n t i n g 
O f f i c e , Washington, January, 1962, p. 1 1 . 
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( i v ) ' p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n * means an 
o f f i c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n of a member which has 
entered i n t o a c r e d i t arrangement w i t h the Fund 
1 
w i t h the consent of the member." 
(v) " p a r t i c i p a t i n g member" means a member 
of the Fund t h a t has entered i n t o a c r e d i t 
2 
arrangement w i t h the Fund....'" 
Therefore, the very envisagement of the P a r t i c i p a t -
i n g Countries and the P a r t i c i p a t i n g I n s t i t u t i o n i n both 
'The L e t t e r ' and i n 'The D e c i s i o n 1 would serve as a 
reason f o r the i n f e r e n c e t h a t ( a ; the p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
of e.g. the Deutsche Bundesbank i n the Borrowing Scheme 
was not an unforeseen l e g a l event, and (b; t h a t t here 
e x i s t s d i f f e r e n c e s between l e g a l s t a t u s of the P a r t -
i c i p a t i n g I n s t i t u t i o n s and t h a t of the P a r t i c i p a t i n g 
Countries.. 
And as we s h a l l see l a t e r , the Deutsche Bundesbank 
and the Sveriges Riksbank seem t o be l e g a l e n t i t i e s 
independent of c e n t r a l Governments of West Germany 
1. With regard to the contents of t h i s sub-
paragraph ( i v ; we s h a l l discuss i n d e t a i l l a t e r . 
2. The above terms, t h a t i s , the terms " P a r t i c i p a n t " , 
" P a r t i c i p a t i n g Country" and " P a r t i c i p a t i n g 
I n s t i t u t i o n " , w i l l be used i n t h i s paper a l s o . 
and Sweden. And their l e g a l status seems to "be 
nearer to the l e g a l status o f p u b l i c corpcr a t i o n s 
than any other s i m i l a r e n t i t i e s . 2 ' ^  
1. With regard to the l e g a l status o f the Deutsche 
Bundesbank, under "West German i n t e r n a l laws, see, 
ge n e r a l l y , A r t i c l e s 1 & 12 of the "Law concerning 
the Deutsche Bundesbank", of 26 July,1957. As 
regards the l e g a l status of the Sveriges Riksbank, 
under i n t e r n a l laws of Sweden, see A r t i c l e s 72 & 
111 o f the " C o n s t i t u t i o n o f the Realm", of Kingdom 
of Sweden; A r t i c l e 70 of 'The Riksdag S t a t u t e s ' , of 
22 June, 1866; and A r t i c l e s 28,30,32 & 33 of 'The 
Sveriges Riksbank Act',of 30 June 193U. For the 
discussion o f these laws see i n f r a under the Chapter 
" I n t e r n a l Laws Governing the P a r t i c i p a t i n g I n s t i t u t i o n s ' . 
2. Cf., however, W. Friedmann, H. Hufnagel; Hakan 
Stromberg, "The Public Corporation, A Comparative 
Symposium", o p . c i t . , pp.139,32i+ & 325. With regard 
to the status o f p u b l i c corporations the E d i t o r of 
the above Symposium has come to the f o l l o w i n g descrip-
t i o n : -
"... For the purpose of the i n q u i r y , the "Public 
Corporation" was broadly defined as an i n s t i t u t i o n 
o p e r a t i n g a service o f an economic or s o c i a l 
character, on beh a l f o f the government, but as 
an independent l e g a l e n t i t y ; l a r g e l y autonomous 
i n i t s management, though responsible to the 
p u b l i c , through government and parliament, and 
subject to some d i r e c t i o n by the government; 
equipped on the other hand w i t h independent and 
separate funds o f i t s own, and the l e g a l and 
commercial a t t r i b u t e s of a commercial ent e r p r i s e . . " 
See Id.p.514.1. Of. also Hans A u f r i c h t "Comparative 
Survey o f Central Bank Lav/", London, Stevens 
& Sons, 1965, p.89. 
3. With regard to the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f p u b l i c corpora-
t i o n s i n English law, 0. Hood P h i l l i p s has t h i s to say:-
"... t h e i r c h i e f c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s are best 
expressed n e g a t i v e l y , namely, t h a t they are 
n e i t h e r Government Departments under the d i r e c t 
c o n t r o l of M i n i s t e r s responsible to Parliament, 
nor are they e l e c t e d by the l o c a l e l e c t o r s . " 
See 0. Hood P h i l l i p s , " C o n s t i t u t i o n a l and 
Ad m i n i s t r a t i v e Law", 3rd E d i t i o n , London, 
Sweet and Maxwell, 1962, p.5U9. 
V I I - CM THE RIKSBANK AND THE BUNDESBANK 
CONCLUDE INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS? 
Whether p u b l i c corporations as such can conclude 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreements i s a vexed question. F. A. 
Mann, i n t h i s connection says:-
" I t seems l i k e l y t h a t ' i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n ' 
should also be p e r m i t t e d .where.;,' the con t r a c t i s 
concluded not by the i n t e r n a t i o n a l person i t s e l f , 
b u t by one o f i t s i n s t r u m e n t a l i t i e s , i n c l u d i n g 
a State Corporation" But, other i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
1 . See F. A. Mann, "The Proper Law o f Contracts 
Concluded by I n t e r n a t i o n a l Persons", (1959) , 
35, B.Y.I.L., p.U5. Take, however, note o f the 
term ' i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n ' and i t s presumed meaning, 
i n the above context. Cf. the same w r i t e r , "The Law 
Governing State Contracts", (l9kk),21,B.Y.I.L.,pp.19-
2 1 , esp. p.21, where he says:-
"The Trust Agreement between the C r e d i t o r 
Governments and the Bank f o r I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Settlements... would also have t o be regarded 
as an i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n t r a c t , although the 
bank i s a Swiss c o r p o r a t i o n " . 
Cf. also Suratgar, David, "Considerations A f f e c t i n g 
Choice o f Law Clauses i n Contracts between 
Governments and Foreign Nationals", o p . c i t . , pp. 
303-310, 313, esp. p. 295 where he quotes t h a t : -
"Another view i s t h a t i n such contracts w i t h 
i n d i v i d u a l s , States confer a measure o f con-
s t i t u t i v e r e c o g n i t i o n upon i n d i v i d u a l s f o r 
t h e i r e l e v a t i o n to the status of tru e subjects 
of p u b l i c i n t e r n a t i o n a l law". Cf. f u r t h e r 
A r t i c l e 1 2(c) of the Harvard D r a f t Convention, i n 
the Lord McNair, "The Law of Tre a t i e s " o p . c i t . , p. 
11+8 footnote 6; J.E.S. Fawcett, "The B r i t i s h 
Commonwealth i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law", London,. Stevens 
& Sons, 1963. pp.l87-19U; "Comments by Government 
the United States of America on Parts, I , I I and 
I I I of the D r a f t A r t i c l e s on the Law of T r e a t i e s " , 
(1967) , 6 1 , A.J.I.L., pp. 112L-1125. 
j u r i s t s do not seem, g e n e r a l l y , to share the vievV t h a t 
p u b l i c corporations have the capacity to conclude 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreements. J.E.S. Pawcett, f o r instance,' 
w h i l s t considering the Angl o - I r a n i a n O i l Company, 
says :-
" p u b l i c corporations, p r i v a t e companies, cannot 
"be p a r t i e s to 3x1. i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreement. So the 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Court o f J u s t i c e refused to regard 
the concessionary c o n t r a c t of 1933 between I r a n 
and the Anglo-Persian O i l Company, as i t then was, 
as an i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreement, even though i t had 
been neg o t i a t e d by way of settlement of a dispute 
between the United Kingdom and Iran. ... and though 
the B r i t i s h Government was a m a j o r i t y shareholder 
i n the company. The company had not, as a creature 
of municipal law, the capacity to enter i n t o an 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l ' agreement." 1 
1. See J.E.S. Pawcett, "The Law of Nations", o p . c i t . , 
p.91. Cf. the same w r i t e r , "Legal Aspects of State 
Trading", (19W), 25, B.Y.I.L., pp. 35 - 37, k2, 
hk; K. L i p s t e i n 4 ( l 9 L i - 5 ) , 22, B.Y.I.L., p. 13k; 
D. W. Bowett, "The Law of I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
I n s t i t u t i o n s " , o p . c i t . , p. 332. e t . seq. 
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Or, Wilhelm Wengler, while considering the Case 
of the Port Kehl, seems to argue t h a t the agreements, 
subject matter of t h a t Case (though p o t e n t i a l l y an 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l one) could not reach the stage of i n t e r -
n a t i o n a l i t y ; because one o f the p a r t i e s thereto was a 
. 1 
French 'public c o r p o r a t i o n ' . 
The f a c t s o f t h i s case, as considered by him, are 
as f o l l o w s : -
"... The (West German) 2 "Land" Baden which i s 
the l e g a l owner o f the Port of Kehl ... concluded 
an agreement w i t h the Port autonome de Strasbourg, 
a p u b l i c c o r p o r a t i o n under French law, whose 
f u n c t i o n i s to administer the French p o r t of 
Strasbourg. An annex to the agreement contains 
the s t a t u t e f o r the p o r t of Kehl, and the s t a t u t e 
was drawn up i n such a way t h a t the same a u t h o r i t y 
administers the two p o r t s as an economic u n i t . 
The Socialist p a r t y i n the Federal Republic 
brought an a c t i o n before the C o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
Court against t h i s agreement; the a c t i o n 
1. See Wilhelm Wengler, "Agreements of states w i t h 
other p a r t i e s than states i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s " , 
(1955)» -8th year, Revue Helle'nique de D r o i t 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l , pp. 125 - 127. 
2. Parenthesis added. 
a l l e g e d v i o l a t i o n of A r t i c l e 59 o f the 
•Fundamental Lav/ "*" which provides t h a t t r e a t i e s 
r e g u l a t i n g the p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s o f the 
Federal Republic must "be approved "by the 
l e g i s l a t i v e "bodies. But Fundamental Law contains 
also another p r o v i s i o n , namely a r t i c l e 32; t h i s 
a r t i c l e provides t h a t a "land" may, i f the 
Federal government gives i t s approval, conclude 
23 \ 
conventions, ' v/ith f o r e i g n states i n matters 
f o r which the "Laender" are competent to l e g i s l a t e . 
•Chough the agreement on the p o r t o f Kehl was not 
concluded "by Baden wi t h the s t a t e o f France, ... 
the Federal government had given i t s approval 
under A r t i c l e 32. Before the C o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
Court, the Federal government ... argued t h a t 
the agreement d i d not f a l l under A r t i c l e 32, 
"because the other p a r t y to i t was not a f o r e i g n 
1. The C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Law of the F.R. of West Germany, 
t h a t i s . 
2. Take note of the term "conventions" i n t h i s context. 
3. Cf. Wa"bnitz, Der Zwischenstaatliche Zahlungsverkehr, 
Auf Der Grundlage I n t e r n a t i o n a l e r Zahlungsabkommen. 
Verlag Otto Schwartz & Co. 1955, p. hk f . f . 
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p u b l i c c o r p o r a t i o n . The C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Court 
decided against the claimants "by means o f the 
same argument ... 1 
Some of the w r i t e r s even doubt t h a t agreements 
concluded between Departments of States can be construed 
as agre'ements between States. For instance, J.E.S. 
Fawcett has considered some agreements concluded 
between Departments of some States. He then questions 
whether p a r t i e s to these agreements are States a t a l l . 
I n t h i s respect he says:-
"The Exchange of Notes of 30 A p r i l , 131+8, 
between Canada and the United States o f America, 
c o n s t i t u t i n g an Agreement r e l a t i n g to the 
improvement of- c e r t a i n p r a c t i c e s f o r s a n i t a r y 
c o n t r o l i n the S h e l l f i s h i n d u s t r y and to the 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n of S h e l l f i s h shippers, i s an 
Agreements made i n e f f e c t between the Canadian 
Department of Na t i o n a l Health and Welfare and 
the United States Public Health Service ... " 
1. See I d . p.126. Cf. J. Mervyn Jones, ' I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Agreements Other than " I n t e r - S t a t e Treaties""! — 
Modern Developments', (191+1+), 21, B.Y.I.L., pp. 
I l l - 122 esp. at p. 117. 
2. See J.E.S. Fawcett,'The Legal Character o f 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Agreements', op. c i t . , p.395. 
163 
He then adds:-
"... i t i s indeed d o u b t f u l whether i n the 
Candaian - United States Agreement the p a r t i e s 
1 
are States a t a l l ... " 
And, as we may know, the orthodox view i s t h a t 
only s tates and i n t e r n a t i o n a l organisations can conclude 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l engagements. For instance, Lord McNair 
has accepted the f o l l o w i n g d e f i n i t i o n f o r the term 
' t r e a t y ' :-
"a w r i t t e n agreement by which two or more States 
p 
or i n t e r n a t i o n a l organisations create or i n t e n d 
to create a r e l a t i o n between themselves operating 
w i t h i n the sphere of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law". ^ 
1. See I b i d . 
2. Take note of the word " i n t e n d " i n t h i s context. 
Cf. J.E.S. Fawcett, Id.p.385, Cf. also (1967), 
61, A.J.I.L., p.290. 
3. See McNair: 'The Law o f T r e a t i e s ' , o p . c i t . , pp. 3 
and k. Cf. d e f i n i t i o n adopted f o r ' t r e a t y ' i n the 
Harvard D r a f t Convention, I b i d , f o o t n o t e 2; A r t i c l e 
2, Section 1 (a) and A r t i c l e 3 of the "Vienna 
Convention on the Lav/ of T r e a t i e s " , o p . c i t . , p. 3; 
(1967), 61, A.J.I.L., p. 293. Cf. also J.E.S. 
Fawcett, "The Law o f Nations", o p . c i t . , pp. 89 -
90 where he says:-
"A t r e a t y ... i s a w r i t t e n agreement by 
which the p a r t i e s e s t a b l i s h i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
l e g a l r e l a t i o n s between them i n a p a r t i c u l a r 
f i e l d or f o r a p a r t i c u l a r purpose ... P a r t i e s 
to i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreements may be states or 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g anizations ... " 
Therefore, whether or not the Borrowing Scheme 
has "been an i n t e r n a t i o n a l engagement seems t o depend 
on whether or not the Bundesbank and the Riksbank are 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e Countries. I n other 
words, due t o the f a c t t h a t a l l w r i t e r s do not share the 
view t h a t p u b l i c c o r p o r a t i o n s can conclude i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
engagements, the only p o s s i b i l i t y i n cons i d e r i n g the 
Borrowing Scheme as an i n t e r n a t i o n a l engagement i s 
to see whether the Bundesbank and the Riksbank have been 
a c t i n g as r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e Countries 
i n the Borrowing Scheme, and the' f a c t t h a t they are 
p u b l i c c o r p o r a t i o n s i n i t s e l f cannot be s u f f i c i e n t enough 
i n c o n s i d e r i n g the Borrowing Scheme as an i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
engagement. 
Here, w i t h a view t o con s i d e r i n g the s t a t u s of the 
P a r t i c i p a t i n g I n s t i t u t i o n s , we could perhaps get some 
help from the p r o v i s i o n s of the Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agree-
ment, whereupon the Borrowing Scheme has been set up. 
The f a c t i s t h a t the P a r t i c i p a t i n g I n s . t i t u t ions are, 
at the same time, .Central Banks of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e 
Countries. Accordingly, they are a c t i n g as " f i s c a l agen-
1 
d i e s " of West Germany and Sweden i n the I.M.F. This 
could mean t h a t they may h o l d some o f f i c i a l p o s i t i o n 
w i t h i n the t e r r i t o r i e s of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e c o u n t r i e s . 
This could also mean t h a t there may be some l e g a l nexus 
1. See A r t i c l e V (1) of the Fund's A r t i c l e s 
of Agreement. 
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between t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s under the Borrowing 
Scheme, and t h a t of t h e i r p o s i t i o n as " f i s c a l 
agencies" of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e Countries. For t h i s 
reason l e t us consider what s t a t u s the P a r t i c i p a t i n g 
I n s t i t u t i o n s can have under the Fund's A r t i c l e s ' o f 
Agreement. Here we would commencejwith • the p r o v i s i o n s 
of A r t i c l e V (1) of the Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement. 
V I I I - PARTICIPATING INSTITUTIONS AND 
ARTICLE V 11) OF THE F.A.A. 
With regard t o the s t a t u s of the P a r t i c i p a t i n g 
I n s t i t u t i o n s , J.E.S. Fawcett seems to suggest 
t h a t they are "agents" of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e 
Countries. This would, ap p a r e n t l y , mean t h a t 
they are a c t i n g on behal f of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e 
Countries i n the Borrowing Scheme. This 
would also pave the way f o r c o n s i d e r i n g tl±e 
'The Decision' as an i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n strument. 
He says:-
"This i n c l u s i o n (of the Sveriges Riksbank 
and the Deutsche Bundesbank as P a r t i c i p a n t s 
i n •The Decision'), simply r e f l e c t s the f a c t 
that 'each member s h a l l deal with the Fund 
only through i t s Treasury, c e n t r a l bank, 
s t a b i l i s a t i o n fund,, or other s i m i l a r f i s c a l 
agency, and the Fund s h a l l deal only with or 
through the same agencies'". 
He seems to suggest- that since the Deutsche 
Bundesbank and the Sveriges Riksbank are Central 
Banks of t h e i r respective countries and 
Central Banks are one of the agencies en vumerated 
i n A r t i c l e V (1) of the Fund's A r t i c l e s of 
Agreement , thus they are acting i n the Borrowing 
2 
Scheme on behalf of t h e i r respective countries. 
This can be supported by the nature of the 
commitments spoken of i n the Paragraphs of the 
1. See J . E. S. Fawcett, 'The I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary 
Fund and International Law', op. c i t . , p.75* 
Parenthesis added. His above quotation i s from 
Section 1, of A r t i c l e V of the Fund's A r t i c l e s 
of Agreement. 
2. Cf. Hans Aufricht, "Comparative Survey of Central 
Bank Law", op. c i t . , pp. 209 - 210. 
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Borrowing Schemej which commitments are to be undertaken, 
generally speaking, by member states of the Fund. For 
instance, the following may lend support to t h i s endi 
1. Paragraph 3>(b) of 'The Decision* gives any 
Pa r t i c i p a n t (including the P a r t i c i p a t i n g 
I n s t i t u t i o n s ) the righ t to veto the adherence 
of new P a r t i c i p a n t s to the Borrowing Scheme. 
I t says:-
"(b) Any member or i n s t i t u t i o n not 
sp e c i f i e d i n the Annex that wishes to 
become a participant;, may a t any time, 
a f t e r consultation with the Fund, give 
notice of i t s willingness to adhere to 
th i s Decision, and, i f the Fund s h a l l 
so agree and no par t i c i p a n t object, the 
member or i n s t i t u t i o n may adhere i n 
accordance with Paragraph 5 ( c ) . " 
2. Paragraph 3 ( c ) of 'The Decision' speaks of 
the adherence of any Par t i c i p a n t to 'The 
Decision', " i n accordance with i t s law", 
which law i s , prima f a c i e , the co n s t i t u t i o n a l 
1. See Appendix IV. 
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c or other s i m i l a r Laws of the Country whose 
n a t i o n a l i t y the P a r t i c i p a n t possesses. 
Otherwise i t would he hard t o conceive 
any other i n t e r n a l r u l e s (governing a 
P a r t i c i p a t i n g I n s t i t u t i o n ) which could 
guarantee i t s o b l i g a t i o n s v i s - a - v i s the 
Fund or other P a r t i c i p a n t s . 
3. The r i g h t conferred on the P a r t i c i p a t i n g 
I n s t i t u t i o n s ( i n accordance w i t h which they 
can vote on a borrowing arrangement; can 
be quoted as another reason i n support of the 
above suggestion; because t h e i r v o t i n g would 
a f f e c t i n t e r n a t i o n a l monetary -policy; and a f o r t i o r i 
2 
the monetary p o l i c y of t h e i r own country. 
1. See Paragraph ( c j of 'The L e t t e r ' , Appendix I . 
2. Cf. the n o t i o n "nation-wide" character of 
the d u t i e s " i n J. E. S. Fawcett, "Legal Aspect 
of State Trading", o p . c i t . , p.43. 
fy. The f a c t that any P a r t i c i p a t i n g I n s t i t u t i o n , 
which has already accepted a commitment under 
a stand-by arrangement, ^ can give notice to 
the Fund that:-
" I n the pa r t i c i p a n t ' s opinion, based 
on the present and prospective balance 
of payments and reserve position, c a l l s 
should no longer be made on the p a r t i c i -
pant or that c a l l s should be f o r a smaller 
amount, the Managing Director may propose 
to other p a r t i c i p a n t s that substitute 
amounts be made available under t h e i r 
1. As regards the d e f i n i t i o n of the term "Stand-by 
Arrangement", J . K e i t h B b r s e f i e l d has t h i s to say:-
"Stand-by Arrangement. An arrangement 
with the Fund by which a member country 
obtains assurance that i t may draw up to 
prescribed amounts during a s p e c i f i e d 
period of time ..." 
See J . Ke i t h Horsefield, "Introduction to the 
Fund", op.cit., p.30. For a detailed i l l u s t r a t i o n 
of t h i s term, see J . Marcus Fleming, "The I n t e r -
national Monetary Fund i t s Form and Functions", 
I .M.F.j Washington, D.C., 1964, pp.34-35. Cf. J.E.S. 
Fawcett "International Monetary Fund and I n t e r -
national Law", op.cit., pp.73-74. Cf. also J . Gold, 
"The Law and Pra c t i c e of the International Monetary 
Fund with respect to 'Stand-by Arrangements'", 
(1963), 12, I.C.L.Q., pp. 1 - 30. 
credit arrangements .. " 
may serve as a further reason i n support of the 
above suggestion; f o r the balance of payments 
po s i t i o n of the member States seems to be something 
within the competency of the member States themselvesi 
And, since Paragraph 7 (d) i s authorizing the 
P a r t i c i p a t i n g I n s t i t u t i o n s to base t h e i r argument 
on the basis of "the present and prospective 
balance of payments and reserve position", of t h e i r 
respective countries* t h i s could also be in d i c a t i v e 
of the f a c t that they are performing the functions 
p 
of "agents" of t h e i r respective countries i n 
the Borrowing Scheme . 
1. See Paragraph 7 (d) of 'The Decision'. Take 
note of the passage "... i n the pa r t i c i p a n t ' s 
opinion" i n the above paragraph 7(d). As 
regards the meaning of the term " c a l l " and 
"credit arrangement" used i n the above 
quotation., see Sub-paragraphs ( v i ) and ( v i i ) 
of Paragraph 1 of 'The Decision'. Cf. Paragraph 
(D) of 'The L e t t e r ' . Cf. also paragraph 11 ( f ) 
of 'The Decision'. 
2. Cf. Hans Aufricht, "Comparative Survey of 
Central Bank Law", op. c i t . , pp. 185 - 187f 
189 - 190, 204. Cf. Also C. H. Alexandrowicsr, 
"International Economic Organisations", London* 
Stevens & Son Limited, 1952, pp. 13 - 16. 
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5. The f a c t that the inte r p r e t a t i o n of parts of 
the undertakings of the P a r t i c i p a t i n g I n s t i t u -
tions has been subjected to the int e r p r e t a t i v e 
provisions of A r t i c l e X V I I I of the F.A.A., can 
be added to the four foregoing observations. ^* 
6. To the above may also be added the f a c t that 
so f a r as repayment of the Fund's indebtedness 
to the P a r t i c i p a t i n g I n s t i t u t i o n s i s concerned 
the Fund can use i t s resources as i f i t 
were using them for repayment to i t s member States. 
1. See former part of Paragraph (20) of 'The 
Decision', i n conjunction with A r t i c l e X V I I I 
of the F.A.A., esp. where i t i s s a i d : -
" ( a ) Any question of inte r p r e t a t i o n of 
the provisions of t h i s agreement a r i s i n g 
between any member and the Fund or between 
any members of the Fund s h a l l be submitted 
to the Executive Directors for t h e i r 
Decision". 
Take notice of the terms "member" and "members", 
i n the above context. 
2. Of. A r t i c l e V, Section (3) of the Fund's 
A r t i c l e s of Agreement. 
To put th i s i n a d i f f e r e n t way, the Fund 
seems to make no d i s t i n c t i o n between i t s 
holdings of a P a r t i c i p a n t ' s currency and i t s 
holdings of a member State's currency. For 
instance Paragraph 11 (b) of 'The Decision', 
says:-
"(b) Before the date prescribed i n 
Paragraph 11 ( a ) , the Fund, a f t e r 
consultation with a p a r t i c i p a n t , may make 
repayment to the pa r t i c i p a n t , i n part or 
i n f u l l , with any in c r e a s e s i n the Fund's 
holdings of the par t i c i p a n t ' s currency 
that exceed,: the Fund's working requirements 
and pa r t i c i p a n t s s h a l l accept such repayment 
See Also Paragraph 11 ( f ) , Paragraph 17 and 
Paragraph 18 of the same document, Appendix 
IV. Cf. A r t i c l e 20 Section 1 (2 - a) of the 
"law concerning the Deutsche Bundesbank?', of 
July 26, 1957 * 
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And i t i s perhaps f o r the above reasons that 
the Sveriges Riksbank, i n i t s Instrument of Adherence, 
points out that: i t i s adhering to 'The Decision' on 
behalf of the Kingdom of Sweden. I t says:-
" S i r (the Fund's Managing Director, that 
i s ) ... we take pleasure i n notifying you that 
the Riksbank, on behalf of Sweden, hereby 
adheres to the Decision of the Executive 
Directors of the Fund on General Arrangements 
1 
to Borrow ... " 
Nevertheless, the question under consideration 
i s f a r from being over; f o r even assuming that the 
commitments spoken of i n Paragraphs of the Borrowing 
Scheme are of a nature which demand the P a r t i c i p a t i n g 
I n s t i t u t i o n s to be "agents" of t h e i r respective 
countries, yet i t seems d i f f i c u l t to say that they 
can be " o r i g i n a l p a r t i e s " to the Borrowing Scheme-
Surely i t i s one thing to say that the Sveriges Riksbank 
and the Deutsche Bundesbank could be " f i s c a l agencies" 
of t h e i r respective Countries, under the Borrowing 
Scheme, and i t i s another that they can "adhere" to any 
1. See Appendix VI. Parenthesis added. See Also 
Appendix XXVII. Cf. Paragraph 1 (b) of 
A r t i c l e 7 of "Vienna Convention on the Law of 
T r e a t i e s " , op. c i t . , p. 4-. 
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agreement l i k e 'The Decision* by v i r t x i e of A r t i c l e 
V, Section (1) of the fund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement. 
And the term " d e a l " used i n A r t i c l e V ( 1 ) , 
seems to be i n d i c a t i v e of the f a c t t h a t the agencies 
ennumerated t h e r e i n can serve as "agents" of t h e i r r e s -
p e c t i v e Countries only a f t e r t h e i r p r i n c i p a l s ( t h a t i s 
t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e Countries; have duly adhered t o 
the Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement. I n other words, so f a r 
as the p r o v i s i o n s of the Fund 1s Agreement(as d i s t i n c t from 
the p r o v i s i o n s of the .borrowing Scheme) are concerned, the 
C e n t r a l Bank of a given country can act as the " f i s c a l agen-
cy" of i t s country only a f t e r i t s coimtry has adhered t o 
the Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement. ' And t h i s seems to "be 
the r u l e s w i t h the Borrowing Scheme too. That i s t o say, i f 
a member s t a t e of the Fund i s i n t e r e s t e d to p a r t i c i p a t e i n 
the A c t i v i t i e s of 'The Decision' (and has intended t o 
1. See A r t i c l e XX (2) (a) of the Fund's 
A r t i c l e s of Agreement. 
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leave i t s ordinary business with, i t s Central Bank), 
i t f i r s t must adhere to 'The D e c i s i o n 1 , i n accordance 
with Paragraph 3 ( c ) of 'The D e c i s i o n 1 , and then 
declare that i t s Central Bank would be acting i n 
•The Decision', as i t s " f i s c a l agency". 1 
Furthermorej i f "Each member s h a l l deal with the 
Fund only through i t s Treasury, c e n t r a l bank, 
s t a b i l i z a t i o n fund, or other s i m i l a r f i s c a l agency, 
and the Fund s h a l l deal only with or through the 
p 
same agencies", and i f t h i s includes the Fund's 
"deal" under the Borrowing Scheme, then there seems 
to be no need f o r specifying the ways i n which the 
P a r t i c i p a t i n g I n s t i t u t i o n s can "adhere" to 'The 
Decision'; f o r , i f the Sveriges Riksbank and the 
Deutsche Bundesbank are acting under A r t i c l e V (1) 
of the Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement, t h e i r p r i n c i p a l s 
must of necessity be the Kingdom of Sweden, and the 
1. See Paragraph 3(c) of 'The Decision'. Paragraph 
3(c) of 'The Decision 1 seems to have been 
ins p i r e d by A r t i c l e XX (2) (a) of the Fund's 
A r t i c l e s of Agreement, and no l e g a l s i m i l a r i t y 
can be seen between Paragraph 3(c) of 'The 
Decision' and A r t i c l e V (1) of the Fund's A r t i c l e s 
of Agreement. Cf. A r t i v l e V ( 1 ) , however, with 
Paragraph (14) of 'The Decision'. 
2. See A r t i c l e V (1) of the Fund's A r t i c l e s of 
Agreement. Take note of the term "only", twice 
used i n the above context. Cf. U.N. Monetary 
Documents, pp. 27, 288, 321, 773 and 774. 
F.R. of West Germany. And i t would be f o r Sweden and 
West Germany to "adhere" t o 'The D e c i s i o n 1 , andjnot 
f o r t h e i r C e n t r a l Banks t o do so. 
But, as we may have seen ( i n the preceding Headings) 
'The L e t t e r ' and 'The Decision' have both a n t i c i p a t e d 
the " P a r t i c i p a t i n g I n s t i t u t i o n s " as e n t i t i e s who can 
i n i t i a l l y iladhere" to the Borrowing Scheme. And the 
f a c t t h a t the P a r t i c i p a t i n g I n s t i t u t i o n s can i n i t i a l l y 
adhere to 'The Decision' can serve as a reason f o r d i f f -
erences e x i s t i n g between them and the f i s c a l "agencies" 
of the Fund's member States. 
Furthermore, Paragraph 14, of 'The Decision' seems 
to be r u l i n g out the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e P a r t i c i p a t i n g 
I n s t i t u t i o n s are t a k i n g p a r t i n the a c t i v i t i e s of the 
Borrowing Scheme, under A r t i c l e V {'\) of the Fund's 
1 
A r t i c l e s of Agreement, and Kules G - 1 of the F.R.R. 
i 
Paragraph 14, of 'The Decision', reads as f o l l o w s : 
"Notice t o or by a p a r t i c i p a t i n g member under 
t h i s Decision s h a l l be i n w r i t i n g or by cable and 
s h a l l be^iven to or by the f i s c a l agency of the 
p a r t i c i p a t i n g member designated i n accordance w i t h 
A r t i c l e V, Section 1, of the " A r t i c l e s and Rule G-1 
of the Rules and Regulations of the Fund. Notice t o 
or by a p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s h a l l be i n w r i t i n g 
or by cable and s h a l l be g i v e n t o or by the p a r t -
2 
l c i p a x i n g i n s t i t u t i o n . " 
17~Rule of the Fund's Rules and Regulations i s a 
complementary r u l e to the p r o v i s i o n s of A r t i c l e V ( 1 ; 
of the Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement * I t says:-
"G—1 Each member s h a l l designate a f i s c a l agency 
f o r i t s t r a n s a c t i o n s w i t h the Fund, i n accordance 
(continued bottom next page) 
Therefore,-as such Paragraph 14, of 'The Decision, seems 
to be breaking o f f any r e l a t i o n s h i p between the P a r t -
i c i p a t i n g I n s t i t u t i o n s " and the " f i s c a l agencies" of 
the P a r t i c i p a t i n g Countries i n the Borrowing Scheme. 
This may be supported by the f a c t t h a t according t o 
Rule G - 1 , of the Fund's Rules and Regulations, each 
" P a r t i c i p a t i n g Country" can change i t s " f i s c a l agency" a t 
any time and w i t h o u t seeking the approval of any a u t h o r i t y ; 
and i t would not a f f e c t the s t a t u s of the P a r t i c i p a t i n g 
Country i n the Borrowing Scheme. 
But, t h i s i s not the same as i n the case of " P a r t i c i -
p a t i n g I n s t i t u t i o n s " ; because the General Arrangements t o 2 — Borrow i s a f o u r - y e a r l y arrangement and w i t h i n t h i s 
p e r i o d of time no P a r t i c i p a t i n g I n s t i t u t i o n can be changed 
unless and u n t i l the agreement of the Fund and a l l other 
P a r t i c i p a n t s t o t h i s e f f e c t , has been a t t a i n e d . 
( f o o t n o t e s continued from previous page).. 
w i t h A r t i c l e V, Section 1 , before i t s s u b s c r i p -
t i o n becomes due, and may change the agency a f t e r 
n o t i f y i n g the Fund.'1. 
2. Cf. Paragraph (12; of "Exchange of l e t t e r s between the 
Ambassador of Switzerland t o the United States and the 
Managing D i r e c t o r of the Fund", concerning the assoc-
i a t i o n of Swiss Confederation w i t h the General Arran-
gements to Borrow. See the Fund's Selected Dec-
i s i o n s , p . 7 1 . 
1 . See Rule G - 1 , of the Fund's Rules and Regulations. 
2. See Paragraph 19(a) of 'The Decision', Appendix IV. 
Therefore, the provisions of Paragraph 14 of 'The 
Decision* on the one hand, and the provisions of 
Rule (G - 1) of the Fund's Rules and Regulations, 
i n conjunction with Paragraph 16, of 'The Decision*, 
on the other, can also lend support to the f a c t that 
the P a r t i c i p a t i n g I n s t i t u t i o n s are not the same as 
the " f i s c a l agencies", subject-matter of A r t i c l e 
V (1) of the Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement. 
So f a r , under the present Heading, we have 
been involved with two d i f f e r e n t sets of i s s u e s : 
( i ) That the nature of commitments, spoken 
of i n the Borrowing Scheme, demands p a r t i e s to the 
Borrowing Scheme to be ei t h e r member States of the 
Fund or t h e i r duly authorised "agencies". 
( i i ) Thatj despite the above demand, the 
P a r t i c i p a t i n g I n s t i t u t i o n s are not p a r t i c i p a t i n g 
i n the Borrowing Scheme as " f i s c a l agencies" of 
t h e i r respective Countries, and i n application of 
A r t i c l e V (1) of the Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement. 
I3C - PARTICIPATING INSTITUTIONS AND 
ARTICLE V I I 12) OP THE fl.A.AT 
To the above second issue may he added the 
f a c t that the Paragraphs of the Borrowing Scheme 
have been s e t out, under A r t i c l e V I I (2) of the 
Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement, and with a view to 
dealing with the so-called "short-term c a p i t a l 
movements"; and not with a view to dealing with the 
day-to-day "transactions" of the Fund. 1 And the 
Preamble to 'The Decision' i s c l e a r l y r e f e r r i n g to 
t h i s point where i t says:-
"In order to enable the International 
Monetary Fund to f u l f i l l more e f f e c t i v e l y i t s 
role i n the international monetary system i n 
the new conditions of widespread c o n v e r t i b i l i t y , 
including greater freedom f o r short-term 
c a p i t a l movements, the main i n d u s t r i a l 
countries have agreed that they w i l l 
stand ready to lend t h e i r currencies to the 
Fund ... under A r t i c l e V I I , Section 2, of the 
A r t i c l e s of Agreement ... I n order to give 
e f f e c t to these intentions, the following 
1. See t i t l e to the A r t i c l e V of the Fund's 
A r t i c l e s of Agreement. 
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terms and conditions are adopted under 
A r t i c l e V I I , Section 2, of the A r t i c l e s 
of Agreement'*. 1 
Now, with a view to "being quite c l e a r , l e t us 
see what the actual provisions of A r t i c l e V I I (2) 
of the Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement are talking 
about. We have, of course, i n mind to see any 
space wherein the P a r t i c i p a t i n g I n s t i t u t i o n s can 
be accommodated. 
This A r t i c l e V I I ( 2 ) , i n part, .reads:-
"Sec. 2. Measures to replenish the 
Fund's holdings of scarce currencies. 
The Fund may, i f i t deems such action 
appropriate to r e p l e n i s h i t s holdings 
of any member's currency, take either 
or both of the following steps: 
( i ) Propose to the member that, on 
terms and conditions agreed between the 
1. See Appendix IV. 
Fund and the member, the l a t t e r lend i t s 
currency to the Fund or that, with the 
approval of the member, the Fund borrow 
such currency from some other source ... , 
but no member s h a l l be under any obligation 
to make such loans to the Fund or to approve 
the borrowing of i t s currency by the Fund 
from any other source ... " 
Therefore, the easy way of es t a b l i s h i n g a le g a l 
l i n k between the contents of 'The Decision* and those 
of A r t i c l e V I I (2) of the Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement, 
i s to construe the contents of 'The Decision' as the 
"terms and conditions agreed between the Fund and the 
member, (tha t ) the l a t t e r lend i t s currency to the 
Fund." 1 ' 
With a view to being c l e a r e r , l e t us put the 
above question i n the following way: 
The above A r t i c l e V I I (2) seems to suggest two 
di f f e r e n t s e t s of sources, from which the Fund can 
repl e n i s h i t s holdings of scarce currencies, (a) 
member States of the Fund (former part of A r t i c l e V I I - 2 ) , 
1. See A r t i c l e v n ( 2 ) of the Fund's A r t i c l e s of 
Agreement. ' Parenthesis added. 
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and (b) some other unspecified source ( l a t t e r 
part of A r t i c l e V I I — 2 ) . And the difference 
"between the above two "sources", seems to be that 
i n the case of (a) an agreement should be reached 
between the Fund and the lending country, under 
which the Fund can borrow that country's currency; 
whereas i n the case of ( b ) , only the "approval" of 
that country i s required. And i n that case, no 
reference has been made to the "terms and conditions" 
to be worked out between the Fund and the member 
State whose currency i s to be borrowed from "some 
other source". 
Therefore, our impression here, was that the 
contents of 'The Decision 1 were the "terms and 
conditions" spoken of i n former part of A r t i c l e 
V I I ( 2 ) , of the Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement* 
I f i t be so, i t would then follow that a l l 
p a r t i e s to these "terms and conditions" are to be 
member States of the Fund. This could be supported 
by the passage "the main i n d u s t r i a l countries have 
agreed" of the above Preamble to 'The Decision'; 
and that t h i s Preamble i s speaking of the ways and 
means of dealing with the "short-term c a p i t a l 
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movements", whose control i s so me tiling generally 
within the competency of the member States, or 
t h e i r duly authorised f i s c a l agencies. After a l l , 
eight out of ten pa r t i c i p a n t s i n the Borrowing Scheme 
are member States of the Fund. Nevertheless we 
preferred to r a i s e t h i s question with the Fund, 
which has drafted "the terms and conditions" of 
'The D e c i s i o n 1 . We put the question to the Fund 
i n the following way:-
"... Since, according to A r t i c l e V I I (2) 
of A.A. 1 the Fund i s assumed to come to 
agreement regarding the General Arrangements 
to Borrow, with member States of the Fund, 
and since Paragraph 14- of the General 
Arrangements to Borrow i s , on the face of i t , 
d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g between P a r t i c i p a t i n g members 
(by r e f e r r i n g to A r t i c l e V (1) of A.A. Rule 
p 
G.l of the R.R. ) , and P a r t i c i p a t i n g 
1. The Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement, that i s . 
2. The Fund's Rules and Regulations, that i s . 
:8'4 
I n s t i t u t i o n s (by not r e f e r r i n g to the 
above provisions) .... And since, on the 
other hand, the Duetsche Bundesbank has 
adhered to the General Arrangements to 
Borrow (as an o r i g i n a l p a r t y ) , therefore, 
kindly l e t me know of any decision, made 
by the Fund, under A. A.,,following which 
an i n s t i t u t i o n as such can come into an 
agreement (as an o r i g i n a l party) with the 
Fund, under A r t i c l e V I I (2) of the A.A. 
of the Fund ... •» 1 
But the Fund, i n i t s r e p l y of 21st May, 1968, 
seems to be of the opinion that the p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
of the Deutsche Bundesbank, i n the General 
Arrangements to Borrow, i s by virtue of the l a t t e r 
part of A r t i c l e V I I ( 2 ) . And, i f , for instance, 
some money has been borrowed from the Deutsche 
1. See Appendix IX. By the term (as an o r i g i n a l 
party) i n the above context we mean that 
although i t seems to create no l e g a l d i f f i c u l t y 
f or the Deutsche Bundesbank to take part i n the 
a c t i v i t i e s of the Borrowing Scheme as the f i s c a l 
agency of West Germany, under A r t i c l e V (1) and 
Rules G-l, yet l e g a l complications do a r i s e i f 
the same Bank i s adhering to 'The Decision' as 
an o r i g i n a l party. 
Bundesbank, i t has been Borrowed from "some 
other s o u r c e " of A r t i c l e V I I ( 2 ) , and n o t , on the face of 
i f , from F . R . of West Germany. This r e p l y , i n p a r t , reads:-
"... This i s v/ith r e f e r e n c e t o your l e t t e r of 8 May, 
1963. A r t i c l e V I I (2) of the A r t i c l e s of Agreement of the 
Fund permits the Fund to borrow a member's currency, 
e i t h e r from the member i t s e l f , o r , v / i t h the approval of 
the member, from some other source w i t h i n or outside the 
t e r r i t o r i e s of the member. I t was on the basis of t h a t 
p r o v i s i o n t h a t , w i t h the approval of the German Federal 
Government, the Deutsche Bundesbank became a p a r t i c i p a n t 
i n the General Arrangements t o Borrow. I t i s a p a r t i c i -
pant i n i t s own name and not as f i s c a l agency f o r 
1 
Germany...." 
Nevertheless, one would doubt t h a t the above view-
could, g e n e r a l l y speaking, s a t i s f y the t e s t of A r t i c l e V I I 
(2) of the Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement; f o r the Fund's 
a u t h o r i t i e s agree on the p o i n t t h a t the averiges Riksba.nk 
and the Deutsche Bundesbank are both C e n t r a l Banks of 
t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e Countries. And the d e f i n i t i o n adopted 
f o r C e n t r a l Banks reads as f o l l o w s : -
"Although arrangements vary, a c e n t r a l 
bank i s the bank which, t y p i c a l l y , w i t h i n i t s 
own country (a) has a monopoly of the banknote 
issue; (b) hplds the g o l d and other monetary 
reserves;-.of the country; ( c ) has the power t o 
r e g u l a t e the supply of c r e d i t ; (d) holds p a r t 
of the reserves of the commercial banking 
1. See Appendix X. Cf. Deutsche Bundesbank's l e t t e r 
of August 20, 1969. Appendix X I I . See also 
Appendix X I . See moreover, " I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Monetary Fund, 1945 - 1965", o p . c i t . , Volume I I . , 
p. 35. 
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system; and (e) acts as f i s c a l agent f o r 
the government." ^ 
As such the functions to be performed by a 
Central Bank seem to be of a nature i n d i v i s i b l e 
from the functions to be performed i n the monetary 
2 
f i e l d s of the country whose Central Bank i t i s . 
By t h i s we do not intend to say that Central 
Banks i n every State are part of the Government 
Departments, or otherwise. And t h i s i s what we 
1. See J . Keith Horsefield, op. c i t . , pp. 22 - 2 3 . 
So f a r as the Deutsche. Bundesbank i n t h i s 
respect i s concerned see A r t i c l e s , 2, 14, 15 , 
16, 19,..20 and .21 of the "Law concerning the 
Deutsche Bundesbank" of 26 July 1957- See 
al s o , A r t i c l e 4 of the Federal Republic of 
West Germany's "Bretton Woods Agreements Law" 
of 1952 . So f a r as the Sveriges Riksbank i s 
concerned see A r t i c l e 72 of the "Constitution 
of the Realm" of Sweden dated 6 June, 18091 
and A r t i c l e s , 2, 8, 9, 10, 11, 15 and 17 of 
"The Sveriges Riksbank Act" of 1934 as amended. 
See Also A r t i c l e 2 of the Swedish Law of 21 
May, 1964j with s p e c i a l regulations on the 
Riksbank's right to issue notes. Cf. d e f i n i t i o n 
adopted by H. Aufricht for Central Banks. See 
h i s "Comparative Survey of Central Bank Law", 
op. c i t . , p• 26. 
2. Cf. I d : pp. 13 - 16, 25 - 27 , 41 - 42, 91 - 94, 
112 - 115 and 166 - 168. 
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1 
s h a l l consider; a t a l a t e r stage. 
What we do i n t e n d t o consider here i s j t h a t the 
Sveriges Riksbank and the Deutsche Bundesbank can h a r d l y 
be considered as something w i t h i n the meaning of "some 
other source" of A r t i c l e V I I of the Fund's A r t i c l e s of 
Agreement; because Section 2 of t h i s A r t i c l e begins v / i t h : -
"The Fund may, i f i t deems such a c t i o n appro-
p r i a t e t o r e p l e n i s h i t s holdings of any member's 
currency, take e i t h e r or both of the f o l l o w i n g 
9 
steps..." 
Therefore, the above p r o v i s i o n i s envisaging c i r -
cumstances under which the Fund could borrow the currency 
of a given member Sta t e , not only from the government of 
t h a t State, but also from "some other source" a t one and 
the same time. And a p l a i n c o n s t r u c t i o n of the term "some 
other source" here, seems t o be p r i v a t e persons, commer-
c i a l banks, and other s i m i l a r bodies, who deal with;. 
1. See under the Chapter " I n t e r n a l Laws Governing 
the P a r t i c i p a t i n g I n s t i t u t i o n s " , i n f r a . 
2. Take note of the term " e i t h e r or both" i n the 
above context. Cf. J o i n t Statement I I I , 4, 
A l t e r n a t i v e A, Section 5, "U.N. Monetary 
Documents", p.31, Of. also I d . , pp.311, 526. 
8'8 
foreign exchange, and whose exchange transactions 
can be distinguished from the exchange transactions 
of t h e i r State; ^ whereas the functions to be 
performed by Central Banks can hardly be distinguished 
from the monetary a f f a i r s of the States whose Central 
Banks they are. 
And t h i s contention can be supported by the 
"d e f i n i t i o n " adopted by the Fundj i n Paragraph 1 of 
'The Decision', for the "P a r t i c i p a t i n g I n s t i t u t i o n s " . 
Sub-Paragraph ( i v ) of Paragragh ( 1 ) of 'The Decision' 
i n t h i s respect says:-
' ( i v ) " P a r t i c i p a t i n g I n s t i t u t i o n " means .. 
an o f f i c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n of a member that has 
entered into a c r e d i t arrangement with the 
1. See Section 5 of "Second Report of Committee 
2 on Operations of the Fund to Commission I " 
of the Bretton Woods Conference, where i t i s 
s a i d : -
"According to Paragraph ( 1 ) ( A r t i c l e 
V I I ( 2 ) of the KA-A.) that i s ) , the Fund 
may borrow the currency of a country 
either from the Government of that country 
or from a private source ..." 
See UN Monetary Documents", p. 311 . Parenthesis 
added. 
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Fund, w i t h the consent of the member." 
Otherwise i t i s hard to conceive of the Fund, "borr-
owing a given currency once from a member State (as one 
source) and. again from her o f f i c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n ^ as 
another source). 
Furthermore, i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o assume t h a t i n 
1944 the authors of A r t i c l e V I I (2) could have foreseen 
the circi-imstances under which the Borrowing Scheme 
should have been arranged, f o l l o w i n g which one 
may suggest t h a t by the expression "some other 
source", they would have meant the C e n t r a l Banks of 
9 
member States of the Fund. *" This f a c t can be 
supported by the submission of the Fund t h a t the 
emergence of the"new" c o n d i t i o n s of c o n v e r i b i l i t y 
1. See Appendix IV. Cf. Paragraph 12 of "Exchange 
of l e t t e r s between the Ambassador of Sw i t z e r l a n d 
to the United States and the Managing D i r e c t o r 
of the Fund" of 11 June, 1964, concerning the 
a s s o c i a t i o n of Swiss Confederation w i t h the 
General Arrangements to Borrow. See the Fund's 
Selected Decisions, p.71. 
2. Cf. J. Gold, "The Law and P r a c t i c e of the I n t e r -
n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund w i t h respect f o 'Stand-by 
Arrangements-, o p . c i t . , p.25. Cf. also 
"Questions- and Answers on the I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Monetary Fund, I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund, 
1945-1965", o p . c i t . , pp. 177 - 179. 
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have necessitated the s e t t i n g up of the Borrowing 
Scheme . ^  
1. See, e.g., Preamble to 'The Decision', where i t 
sayss-
"In order to enable the International 
Monetary Fund to f u l f i l l more e f f e c t i v e l y 
i t s role i n the international monetary 
system i n the new conditions of widespread 
c o n v e r t i b i l i t y , including greater freedom 
fo r short-term c a p i t a l movements, the main 
i n d u s t r i a l countries have agreed that ...." 
Emphasis added. The movement of "hot" money seems 
r e a l l y to be a new phenomenon i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
monetary a f f a i r s , something perhaps untbought of 
at the time- of the drafting of the Fund's A r t i c l e s 
of Agreement. Cf. statement of B. M. Bernstein to 
the U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, 
e s p e c i a l l y where he says:-
"Some provision must be made to finance 
c a p i t a l movements. The I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary 
Fund does not have the resources necessary f o r 
t h i s purpose. Professor Zo-lioitas, the governor 
of the Bank of Greece, has suggested that the 
Fund could acquire additional resources by 
entering into standby agreements with the 
leading creditor countries, using for this 
the borrowing authority under A r t i c l e V I I , 
the scarce currency provision of the Fund 
Agreement. This i s an ingenious proposal ..." 
Take notice of the term "an ingenious proposal" i n 
the above context. See "Statement of Edward M. 
Bernstein to the U.S. Congress", E. M. Bernstein, 
Ltd., I n t e r n a t i o n a l Payments Imbalances and Weed 
for Strengthening I n t e r n a t i o n a l F i n a n c i a l Agree-
ments. Hearing (Washington D.C.), 1961, p. 111. 
Cf. I d . , pp. 129 and 130 . Cf. also F. A. Mann, 
"International Monetary Law", Lucerne Meeting, 
In t e r n a t i o n a l Law Association, 1952, pp. 240, 242, 
292 - 293; "The Legal Aspects of Money"* op. c i t . , 
Continued, footnote 1 from Page 95* 
pp. 339 and 34-0; "International Monetary Fund -
Summary Proceedings"; year 1961, pp. 15 , 121, 
year 1962, p. 22. 
For a very illuminating description of the 
background of the above issues see "International 
Monetary Fund, 1945-1965", op. c i t . , volume I I I , 
pp. 166-168 and 171-180, esp. pp. 166, 178. See 
also UN Monetary Documents, pp. 29 , 40, 140, 314, 
324, 452, 525 , 668 -669, 777-778 and 1213. 
For the reasons given to s a t i s f y the above 
contentions see, "International Monetary Fund -
Annual Report", 1962, p. 33; "International 
F i n a n c i a l News Survey", 1962, p. 111. 
Of. J . Gold, "Interpretation by the Fund", 
op. c i t . , pp. 26 - 31; "International Monetary 
Fundj 1945 - 1965", op. c i t . , volume I , pp. 503 -
506 and 597; volume I I , pp. 410 - 416. 
Here i t may be useful to r a i s e the following 
points. These points though not immediately r e l a t e d 
to the iss u e s under consideration, yet might serve 
as causa sine quj^ non for them. 
1. Prom the point of view of int e r n a t i o n a l monetary 
p o l i c y , the formation of a scheme, l i k e the Borrowing 
Scheme, was a necessary one; and i t had to be set up 
as soon as possible; ^ 
2. I f the Swedish Kronor and/or the Deutsche Mark 
were not amongst currencies to be borrowed under the 
Borrowing Scheme, the entire a c t i v i t i e s of the 
p 
Borrowing Scheme could have been i n jeopardy; 
3. The Fund was interested i n having as secure 
and i n t e r n a t i o n a l , a l e g a l structure f o r the Borrowing 
1. See "Statement of E. M. Bernstein to the U.S. 
Congress 1 1, op. c i t . , esp. p. 122. See also 
"International F i n a n c i a l News Survey1', 1962, 
p. 1. Cf. F r i t z Machlup "Plans for Reform of 
the International Monetary System", op. c i t . , 
p. 12. 
2. See J . Gold, "The Fund and Non-Member States, 
Some Legal E f f e c t s " , op. c i t . , p.33• 
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1 Scheme, as f e a s i b l e , and; 
4. I n Sweden and West Germany, i t was p r e f e r r e d 
— from a p r a c t i c a l p o i n t of view t o send 
the Sveriges Rikabank and theDeutsche Bundesbank t o 
2 
p a r t i c i p a t e i n the a c t i v i t i e s of the Borrowing Scheme. 
Therefore,, the hasteifor the s e t t i n g up of the 
Borrowing Scheme, together w i t h the other above elem-
ents, l e d . t h e i n t e r e s t e d bodies to formulate the 
Borrowing Scheme, under A r t i c l e V I I (2) of the Fund' a 
A r t i c l e s of Agreement, which A r t i c l e i t s e l f caused the 
fo r e g o i n g l e g a l d i f f i c u l t i e s . 
Whatever the o r i g i n a l meaning of new i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
of A r t i c l e V I I (2) of the Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement, 
i t i s , however, c e r t a i n t h a t the a c t i v i t i e s ^ the P a r t -
i c i p a t i n g I n s t i t u t i o n s i n the Borrowing Scheme have been 
approved by t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e Countries, and t h i s approval 
has been given i n w r i t t e n documents. This i s something 
which could a t l a s t help us i n c o n s t r u i n g 'The Decision' • 
as an i n t e r n a t i o n a l engagement. For the importance a t t -
ached t o t h i s , we asked the Fund as to the nature of the 
approval of West Germany and Sweden i n t h i s respect. D 
1. See supra, under the same Chapter. See also 
Paragraph 1 ( i v ) of 'The Decision'. 
2. See i n f r a , under the Chapter " I n t e r n a l laws 
Governing the P a r t i c i p a t i n g I n s t i t u t i o n s " . 
3. See Appendix V I I . 
The Fund, i n i t s r e p l y of .January 16, 1969, s t a t e d : -
"....With reference t o your question on the 
approval of the Government of the Federal Republic 
of Germany, re g a r d i n g the adherence of Deutsche 
Bundesbank, and the approval of the Government 
of Sweden re g a r d i n g the adherence of the Sveriges 
Riksbank, t o theGeneral Arrangements t o Borrow, the 
approvals were given by l e t t e r s from these two 
Governments t o the Fund. No terras were imposed, 
t h a t i s to say, the instruments of approval simply 
s t a t e d t h a t the r e s p e c t i v e Governments approved 
the Borrowing by the Fund from t h e i r c e n t r a l banks 
... under the terms and c o n d i t i o n s set out i n the 
Fund's d e c i s i o n on. the General Arrangements t o 
- 1 ±sorrow ('The Decision' t h a t i s ) . 
And one of the terms and c o n d i t i o n s under which West 
Germany and Sweden approved the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of t h e i r 
banks, i s t h a t the Bundesbank and the Riksbank are 
2 
p a r t i c i p a t i n g as the " o f f i c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s " of 
•West Germany and Sweden. ~ 
The submission of these two documents by West 
Germany and Sweden seems to s a t i s f y the requirements 
f o r c o n s t r u i n g the Bundesbank and the Riksbank as 
1. See Appendix V I I I . Parenthesis added. Cf. 
Appendices V I and X I I . Take note of the passage 
"under the terms and c o n d i t i o n s set out i n the Fund's 
d e c i s i o n " i n the above q u o t a t i o n . 
2. See Paragraph 1 ( i v j of 'The Decision'. 
Appendix IV. 
a u t h o r i z e d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e 
Countries i n the Borrowing Scheme. These seem 
also t o be strong, enough to outweigh contentions 
made i n connection w i t h the s t a t u s of the P a r t i c i p a t i n g 
I n s t i t u t i o n s i n the Borrowing Scheme. 
One f u r t h e r p o i n t remains t o be considered here, 
v i z . , the s t a t u s of the Fund i n respect of 'The Dec-
i s i o n ' . That i s t o say, whether the Fund i s a p a r t y 
t o 'The Decision'. The f a c t i s , t h a t before October 24, 
1962, the date of e n t r y i n t o f o r c e of 'The Decision', 
i t was simply a d e c i s i o n of the Fund's Executive 
D i r e c t o r s . " 
I t i s , however, beyond doubt t h a t t h i s d e c i s i o n 
envisaged r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s not only f o r the Group 
if 
of Ten, but also f o r the Fund i t s e l f . As t o how i t 
should come i n t o e f f e c t , i t was a n t i c i p a t e d , t h a t : -
f 
Cf. J.E.S. Fawcett I n t e r n a t i o n a l La\ if !•! ana-1968, Manchester Uses of Outer Space 
, " v/ atid|;;-;-«s-'A-
", V „J 
U n i v e r s i t y Press, PP»1-j.7i. „ " A 
E.G. Paragraphs 7(e) and 11 of 'The Decision'7' 
See i n f r a , Chapter " C o n s u l t a t i v e Arrangement sjbf 
the Borrowing Scheme" under the "Pre-Repayments 
Co n s u l t a t i v e Arrangements of 'The Decision'". 
1. 
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"Paragraph 4« Entry i n t o Force This 
Decision, s h a l l "become, e f f e c t i v e when i t has "been 
adhered to "by a t l e a s t seven of the members or 
i n s t i t u t i o n s i n c l u d e d i n the Annex w i t h c r e d i t 
arrangements amounting i n a l l to not l e s s than 
the e q u i v a l e n t of f i v e and one-half b i l l i o n 
U nited States d o l l a r s of the weight and fineness 
i n e f f e c t on J u l y 1, 1944." ' 
Whether the Fund i s a c t u a l l y a p a r t y t o 'The 
De c i s i o n 1 seems to be r e l a t e d t o the general question 
whether i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i s a t i o n s can be p a r t i e s t o 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreements i n c l u d i n g t h e i r own d e c i s i o n s . 
D. W. Bowett, i n t h i s respect says:-
" T r e a t i e s to which i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s 
are a p a r t y , whether they be agreements between 
d i f f e r e n t i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s , between 
States and i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s , b i l a t e r a l 
or m u l t i l a t e r a l , are now commonplace ... i t i s 
undoubtedly w i t h i n the United Nations and the 
s p e c i a l i z e d agencies t h a t the t r e a t y has become 
a common form of e s t a b l i s h i n g a r e l a t i o n s h i p , or 
c r e a t i n g r i g h t s and .duties, under i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law." 2 
1. See Appendix IV. . 
2. See D. W. Bowett, "The Law of I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
I n s t i t u t i o n s " , o p . c i t . , p.306. 
9 ? 
This i s , however, admitted t h a t t o be p a r t y t o 
an i n t e r n a l i o n a l agreement i s dependent on whether the 
o r g a n i s a t i o n concerned has possessed i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
p e r s o n a l i t y , and whether ( f u r t h e r t o t h a t ) i t has 
1 
treaty-making c a p a c i t y . As to the f i r s t of the 
two above requirements, we have seen t h a t the Fund 
possesses i n t e r n a t i o n a l p e r s o n a l i t y . 
As regards treaty-making c a p a c i t y of the Fund, 
i t can be construed from reference to i t s c o n s t i t u e n t 
instruments and from reasonable i m p l i c a t i o n f o r the 
proper performance of i t s f u n c t i o n s . I n other words, 
the Fund should have e i t h e r (a) express treaty-making power 
or (b) i t could enter i n t o t r e a t y o b l i g a t i o n s by the au-
t h o r i t y of i t s i m p l i e d power. 
(a) As t o the express treaty-making c a p a c i t y of the 
Fund, A r t i c l e IX of the Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement 
says: -
"Section 2. Status of the Fund. The 
Fund s h a l l possess f u l l j u d i c i a l p e r s o n a l i t y , and, 
i n p a r t i c u l a r , the ca p a c i t y : ( i ) t o contract.....'" 
1 . 
2. 
See I b i d , 
See supra, under the same Chapter. 
96 
A s i m i l a r a u t h o r i t y has "been accorded t o the 
Fund under A r t i c l e I I of the United 'nations Con-
v e n t i o n on the P r i v i l e g e s and Immunities of the 
Sp e c i a l i z e d Agencies, Annex V. The Fund has long 
p r a c t i s e d t h i s power. For in s t a n c e , on June 11, 1964, 
i t entered i n t o an agreement w i t h the Swiss Confederation 
(not a member of the Fund), under which the Swiss Con-
f e d e r a t i o n agreed t o r e p l e n i s h the means of i n t e r n a t -
i o n a l l i q u i d i t y up t o an amount e q u i v a l e n t t o # 200 
m i l l i o n . 1$/: took place i n the form of an exchange of 
l e t t e r s between the Ambassador of Switzerland t o the 
United States and the Managing D i r e c t o r of the Fund. 
I n August 1966, the Fund entered i n t o a s i m i l a r agree-
ment ( t h i s time w i t h I t a l y ) , w i t h a view t o borrowing 
1 
an amount equ i v a l e n t to -2 250 m i l l i o n of I t a l i a n l i r e . 
I t took e f f e c t i n the form of exchange of l e t t e r s 
between the A c t i n g Managing D i r e c t o r of the Fund and 
the M i n i s t r y of the Treasury of I t a l y . 
To the above may be added the Agreement between 
the United Nations and the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary 
Fund, dated November 15, 1947. This agreement has been 
entered i n t o pursuant t o the p r o v i s i o n s of A r t i c l e 63 of 
the Charter of the U.N., under which there has been 
envisaged both r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s f o r the Fund and 
2 
the United Nations. 
1. Cf. arrangement between the Fund and the United State 
of America and Republic of South A f r i c a , concerning 
the sale of gold t o the Fund. See the Fund's new 
Selected Decision of 1970. pp.56-61. 
2. See, e.g. A r t i c l e s V I and V I I I . 
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(b) Even assuming t h a t the Fund has not been 
expressly empowered to enter i n t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
agreements, yet i t could do so, under the a u t h o r i t y 
of A r t i c l e V I I ( 2 ) , so f a r as s e t t i n g up of 'The 
Decision' i s concerned.. Otherwise i t i s hard t o see 
how the Fund can perform i t s functions' under A r t i c l e 
V I I ( 2 ) , and r e p l e n i s h i t s holdings of scarce c u r r e n -
1 
c i e s , i n c l u d i n g the currency of non-member States. 
Therefore, there seems to "be h a r d l y any d i f f -
i c u l t y c o n s i d e r i n g the Fund as a p a r t y to 'The Decision'. 
So f a r as 'The L e t t e r ' i s concerned, however, 
the Fund does not seem to he a p a r t y t h e r e t o , and 
i t has been entered i n t o between the Group of Ten 
themselves. The question again i s : are the Sveriges 
Riksbank and the Deutsche Bundesbank r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s 
of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e Countries i n 'The l e t t e r ' ? This 
q u e s t i o n can f i n a l l y be approached as f o l l o w s : 
1. Preamble to 'The Decision' r e f e r s t o 'The L e t t e r ' 
as an agreement concluded between "the main i n d u s t r i a l 
c o u n t r i e s " , and thus i t i n d i c a t e s t h a t these two banks 
are a c t i n g on b e h a l f of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e Countries i n 
•The L e t t e r ' . F u r t h e r , the same Preamble s t a t e s t h a t the 
1. Cf. Reparations Case, where the Woid Coiirt has s a i d : 
" I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o see how such a convention 
(Convention on p r i v i l e g e s and immunities) could 
operate, except upon the i n t e r n a t i o n a l plane and 
as between p a r t i e s possessing i n t e r n a t i o n a l per-
s o n a l i t y " . See (1949) I.C.J. Report, 175. 
.parenthesis added. 
2. Cf. J. Gold, " I n t e r p r e t a t i o n By the Fund," op.cit.p.57 
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terms and c o n d i t i o n s o f 'The Decision' have been set 
up w i t h a view t o g i v i n g e f f e c t t o the i n t e n t i o n of . 
the Group of Ten, as envisaged i n "The L e t t e r ' , and 
because the s t a t u s of these banks i n 'The Decision' 
has been recognized by Sweden and West Germany as 
t h e i r " o f f i c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s " , then i t i s hard t o 
assume t h a t they are a c t i n g i n 'The L e t t e r ' otherwise 
than the o f f i c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s of Sweden and west 
Germany, bearing i n mind t h a t 'The L e t t e r ' and 
'The Decision' are two i n t e r - r e l a t e d documents, and 
they are set up t o achieve the same o b j e c t , that|is 
the replenishment of the' Fund's resources of scarce 
c u r r e n c i e s . 
2. As i n the case of 'The Decision', the nature 
of f u n c t i o n s to be performed by these two i n s t i t u t i o n s 
i n 'The L e t t e r ' are i n d i v i s i b l e from the f u n c t i o n s of 
Sweden and west Germany i n the f i e l d of t h e i r monetary 
and l e n d i n g a c t i v i t i e s . Therefore, l i k e 'The D e c i s i o n 1 , 
'The L e t t e r ' seems to be an i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreement. 
X. CONCLUSION 
There are doubts as to the s t a t u s of the Borrowing 
e Scheme, because there are doubts as t o whether the 
P a r t i c i p a t i n g I n s t i t u t i o n s a.re w i t h i n "some other 
source" of A r t i c l e V I I (2) of the Fund's A r t i c l e s b f 
Agreement. 
But due to the f a c t t h a t the P a r t i c i p a t i n g I n s t -
i t u t i o n s have been p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the Borrowing Scheme 
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as " o f f i c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s " of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e 
Countries, and due t o the f a c t t h a t t h e i r s t a t u s 
as o f f i c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s have been recognized and 
"appro ved" by Sweden and West Germany, t h e r e f o r e 
there seems t o be no l e g a l d i f f i c u l t y i n c o n s t r u i n g 
'The L e t t e r ' and 'The Decision' as i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
agreements. 
This can be supported by the f a c t t h a t the 
monetary a c t i v i t i e s of the p a r t i c i p a t i n g I n s t i t u t i o n s 
i n the Borrowing Scheme cannot be separated from the 
monetary a c t i v i t i e s of Sweden and West Germany. The 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the Riksbank and the Bundesbank i n 
the a c t i v i t i e s of the Borrowing Scheme seems to be 
an i n t e r n a l lav/ n e c e s s i t y , and seems to have been 
devised w i t h a view to a v o i d i n g the d u p l i c a t i o n of 
procedures t o be f o l l o w e d by both them and t h e i r 
Governments f o r every borrowing arrangement of the 
Borrowing Scheme. 
1. See i n f r a under the Chapter " I n t e r n a l Laws 
Governing the P a r t i c i p a t i n g I n s t i t u t i o n s . " 
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CHAPTER TWO 
I n t e r n a l Laws Governing the P a r t i c i p a t i n g I n s t i t u t i o n s . 
I . INTRODUCTION 
Under the present Chapter we s h a l l consider i n t e r n a l 
laws governing the Sveriges Riksbank and the Deutsche 
Bundesbank. This we s h a l l attempt w i t h a view t o 
f i n d i n g the reason why the competent a u t h o r i t i e s i n Sweden 
and West Germany have given way to t h e i r C e n t r a l Banks t o 
p a r t i c i p a t e i n the a c t i v i t i e s of the Borrowing Scheme. The 
i n q u i r y i n t o the above i n t e r n a l laws seem t o be u s e f u l i n 
t h a t i t reveals; the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p o s i t i o n they h o l d i n 
the t e r r i t o r i e s of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e Countries, and t h a t how 
f a r t h e i r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s can s a t i s f y the 
requirementsjpf the Borrowing Scheme. 
This study we s h a l l attempt under the Headings 
" I n t e r n a l Laws Governing the Sveriges Riksbank" and " I n t e r n a l 
Laws Governing the Deutsche Bundesbank". 
I I . INTERNAL LAWS GOVERNING THE 
SVERIGES RIKSBANK 
(a) LEGAL STATUS. 
According to the i n t e r n a l laws governing the 
Sveriges Riksbank, i t i s an independent i n s t i t u t i o n w i t h i n 
1. Cf. Lord McNair, "The Law of T r e a t i e s " , op.cit.,p.36; 
"Report of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Commission on the work of 
of the Second Part of i t s Seventeenth Session",(1967),61, 
A.J.I.L., pp.309,398-400; A r t i c l e 46 of the "Vienna Con-
v e n t i o n on the Law of T r e a t i e s " , o p . c i t . , p.17* 
m 
the t e r r i t o r i e s of Sweden. ^ 
A r t i c l e 72 of the "Constitution of the Realm" of 
p 
the Kingdom of Sweden states that the Sveriges R i k s -
bank i s not to be administered by a single governor or 
under the di r e c t i o n of a Cabinet Minister; but i t i s 
to be governed by a group of "Directors". I t says:-
"The Riksbank remain under the guarantee of 
the Riksdag ^ and i s administered ... by Directors 
appointed ad hoc ..." 
According to the l a t t e r part of the same A r t i c l e , 
these Directors are to be elected mainly by the P a r l i a -
ment of Sweden. I t says:-
"... The Board of Directors of the Riksbank 
s h a l l consist of seven Members, of whom the King 
i n Council appoints one ... and the remaining 
1. See, generally, M. H. De Kock, "Central Banking", 
Third E d i t i o n , Staples Press Limited, London, 1954-, 
pp. 13 - 14. 
2. Dated 6 June, 1809. 
3. The Parliament of Sweden, that i s * 
4. Cf. A r t i c l e 32, of The Sveriges Riksbank Act of 30 
June, 1934. 
s i x ..., are elected by the Riksdag ..." ' 
Therefore, the Sveriges Riksbank i s to be run by 
the simple majority votes of i t s Directors and not by 
the d i r e c t i o n of the Swedish Government. ^' 
1. This and other provisions of the Swedish laws gover-
ning the Riksbank have been quoted from the Pamph-
l e t kindly supplied to us by the Sveriges Riksbank, 
(See Sveriges Riksbank, The Svergies Riksbank Act 
of 30 June, 1934, The Monetary Act of the 30th May, 
1873 with Amendments up to the 31st August, 1964). 
I t i s necessary to have reference to this here be-
cause some differences can be discerned between the 
E n g l i s h version; of the above quoted Swedish laws 
and those of the same laws appearing i n the Hans 
Aufricht's 'Central Banking L e g i s l a t i o n ; A c o l l e c t -
ion of Central Bank, Monetary and Banking Laws", 
Vol. I I , Europe, which c o l l e c t i o n has been published 
by the Fund. 
2. See also M. H. De Kock, op. c i t . , p. 323 footnote 1. 
3. Although the Swedish laws governing the Sveriges 
Riksbank do not d i r e c t l y describe the voting proce-
dure of the Board of Directors of the Sveriges R i k s -
bank, yet "The Riksdag Statutes of 22. June., 1866" 
can throw enough l i g h t on this question. This S t a t -
ute, i n i t s A r t i c l e 7Q, points dut:-
"(4) ... The person presiding over the 
meetings of the Board of Directors of the Rik s -
bank s h a l l have the casting, vote i n the event 
of an equality of votes i n favour of two div e r -
gent opinions ... " 
Therefore, i t seems c l e a r , from the contents of the 
above Article,- that the decisions of the Board of 
Directors of the Sveriges Riksbank are to be taken 
by a simple majority of the votes of i t s D i r e c t o r s . 
The above voting procedure seems to be worth mention-
ing here, i n that the undertakings which i t produces 
seem to be d i s t i n c t from the undertakings of ordin-
ary subjects of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law whose decisions 
are customarily based on the p r i n c i p l e of unanimity 
and j o i n t cabinet r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . 
4. Cf. Sections, 2,3 and 4 of "The Bank of England Act 
of 1946" (9 & 10 Geo. 6 ch. 27). Take especial note 
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A r t i c l e 33 of "The Sveriges Riksbank Act of 30 June, 1934" 
p r o h i b i t s even the presence of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the 
Swedish. Government a t the meetings of the Board of D i r -
e c t o r s , when any d e c i s i o n i s to be taken by t h a t Board. 
I t says:-
" A r t i c l e 33* I f the King i n Council, e i t h e r 
upon the recommendation of the Board of D i r e c t o r s of 
the Riksbank or else when i t i s otherwise deemed nec-
essary to do so, has a u t h o r i s e d a Representative t o 
confer w i t h the Board of D i r e c t o r s of the Riksbank 
on some s p e c i a l matter, the Board may discuss w i t h the 
Representative of the King i n Council, b u t , 
of the f o l l o w i n g p r o v i s i o n s : -
" ( 2 ) . . . ( 2 ) The Governor, Deputy Governor and 
other members of the Court of d i r e c t o r s s h a l l be 
appointed by His Majesty..." 
"(4) - ('I) The Treasury may from time t o time give 
such d i r e c t i o n s t o the Bank as, a f t e r c o n s u l t a t i o n 
w i t h the Governor of the Bank, they t h i n k necessary i n 
the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t s . . . . " 
Cf. also "The Bank of England Q u a r t e r l y B u l l e t i n " , 1966, pp. 
233 - 245, esp. a.t p.233. For more m a t e r i a l as to v a r y i n g 
degree of autonomy (o r otherwise) of c e n t r a l banks, see Hans 
A u f r i c l r b , "Comparative Survey of Central Bank law", o p . c i t . , 
pp. 18-19, 29, 31-32, 36-41, 116-120. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , h i s 
survey does not i n c l u d e the Sveriges Riksbank and the 
Deutsche Bundesbank. What, however, can be deduced from 
h i s survey i s t h a t one can see h a r d l y any important s i m i l a r -
i t y between the powers and f u n c t i o n s of c e n t r a l banks. 
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must not take any d e c i s i o n i n h i s presence." 
As such, the Sveriges Riksbank i s an autonomous 
i n s t i t u t i o n i n the f i e l d of i t s a c t i v i t i e s , w i t h i n the 
t e r r i t o r i e s of Sweden.. 
(b) POWERS 
The Sveriges Riksbank seems t o have been e n t r u s t e d 
w i t h the f u n c t i o n s of State i n the f i e l d of monetary a c t i v -
i t i e s of Sweden. ~ Among the r i g h t s granted t o i t has been 
the r i g h t of issuing: bank notes. A r t i c l e 72 of the Con-
s t i t u t i o n of the Realm of Sweden i n t h i s respect says:-
"The Riksbank i s e x c l u s i v e l y a u t h o r i z e d t o issue 
notes t h a t s h a l l be l e g a l tender w i t h i n the Realm. 
Such notes s h a l l be redeemed by the Riksbank on 
demand i n gold a t t h e i r face value, "y. 
1. As to the d i f f e r e n c e s which could take place 
between the C e n t r a l Banks and Governments of States, 
see Hans A u f r i c h t , "Comparative Survey of C e n t r a l Bank 
Law", o p . c i t . , p.89. Cf. I d . , pp.116-12.0. 
2. See Halcan StrBmberg, "The P u b l i c Corporation i n 
Sweden, A Comparative Symposium", o p . c i t . , 
p.325, e t . eeq. 
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A r t i c l e 2 of "The Sveriges Kiksbank Act", i n complement 
of the above A r t i c l e 72, s t a t e s : -
"The Riksbank, which i n accordance v/ith s p e c i a l 
r e g u l a t i o n s issued thereon i s e x c l u s i v e l y a u t h o r i z e d 
t o issue bank notes,©aerieson banking i n co n f o r m i t y 
1 
w i t h the present Act." 
Amongst other major banking a c t i v i t i e s t o be performed 
by the Sveriges Riksbank, i s the r i g h t t o deal i n gol d t o 
c o n t r o l i t s p r i c e . A r t i c l e 13 of the same Act says:-
"The Riksbank may buy and s e l l gold...Gold b u l l i o n 
d e l i v e r e d t o the Royal Mint f o r the Riksbank's account 
s h a l l be pa i d f o r by the bank a t the value of gold i n 
Swedish currency, i . e . a t the r a t e of two thoiisand f o u r 
hundred and e i g h t y kronor per kilogramme of f i n e g o l d , 
l e s s one '-quarter per cent,... and such other p r e s c r i b e d 
2 
fees as are payable t o the Royal Mint,...." 
Among other functions.;to be performed by the Riksbank 
are grant of c r e d i t s to f o r e i g n C e n t r a l Banks as w e l l as t o 
1. For the d e t a i l e d powers of the Sveriges Riksbank i n 
i s s u i n g bank-notes, see A r t i c l e s 8 and 9 of the 
same Act. 
2. C o n t r o l of p r i c e of gold i s , according t o A r t i c l e 
V I ( 2 ) of the Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement, one of 
the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of member States of the Fund. 
108 I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund. A r t i c l e 15 of the same A c t staxes: 
" A r t i c l e 15. - The Riksbank may r a i s e c r e d i t s abroad as 
w e l l as grant c r e d i t s t o f o r e i g n c e n t r a l banks and t o the 
1 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund." 
Therefore, the above p r o v i s i o n s reasonably i n d i c a t e t h a t 
the f u n c t i o n s t o be performed by the Sveriges Riksbank are i n -
d i v i s i b l e and i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from the State's f u n c t i o n i n 
Sweden. This i s perhaps the reason why the Riksbank has been 
"placed under guarantee of the Riksdag." This i s also perhaps 
the reason why the Riksbank i s performing the f u n c t i o n s which 
are g e n e r a l l y e n t r u s t e d w i t h the M i n i s t r y of Finance of the 
•5 
Countries of other P a r t i c i p a n t s . 
I I I . INTERNAL LAWS GOVERNING- THE DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK. 
(a) LEGAL STATUS. 
The s t a t u s of the Deutsche Bundesbank, under i n t e r n a l laws 
of the Federal Republic of West Germany, i s more or l e s s 
s i m i l a r t o t h a t of the Sveriges Riksbank. For in s t a n c e , 
A r t i c l e 2, of the West German "Law concerning the 
1. Cf. A r t i c l e 16 of the same Act, esp. where i t i s s a i d : -
" ( d ) . . . F u r t h e r , the Riksbank may acquire shares of 
the Bank f o r I n t e r n a t i o n a l Settlements up t o an amount 
decided by the King i n Council and the Riksdag." 
2. See A r t i c l e 1 of "The Sveriges Riksbank Act", Cf. f i r s t 
Para, of A r t i c l e 72 of " C o n s t i t u t i o n of the Realm of Sweder 
3. Cf. the Sveriges Riksbank's l e t t e r of October 29, 1969, 
e s p e c i a l l y where i t i s s a i d : -
"With reference t o your l e t t e r of October 22,1969, 
we wish t o i n f o r m you t h a t on behal f of Sweden the 
Sveriges Riksbank i s the P a r t i c i p a t i n g I n s t i t u t i o n i n the 
General Arrangements t o Borrow, not the M i n i s t r y of 
Finance as i s the ca.se rega r d i n g most of other member 
Countries..." 
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Deutsche Bundesbank" of 26 July, 1957, states that the 
Deutsche Bundesbank i s an autonomous Federal i n s t i t u t i o n . 
I t says:-
"The Deutsche Bundesbank s h a l l be an autonomous 
Federal I n s t i t u t i o n , and a l e g a l person under public 
law ...» 1 , 2 
A r t i c l e 12 of the same law s t a t e s that the Deutsche 
Bundesbank i s to be independent of instructions of the 
Federal Government. I t says:-
" A r t i c l e 12. The Bank's Relationship to the 
Federal Government ... I n the exercise of the 
powers conferred on i t under t h i s law, i t s h a l l 
be independent of instructions of the Federal 
h. 
Government.11 
1. This and other provisions of West-German laws govern-
ing the Deutsche Bundesbank have been quoted from the 
"Enclosure to the Monthly Report of the Deutsche 
Bundesbank", of August 1957• I t i s necessary to 
state t h i s here because some differences can be traced 
between the English version of the above West-German 
laws and that of the same laws which has appeared i n 
the Hans Aufricht's "Central Banking L e g i s l a t i o n " , 
Vol. I I , Europe, op. c i t . ; Cf., e.g., A r t i c l e 3 of the "Law concerning the Deutsche Bundesbank", appeared 
i n the two papers. 
2. Cf. Hans Aufricht, "Comparative Survey of Central Bank Law", op. c i t . , p . x i . 
3. The Deutsche Bundesbank, that i s . 
4. Take note of the word " s h a l l " i n the above context. 
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method °f ope-ration, 
r r n y .-hr>...Tn»n The Deutsche Bundes banks i s also 
s i m i l a r to that of the Sveriges Riksbahk. For instance, 
the main governing body of the Deutsche Bundesbank (that 
i s , the Central Bank Council), consists of the President 
and the Vice-President of the Deutsche Bundesbank, and 
u s u a l l y eight members of the Bank's Directorate, together 
with the Presidents of a l l "Land Central Banks". 1 , 2 
With regard to the voting procedure of "the Central 
Bank Council", Section (3) of A r t i c l e 6 of the "Laws 
concerning the Deutsche Bundesbank", s t a t e s s -
"(3) The Central Bank Council ... s h a l l take 
i t s decisions by a simple majority... 1 1 
1. As regards the appointment and l e g a l status of the 
President and Vice-President and members of the 
Deutsche Bundesbank's Directorate, see A r t i c l e 7 
of the above-mentioned Lav/. Concerning the appoint-
ment, status and number of the Presidents of the 
"Land Central Banks", see A r t i c l e 8 of the same Law. 
See further M. H. De Kock, "Central Banking", op.cit., 
p.320, footnote 3. Cf. Hans Aufricht, "Comparative 
Survey of Central Bank Lav/", op.cit., pp.28-31 and 
98-104. 
.2. For the h i s t o r i c a l background and f o r the reasons why 
the A l l i e d Forces decided to curb the government con-
t r o l over the Germany's Central Bank as w e l l as r e -
gional banks, see "Bank Deutscher Laender", (1949)» 
20, Department of State B u l l e t i n , pp. 126 - 129. 
3. Cf. 'The Times', November 17, 1970, p. 24; Idem ' November 18, 1970, p. 25. 
i l l 
Thus, l i k e the Sveriges Riksbank, the Deutsche 
Bundesbank i s not an i n s t i t u t i o n to be governed by a 
Cabinet Minister or by a single responsible person. ^ 
Therefore, according to the above quoted A r t i c l e s 
of the West German "Law concerning the Deutsche Bundes-
bank", the Deutsche Bundesbank has been an autonomous 
Mr-
ins t i t u t i o n and independed" from the instructions of the 
Federal Government. 
The only power, however, conferred upon the Federal 
Government, (concerning the administration of the Deutsche 
Bundesbank) i s the r i g h t to defer the decisions of i t s 
p 
"Central Bank Council" f o r a period of at most two 
weeks. Section (2) of A r t i c l e 13 of the "Lav/ concerning 
the Deutsche Bundesbank" i n t h i s respect sayss-
1. By quoting the number of persons s p e c i f i e d to run the 
Deutsche Bundesbank (as w e l l as the Sveriges Riksbank), 
we are trying to bring to notice the apparent inten-
t i o n of the Legislatures of West-Germany and Sweden 
to accord as autonomous a lega l status to these I n s t i -
tutions as i s f e a s i b l e ; f o r i t seems more d i f f i c u l t 
to influence a group of Administrators rather than a 
single one. 
2. As we have n o t i c e d ( A r t i c l e (6) of the "Law concerning 
the Deutsche Bundesbank") the Central Bank Council i s 
the highest governing body of the Deutsche Bundesbank. 
3. Cf. "The Times", May 21, 1970, p. 32 under the "Power 
of Bundesbank". 
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"(2) The,members of the Federal Government 
s h a l l be e n t i t l e d to take part i n the deliberations 
of the Central Bank Council. They s h a l l have no vote 
but may bring motions. At t h e i r request, the taking 
of a decision s h a l l be deferred, but for not more 
than two weeks." ^ 
Therefore, i t i s c l e a r , from the contents of the above 
A r t i c l e (13) Section (2), that i f the Central Bank Council 
of the Deutsche Bundesbank wishes to carry out any one of 
i t s decisions, i t can do so, at most, a f t e r the elapse of 
a period of two weeks, despite the d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n of the 
2 Federal Government of West-Germany. -. - v . <? 
1. Cf. Hans Aufricht, "Comparative Survey of Central Bank 
Law", op. c i t . , p. 35« 
2. Cf. "Report of November 21", cabled by Ian McDougall, 
the B B C's correspondant i n Bonn. Cf. also 'The 
Times', March 6, 1970, p. 23 where i t i s s a i d j -
"Some economists and bankers here foresee 
a major clas h at tomorrow's council (the Central 
Bank Council) meeting between Professor S c h i l l e r 
and the council over the possible proposal to 
increase Bank r a t e . A decision to l i f t i n t e r e s t 
rates here i s seen by some experts as being a 
heavy embarrassment to the Economics Minister, 
following h i s recent c a l l for lower in t e r n a t i o n a l 
r a t e s . 
However some bankers now believe that Pro-
fessor S c h i l l e r w i l l accept the council's decision 
to r a i s e the rate ..." 
Parenthesis added. See then "The Times", March 7, 1970, 
p.13, under the "W German Bank rate r a i s e d to 7.5 p c", 
i n which i t has been reported that the Federal Minister 
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( I D ) POWERS. 
Like the Sveriges Riksbank, the Deutsche Bundesbank 
seems t o perform the f u n c t i o n s of State i n the f i e l d o f 
monetary a c t i v i t i e s of West Germany. As regards issuance 
of bank notes, A r t i c l e 14 of the "Law concerning the Deutsche 
Bundesbank", s t a t e s : -
" ( 1 ) The Deutsche Bundesbank s h a l l have the ex-
c l u s i v e r i g h t to issue bank notes i n the area t o which 
t h i s Lav/ a p p l i e s . I t s notes s h a l l be expressed i n 
Deutsche Marks. They s h a l l be the sole u n r e s t r i c t e d 
Legal tender...." 
A r t i c l e 3 of the same Act confers t o the Deutsche 
Bundesbank the r i g h t t o r e g u l a t e the c i r c u l a t i o n of money 
as w e l l as supply of c r e d i t t o the economy. I t says:-
"The Deutsche Bundesbank, making use o f the powers i n 
the f i e l d of monetary p o l i c y conferred upon i t under t h i s 
Law, s h a l l r e g u l a t e the note and c o i n c i r c u l a t i o n and the 
supply of c r e d i t t o the economy w i t h the aim of safe-
guarding the currency and. s h a l l ensure the due execution 
by banks of payments w i t h i n the country as w e l l as t o and 
from f o r e i g n c o u n t r i e s . " 
Amongst other State's f u n c t i o n s t o be performed by the 
Deutsche Bundesbank, i s the r i g h t to i n f l u e n c e open market 
p o l i c y i n the f i e l d of i t s a c t i v i t i e s . A r t i c l e 15 of the same 
Footnote 2. continued. 
of Economics has f i n a l l y acceded t o the Bank's r u l i n g . 
See f u r t h e r , "The Sunday Times", December 1, 1968, pp.34-
35; "The Guardian", November 18, 1970, p.14; "The Times", 
May 18, 1971. p.17. 
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Act i n t h i s respect says:-
"Por the purpose of i n f l u e n c i n g the c i r c u l a t i o n of 
money and the supply of c r e d i t , the Deutsche Bundesbank 
s h a l l from time t o time f i x the i n t e r e s t and discount r a t e s 
t o be a p p l i e d t o i t s t r a n s a c t i o n s and s h a l l determine the 
p r i n c i p l e s governing i t s c r e d i t and open market operations"' 
As we may know, the above o p e r a t i o n i s one of the funda-
mental operations to m a i n t a i n the par value of currency, and i s 
something w i t h i n the competence of member States of the Fund. 
To the above may be added the r i g h t accorded t o the Deutschi 
Bundesbank, i n accordance w i t h which i t can p a r t i c i p a t e i n the 
a c t i v i t i e s of su p r a - n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s such as B.l.S. 
A r t i c l e 4- of the same Act i n t h i s respect says:-
"The Deutsche Bundesbank s h a l l , be au t h o r i z e d t o p a r t -
i c i p a t e i n the Bank, f o r I n t e r n a t i o n a l Settlement and... i n 
other: i n s t i t u t i o n s s e r v i n g the purposes of a su p r a - n a t i o n a l 
currency p o l i c y or f a c i l i t a t i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l payments and 
2 
c r e d i t t r a n s a c t i o n s . . . " 
IV. INTERNAL LAWS GOVERNING THE PARTICIPATING 
INSTITUTIONS - FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS. 
So f a r , under the present Chapter, we observed t h a t the 
Sveriges Riksbank and the Deutsche Bundesbank are autonomous 
i n s t i t u t i o n s , performing f u n c t i o n s of State i n the f i e l d j o f 
monetary a c t i v i t i e s . This can be regarded as the main reason why 
Sweden and West Germany have given way t o these Banks t o 
p a r t i c i p a t e i n the a c t i v i t i e s of the Borrowing Scheme. 
1. Of. A r t i c l e 21 of the same Act. 
2. ' Cf. A r t i c l e 7 ( 3 ) , 19 (1-9) and 22 of the same Act. Of, 
also Appendices X I and X I I . 
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The t h i n g which s t r i k e s one's mind here i s how i s i t 
t h a t the Government o f Sweden and the Government o f West 
Germany were not f a c e d w i t h any l e g a l o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
d i f f i c u l t i e s when they decided to "become member States o f 
the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund; b u t , i n the case of the 
Borrowing Scheme, they have been fac e d w i t h l e g a l and 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d i f f i c u l t i e s to the degree t h a t they have 
given way t o t h e i r C e n t r a l Banks to take up the job o f 
becoming the " P a r t i c i p a n t s " i n the Borrowing Scheme? 
This question may be r a i s e d the o t h e r way round a l s o . 
The o t h e r way round, t h a t i s i f , f o r i n s t a n c e , the Govern-
ment of Sweden cannot d i r e c t the Svergies Riksbank i n the 
f i e l d of monetary a c t i v i t i e s , then how i s i t t h a t i t could 
serve as her " f i s c a l agency" under A r t i c l e V (1) o f the 
Fund's A r t i c l e s o f Agreement? 1 
1. See, f o r i n s t a n c e , A r t i c l e (2) o f "The Sveriges Riks-
bank A c t " of 30 June, 1934, where i t says:-
"The Riksbank may not take p a r t i n or c a r r y 
on .any k i n d o f business o t h e r than t h a t e x pressly 
p e r m i t t e d to the bank by the present Act." 
Take n o t i c e of the term "expressly p e r m i t t e d " i n the 
above c o n t e x t . Cf. Swedish" " B r e t t o n Woods Agreements 
Measures", "Excerpts from His Majesty's B i l l No. 89/ 1950" and "Excerpts from Report No. 8/1950 of the 
Banking Committee o f the Riksdag", e s p e c i a l l y Sections 
1 and 2. See Hans A u f r i c h t , " C e n t r a l Banking L e g i s l a -
t i o n " , V o l . I I , Europe, op. c i t . , pp. 699 - 701. Cf. 
also A r t i c l e 20, S e c t i o n 1, No. 2 o f the "Lav/ Con-
cern i n g the Deutsche Bundesbank". 
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The answer to the above qu e s t i o n , however, may be as 
f o l l o w s : -
1) Any i n s t i t u t i o n , or bank, can adopt d i f f e r e n t p o s i -
t i o n s and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s i n d i f f e r e n t spheres of i t s 
a c t i v i t i e s and a t d i f f e r e n t p eriods of time. And t h i s 
- i c 
could happen, i n respect o f j u . f i d i a l persons under bo t h 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l lav/ and the municipal law o f Countries."*" 
Therefore, i n so f a r as the Riksbank and the Bundesbank, 
are a c t i n g as " f i s c a l agencies" of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e Count-
r i e s under A r t i c l e V ( l ) o f the Fund's A r t i c l e s , o f 
p 
Agreement they are n o t h i n g more than the "agencies" 
1. Cf. C. H. Alexandrowicz, " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Economic 
Organizations", op. c i t . , p. 87; J. E. S. Fawcett, 
"Legal Aspects o f State T r a d i n g , " op. c i t . , p. 35 et 
seq.; B i n Cheng, (1958)» H » Current Legal Problems, 
p. 2 j l e t . seq.; F. A. Mann, "The Law Governing State 
Contracts", op. c i t . , p. 24-, e t . seq. The above 
p o i n t seems to be t r u e s p e c i f i c a l l y i n the case o f 
the Sveriges Riksbank, because on June 7> 1962, i t 
adhered to 'The D e c i s i o n 1 on b e h a l f of Sweden, and 
i t h e l d t h i s p o s i t i o n up to August 1, 1962, when 
"... the commitment of Sweden was ... t r a n s f e r r e d 
to the Sveriges Riksbank". See " I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Monetary Fund, 19^ -5 - 1965"> op. c i t . , volume I , p. 
512, i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h the Instrument of Adherence 
o f June 7, 1962, (Appendix V I ) and Annex to 'The 
Decision', (Appendix 1 7 ) . See also Appendix V I I I . 
Cf., however, Appendices XXVII and XXIX. 
2. Cf. Hans A u f r i c h t , "Comparative Survey of C e n t r a l 
Bank Law", op. c i t . , pp. 106 - 111. 
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of "their r e s p e c t i v e Countries. 
And, n a t u r a l l y , any f i n a l d e c i s i o n i n 
t h i s respect would r e s t w i t h the Government of Sweden 
and the Government of West Germany, and not w i t h t h e i r 
" f i s c a l agencies". But i n so f a r as the Riksbank and 
the Bundesbank are a c t i n g as the P a r t i c i p a t i n g I n s t -
i t u t i o n s , under the Borrowing Scheme, t h e i r s t a t u s and 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y have no connection w i t h A r t i c l e V(1) 
of the Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement, and i s to be 
subject t o the p r o v i s i o n s of 'The L e t t e r ' and 'The 
Decision' , as w e l l as the i n t e r n a l lav/s governing 
those I n s t i t u t i o n s . 
2) A second, but r a t h e r d i f f e r e n t answer t o the 
above question may be: i n the case of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Monetary Fund, a member would n e a r l y always approach 
the Fund w i t h a view to "borrowing" some currency 
from i t (as d i s t i n c t from l e n d i n g some currency t o 
i t ) ; but, the General Arrangements t o Borrow has 
been formulated, under A r t i c l e V I I (2) of the Fund's 
Agreement, and w i t h a view to r e p l e n i s h i n g the Fund's 
h.Qjdiiags;-';of s/pareevfeurrencies. This 'lending " t o 
the Fund (as d i s t i n c t from borrowing from i t ) 
can be done not only by the member States of the Fund, but 
also "by some o t h e r u n s p e c i f i e d "sources". 
Therefore, the P a r t i c i p a t i n g I n s t i t u t i o n s can o n l y 
"lend" money to the Fund and cannot borrow any currencies 
p 
from i t . 
1. See A r t i c l e V I I ( 2 ) of the Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agree-
ment, where i t sayss-
"Section 2. Measures to r e p l e n i s h the 
Fund's h o l d i n g of scarce c u r r e n c i e s . The 
Fund may, i f i t deems such a c t i o n a p p r o p r i a t e 
to r e p l e n i s h i t s holdings of any member's cu r -
rency, take e i t h e r o r b o t h o f the f o l l o w i n g 
steps: 
( i ) Propose to the member t h a t , on terms and 
c o n d i t i o n s agreed between the Fund and the member, 
the l a t t e r l e n d i t s currency to the Fund, o r t h a t , 
w i t h the approval o f the member, the Fund borrow 
such currency from some ot h e r source, e i t h e r 
w i t h i n o r ou t s i d e the t e r r i t o r i e s o f the member.." 
Take n o t i c e o f the passage "some ot h e r source e i t h e r 
w i t h i n o r o u t s i d e the t e r r i t o r i e s o f the member" i n the 
above c o n t e x t . Cf. U,N\ Monetary Documents, p. 311. 
Cf. also J. Gold, "The Fund and Non-Member S t a t e s , 
Some Legal E f f e c t s " , op. c i t . , p. 34. 
2. As we.shall see l a t e r , any P a r t i c i p a n t who i s approa-
ching the Fund's Managing D i r e c t o r f o r the purpose o f 
"borrowing" currencies under the Borrowing Scheme » 
should n e c e s s a r i l y be a member State o f the Fund, and 
not a P a r t i c i p a t i n g I n s t i t u t i o n . See i n f r a , under 
the Chapter "Consultative Arrangements o f the 
Borrowing Scheme". Cf. Paragraphs 11, 17 and 18 
of 'The De c i s i o n ' , Appendix IV. 
119 
And t h i s i s perhaps the reason why i n the case of -
" l e n d i n g " of curr e n c i e s t o the Fund, the Fund has not 
seen i t necessary t o take too many pr e c a u t i o n a r y measures, 
and would r a t h e r be prepared t o borrow the necessary 
currency from "any source". 
The competent a u t h o r i t i e s i n Sweden and "West Germany, 
however, might have looked a t t h i s from q u i t e a d i f f e r e n t ;v 
angle. That i s t o say, they might have thought t h a t the 
"l e n d i n g " of t h e i r currencies t o the Fund bears more im-
portance than the "borrowing" of some curr e n c i e s from i t . 
And t h i s i s perhaps the reason why i n the case of "borrow-
i n g " some currencies they have l e f t i t to the d i s c r e t i o n of 
t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e Governments; whereas i n the case o f . " l e n d -
i n g " they have p r e f e r r e d i t t o be d e a l t w i t h by some i n s t -
1 
i t u t i o n s immune from the i n f l u e n c e of the Government. 
V. CONCLUSION. 
P a r t i c i p a t i o n of the Riksbank and the Bundesba-hk i n 
the a c t i v i t i e s of the Borrowing Scheme seems t o be r e q u i r e d 
by the i n t e r n a l law and t o be due to the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
p o s i t i o n they h o l d i n the f i e l d of monetary a c t i v i t i e s of 
Sweden and West Germany. 
The f a c t t h a t any lo a n from Sweden and West Germany 
i s t o a t t a i n the acceptance of the Riksbank and the Bun-
desbank seems to be the main reason why the competent 
a u t h o r i t i e s in . these two Countries have p r e f e r r e d t o 
leave the p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the Borrowing Scheme t o these 
1. Cf. A r t i c l e 20, of the "Law Concerning the 
Deutsche Bundesbank" of J u l y , 1957. 
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Banks a l t o g e t h e r . This w i l l prevent the d u p l i c a t i o n of 
procedure t o he f o l l o w e d f o r every ""borrowing arrangement" 
(by both these C e n t r a l Banks and t h e i r Governments), 
which would have been the case had the Governments of 
Sweden and West Germany been the P a r t i c i p a n t s i n the Borrow-
i n g Scheme. This i s a necessary p r a c t i c a l step, because the 
s p e c u l a t i v e movement of hot money ( s u b j e c t - m a t t e r of the 
Borrowing Scheme) i s a d e l i c a t e and wide-spread problem, 
and i s something, t o be d e a l t w i t h w i t h i n the s h o r t e s t n e r i o d 
a Y\r\Lru.llVU.TVL of-
of time and w i t h l=e=s-s "procedure. An i n c i d e n t a l e f f e c t of 
the above step i s , however, t h a t i t leaves the issue of 
loa n i n these two Countries t o the d i s c r e t i o n of these 
autonomous and p r o f e s s i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , which i n s t i t u t i o n s 
are more immune from the i n f l u e n c e of p o l i t i c i a n s . 
The p o s i t i o n of these two Banks, n e v e r t h e l e s s , does 
not seem to have a f f e c t e d the s t a t u s of the Borrowing 
Scheme i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l ^ l a w , because,(as we have seen i n 
the preceeding Chapter) they are p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the 
Borrowing Scheme as o f f i c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s of t h e i r r e s -
p e c t i v e Countries, and .their r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s i n t h i s 
respect seem t o be i n d i v i s i b l e from those of the States 
of Sweden and West Germany. 
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CHAPTER THREE. 
STEPS NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT 
THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF 
'THE DECISION.' 
I - . . INTRODUCTION. 
Paragraph. 3 ( c ) of 'The Decision' i n p a r t 
says:-
"A member or i n s t i t u t i o n s h a l l adhere 
to t h i s d e c i s i o n by d e p o s i t i n g w i t h the 
Fund an instrument s e t t i n g f o r t h t h a t i t ... 
has taken a l l steps necessary t o enable i t 
t o c a r r y out the terms and c o n d i t i o n s of t h i s 
. . 1 Decision...» 
.What i s meant by the phrase "taken a l l steps 
necessary" i n the above Paragraph 3 (c)? Does i t 
o b l i g a t e the p a r t i c i p a n t s to take, i n t e r a l i a , 
l e g i s l a t i v e measures f o r the implementation of the 
terms and c o n d i t i o n s of 'The Decision'? 
With a view t o a s c e r t a i n i n g t h i s , we asked the 
1. See Appendix IV. 
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P a r t i c i p a n t s as t o the steps taken by them f o r the 
implementation of the terms and c o n d i t i o n s of 'The 
D e c i s i o n 1 . 
A study of the r e p l i e s t h a t we have' r e c e i v e d 
t i c f f c ; 
reveals the f a c t t h a t . ^ a l l the P a r t i c i p a n t s have 
jsrdr, taken necessary l e g i s l a t i v e measures f o r the 
implementation of the terms and c o n d i t i o n s of 'The 
Decision'. For ins t a n c e , i n the case of the Deutsche 
Bundesbank, we have re c e i v e d the f o l l o w i n g r e p l y : -
"Out i n s t i t u t i o n being immediate p a r t i c i p a n t 
i n the General Arrangements t o Borrow, Parliamen-
t a r y a c t i o n was not r e q u i r e d . " 
On the other hand, we have the Fund's statement, saying 
t h a t : -
"Ten main i n d u s t r i a l c o u n t r i e s , a f t e r 
necessary l e g i s l a t i v e a u t h o r i z a t i o n s have been 
obtained and they f o r m a l l y adhere t o the arrange-
2 
ments. w i l l stand ready t o l e n d t h e i r c u r r e n c i e s 
to the Fund...." ^ 
1. For Belgium, see Appendix X I I I ; see also B e l g i a n 
Law of January 4, 1963; c f . " I n t e r n a t i o n a l F i n a n c i a l 
News Survey", 1963, p.25. For Canada, see Appendix 
XIV; c f . the same Survey, year 1964, p.25. For the 
Deutsche Bundesbank., see Appendix XV; c f . the same 
Survey, year 1962. pp.189-190. For France; see 
Appendix XVI; ef. the same Survey, year 1962, pp. 
189-190. For I t a l y , see Accordi Generali Di P r e s t i t o 
Tra I I Fondo Monetario I n t e r n a t i o n a l e E 10 Paesi Suoi 
Membri, Roma, I ^ , s t i t u t o P o l i g r a f i c o D e l l o S t a t o , 1965; 
c f . ' t h e same Survey, year 1962, p.93. For Japan, 
we d i d not recei v e any r e p l y ; See, however, the same 
(f o o t n o t e s cont'd next, page) 
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Under the present Chapter we have i n v e s t i g a t e d 
the above question t o see whether the phrase "Taken 
a l l steps necessary" has - from the p o i n t of view of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law - o b l i g a t e d the P a r t i c i p a n t s t o 
take l e g i s l a t i v e measures, f o r the implementation of the 
terms and c o n d i t i o n s of 'The Decision'. Here we had t o 
lend help from the p r o v i s i o n s of the Fund's Agreement; 
1. Survey, page' 165. For the Netherlands, see 5 (1945) 
Nr. 2. ,. Tra c t a t e n b l a d Van Het K o n i n k r i j k Der 
Nederlanden, Jaargang 1962, Nr. 68; c f . the same 
Survey, year 1962, p.253. For the Sveriges 
Riksbank, see Appendix X V I I ; cf-. the same Survey, 
year 1962, p.245* For the United Kingdom, see 
"Arrangements f o r Borrowing by the I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Monetary Fund", H.M.S.O., Cmnd. 1656, March 1962; 
ef. the same Survey, year 1962, p.141. For the 
United States of America, see Appendix X V I I I ; 
. c f . the same Survey, year 1962. p.341. 
2. 'The D e c i s i o n 1 , t h a t is . . 
3. See I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund, Press Release, 
January '5, 1962. The above requirement, s t a t e d 
by the Fund, seems t o be in . c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the 
f a c t t h a t , under the C o n s t i t u t i o n of some of the 
Countries, f i n a n c i a l commitments of the Executive 
r e q u i r e l e g i s l a t i v e a u t h o r i t y . 
12£ 
because i t i s the wording of A r t i c l e XX (2 - a) 
of the F. A.A.which has in s p i r e d the provision of 
Paragraph 3 ( c ) , and the above standard phrase. 
For the above purpose we have attempted to 
consider ( a ) the Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement, 
and (b) the Fund Governing Bodies' views to 
see how these could throw l i g h t on the meaning and 
scope of e f f e c t of the phrase "taken a l l steps 
necessary". 
I I - THE FUND'S ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT 
A r t i c l e XX (2 - a) of the F.A.A.reads:-
"Section 2. Signature. (a) Each 
government on whose behalf this Agreement 
i s signed s h a l l deposit with the Government 
of the United States of America an 
instrument setting f o r t h that i t ... has 
taken a l l steps necessary to enable i t to 
carry out a l l of i t s obligations under this 
Agreement". 
Whether the phrase "taken a l l steps necessary" 
of the above a r t i c l e has obligated the Fund's member 
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States to transform a l l the provisions of the 
Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement into t h e i r municipal 
law i s a vexed question. 1 
What s t r i k e s one, however, w h i l s t studying the 
F.A.A.»is the s p e c i f i c form of drafting of Section 
10 of A r t i c l e IX. Section 10 of A r t i c l e IX speaks 
of the need f o r i n t e r n a l l e g i s l a t i v e measures, for 
the implementation of terms and conditions of 
A r t i c l e IX only. I t says:-
"Section 10. Application of A r t i c l e . 
Each member s h a l l take such action as i s 
necessary i n its-.--own t e r r i t o r i e s f o r the 
1. Here i t may be added the above provision 
of A r t i c l e XX has been accepted, by the U.N. 
S e c r e t a r i a t , as one of the standard provisions 
to be used i n international engagements. See 
"The United Nations' Handbook of.":Final Clauses", 
U.N. S e c r e t a r i a t , General, ST/LEG/1. 28 August, 
1951, p. 152. As yet, no l i g h t has been 
thrown on the meaning and scope of the e f f e c t s 
of the above provision and standard phrase. 
Therefore, the following considerations may 
be of some help i n c l a r i f y i n g the status Of 
the above provision i n international r e l a t i o n s 
as w e l l . Cf., however, I d . p. 
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purpose of making e f f e c t i v e i n terms of i t s 
own law the p r i n c i p l e s s e t f o r t h i n t h i s 
A r t i c l e and s h a l l inform the Fund of the 
de t a i l e d action which i t has taken." 1 
The inference here i s that the drafters of the 
F. A-A.have, "by implication, ruleidv out the necessity 
f o r taking i n t e r n a l l e g i s l a t i v e measures f o r the 
implementation of the terms and conditions of each 
and every part of the Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement. 
1. Cf. U.N. Monetary Documents, pp. 2^4, 459, 529, 
675, esp. Memorandum of the United Kingdom^ 
Delegation to Commission I , at p. 425. Cf. 
also "The P r a c t i c e of the United Nations, The 
S p e c i a l i z e d Agencies and the In t e r n a t i o n a l 
Atomic Energy Agency Concerning t h e i r Status, 
P r i v i l e g e s and Immunities, Part Two: the 
Organizations", U.N*, General Assembly, A/CN. 
4/L.118/Add. 1, 5th May, 1967, Chapter V I I I , 
Paragraph 6. 
2. Cf. J . E. S. Fawcett, "The I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Monetary Fund and International Law", 
op. c i t . , p. 70, footnote ( 6 ) . 
This, a t the same time, would mean that the 
phrase r ,takeh a l l steps necessary" of A r t i c l e 
XX (2 - a ) i i n i t s e l f does not obligate the Fund's 
member States to give i n t e r n a l l e g a l e f f e c t to a l l 
the provisions of the F. A. A. ^ 
Here one may go one step f u r t h e r end even 
doubt whether the wording of the above A r t i c l e IX 
(10) has gone so f a r as to obligating the Fund's 
member States to make the provisions of A r t i c l e 
IX part of t h e i r national law. This doubt springs 
mainly from the steps taken by member States of the 
Fund, pursuant to the provision of Section (10) of 
A r t i c l e IX. For t h i s reason we w i l l consider 
(under the following Heading) the steps^taken by 
some of the leading member States of the Fund, for 
the implementation of the terms and conditions of 
A r t i c l e IX; and to see how these members have 
understood the meaning and scope of e f f e c t of above 
Section (10) of A r t i c l e IX. This we s h a l l attempt 
with the understanding of the f a c t that the practice 
of States, i n t h e i r international r e l a t i o n s , 
1. Cf. U.N. Monetary Documents, pp. 291, 4-991 597, 687-688 and 797-798. 
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constitutes one of the major sources of i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law. 1 
STEPS TAKEN" BY SOME OF THE LEADING 
MEMBER STATES OF THE FUND, IN APP-
LICATION OF ARTICLE IX U P ) 
A r t i c l e IX of the Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement 
contains provisions concerning the Fund's Status 
Immunities and P r i v i l e g e s i n the t e r r i t o r i e s of 
i t s member States: and f o r our study here, we have 
chosen mainly the steps taken by the United States 
of America i n appl i c a t i o n of Section 10 of the above 
A r t i c l e IX. 2 5 
1. Cf. A r t i c l e 31 (3 - b) of the "Vienna 
Convention on the Law of T r e a t i e s " , op. c i t . , p.12; (1967), 61, A*J.I.L., pp. 385-386. 
Cf. also, F. A. Mann, "International Case Law", 
(1946), 22, 1, International A f f a i r s , p. 104; 
"The Legal Consequences of Sabbatino", (1965), 
51, V i r g i n i a Law Review, p. 617. 
2. Cf. Section 46 of Convention on the P r i v i l e g e s 
and Immunities of the S p e c i a l i z e d Agencies, 
"United Nations r ; Handbook of F i n a l Clauses," op. c i t . , p. 154. 
3. Steps taken by the United States of America i n 
t h i s respect are mainly: ( i ) United States 
Bretton Wood Agreements Act and Amendments 
(Public Law, 171, 79th Cong., 1st Sess' - 59 
S t a t . 512 ( W5)); ( i i ) United States I n t e r -
national Organisations Act (Public Law, 291, 
79th Cong. 1st Sess. 59 S t a t . , 669 (W-5)), 
and ( i i i ) The United States Executive Order 
9751 (3C.F.R. (W3-48 comp.) 558). 
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This choice has c h i e f l y been due to the 
f a c t that 
( i ) The Fund's headquarters have "been s i t u a t e d i n 
the t e r r i t o r i e s of the United States, and t h i s adds 
to the importance attached to the steps taken by 
the Government of the United States i n t h i s respect. 
I n other words, the question of the Fund's Status, 
Immunities and Pri v i l e g e s i s a more current issue i n 
the t e r r i t o r i e s of the United States than i n the 
t e r r i t o r i e s of any other member States of the Fund. ' 
( i i ) That the U.S. Government has not acceded to the 
"United Nations Convention on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the Specialised Agencies", of November 
p 
2 1 , 1947; and as such the above Convention cannot 
be invoked against the United States of America. 
1. The f o l l o w i n g i s what the Fund has said i n t h i s 
connections-
"These Statutes and r e l a t e d executive 
order (the above-mentioned U.S. Acts and 
Executive Order, that i s ) have been selected 
f o r i n c l u s i o n i n t h i s reference work (the 
Fund's Selected Decisions of the Executive 
Directors, that i s ) because the Fund's Head-
quarters are i n the United States and the 
Fund has no headquarters agreement."Se'er the:-Fund's 
Selected Decisions pp. 117, 146-171• Parentheses 
added. 
2. See Hans A u f r i c h t , " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund, 
Legal Bases, Structures, Functions ", op. c i t . , 
p. 18, footnote 23. Cf. D. W. Bowett, "The Law 
of I n t e r n a t i o n a l I n s t i t u t i o n s " , op. c i t . , p. 318 
•f'nnfcnntTP 8 ^ . 
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For the purpose of above study, we have chosen: 
( i ) The Provisions of Section 2 of A r t i c l e IX of 
the Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement, and steps taken 
by the U.S. Government pursuant to that p r o v i s i o n ; 
and 
( i i ) The provision of Section 8 of A r t i c l e IX of 
the Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement, and the steps taken 
by the U.S. Government pursuant to that provision. ^ 
( i ) SECTION 2 OF ARTICLE IX OF THE F. A .A . 
Section 2, of A r t i c l e IX of the Fund's A r t i c l e s 
of Agreement has conferred f u l l j u f i i d i a l p ersonality 
on the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund. I t says:-
"Section 2. Status of the Fund. 
the Fund s h a l l possess f u l l j - u i i d i a l 
p 
personality .... " 
As such, no q u a l i f i c a t i o n has been attached to 
the o b l i g a t i o n of the Fund's member States i n 
1. For the background of the above provisions of 
A r t i c l e IX, see U.N. Monetary Documents, pp. 
52, 129i 421-23, 426-427, 528, 573 and 674-675. 
2. Cf. "The Practice of the United Nations, The 
Specialized Agencies and the I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Atomic Energy Agency Concerning t h e i r Status, 
P r i v i l e g e s and Immunities", op. c i t . , p . 6. 
m 
implementating the terms and conditions of the 
above A r t i c l e IX, Section 2. 
By way of contrast, Section 1 of T i t l e I of 
the "United States I n t e r n a t i o n a l Organisations 
Immunities Act" has l e f t i t to the d i s c r e t i o n of 
the United States* A u t h o r i t i e s to c l a s s i f y , e.g.., 
the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund, as "an I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Organisation" or otherwise. 
This Section 1 of T i t l e I , i n p a r t , says:-
"For the purposes of t h i s t i t l e , the term 
" i n t e r n a t i o n a l organisation" means a p u b l i c 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l organisation i n which the United 
States p a r t i c i p a t e s pursuant to any t r e a t y ... 
and which s h a l l have been designated by the 
President ... as being e n t i t l e d to enjoy the 
p r i v i l e g e s , exemptions, and immunities herein 
provided. The President s h a l l be authorised, 
i n the l i g h t of the functions performed by any 
such i n t e r n a t i o n a l organisation ... to withhold 
or withdraw from any such organisation ... the 
p r i v i l e g e s , exemptions,and immunities provided 
f o r i n t h i s t i t l e ... or to condition or l i m i t 
the enjoyment by any such organisation ... of 
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any such p r i v i l e g e , exemption, or immunity* 
The President s h a l l "be authorised, i f i n 
hiis judgement such a c t i o n should be j u s t i f i e d 
by reason of the abuse by an i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
organisation ... of the p r i v i l e g e s , exemptions, 
and immunities herein provided or f o r any 
other reason, a t any timer':,,' to revoke the 
designation of any i n t e r n a t i o n a l organisation 
under t h i s section 
Therefore, what was expected to be accepted by 
c 
the United States, unconditionally ( juJd/dial 
personality of the Fund, that i s ) has been subjected 
t o : ( i ) designation of the President of the United 
States, and ( i i ) withholding or withdrawal of that 
designation, by the President of the United States, 
and ( i i i ) the r i g h t to conditioning or to l i m i t i n g 
the scope of operation of the above enjoyments, by 
the President of the United States. 
1. Take note of the passage:-
"... or f o r any reason, at any 
tirae ; to revoke the designation of any i n t e r n a t i o n a l organisation ... " 
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As such, the above provisions of Section 1 of 
T i t l e I of the "United States I n t e r n a t i o n a l Organi-
sations Immunities Act", do not seem to have met the 
requirements of Section 2 of A r t i c l e IX of the Fund's 
A r t i c l e s of Agreement. 
( i i ) SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE IX OF THE g-A.A. 
Section 8 of A r t i c l e IX of the Fund's A r t i c l e s of 
Agreement also speaks of unconditional p r i v i l e g e s and 
immunities to be accorded to the Fund's o f f i c e r s j and 
employees. I t says:-
"Section 8. Immunities and p r i v i l e g e s of 
o f f i c e r s and employees:- - / i l l governors, execu-
t i v e d i r e c t o r s , a lternates, o f f i c e r s and employees 
of the Ufund-
( i ) s h a l l be immune from l e g a l process w i t h 
respect to acts performed by them i n t h e i r o f f i c -
i i i 
i a l capacity.... 
By way of contrast, Section 8 of T i t l e I of the 
"United States I n t e r n a t i o n a l Organisations Immunities 
Act" has l e f t i t to the d i s c r e t i o n of the U.S. Secret-
ary of State to accord any Immunities and p r i v i l e g e s 
to the Fund's o f f i c e r s and employees. I t - says:-
1 . Cf. F. A. Mann, "In t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Co-operation", 
op. c i t . , p. 252. 
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"Section 8 .(a) ITo person s h a l l he e n t i t l e d to 
t h i s t i t l e ^ unless he ... s h a l l have been duly-
n o t i f i e d to and accepted by the Secretary of 
State as a representative, o f f i c e r or employee..." 
Therefore, the provisions of Section 8 of T i t l e 
I of the "United States I n t e r n a t i o n a l Organisations 
Immunities Act", do not seem to have met the r e q u i r e -
ments of Section 8 of A r t i c l e IX of the Fund's A r t i c l e s 
of Agreement. ^ 
But, before leaving the present argument we have 
to b r i n g i n t o picture the provisions of another United 
States enactment, that i s , the provisions of the "United 
States Bretton Woods Agreements Act and Amendments". 
1 . T i t l e I , that i s , which T i t l e covers status, 
immunities and P r i v i l e g e s of I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Organisations. 
2 . Cf. United States Ex. Rel. Roberto Santiesteban 
Casanova v. i ' i t z p a t r i c k , U.S. Dist. Ct. S.D.W.Y., 
16 January 1963. 214 Federal Supplement, p. 425, 
discussed by Michael Hardy i n h i s "Modern Diplo-
matic Lav/", 1968, Manchester University Press, pp. 
112 - 114. Cf. also Keeney v. United States, U.S. 
D i s t r i c t Court of Columbia, March 17, 1953> and 
Court of Appeal, D i s t r i c t of Columbia, August 26, 
1954, I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Reports, v o l . 20, 1953, 
pp .382 and 384. 
3 . Cf., however, The f i n d i n g s of the Federal Com-
munications Commission regarding Section 7 of 
A r t i c l e IX of the Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement, 
i n the " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Reports', 1955 : , » p, 705. 
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The f a c t i s that the provisions of the "United States 
Bretton Woods Agreements Act and Amendments" seems to 
s a t i s f y the requirements of Section 10 of A r t i c l e IX 
of the Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement. I t , i n i t s Sec-
t i o n 1 1 , states:-
"Section 1 1 . The provisions of A r t i c l e IX, 
Sections 2 to 9» both inclusive ... of the A r t i c -
les of Agreement of the Fund ... s h a l l have f u l l 
force and e f f e c t i n the United States and i t s 
t e r r i t o r i e s and possessions upon acceptance of 
membership by the United States i n , and the est-
blishment of, the Fund . i , " ^  
Therefore, Section 11 of the above United States' 
Act despite the provisions of the "United States 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Organisations Immunities Act" " has 
accorded f u l l force and e f f e c t to the provisions of 
A r t i c l e IX of the Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement i n the 
t e r r i t o r i e s and possessions of the United States. 
This, on the other hand, may drive us to the con-
clusion t h a t the provisions of the "United States Bretton 
Woods Agreement Act and Amendments" can hardly be recon-
c i l e d w i t h the provisions of the "United States I n t e r -
1 . See the Fund's Selected Decisions, p. 154. 
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national Organisations Immunities Act." ^ 
Here i t would perhaps "be useful to attempt to f i n d 
any way out of the possible inconsistencies between the 
provisions of the two above United States' Acts. I n 
other words, i t would be of some value to t r y to see 
which one of the two above United States Acts i s to 
p r e v a i l should there arise any inconsistency 
p 
between the provisions of the two. 
1. As we have seen, the provisions of the "United 
States I n t e r n a t i o n a l Organisations Immunities Act" 
seems to f a l l short of the requirements of Section 
10 of A r t i c l e IX; whereas the provisions of the 
"United States Bretton Woods Agreements Act"..do 
not. 
2. I n t h i s connection i t may be contended tha t the 
above suggested inconsistencies could not make any 
p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s ; because only one of the 
two above "Acts" should be applicable- i n the case 
of the In t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund's status, 
immunities and p r i v i l e g e s . 
This contention, however, can be answered by saying 
t h a t : -
( i ) Suppose that t h i s contention i s to be taken 
i n t o consideration, i t i s s t i l l necessary to ascer-
t a i n which one of the two above "Acts" i s to be 
the applicable one. 
( i i ) By the p u b l i c a t i o n of both "Acts" i n i t s 
Selected Decisions and Documents, the Fund has 
impl i e d l y accepted that both Acts are mutatis mut-
andis, applicable i n the case of the I.M.F.'s 
status immunities and p r i v i l e g e s . See the Fund's 
Selected Decisions, pp. 146 - 1 7 1 . Of. "The 
Practice of the United Nations, the Specialized 
Agencies and the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Atomic Energy 
Concerning t h e i r Status, Privileges and Immunities", 
op. c i t . , Add.2, pp. 69 - 70 . 
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The thing i s i f the contents of the "United 
States Bretton Woods Agreements Act" are to p r e v a i l 
i n connection w i t h the status, immunities and 
pr i v i l e g e s of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund 
i t would then mean that the requirements of Section 10 
of A r t i c l e IX of the Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement has 
been met by the United States of America. And, i f the 
contents of the "United States I n t e r n a t i o n a l Organisa-
tions Immunities Act" i s to p r e v a i l , i t would then 
mean that the requirements of Section 10 of A r t i c l e IX 
of the Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement have not been met 
by the United States of America. 
Now l e t us t u r n to the point as to how the above 
possible c o n f l i c t could be avoided or resolved. 
SUGGESTIONS CONCERNING THIS POSSIBLE CONFLICT 
1. One suggestion here i s ; since the "United States 
Bretton Woods Agreements Act" has be en approved on J l 
July, 194-5, and since the "United States I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Organisations Immunities Act" has been approved on 29 
December, 194-5» 1 therefore the former Act can be 
regarded as "lex prior;." and the l a t t e r one as "lex 
po s t e r i o r " . And lex po s t e r i o r l e g i p r i o r i 
1 . See Also U.S. Executive Order 9751 (3 C.F.R. (1945-
48 comp.) 5 5 8 ) . 
13 8 
deroigat.^ 
2 . The above argument, however, can be contended by-
saying that the "United States Bretton Woods Agreements 
Act" i s to deal w i t h only f i s c a l bodies of I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
2 
Organisations, as compared w i t h the "United States 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Organisations Immunities Act", which i s 
to deal w i t h the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Organisation^ as a whole. 
As such the former Act i s to be regarded as "lex 
s p e c i a l i s " as compared w i t h the l a t t e r one, which i s 
to be regarded as "lex generalis". And lex specialis 
3 
derogat generally. 
3. Another suggestion i n t h i s connection i s , since 
the "United States I n t e r n a t i o n a l Organisations Immunities 
1 . Cf. A r t i c l e 30 Paragraph 3 of "Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties", op. c i t . , p. 12 . Cf. 
also ( 1967 ) , 61, A. J.I.L.,pp. 34-2 - 34-2, 3^6 - 34-7. 
2 . That i s , o r i g i n a l l y the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary 
Fund, and the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Bank f o r Reconstruc-
t i o n and Development. 
3. Cf. Georg Schwarzenberger, " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law", 
Vol. I , Third E d i t i o n , London, Stevens and Sons 
Limited, 1957, PP. 508 - 5 1 1 . 
i s 9 
Act" i s to deal exclusively w i t h "status, immunities 
and p r i v i l e g e s " of i n t e r n a t i o n a l organisations, as such 
i t i s to be regarded as "lex s p e c i a l i s " , as compared 
w i t h the "United States Bretton Woods Agreements Act" 
which i s to deal w i t h "various aspects" of a c t i v i t i e s 
of the Bretton Woods Organisations (and which i s to be 
regarded as "lex generalis"). ^ 
4-. The above suggestion can also be countered by 
saying t h a t : Section 11 of the "United States Bretton 
p 
Woods Agreements Act" (and not that Act as a whole) 
i s to be regarded as "lex s p e c i a l i s " , i n comparison 
w i t h the "United States I n t e r n a t i o n a l Organisations 
Immunities Act" which i s to be regarded as "lex gen-
e r a l i s " (so f a r as status, immunities, and p r i v i l e g e s 
of the I.M.F. and the B.I.R.D. are concerned). ' I n 
1. As we may know, the "Bretton Woods Organisations" 
are mainly I.M.F. and I.B.R.D. And, i n t h i s t h i r d 
suggestion, the U.S. Act dealing w i t h them i s 
suggested to be regarded as "lex generalis". 
2. As we may have noticed, t h i s section 11 of the 
"United States Bretton Woods Agreements Act" i s 
exclusively dealing w i t h status, immunities and 
pr i v i l e g e s of the In t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund and 
the Bank f o r I n t e r n a t i o n a l Reconstruction and Dev-
elopment. 
3 . As we have seen, the "United States I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Organisations Immunities Act" i s dealing w i t h 
"status, immunities and p r i v i l e g e s " of the I n t e r -
n a t i o n a l Organisations as a whole; and thus, t h i s 
Act, i n t h i s f o u r t h suggestion, i s suggested to be 
regarded as "lex generalis". 
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other words, since the "United States I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Organisations Immunities Act" i s to be regarded ( i n 
t h i s context) as "lex generalis", thus i t s contents 
cannot over-ride the contents of Section 11 of the 
"United States Bretton Woods Agreements Act." 
Now, w i t h regard to the four above suggestionsj 
we could not come to any s p e c i f i c conclusion; because -
of the uncertainties which were involved. We could 
not accordingly see how f a r the provision of A r t i c l e 
IX of the Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement have been given 
the force of law i n the t e r r i t o r i e s of the Headquarters 
Country of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund. 
Nevertheless i f the aim here i s to construe the 
" i n t e n t i o n " of the two above U.S. Acts, i t seems easier 
to suggest that the re a l answer to the above possible 
c o n f l i c t should be sought from the d r a f t e r s and sponsors 
of the two above pieces of l e g i s l a t i o n . I n other words, 
i t seems easier to leave the question of the choice 
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of p r e v a i l i n g law, i n t h i s r e s p e c t , to the U.S. 1 a u t h o r i t i e s . 
T h i s suggestion, however, can h a r d l y s a t i s f y 
the t e s t of i n t e r n a t i o n a l l awyers; f o r the prov-
i s i o n s of one of the above Acts i s to give e f f e c t 
to i n t e r n a t i o n a l o b l i g a t i o n s of a Headquarters S t a t e . 
And to a p u b l i c i s t , the p r o v i s i o n s of the"United S t a t e s 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l O r g a n i z a t i o n s Immunities Act" should 
give way to the p r o v i s i o n s of the "United S t a t e s 
B r e t t o n Woods Agreements Act"; simply because the 
l a t t e r has been enacted w i t h a view to g i v i n g e f f e c t 
1. For the d i s c u s s i o n as to-the a p p l i c a b i l i t y 
of the U.S. laws concerning p r i v i l e g e s and 
immunities, see, g e n e r a l l y , M. Hardy, "Modern 
Diplomatic Law", o p . c i t . , pp.110-114, 117-126. 
Cf. F. A. Mann, " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Go-
operation", o p . c i t . , p..251 . fn.1. Cf. a l s o 
• U.fc/. Monetary Documents, p.426; "The P r a c t i c e 
of the United Nations, the S p e c i a l i z e d Agencies 
and the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Atomic Energy Concerning 
t h e i r S t a t u s , P r i v i l e g e s and Immunities", op. 
c i t . , Add. 2., p..69; D. W. Bowett, "The 
Law of I n t e r n a t i o n a l I n s t i t u t i o n s " , o p . c i t . , 
pp. 318 - 319. 
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to the p r o v i s i o n s of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l o b l i g a t i o n , 
t h a t i s , the p r o v i s i o n s of, i n t e r a l i a , A r t i c l e 
i IX of the Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement. 
1. Cf. F. A. Mann, " I n t e r n a t i o n a l D e l i n q u e n c i e s 
Before Municipal Courts", (1954), 70,. 
L.Q.R., pp.182, 194; "The I n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
of Uniform S t a t u t e s " , o p . c i t . , p.281.; 
"Money i n P u b l i c I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law", R e c u e i l 
des, Cours, o p . c i t . , p.79. Of. also- J . Gold, 
"The Cuban I n s u r a n c e Cases and the A r t i c l e s 
of the Fund", I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund, 
Washington-, D.C., 1966, pp. 13 and 18, 
• " I n t e r p r e t a t i o n by. the Fund", o p . c i t . , pp.32 - 37. 
" D e c i s i o n of the Swiss F e d e r a l C o u n c i l on the 
l e g a l -status of permanent d e l e g a t i o n s of Member 
Stages to the European O f f i c e of the united 
Nations and to other i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s 
w i t h headquarters i n S w i t z e r l a n d " , United • 
Nations S e c r e t a r i a t D i s t r i c t General, ST/LEG/2, 
September 1952, pp.219 - 222, a t p.221; 
"Ba l f o u r , Guthrie & Co., Li m i t e d , et a l . v. 
United S t a t e s et a l . " No. 253-25, United S t a t e s 
D i s t r i c t Court, N.D. C a l i f o r n i a , S.D. May 5, 1950, 
. 90 F. Suppl. p.834; "The .Pra c t i c e of the United 
Nations, the S p e c i a l i z e d Agencies and the I n t e r -
N a t i o n a l Atomic Energy Agency concerning t h e i r 
S t a t u s , P r i v i l e g e s and Immunities", United -
Nations, A/C. N.4/L.118, 8 th March, 1967, 
pp. 56 - 59. . 
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I I I - THE FUND GOVERNING BODIES' VIEWS 
Under the present Heading we s h a l l mainly t r y to 
see how f a r the Fund Governing Bodies* pronouncements 
could throw l i g h t on the meaning and scope of the 
phrase • . ?t.aken a l l steps necessary" of A r t i c l e XX 
(2 - a) of the Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement. 
The main Decision we are going to consider here 
i s the Fund's Decision concerning the contents of A r t -
i c l e V I I I (2 - b) of the Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement. 
The f a c t i s that u n t i l 194-9 the only provisions 
of the Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement which seemed cer-
t a i n to require i n t e r n a l l e g i s l a t i o n were the provisions 
of A r t i c l e IX. Whether there was any other provision 
of the Fund's Agreement, r e q u i r i n g i n t e r n a l l e g i s l a t i o n 
i n the t e r r i t o r i e s of the Fund's member State, was not 
clear. At t h i s time, due to d i f f e r e n t conclusions 
reached by d i f f e r e n t j u d i c i a l bodies i n connection w i t h 
A r t i c l e V I I I of the Fund's Agreement, the Fund had to 
step i n and c l a r i f y some l e g a l points i n t h i s 
1 . See Unenforceability of Exchange Contracts: Fund's 
I n t e r p r e t a t i o n of A r t i c l e V I I I , Section 2-b, the 
Fund's Decision No. 446 -4 , 10 June, 1949, i n the 
Fund's Selected Decision, pp. 73 - 74 . 
1^ 4 
respect. ^ The r e s u l t was the Fund's i n t e r p r e t a t i v e 
Decision No. 446-4. 
The Fund Executive Board, i n th i s Decision, 
pointed out that the Fund's member States, by accep-
t i n g the Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement, have under-
taken to make c e r t a i n other provisions of the Fund's 
A r t i c l e s of Agreement part of t h e i r "national law". 
This Decision, i n p a r t , reads:-
"The Board of Executive Directors of the 
In t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund has interp r e t e d ... 
the f i r s t sentence of A r t i c l e V I I I , Section 2(b), 
which provisions reads as f o l l o w s : 
Exchange contracts which involve the currency o f 
any member and which are contrary to the exchange 
con t r o l regulations of t h a t member maintained or 
imposed consistently w i t h t h i s Agreement; s h a l l 
be unenforceable i n the t e r r i t o r i e s of any member* 
The meaning and e f f e c t of t h i s p r o v i s i o n are as 
fo l l o w s : -
1) 
1 . See Ervin P. Hexner, " I n t e r p r e t a t i o n by Public 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Organisations of t h e i r Basic I n s t r u -
ments", ( 1 9 5 9 ) , 53, A . J . I . I * , p* 359. 
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2. By accepting the Fund Agreement, members 
have undertaken to mate the p r i n c i p l e mentioned 
above e f f e c t i v e l y part of t h e i r national law. 
This applied to a l l member ..." 1 
Therefore, according to t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i v e 
Decision, i t i s not only the provisions of A r t i c l e 
IX of the Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement which requires 
i n t e r n a l l e g i s l a t i v e measures. And there may w e l l be 
some other provisions of the Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agree-
ment, such as the above A r t i c l e V I I I (2-b), which 
could require necessary i n t e r n a l l e g i s l a t i v e measures. 
The main d i f f i c u l t y , however, concerning the 
above i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s i n that i t s compass can hardly 
1. Cf. J. E. S. Fawcett, "The Law of Nations", op. 
c i t . , p. 102, et. seq., esp. where he sayss-
"Treaties may, f o r t h e i r proper execu-
t i o n and observance, c a l l as we have seen 
f o r changes i n the domestic law of countries 
which enter i n t o them: f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y 
a country cannot be heard to s;ay that i t can-
not implement the t r e a t y because i t s domestic 
law, incl u d i n g i t s c o n s t i t u t i o n , prevent i t . 
I t must eith e r refuse to accept the t r e a t y , 
or bring i t s domestic law in t o conformity 
w i t h i t ... " 
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be circumscribed; f o r i f the Fluid's member States are 
obliged to make the p r i n c i p l e mentioned i n A r t i c l e V I I I 
(2-b)"part of t h e i r national law" then why the same 
reasoning cannot be extended to cover the p r i n c i p l e s 
of other provisions of the Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement; 
and why one cannot conclude that the phrase "take'ii. 
a l l steps necessary" bears the o b l i g a t i o n f o r making 
a l l the provisions of the Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement 
part of national law of the Fund's member States? I n 
other words i f by reason of the f a c t that the Fund's 
member States have i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y accepted the Fund's 
A r t i c l e s of Agreement, they "have undertaken to make 
the p r i n c i p l e of A r t i c l e V I I I (2-b) e f f e c t i v e l y part 
of t h e i r national law", then why the same reasoning 
cannot be extended to cover the provision of, say, 
A r t i c l e IV, Section 3 of the F. A.A,? 
This contention, however, can be answered by saying 
that:by entrusting the power of " i n t e r p r e t a t i o n " to the 
Fund's Executive D i r e c t o r s , 1 the Fund's member States 
have accepted t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i v e Decisions as author-
1. See A r t i c l e X V I I I (a) of the Fund's A r t i c l e s of 
Agreement. 
14? 
i t a t i v e and "binding. 
Therefore, i f the Fund's Executive Directors have 
been asked to d e l i v e r a given i n t e r p r e t a t i v e r u l i n g , 
then i t has he en l e g a l l y l e f t to them to say t h a t ; -
"By accepting the Fund-: Agreement., members 
have undertaken to make the p r i n c i p l e mentioned 
2 
above e f f e c t i v e l y part of t h e i r national law". 
As such,, the e f f e c t s of the r u l i n g of the above 
passage cannot automatically be stretched to cover a l l 
the provisions of the Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement. I n 
other words, i t cannot be concluded that the F.E.D. i s 
of the opinion that a l l the p r i n c i p l e s mentioned i n the 
Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement should be given the force 
1. Cf. however, Ervin P. Hexner, " I n t e r p r e t a t i o n by-
Public I n t e r n a t i o n a l Organisations of t h e i r Basic 
Instruments", op. c i t . , pp.353-356. Cf. also F.A. 
Mann, "The Legal Aspects of Money", op. c i t . , p. 
385, footnote 2. 
2. Take note of the phrase " p r i n c i p l e mentioned above" 
of the above passage, whose compass cannot e a s i l y 
be extended to cover a l l the p r i n c i p l e s of the 
Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement. Cf. U IT Monetary 
Documents pp. 54-55, 287-288, 334, 341, 502, 576* 
671, 780. 
3. Cf. Sarah E. Parker, "The I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary 
Fund: Public and Private I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Aspects", 
(1969), 47, Northern Carolina Lav/ Review, pp. 836-
861, at p. 856. 
of law i n the t e r r i t o r i e s of the Fund's member States. 
And the question as to which of the p r i n c i p l e s of the 
Fund's Agreement are to be given the force of law seems 
to t u r n on the nature of that very p r i n c i p l e . For i n -
stance, Professor Nussbaum, w i t h regard to the p r i n c i p l e 
of A r t i c l e V I I I (2-b), of the Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agree-
ment, has stated t h a t : -
"... The United States, England, Canada, the 
P 
Phil, ipine Republic and Costa Rica have i n t h e i r 
enabling Acts, e x p l i c i t l y conferred the q u a l i t y 
of i n t e r n a l law upon A r t i c l e V I I I , Section (2-b) 
( 1 ) . Evidently, i t i s the theory of the govern-
ments of these countries that without such acti o n 
the p r o v i s i o n would be devoid of any actual e f f e c t 
and that therefore i t s "incorporation" i s obliga-
t o r y under the general rule of A r t i c l e XX, Section 
2(a). 1 That theory seems to be f u l l y j u s t i f i e d 
as otherwise A r t i c l e V I I I Section 2(b) (1) would 
be a t h i n g of nought; i t s incorporation i s there-
1. Take note of the term "general rule of A r t i c l e XX, 
Section 2 ( a ) " i n the above context. 
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1 • f o r n e c e s s a r y to " c a r r y out" the o b l i g a t i o n s imposed 
2 
upon.the Government by the Agreement." 
So f a r , under the present Heading, we-observed t h a t 
to the- Fund '.s E x e c u t i v e D i r e c t o r s the 
o b l i g a t i o n of making p r o v i s i o n s of the. Fund's A r t i c l e s of 
. Agreement p a r t of n a t i o n a l law 'of the Fund 1 s. member States,, i s 
not l i m i t e d to the p r i n c i p l e s of. A r t i c l e IX of the Fund's-. 
A r t i c l e s of Agreement. And the p r i n c i p l e mentioned i n A r t i c l e 
V I I I ( 2 - b ) , ~ should a l s o be given-the f o r c e of law i n the. t e r r -
i t o r i e s of the Fund's member S t a t e s . 
The . Fund' s .'General Counsel seems to b e l i e v e that.' 
the above o b l i g a t i o n transcends even the p r o v i s i o n s of 
A r t i c l e ' I X and A r t i c l e V I I I ( 2 - b ) . He s a y s : -
"The duty.to t r e a t .c e r t a i n c o n t r a c t s as unenfor- . 
• ceable is-'not confined to .contracts, t h a t a r e c o n t r a r y 
to exchange c o n t r o l r e g u l a t i o n s which d e a l w i t h c u r r e n t 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a n s a c t i o n s ; i t a p p l i e s e q u a l l y to 
regulations t h a t c o n t r o l c a p i t a l t r a n s f e r s . Again the duty 
binds a l l members- and not merely t h e . A r t i c l e V I I I 
group,, even though the duty i s to be found i n '.• " 
1. , Take note a l s o of the word "necessary", i n the 
above context. Cf. the word "n e c e s s a r y " of standard 
phrase of A r t i c l e XX ( 2 - a j of the Fund's A r t i c l e s of 
Agreement, 
2. See Arthur Nussbaum, "Money i n the Law. N a t i o n a l 
. .,' and I n t e r n a t i o n a l " , Columbia U n i v e r s i t y , Brooklyn, 
; The Foundation P r e s s I n c . , 1950, pp.544-545. See ' 
a l s o Lord McNalr, "The Law of T r e a t i e s " , op., c i t . , 
p. 136,- footnote 3. 
A r t i c l e V I I I . 1 
I n one instance, the Fund has gone even "beyond 
t h i s stage, that i s , i n the case of prospective member 
States of the Fund. I n that case, the prospective 
1. See J. Gold, "The I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund and 
Private Business Transactions Some Legal 
Effe c t s of the A r t i c l e s of Agreement", I.M.F.t Washington D.C.»1965, p. 24. We have quoted the 
above passage w i t h a view to conveying the views 
of one of the Fund's a u t h o r i t i e s i n that the o b l i -
gation of the Fund's member States to give i n t e r -
nal l e g a l e f f e c t to the provisions of the Fund's 
A r t i c l e s of Agreement transcends the provisions 
of A r t i c l e V I I I . And the above quotation seems 
to be self-explanatory, so f a r as that aspect of 
our argument goes. We, however, admit that to 
fo l l o w other l e g a l t e c h n i c a l i t i e s involved 
i n the above quotation require some f a m i l -
i a r i t y w i t h the l e g a l h i s t o r y as w e l l as j u d i c i a l 
decisions so f a r have been made i n connection w i t h 
A r t i c l e V I I I of the Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement. 
And t h i s subject-matter has been adequately ex-
plored by d i f f e r e n t w r i t e r s on i n t e r n a t i o n a l mone-
ta r y law. For t h i s the in t e r e s t e d readers are 
referre d to a series of a r t i c l e s w r i t t e n by J. 
Gold i n the I.M.F.'s "Staff Papers" under the 
Heading of "The Fund Agreement i n the Courts". 
For the reference to these and other a r t i c l e s , 
w r i t t e n by the same w r i t e r , i n t h i s respect, see 
the Bibliography attached to t h i s work. See also, 
A. Nussbaum, "Money i n the Law National and 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l " , op. c i t . , pp. 54-0-54-6; F. A. Mann, 
"Int e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Lav;", Lucerne Meeting, op. 
c i t . , pp. 235-290; "Money i n Public I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Law", Recue.il des Cours, op. c i t . , pp. 47 r' 74> 
"The Legal Aspect of Money", op. c i t . , pp. 378-
387; C. H. Alexandrowicz, "World Economic Agencies", 
op. c i t . , pp. 189-198. The above l i t e r a t u r e w i l l , 
at the same time, reveal that the above requirements 
of A r t i c l e V I I I have not been f u l l y met i n the 
t e r r i t o r i e s of the Fund's member States. 
member S t a t e s are to give "the f o r c e of law" to a l l 
p r o v i s i o n s of the Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement. Other-
wise they most probably would l o s e the chance of be-
coming member S t a t e s of the Fund. 
The d r a f t of "Memorandum of law" which i s 
to be s i g n e d and submitted to the Fund, by the pro-
s p e c t i v e member S t a t e s has t h i s to say i n t h i s 
r e s p e c t : -
" I . The Government of ( c o u n t r y ) has decided to 
adhere to the p r o v i s i o n s of the A r t i c l e s of Agree-
ment of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund i n a c c o r d -
ance w i t h the c o n d i t i o n s d e f i n e d by the Board of 
Governors of the Fund ... 
I I 
I I I . The A r t i c l e s of Agreement of the I n t e r n a t -
i o n a l Monetary Fund have the f o r c e of lav/ i n the 
t e r r i t o r y of ( c o u n t r y ) s i g n M i n i s t e r o f 
J u s t i c e , or other s i m i l a r o f f i c i a l of p r o s p e c t i v e 
member" 1 
1. See the Fund's "Information on F i l i n g A p p l i c a t i o n 
f o r Membership", op. c i t . , Appendix E . As to the 
d e f i n i t i o n of the "Memorandum of Law" the same 
Inf o r m a t i o n s a y s : -
"Memorandum of Law signed by an appropriate 
o f f i c i a l of the Government, p r e f e r a b l y the 
M i n i s t e r of J u s t i c e or M i n i s t e r of F o r e i g n 
A f f a i r s . The purpose of the Memorandum of 
Law i s to inform the Fund on the law and the 
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T h i s , y e t can h a r d l y b r i n g us to the c o n c l u s i o n 
t h a t the phrase "taken a l l steps n e c e s s a r y " of A r t i c l e 
XX (2-a) has o b l i g a t e d the Fund's member S t a t e s to give 
the f o r c e of lav; to a l l the p r o v i s i o n s of the Fund's 
A r t i c l e s of Agreement; because I n the case of i t s " o l d " 
member s t a t e s , the Fund so f a r has been q u i t e s a t i s f i e d 
i f . i t could see only the few above-mentioned p r o v i s i o n s 
had been given the f o r c e of law i n the t e r r i t o r i e s of i t s 
•1 
member S t a t e s . 
And tile s i t u a t i o n i n the case of the above d r a f t 
"Memorandum of Law" seems to be something not much a f f e c -
t e d by the p r o v i s i o n s of A r t i c l e XA (2-a,), but something 
mostly a f f e c t e d by the b a r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n the Fund holds 
v i s - a - v i s i t s p r o s p e c t i v e member States:. 
A f t e r a l l there are some p r o v i s i o n s of the F.A.A. which 
« do not r e q u i r e i n t e r n a l l e g i s l a t i o n f o r t h e i r proper performance 
footnote cont'd. 
p r a c t i c e of the p r o s p e c t i v e member i n regard to acceptance 
of i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreements, and to d e s c r i b e the steps 
taken to enable i t to c a r r y out i t s o b l i g a t i o n s under the 
Fund Agreement... Copies of laws, decrees, or s p e c i f i c prov-
i s i o n s of laws or decrees r e f e r r e d to i n the Memorandum of 
Lav/- should be forwarded w i t h t h a t document..*1 See Id.p.4. 
1. See. F.A.Mann, "The Exchange Con t r o l Act, 1947" (1947), 10, 
Modern Law Review, p..418, Cf. the same author "Le g a l Aspect 
of Money", o p . c i t . , p.384, footnote 2. See a l s o J . Gold, 
"The I n t e r n a t i o n a l . Monetary Fund and P r i v a t e B u s i n e s s Trans-
a c t i o n s " , o p . c i t . , pp.20-31. See esp. views expressed by 
the U.S. S o l i c i t o r - G e n e r a l i n connection w i t h the Banco de 
B r a s i l , S.A. v. A.C. I s r a e l Commodity Co., Inco.Case,. a t pp. 
29,30 and 31; C.H. Alexandrowicz, "World Economic Agencies" 
op.cit.pp.193-194, e s p e c i a l l y footnote 53; " I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Law A s s o c i a t i o n " y e a r 1952, p.255. The above l i t e r a t u r e 
would a l s o show t h a t how f a r the above few p r o v i s i o n s of the 
fund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement have been r e s p e c t e d i n the 
t e r r i t o r i e s ' of the Fund's member S t a t e s . 
2. See e.g.,. A r t i c l e X of theFund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement. 
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CONCLUSION. 
To sum up our' c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , under the pre s e n t 
Chapter, we can conclude t h a t the phrase "taken a l l 
steps n e c e s s a r y " of A r t i c l e XX ( 2 - a j , o b l i g a t e s the 
la n d ' s member S t a t e s to take i n t e r n a l l e g i s l a t i v e measures 
f o r the implementation of only those p a r t s of the Fund's 
A r t i c l e s of Agreement which " n e c e s s i t a t e " i n t e r n a l l e g i s -
• 1 
l a t i o n . I n other words, the above phrase does not 
o b l i g a t e the Fund's member S t a t e s to transform . a l l the 
p r o v i s i o n s of the Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement i n t o t h e i r • 
i n t e r n a l law. 
Th i s has been.supported by the f a c t t h a t only on two 
major o c c a s i o n s have a l l the member S t a t e s been expected to 
giv e i n t e r n a l l e g a l a u t h o r i t y to the p r o v i s i o n s of the 
Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement, t h a t i s , i n the case of 
(a ) A r t i c l e IX, and (b) A r t i c l e V I I I ( 2 - b ) . 
( a ) I n the case of A r t i c l e IX there i s an express-
p r o v i s i o n to the e f f e c t t h a t "Each member s h a l l take such 
a c t i o n as i s n e c e s s a r y i n i t s own t e r r i t o r i e s for- the purpose 
of making e f f e c t i v e i n terms of i t s own lav/ the p r i n c i p l e s 
s e t f o r t h i n t h i s A r t i c l e . . . " Therefore, the nature of 
commitments of A r t i c l e IX ( p r i v i l e g e s and immunities) and 
the s p e c i f i c d r a f t i n g of A r t i c l e I X ( 1 0 ) , i n d i c a t e t h a t the 
phrase "taken a l l steps n e c e s s a r y " of A r t i c l e XX (2-a) does 
1 Cf. J . E. S. Fawcett, "The L e g a l C h a r a c t e r of 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Agreements", op. c i t . , p.391. 
not o b l i g a t e the Fund's member S t a t e s to give i n d i s -
c r i m i n a t e l y i n t e r n a l l e g a l e f f e c t to a l l the p r o v i s i o n s 
of the Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement. 
(b) I n the case of A r t i c l e V I I I ( 2 - b ) , a l s o the p o s i t i o n 
seems to be of an e x c e p t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r , t h a t i s , the 
commitments contemplated t h e r e i n seem to n e c e s s i t a t e 
i n t e r n a l l e g i s l a t i o n f o r theirjproper performance, without 
which A r t i c l e V I I (2-b) woiild be a t h i n g 01 nought. T h i s 
f a c t has been confirmed by an a u t h o r i t a t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
g i ven under A r t i c l e X V I I I of the Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement. 
I n other words, i t i s the wording of A r t i c l e V I I I (2-b) 
which c r e a t e s the l e g a l o b l i g a t i o n to give i n t e r n a l l e g a l 
e f f e c t s to i t s p r o v i s i o n s , an o b l i g a t i o n u n d e r l i n e d by the 
d e c i s i o n taken under A r t i c l e X V I I I . 
Lack of n e c e s s i t y to give i n t e r n a l l e g a l e f f e c t to 
a l l the p r o v i s i o n s of the Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement, 
however, does not mean t h a t , so f a r as i n t e r n a t i o n a l lav/ 
i s concerned, the Fund's member S t a t e s are not under t r e a t y • 
1 
o b l i g a t i o n to perform the Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement. 
1-. Cf. J . ¥. Bridge, "The L e g a l Nature of Acts of 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l O r g a n i s a t i o n s and I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Courts and the L e g a l S t a t u s of such a c t s i n Municipal 
Law", I n t e r n a t i o n a l Academy of Comparative Law, 
E i g t h I n t e r n a t i o n a l Congress of Comparative Law, 
S e c t i o n IV. TOPICAiL'. p.2. et seq. 
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The same argument can be r a i s e d i n connection . 
w i t h the phrase "taken of a l l s t e p s n e c e s s a r y " of 
Paragraph 3 ( e ) of 'The D e c i s i o n ' . Although a l l the 
commitments of the P a r t i c i p a n t s would remain v a l i d in-
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, y e t the i n c o r p o r a t i o n of the above 
phrase i h t h e i r "instrument of adherence" does not seem 
to have o b l i g a t e d them-to transform the p r o v i s i o n s of 
'The D e c i s i o n ' i n t o t h e i r m u n i c i p a l laws. I n other 
words, so f a r as the Paragraphs of 'The D e c i s i o n 1 are 
concerned, n e i t h e r has there been contemplated commitments 
of the nature of commitments of- A r t i c l e IX and A r t i c l e V T l I 
( 2 - b ) , nor are there, any s o e c i a l i n t e r p r e t a t i v e powers l i k e 1 ' t h a t of A r t i c l e ' X Y I I I , f o l l o w i n g which one can c l a i m t h a t 
some of the Paragraphs of 'The D e c i s i o n ' should have been 
given the f o r c e of law i n the t e r r i t o r i e s of t h e P a r t i c i p a n t s 
Therefore, those P a r t i c i p a n t s who have not taken some, or 
a n y • i n t e r n a l l e g a l s t e p s , f o l l o w i n g t h e i r adherence to 'The 
D e c i s i o n ' , do not seem to have been o b l i g a t e d to do so; and 
the Fund's statement, contained i n the P r e s s R e l e a s e of 
January'5, 196-2.,' seems to be an e x h o r t a t i o n . F a i l u r e i n p a r t 
some of the P a r t i c i p a n t s i n t h i s r e s p e c t , does not however,. 
s.eem to have a f f e c t e d t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n s under 'The D e c i s i o n ' 
so f a r as i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i s concerned. 
1. Contra, see Paragraph 20, of 'The D e c i s i o n ' , 
Appendix, IV. 
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CHAPTER POUR 
CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENTS OP THE 
BORROWING SCHEME 
I - INTRODUCTION 
Under the present Chapter we have f i r s t attempted 
to see how the c o n s u l t a t i v e a.rrangements of the Borrow-
ing Scheme work i n p r a c t i c e ; and what s e t s of o b j e c t i v e s 
are to "be achieAred thereunder. An examination of the 
o b j e c t i v e s to be achieved (under c o n s u l t a t i v e arrange-
ments of the Borrowing Scheme), on the one hand, and a 
p e r u s a l of what has been developing i n the course of 
time, ( i n the f i e l d of a c t i v i t i e s of the Group of Ten) 
on the other, w i l l prove the f a c t t h a t the scope of 
a c t i v i t i e s of the Group of Ten has f a r transcended the 
l i m i t s of " C o n s u l t a t i v e Arrangements" of the Borrowing 
Scheme. 
Under the present Chapter,however, we have t r i e d 
to c h a r t those c o n s u l t a t i v e arrangements of the Group 
of Ten which are founded i n the terms and c o n d i t i o n s , 
of 'The l e t t e r ' and 'The D e c i s i o n ' . To achieve t h i s , 
we have considered the c o n s u l t a t i v e arrangements of 'The 
L e t t e r ' and 'The D e c i s i o n ' once s e p a r a t e l y , 
and f o r the second time, i n connection w i t h each other. 
As r e f e r r e d to e a r l i e r , p a r t s of the a c t i v i t i e s of 
the Group of Ten have not been a n t i c i p a t e d i n the E a r a -
15 7 
graphs of the Borrowing Scheme; hut even those parts of 
t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s which have- been anticipated i n the Para-
graphs of the Borrowing Scheme do not seem to have been 
abided by s a t i s f a c t o r i l y . 
For instance, we s h a l l see that some bodies and 
e n t i t i e s , unknown to the dr a f t e r s of the Borrowing Scheme, 
have taken active part i n the monetary a c t i v i t i e s of the 
Borrowing Scheme. I t i s i n the course of t h i s study that 
we come across the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the representative 
of Economics Mi n i s t r y of West-Germany f u r t h e r to the 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the Deutsche Bundesbank i n the a c t i -
v i t i e s of the Borrowing Scheme. This unfamiliar p a r t i c i -
pation of a u t h o r i t i e s of the Mi n i s t r y of Economics of 
West-Germany has s u r p r i s i n g l y some contractual evidence 
i n support of i t , and w i l l c o nstitute our l a s t Heading 
under the present Chapter. Then w i l l come our conclusions 
and suggestions. Now, l e t us turn to the d e t a i l s of the 
f i r s t of the above-mentioned issues. 
I I - PURPOSES AND MECHANISM 
Before any "borrowing arrangement" can be worked out, 
a series of consultative arrangements are to take place. 
These consultative arrangements are formulated w i t h a 
view to i n v e s t i g a t i n g the merit and magnitude of any 
"borrowing arrangement". This involves p r i m a r i l y the 
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question as to whether a given "borrowing arrangement11 
i s necessary "to f o r e s t a l l or cope w i t h an impairment 
of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary System." 1 I f t h i s neces-
s i t y can be ascertained,then other questions would be: 
(1) the shape of the "borrowing arrangement", and 
whether i t should be i n the form of a single "exchange 
transaction" or i n the form of several "exchange trans-
p 
actions". Several "exchange transactions" usually 
5 4 
constitute a "stand-by-arrangement". 
1. See Preamble to 'The Decision', Appendix IV. For the 
f i r s t "borrowing arrangement" a c t i v a t e d w i t h the help 
of consultative arrangements of the Borrowing Scheme, 
see " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Financial News Survey", 1964, p.433. 
2. See, e.g., Sub-Paragraphs (a) and (d) of Paragraph 7 
of 'The Decision', Appendix IV. 
3. As regards the d e f i n i t i o n of "stand-by-arrangement", 
see supra, under the Chapter " P a r t i c i p a t i n g I n s t i t u -
tions and the F. A. A". With-regard to the d e f i n i t i o n 
of "exchange transactions" i n general, J. Marcus 
Fleming has t h i s to say: 
"transactions between the Fund and i t s mem-
bers take the form of an exchange of currency 
against currency, or an exchange of currency 
against gold. One of the currencies involved 
i s generally that of the member making the 
transaction ... Members who wish to use the 
Fund's resources to make i n t e r n a t i o n a l payments, 
purchase from the Fund some f o r e i g n currency they 
can use, and pay to the Fund a corresponding 
amount of t h e i r own currency, which the Fund 
then holds ...." 
See J. Marcus Fleming "The I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund 
I t ' s Form and Functions", op. c i t . , p. 28. Of. J. 
Gold, "The Fund and Non-Member States Some Legal 
E f f e c t s " , op. c i t . , p. 25. 
4. Here i t may be noticed that by the term "borrowing arrangement" i n t h i s Chapter, we mean both "an exchange 
transaction" and "a stand-by;r£irrangement". Cf. Paragraph 
7f a N 'The I l o n i c i n n l 
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(2) another thing to be hammered out, w i t h the 
help of these consultative arrangements, i s the magni-
tude and the choice of currencies to be borrowed f o r a 
"Borrowing arrangement". I n other words, i t i s w i t h i n 
the stage of "consultaibive arrangements" which the 
Parti c i p a n t s (together w i t h the Fund's a u t h o r i t i e s ) 
should work out the "magnitude" of the Participants* 
currencies necessary to meet the monetary problem f o r 
which a prospective drawer i s seeking a "borrowing arran-
gement". This would, at the same time, include the"pro-
p o r t i o n " of the currencies to be contributed by the P a r t i -
cipants, under that "borrowing arrangement". ^ 
(3) The next series of issues to be considered 
under these consultative arrangements are ways i n which 
these currencies are to be "repurchased" and "repaid"; 
together w i t h the f i x i n g of the period of time v/i t h i n 
which these repurchases and repayments can be carr i e d 
2 
out. 
A f t e r a l l the above series of consultations have 
been car r i e d out, and a f t e r they have resulted i n a 
"borrowing arrangement", then would come the stage of 
" c a l l " . The stage of c a l l has been described by Para-
1. Cf. " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund - Annual Report", 
1962, pp. 37, 39. 
2. See Paragraph 11 of 'The Decision', Appendix IV. 
16*0 
graph 1 ( v i i ) of 'The Decision', as f o l l o w s : -
•r-
' ( v i i ) " c a l l " means a notice by the Fund to a 
p a r t i c i p a n t to make a transfer under i t s c r e d i t 
arrangements to the Fund's account; ' 
Aft e r the necessary transfers have been made (by 
the Participants to the Fund), then would come the stage 
of "purchase" (by the prospective drawer from the Fund). *^ 
These are, generally, stages to be followed before 
some currencies can be borrowed by a "prospective drawer" 
under the Borrowing Scheme. There remain, however, two 
more stages to complete the r i n g f o r a series of borrow-
ing arrangements. These two stages are: 
(a) The stage of "repurchase" by a "drawer" of the 
currencies which i t has already borrowed under a "borrow-
1. As regards the d e f i n i t i o n of "purchase", so f a r as 
the Fund's terminolgy i s concerned, see J. Keith 
Horsefield, "Introduction to the Fund", op. c i t . , 
p. 29. Cf. F. A. Mann "Money i n Public I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Law", Recueil des Cours, op. c i t . , pp.23 - 25. Cf. 
also " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund - Summary Proceed-
ings", 1962, p. 21. 
2. Cf., however, " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund - Press 
Release", No. 695, June 19, 1968. 
ing arrangement". 
(b) The stage of "repayment" under which the Fund's 
indebtedness, to the lending Participants, should be 
p 
carr i e d out. 
Here i t i s necessary to point out that the above 
consultative arrangements are a rather s i m p l i f i e d p a t t -
ern of consultative arrangements f o r a single "borrowing 
arrangement". And, as we may guess the pattern might 
not always be as simple as t h i s . For instance, i n some 
cases i t may not be necessary to f o l l o w a l l the above 
3 
stages f o r a single "borrowing arrangement". 
1. This stage can as w e l l be termed the stage i n which 
a drawer attempts to pay back i t s indebtedness to 
the Fund. As to the technical meaning of the v/ord 
"repurchase", so f a r as the Fund's terminolgy i s 
concerned, see Keith Horsefield, "Introduction to 
the Fund", op. c i t . , p. 30. Cf. J. Marcus Fleming, 
"The I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund I t s Form and 
Functions", op. c i t . , pp. 28-29; F. A. Mann, "Honey 
i n Public I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law", Recueil des Cours, op. 
c i t . , pp.24-25. So f a r as t h i s question relates 
d i r e c t l y to the transactions of the Borrowing Scheme 
see Presentation of the Seventeenth Annual Report, Per 
Jacobsson, " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund - Summary 
Proceedings", 1962, pp. 21-22i 
2. See i n f r a , under the Sub-Headings of "Pre-Repayment 
Consultative Arrangements of 'The Decision 1", and 
"Pre-Repayment Consultative Arrangements of 'The 
Lett e r ' " . Cf. J. Marcus Fleming, "The I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Monetary Fund — I t s Form and Functions", op. c i t . , 
pp. 28-29. 
3. See, e.g., Paragraph 11 (d) of 'The Decision', 
Appendix IV. 
I n some other instances, i t may be necessary to 
arrange some extra consultative arrangements i n order to 
meet the l e g a l requirements of the Borrowing Scheme. Among-
st these extra consultative arrangements may "be c i t e d con-
s u l t a t i v e arrangements f o r "future c a l l s " ; ^ consultative 
2 
arrangements f o r an unexpected "repayment"; and consul-
t a t i v e arrangements f o r an unexpected "repurchase". ' 
The v a r i e t y of consultative arrangements of the 
Borrowing Scheme, taken together w i t h the d i f f e r e n t r e -
quirements to be met f o r any "borrowing arrangement", 
would n a t u r a l l y require d e t a i l e d provisions i n t h i s respect. 
These provisions have been set out by the drafters.of 'The 
Letter and 'The Decision* separately and under d i f f e r e n t 
t i t l e s . The drafters of'The L e t t e r ' on one occasion, have 
gone so f a r as to suggest that the entire provisions of 
'The Let t e r ' are a set of consultative arrangements-. The 
l a t t e r part of 'The Let t e r ' i n t h i s respect says:-
"These consultative arrangements, undertaken 
i n a s p i r i t of i n t e r n a t i o n a l co-operation, are 
1. See Paragraph 7(a) of 'The Decision', Appendix IV. 
2. See, e.g., Paragraph 11 (b) of 'The Decision' Appendix 
IV. 
3. See, e.g., Paragraph 11 (c) of 'The Decision', Appendix 
IV. 
4. Take notice of the term "These consultative arrange-
ments", which i s , prima f a c i e , r e f e r r i n g to the entire 
provisions of 'The L e t t e r 1 . Cf. the term "procedure" 
used i n the Preamble to the same document. 
i e 3 
designed to ensure the s t a b i l i t y of the i n t e r n a t -
i o n a l payments system". ^ 
I I I - EFECTS OF THE GQNSUI/PATIVE ARRANGEMENTS 
However, i t cannot "be deduced from the above quota-
t i o n (and from the term "undertaken" therei n ) that the 
consultative arrangements of the Borrowing Scheme can i n 
themselves bring about any clear cut l e g a l o b l i g a t i o n . 
And as we s h a l l see l a t e r any single "borrowing arrangement" 
can come i n t o e f f e c t only a f t e r the acceptance of the Group 
p 
of Ten and the approval of the Fund. This xs perhaps 
the reason why J.E.S. Fawcett, w i t h reference to 'The 
L e t t e r 1 and 'The Decision 1 has said:-
"They are rather arrangements i n p a r a l l e l , 
c o n s t i t u t i n g at most a pactum de contrahendo; f o r 
the p a r t i c i p a n t s do not bind themselves uncondit-
i o n a l l y to extend c r e d i t to the Fund i n the form 
5 
of currency." ^  
1. Take notice of the word "undertaken"in the above 
context. 
2. See i n f r a under the same Chapter. Cf. Paragraphs (G) and (D) of »The L e t t e r ' discussed under the 
Chapter "Voting Machinery of the Borrowing Scheme", i n f r a . 
5- See J.E.S. Fawcett, " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund and 
In t e r n a t i o n a l Law", op. c i t . , p. 75. For the economic 
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And F r i t z Machlup who has studied d i f f e r e n t 
proposals concerning the Borrowing Scheme agrees 
that those i n favour of "non-automatic c y c l i n g " of 
short-term c a p i t a l were f i n a l l y successful i n charting 
the plan f o r the Borrowing Scheme. I n other words, he 
agrees that the proposals of those i n favour of " a t t a i n -
ment of acceptance of lending Countries f o r every borr-
owing arrangement" (as d i s t i n c t from the proposals of 
those i n favour of automatic r e t u r n of outflown c a p i t a l ) 
were f i n a l l y chosen and put in t o the framework of the 
Borrowing Scheme. He says:-
"Of the many forms which the support action 
may take ten a l t e r n a t i v e forms are shown i n T-
Account Set 2 the most favored at the present 
time calls f o r loans to the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary 
Fund by central banks of surplus countries i n t h e i r 
own currency, enabling the Fund to s e l l these c u r r -
encies to the monetary a u t h o r i t y of the d e f i c i t ; / 
country ... This i s the kind of action recommended 
reasons why a surplus country cannot be expected 
to extend unconditionally c r e d i t to a d e f i c i t 
country see James Edward Meade, "The Theory of 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Economic Policy, Volume I , The 
Balance of Payments", London, Oxford University 
Press, 1951, pp. 225 - 226. Of. F r i t z Machlujp., 
"Plans f o r Reform of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary 
System", op. c i t . , pp. 16 and 23-25. 
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i n the proposals made by Xenophon Zolotas, p r e s i -
dent of the Bank of Greece, Edward M. Bernstein, 
former d i r e c t o r of the Research D i v i s i o n of the 
I.M.F., and Per Jacobsson, managing d i r e c t o r of 
the I.M.F. ... For example, under the Bernstein 
plan the c e n t r a l banks i n trouble could-; w i t h 
r e l a t i v e c e r t a i n t y count on the a v a i l a b i l i t y of 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund support, whereas under 
the Jacobsson plan which represents a compro-
mise with the more orthodox points of view of 
cen t r a l bankers i n continental Europe the 
lending banks would have to approve of the intended 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund action i n each case ..." ~ 
1. See I d . , pp. 17 - 20. See also Statement by the 
Governor f o r Greece, Xenophon Zolotas, " I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Monetary Fund - Summary Proceedings'1, 1961, pp. 71-75 
at p.73.; Statement by Per Jacobsson, the F. M.D., I d . 
p.28; Franco-American Dr a f t , discussed i n " I n t e r n a t -
i o n a l Monetary Fund, 1945-1965", o p . c i t . , volume I , 
p. 511; volume I I , pp.374 - 375- Cf. I d . Volume lyj 
pp. 508-510. For attempts to bring about automatic 
cycling of short-term c a p i t a l , see 'The Guardian 1, 
January 20, 1969, p. 10. Cf. 'The Guardian 1, January 
14, 1969, p. 13. 
Therefore, i t seems more reasonable to suggest that 
the a c t i v i t i e s of the Group of Ten were expected to be 
carried out i n a s p i r i t of co-operation and mutual 
understanding ^, as d i s t i n c t from p o l i t i c a l and economic 
2 5 pressure, or l e g a l o b l i g a t i o n . ^ 
Even A r t i c l e V I I (2) of the Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agree-
ment i n accordance w i t h which the Borrowing Scheme 
has been set out does not impose, on the face of i t , 
any o b l i g a t i o n on the Fund's member States to lend t h e i r 
currencies to the Fund. I t , i n i t s Sub-Section ( i ) states:-
".... no member s h a l l be under any o b l i g a t i o n 
to make such loans to the Fund or to approve the 
borrowing of i t s currency by the Fund from any 
1. Cf. J. E. Meade, "The Balance of Payments", o p . c i t . , 
pp. 114-124 and 167 - 170. 
2. Cf., however, "The Times", November 22, 1968, p. 21; 
"The Guardian", January 20, 1969i p. 10; Ossola 
Rinaldo, " I n the Creation of New Reserve Assets: 
the Report of the Study Group of Ten", op. c i t . , p. 291. Cf. also "Declaration on the P r o h i b i t i o n of 
M i l i t a r y , P o l i t i c a l or Economic Coercion i n the 
Conclusion of Treates", Cmnd. 4140, p. 37 • 
3. See, e.g. Paragraphs (D) and (F) of 'The Le t t e r ' , 
under which no clear-cut o b l i g a t i o n has been con-
templated f o r automatic c y c l i n g of "hot" money. Cf. 
J. E. S. Fawcett, "The Law of Nations", op. c i t . , 
P. 95. 
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other source". 
However, one of our i n t e r e s t s , i s to see whether 
any o b l i g a t i o n can be imposed on the Participants " a f t e r " 
they have undergone the consultative arrangements f o r a 
"borrowing arrangement" and " a f t e r " they have accepted 
such a "borrowing arrangement". But f i r s t i t seems 
necessary to es t a b l i s h , w i t h p r e c i s i o n , the two f o l l o w -
ing :-
(a) The procedure as v/ell as the "stages" of 
consultative meetings of the Borrowing Scheme. 
(b) The body or bodies to be consulted at any one 
stage of these consultative meetings; because 
1. As Professor D. H. N. Johnson, i n one of his 
lectures a t London Unive r s i t y pointed out, the 
h i s t o r y of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s has proved 
the preference of taking a lenient l i n e at the 
s t a r t of any m u l t i l a t e r a l co-operative engage-
ment, and then, i n the course o f time, t r y i n g 
to t i g h t e n i t s bearings, i f i t happened to be 
necessary. And t h i s i s perhaps what has been 
taking place i n the case of the Borrowing Scheme. 
See, e.g., the F.B.B. Decision, ITo. 1951-(65/59) 
of October 15, 1965i Cf., however, " I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Monetary Fund - Annual Report", year 1962, p. 36; 
year 1964 p. 38; year 1968; p. 14; year 1969, p. 155. Cf. also " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund -
Summary Proceeding", year 1964, p. 279; year 
1968, p. 26. 
i g 8 
(1) the" exchange speculation and the movement of 
"hot" money i s of a quick and widespread nature, which 
could r e s u l t i n considerable losses w i t h i n a short period 
of time, and therefore i t seems v i t a l to have a quick 
and e f f e c t i v e consultative machinery so as to deal w i t h 
such a s i t u a t i o n i n the shortest possible period of time; 
and 
(2) any untimely leakage out of the issues raised, 
or decisions taken, i n the consultative meetings of the 
Group of Ten could again cause serious f i n a n c i a l i n j u r i e s 
and therefore, i t seems necessary also to be able to 
specify the bodies l e g a l l y e l i g i b l e to take part i n any 
one of the above consultative meetings. 
For the importance attached to the above issues, 
we have t r i e d to study the d e t a i l e d Paragraphs of 'The 
Le t t e r ' and "The Decision', once separately, and f o r the 
second time, i n connection w i t h each other. This we 
have done w i t h a view to s i f t i n g those provisions of the 
Borrowing Scheme which are d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d to i t s "con-
s u l t a t i v e meetings", and which are unfortunately scattered 
throughout the Paragraph of 'The Letter' and 'The Decision'. 
1. Cf. F. A. Mann "Money i n Public I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law", 
Recueil des Cours, op. c i t . , p. 
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IV - RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SCOPE OF 
ACTIVITIES 0* THE GROUT OS M 
However, before g e t t i n g involved i n the actual 
provisions of "consultative arrangements". of the borr-
owing Scheme, we have to r e f e r , although b r i e f l y , to 
some new developments i n the scope of a c t i v i t i e s of 
the Group of Ten, something which had not been- a n t i c i -
pated i n the Paragraphs of 'The Letter' or 'The Decision'. 
Tile reference to these new developments seems to be j u s t i -
f i e d here, f o r one can d i f f e r e n t i a t e between those con-
s u l t a t i v e arrangements of the Group of Ten which are by 
v i r t u e of the provisions of the Borrowing Scheme, and 
those which have been developed i n the course of time. 
The f a c t i s that the Group of Ten i n d u s t r i a l Count-
r i e s have seen i t necessary to consult each other, not 
only on occasions necessary f o r a "borrowing arrangement", 
but also f o r a world-wide range of issues, r e l a t i n g to 
2 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l monetary r e l a t i o n s . This new development 
1. Cf. J. Gold, i n "I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund, 194-5-1965", op. c i t . , volume I I , pp. 520-521. 
2. See, e.g., Communique'of the Group of Ten of September 25, 1966, " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Financial News Survey", 1966, 
p.328; Herbert G. Grubel, "The I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary 
System - E f f i c i e n c y and P r a c t i c a l A l t e r n a t i v e s " , Pen-
guin, Harmondworth, Middlesex, 1969J p.55* Cf. James 
R. Atwood, John H. Borton and Nolan E. Clark, "Legal 
Problems of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Reform", i n the . 
"Stanford Law Review", Vol. 20, 1967-68, Leland Stanford 
Junior U n i v e r s i t y , p. 889, where the Borrowing Scheme 
has been described as "a sort of I M F w i t h i n the 
I M F." 
1' • I M ( \ i i) 
i s perhaps the by-product of the f a c t that the Group of 
Ten possess the majority of the weighted votes of the 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund."*" And, at any given time, 
t h i s policy-making Group of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary 
Fund i s faced w i t h many monetary problems, a minor one 
of which i s the question of short-term c a p i t a l movement, 
p 
the subject-matter of the Borrowing Scheme. 
Therefore, i f one follows the consultative meetings 
of the Group of Ten, he w i l l witness a so r t of constant 
surveillance by them of the world monetary system, i n c l -
uding the shortage of means of l i q u i d i t y . ^ 
1. For a c r i t i c a l argument i n t h i s respect see Harold 
Holt, Governor of the Bank and Fund f o r A u s t r a l i a ^ 
" I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund - Summary Proceedings", 
1965, pp. 78-82. Contra see Statement by the 
Governor of the Bank and Fund f o r the United States 
of America, Henry W. Fowler, I d . pp. 107-108; See 
also Statement by the Governor f o r the United King-
dom, Reginald Maudling, i n the same p e r i o d i c a l year 
1964, pp. 166-167. Cf. Closing Remarks of Pierre -
Paul' Schweiizer, the F M D, i n the " I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Financial News Survey", 1965, p. 373• 
2. Cf. Hans A u f r i c h t , "The Fund Agreement: Living Law 
and Emerging Practice", op. c i t . , p. 59* 
3. See, generally, " M i n i s t e r i a l Statement of the Group 
of Ten", August 10, 1964; "Communique" of Ministers 
and Governors of the Group of Ten", July, 1966. Cf. 
address by Otman Emminger on " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary 
Reform" i n Montreal on September 11, 1967. See J. 
Gold, "The Next Stage i n the Development of I n t e r -
na t i o n a l Monetary Fund Law : The Deliberate Control 
of L i q u i d i t y " , (1968), 62, A.J.I.L., p. 377, f o o t -
note 36. Cf. also Statement of the Secretary of 
Treasury of the United States, on behalf of the Group 
of Ten, October 2, 1963. See " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary 
Fund - Summary Proceedings", 1963, PP« 285 - 286. 
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For instance on some occasions one can see that the 
agenda of these "consultative meetings" has been the 
question of an increase i n the Fund's member States' 
quotas or proposals f o r the amendment of the Fund's 
p 
A r t i c l e s of Agreement, neither of which i s r e l a t e d to 
the "borrowing arrangements" of the Borrowing Scheme. 
On some other occasions he can see that some of 
these consultative meetings o r i g i n a l l y prompted by a 
"borrowing arrangement" have then been occupied by 
questions such as "upvaluation" ^ of currencies and so on. 
1. See, e.g., 'Communique' of Ministers and Governors 
of the "Group of Ten" of Tokyo', September 7, 1964; 
"The Times Business News", November 1, 1969j p. 13; 
'The Times', July 9, 1970, p. 28. 
2. See M i t c h e l l B. C a r r o l l , "Summit of I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Monetary Law", I n t e r n a t i o n a l La?/yer, Volume 3> No. 
2, pp. 374-375. 
3« By the term "upvaluation" here, we mean: revaluing 
the par of a currency upwards. I t may, however, be 
noticed that the term "revaluation 1 1 alone has some-
times been used f o r t h i s purpose; and t h i s i s perhaps 
what has been preferred by the Fund's a u t h o r i t i e s , 
(footnote: See, e.g., J. Gold, "Maintenance o f the 
Gold Value of the Fund's Assets", I.M.F., Washington, 
D.C., 1965, p.2.) Yet, since the term "revaluation" 
has on some other occasions been used by the Fund 
as meaning the changing of par of a currency both 
downwards and upwards (footnote: see the Fund's 
Selected Decisions, p. 10.) which would cover both 
"devaluation" and "upvaluation", therefore f o r t h i s 
reason we have preferred to use the term "upvaluation 1 1 
as meaning "revaluing the par of a currency upwards". 
4. See, e.g.j "Communique'' of the Group of Ten" of 
November 1968, Appendix XVI. 
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Which sets of these consultative meetings are 
carried out "by v i r t u e of the provisions of the Borrow-
ing Scheme, and which sets are not, i s not quite c l e a r . 
We assume, however, that a l l the consultative meetings 
of the Group of Ten are not carried out by v i r t u e of 
the provisions of the Borrowing Scheme. This we assume 
i n order to be able to proceed dealing w i t h the questions 
which we are going to consider under the present Chapter. 
Therefore, our study here w i l l be l i m i t e d — — as 
f a r as possible to those consultative arrangements 
of the Group of Ten which are d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d to the 
"borrowing arrangements" of the Borrowing Scheme. This 
we would f i r s t attempt under the Heading "Consultative 
Arrangements of 'The Decision'. Then would come the 
Heading "Consultative Arrangements of 'The Letter'"* 
1. This assumption can be i n f e r r e d from the Paragraphs 
of 'The Decision' and 'The Let t e r ' also.. Yet, i f 
the Participants themselves have come to xthe con-
clusion that a l l t h e i r current a c t i v i t i e s have been 
by v i r t u e of the provisions of the Borrowing Scheme, 
that would be another matter. See, f o r instance, 
the l a t t e r part of 'The Lette r ' , where i t says:-
" I t i s understood that i n the event of any 
proposals f o r c a l l s under the c r e d i t arrange-
ments or i f other matters should arise under 
the Fund decision r e q u i r i n g consultations 
among p a r t i c i p a n t s , a consultative meeting 
w i l l be held among a l l the p a r t i c i p a n t s . " 
Take notice of the term "other matters" i n the above 
context and also of the eff e c t s of ejusdem generis 
rule: on that term i n t h i s context. 
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V - CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENTS OF 'THE DECISION' 
The major consultative arrangements of 'The Decision 1 
a 
are (a) those taking place before the currencies of some 
Participants can be borrowed f o r a prospective drawer; 
and (b) those taking place before the "repayment" of 
the borrowed currencies. As a matter of convenience, we 
have termed these two sets of consultative arrangements 
as "Pre-Call Consultative Arrangements of 'The Decision'" 
and "Pre-Repayment Consultative Arrangements of 'The 
Decision 1". Now, l e t us tur n to the f i r s t of these con-
s u l t a t i v e arrangements. 
PRE-CALL CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENTS OF 
' 'THE DECISION* 
The p r e - c a l l consultative arrangements of 'The 
Decision' should themselves be divided in t o two separate 
parts: 
( i ) those taking place w i t h the Fund's Managing 
Director alone; and ( i i ) those taking place with the Fund's 
Executive Directors, the Participants and the Fund's 
Managing Director ( f o r the second time). These two sets 
of consultative arrangements are described by the Drafters 
of 'The Decision' as " I n i t i a l Procedure" and "Calls", 
respectively. For t h i s , we have also named our two 
next T i t l e s as " ( i ) I n i t i a l Procedure", and " ( i i ) C a l l s " . 
Nov/, l e t us see the f i r s t of these two sets of consultative 
arrangements of 'The Decision'. 
1. See Paragraphs (6) and (7) of 'The Decision', 
Appendix IV. 
V7A 
( i ) INITIAL PROCEDURE 
The f i r s t step to be taken by a member State of the 
Fund — which i s i n need of some currencies — i s to 
approach the Fund and raise the matter with i t . Here, 
the Fund's Managing Director has the task of studying 
t h i s request i n the l i g h t of i n t e r n a t i o n a l monetary af-
f a i r s . He should also take i n t o account the Fund's h o l -
dings of the required currencies. I t i s at t h i s stage 
that he should be convinced that the proposed borrowing 
arrangement (a) " i s necessary i n order to f o r e s t a l l or 
cope w i t h an impairment of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l monetary 
system", and (b) "the Fund's resources need to be sup-
plemented f o r t h i s purpose". Paragraph (6) of 'The' 
Decision', i n t h i s respect, says: 
" I n i t i a l Procedure. — When a p a r t i c i p a t i n g 
member or a member whose i n s t i t u t i o n i s a p a r t i c i p a n t 
approached the Fund on an exchange transaction or stand-
by-arrangement and the Managing Director, a f t e r con-
s u l t a t i o n , considers that the exchange transaction 
or stand-by-arrangement i s necessary i n order to f o r e -
s t a l l or cope w i t h an impairment of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
1. Cf. Report of Per Jacobsson, the F M D, to the 
ECOSOC, "I n t e r n a t i o n a l Financial News Survey", 
1963, pp. 111-112. 
2. Cf. " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Financial News Survey", 1964, 
p. 433. 
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monetary system, and that the Fund's resources need 
to he supplemented f o r t h i s purpose, he s h a l l i n i t -
i a t e the procedure f o r making c a l l s under Paragraph 
n i l 1 
However, what i s not clear from the contents of the 
above Paragraph ( 6 ) , i s the^question of who i s (or are) 
that (or those) to be consulted by the Fund's Managing 
Director at t h i s stage? I s i t the prospective drav/er, 
the Fund's Executive Directors, or the Participants 
(some, several or a l l of them)? Paragraph (6) simply 
states "... and the Managing Director, a f t e r consultation..." 
And, as we s h a l l see l a t e r , one cannot be quite s a t i s f i e d 
that t h i s consultation i s to take place between the Fund's 
2 
Managing Director and the prospective drawer only. 
1. See Appendix IV. 
2. Here, t h i s at l e a s t may be noticed that Paragraph (6) 
of 'The Decision* i s not s t a t i n g that a prospective 
drawer must f i r s t contact the Fund's Managing Director. 
I t says: . 
"When a p a r t i c i p a t i n g member ... approaches, 
the Fund." 
Therefore a borrowing request apparently a t a l a t e r 
stage would reach the hands of the Fund's Managing 
Director, and t h i s would reach his hands through the 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund and not d i r e c t l y from 
a prospective drawer. This state of a f f a i r s could 
create room f o r the suggestion that the Fund's 
Managing Director " a f t e r consultation" w i t h the Fund's 
Executive Directors, may i n i t i a t e the procedure f o r 
making c a l l s under Paragraph (7) of 'The Decision'. 
Cf. " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund - Annual Report", 1962,pp. 37 and 39; "National Advisory Council on 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary and Financial Problems", op. 
c i t . , p . l 2 . Cf .also " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund, 194-5-I Q ^ ' i <-».-i t . .volume I .r>. 569:volume II,pp.455-458. 
I f , however, the Fund's Managing Director, " a f t e r 
consultation" considers t h a t the requested ""borrowing 
arrangement" i s such as to f o r e s t a l l or cope w i t h an 
impairment of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l monetary system, and 
f u r t h e r the Fund's own resources cannot meet the demand 
f o r such a ""borrowing arrangement", then "he s h a l l i n i -
t i a t e the procedure f o r making c a l l s under Paragraph 7"."^  
( i i ) GALLS 
At t h i s stage, the Fund's Managing Director enters 
into r e a l business; that i s . he t r i e s , byway of consult-
a t i o n w i t h competent a u t h o r i t i e s , to work out a formula 
f o r the requested "borrowing arrangement". At t h i s stage 
(despite the previous one) i t i s clear that the Fund's 
Managing Director can make a proposal f o r c a l l s f o r "an 
exchange transaction or f o r future c a l l s f o r exchange 
transactions under a stand-by-arrangement", only a f t e r 
such a proposal has been (a) "accepted" by the P a r t i c i o a n t s , 
and (b) "approved" by the Fund's Executive Directors. 
Paragraph 7(a) of 'The Decision', i n t h i s respect, 
says:-
"(a) The Managing Director s h a l l make a pro-
posal f o r c a l l s f o r an exchange transaction, or f o r 
1. See Paragraph 6 of 'The Decision 1', Appendix I . Gf. 
" I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund, 1945-1965", op. c i t . , 
volume I I , pp. 376-377. 
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future c a l l s f o r exchange transactions under a 
stand-by-arrangement only a f t e r consultation w i t h 
Executive Directors and p a r t i c i p a n t s . A proposal 
s h a l l become e f f e c t i v e only i f i t i s accepted by 
pa r t i c i p a n t s and the proposal i s then approved by 
2 
the Executive Directors ...M 
I t i s not, however, clear what i s meant by the term 
" p a r t i c i p a n t s " i n the above part of Paragraph 7(a) of 
'The Decision'. I n other words, Paragraph 7(a) does not 
specify which group of Participants are to be consulted 
i n t h i s respect. I s i t a l l of them, or only those which 
are prepared to contribute money under the requested bor-
rowing arrangement? This question may become more obscure 
i f one t r i e s to read the word "each" (used i n the l a t t e r 
p art of Paragraph 7(a)) as meaning a l l the-Participants 
i n the Borrowing Scheme; because i t reads:-
"Each p a r t i c i p a n t s h a l l n o t i f y the Fund of the 
acceptance of a proposal invo l v i n g a c a l l under i t s 
1. Cf. " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund - Annual Report1', 
1968, p. 108i 
2. The above attempt by the Fund's Managing Director would 
apparently include the working out of d i f f e r e n t curr-
encies, as w e l l as t h e i r proportion, f o r every "borr-
owing arrangement". See Sub Paragraphs (b) and (c) of 
Paragraph 7 of 'The Decision', Appendix IV. 
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c r e d i t arrangement." ^ 
Therefore, here Paragraph 7(a) does not specify-
that i f , f o r example, one or more of the Participants were 
not i n agreement w i t h the proposed "borrowing arrangement", 
whether the r e s t of the Pa r t i c i p a n t s could hammer out a 
new proposal f o r such a borrowing arrangement; or whether 
i t i s intended to mean that a l l the Participants — i r r e s p -
ective of whether or not they are prepared to contribute 
money under that borrowing arrangement — should have t h e i r 
p 
say about i t . 
Here i t may be pointed out that there has been envis-
aged another set of consultations i n Paragraph (7) of 'The 
Decision 1, that i s , the consultative arrangements of Sub-
Paragraph (d) of Paragraph 7. This set of consultative 
arrangements has been contemplated w i t h a view to dealing 
w i t h exceptional cases such as those i n which a "lending 
P a r t i c i p a n t " requests the reversal of a "borrowing arrange-
ment" which has already undergone the procedure of Para-
graph 7 ( a ) i and which has been p a r t l y c a r r i e d out by the 
P a r t i c i p a n t . 
1. Cf. Brian Tew, "I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Co-operation, 
19^5-6311, Hutchinson University Library, London, 19631 
p. 187, especially where he says:-
"These supplementary resources would not be 
available automatically, since use of them would 
be subject to the approval of the 'Club1". 
2. Cf. Paragraphs (c) and (D) of 'The Lett e r ' , discussed 
under the Chapter "Voting Machinery of the Borrowing 
Scheme", i n f r a . 
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The consultative arrangements of Paragraph 7(d) do 
not yet seem to const i t u t e a new set of consultations. 
I n f a c t , they seem to be the r e p e t i t i o n of the consulta-
t i v e arrangements of Paragraphs 6 and 7 (a) of 'The 
Decision 1. 
Paragraph 7(d) of 'The Decision 1, i n p a r t , reads:-
"(d) I f a p a r t i c i p a n t on which calls may be 
made pursuant to Paragraph 7(a) f o r a drawer's 
purchases under a stand-by arrangement gives not-
ice to the Fund that i n the pa r t i c i p a n t ' s opinion, 
based on the present and prospective balance of 
payments and reserve p o s i t i o n , c a l l s should no 
longer be made on the p a r t i c i p a n t or that c a l l s 
should be f o r a smaller amount, the Managing D i r -
ector may propose to other p a r t i c i p a n t s that sub-
s t i t u t e amounts be made available under t h e i r c r e d i t 
arrangements, and t h i s proposal s h a l l be subject to 
the procedure of Paragraph 7(a) ..." 
Therefore, the consultative arrangements of Paragraph 
7(d) of 'The Decision' do not seem to co n s t i t u t e , i n them-
selves a new and independent set of consultative arrange-
ments . 
So f a r , under the Sub-Heading of "Pre-Call Consulta-
t.'ive Arrangements of 'The Decision"*, we have seen that no 
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"borrowing arrangement*' can be worked out unless and u n t i l 
i t has been duly accepted by the Fund's Managing Director, 
the P a r t i c i p a n t s , and the Fund's Executive Directors. Wow 
l e t us t u r n to our next Sub-Heading and consider the con-
s u l t a t i v e arrangements necessary f o r the "repayment" of a 
"borrowing arrangement". 
PEB-REPAYMENT CONSUIffATIVE ARRANGEMENTS 
; OF 'THE DECISION1 
These next sets of consultative arrangements of 'The 
Decision' seem to be of a d i f f e r e n t nature as compared 
wi t h those of Paragraphs 6, and 7 (a) of 'The Decision'. 
This i s so, p a r t l y because (a) those to be consulted w i t h , 
under these series of consultations are w e l l described, 
and (b) these consultative arrangements are — i n contrast 
w i t h the previous ones — of a b i l a t e r a l form. These con-
s u l t a t i v e arrangements can be. described as f o l l o w s : -
(1) A f t e r the ex p i r a t i o n of at most a five-year 
period — commencing w i t h the date on which a borrowing 
arrangement has come into e f f e c t — the Fund's indebtedness 
s h a l l become due. At t h i s time the Fund would "consult" 
a lending P a r t i c i p a n t as to the means by which the Fund's 
indebtedness can be repaid. This repayment of the Fund's 
indebtedness may be achieved by paying to tha t P a r t i c i p a n t , 
of i t s own "currency whenever f e a s i b l e , ^ or i n gold, or, 
1. Cf. " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund - Annual Report", year 
n . 1 r\i. _ n n c n n ai\ 
i s i 
..., i n other currencies that are convertible i n f a c t . " 
(2) There has been contemplated another set of con-
s u l t a t i v e arrangements i n Paragraph 11 of 'The Decision 1. 
This second set of consultative arrangements has been w e l l 
described by Sub-Paragraph (b) of the same Paragraph. I t 
says:-
"(b) Before the date prescribed i n Paragraph 
1 1(a), the Fund, a f t e r consultation w i t h a p a r t i c i -
pant, may make repayment to the p a r t i c i p a n t , i n 
par t ^ or i n f u l l , w i t h any increases i n the Fund's 
holdings of the p a r t i c i p a n t ' s currency that exceed 
the Fund's working requirements, and p a r t i c i p a n t s 
4 
s h a l l accept such repayment.11 
1 . See Paragraph 11(a) of 'The Decision' Appendix IV. 
Cf. " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund - Annual Report", 
1968, p. 102. 
2. As to the meaning of "convertible currencies", see 
Hans A u f r i c h t , " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund; Legal 
Bases, Structure, Functions," op. c i t . , pp.25-26. 
Cf. F. A. Mann, "Money i n Public I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law", 
Recueil des Cours, op. c i t . , pp. 48-50. A,s to the 
meaning of "currencies that are convertible i n f a c t " 
see J. Gold, "Special Drawing Rights", I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C., 1969, p. 29. Cf. 
"In t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund, 1945-1965", op. c i t . , 
volume I I I , p . 510. 
3. Cf. " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund -Annual Report", 
1969, p. 35. 
4 . Cf. " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund - Annual Report", 
1968, p. 98. 
(3) I f , before the date prescribed i n Paragraph 
11(a), a lending P a r t i c i p a n t n o t i f i e s the Fund that i t 
i s i t s e l f faced w i t h ;. balance of payments and reserve 
d i f f i c u l t i e s , and thus asks the Fund f o r the repayment 
of a l l or part of the Fund's indebtedness; the Fund, 
" a f t e r consultation w i t h the p a r t i c i p a n t " s h a l l make 
repayment to that P a r t i c i p a n t " i n the currencies of other 
members that are convertible i n f a c t , or ... i n gold..." 
1. The lending P a r t i c i p a n t , that i s . 
2. See " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Financial S t a t i s t i c s " , I.M.F., 
June 1970, pp. 16 - 59 where i t i s said:-
"Generally speaking, amounts lent to the 
Fund are repayable when the member whose drawing 
they financed repurchases i t s currency from the 
Fund or when the lending country i t s e l f experi-
ences a balance of payments d e f i c i t . I n the 
f i r s t case repayment would generally be i n the 
currency of the country from whom the Fund had 
borrowed. I n the l a t t e r case repayment would 
be i n the currency of other countries." 
3. See Paragraph 1 1 ( f ) of 'The Decision', Appendix IV. 
Cf. " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund - Annual Report", 
year 1962, p. 35; year 1968, p. 107; year 1969, PP. 
34-35. Cf. also " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund -
Summary Proceedings", year 1968,.p. 26; " I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Monetary Fund, 194-5-1965", op. c i t . , volume I , pp. 515 
- 516; "The Times", July 16, 1970, p. 21. 
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(4-) There has been envisaged another set of con-
s u l t a t i v e arrangements which would lead to the "repayment" 
of the Fund's indebtedness to the lending P a r t i c i p a n t s ; 
that is,where the Fund considers that the problem f o r 
which a drawer member has come to a "borrowing arrange-
ment" has been overcome. Paragraph 11(d) of 'The Decision' 
i n t h i s respect says:-
"Whehever the Fund decides i n agreement with a 
drawer that the problem f o r which the drawer made 
i t s purchases has been overcome, the drawer s h a l l 
complete repurchase^, and the Fund s h a l l complete 
repayment and be e n t i t l e d to use . i t s holdings of 
the drawer's currency below 75 per cent of the 
drawer's quota i n order to complete such repayment." 
To sura up our considerations under the Sub-Heading of' 
"Pre-Repayment Consultative Arrangements of 'The Decision"', 
we could say that before the "repayment" of the Fund's 
indebtedness, there may take place four sets of consulta-
t i v e arrangements; and these f o u r sets of consultative 
arrangements are to be arranged between the I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Monetary Fund, on the one hand, and a lending or a borrow-
ing P a r t i c i p a n t on the other. But, what we could not 
c l e a r l y see here was what kind of l e g a l consequences a l l 
1. See Appendix IV. Cf. " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Financial News 
Survey", 1962, p. 541. 
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the above "consultations' 1 could bring about? And: 
i f , f o r instance, some of these "consultations" d i d not 
r e s u l t i n a mutual understanding between the Fund and 
a lending (or borrowing) P a r t i c i p a n t , what would then 
be the l e g a l p o s i t i o n i n t h i s respect? Would the f i n a l 
decision rest w i t h the Fund's Authorities? Or has there 
taken place a "controversy" over the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of 
•The Decision' which i n t e r p r e t a t i o n requires the agreement 
2 
of the Fund as w e l l as the Participants? 
VI - CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENTS OF 'THE LETTER' 
With regard to the consiiltative arrangements of 'The 
Letter'-, one would assume that these are more or less i n 
l i n e w i t h those of Paragraphs of 'The Decision' . Bearing 
1. Cf. the term "consultation" of A r t i c l e 54 (b) and 
A r t i c l e 57 (b) of the "Vienna Convention on the Lav/ 
of Treaties", op. cit.,,p. 19. Cf. U.N. Monetary 
Documents, p. 824; Hans A u f r i c h t , "Comparative Survey 
of Central Bank Law", op. c i t . , p. 116; A r t i c l e s IV 
(5-b), V I I (3 - b ) , V I I I (3) - ( 6 ) , XIV ( 4 ) , XIX (8) -
( i - 4) of the Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement. Cf. 
moreover F. A. Mann, "Reflections on a Commercial Law 
of Nations", op. c i t . , p. 32. 
2. See former part of Paragraph 20 of 'The Decision', 
Appendix IV. Cf. J. Gold, " I n t e r p r e t a t i o n by the 
Fund", op. c i t . , p. 55; F. A. Mann "Money i n Public 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law", Recueil des Cours, op. c i t . , pp. 
42 - 44; " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund - Annual Report", 
1962. p. 37. 
3- Cf. J. E. S. Fawcett, " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund and I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law", op. c i t . , p. 75* 
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t h i s assumption i n mind, we have attempted to consider 
these consultative arrangements under the same Sub-
Headings as those of Paragraphs of 'The Decision 1. As 
such, we would here also have the Sub-Headings of"Pre-
C a l l Consultative Arrangements of 'The L e t t e r " 1 , and 
"Pre-Repayment Consultative Arrangements of 'The Lette r ' " . 
The t h i n g , however, which commends reference here 
— even before knowing the status and scope of the con-, 
s u l t a t i v e arrangements of 'The Letter' — i s the f o l l o w -
ing contention: 
I f the consultative arrangements envisaged i n 'The 
Let t e r ' are so assimilated to those of 'The Decision' 
that one can hardly d i f f e r e n t i a t e between the two, then 
one set of these consultative arrangements seems to be 
superfluous. And, i f the two sets of consultative 
arrangements have been contemplated w i t h a view to 
achieving the same objective, but because they have been 
drafted by d i f f e r e n t d r a f t e r s , they do not match each 
other, then t h e i r contemporaneous effectiveness seem to 
be mischievous. Now, l e t us tur n to the actual provisions 
of the Pre-Call Consultative Arrangements of 'The Letter'. 
PRE-CALL CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENTS OF 
'THE LETTER1 
Paragraph (A) of 'The Let t e r ' seems to have, envisaged 
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two sets of consultative arrangements, (a) the consulta-
t i o n between a prospective drawer and the Fund's Managing ; 
Director, and (b) the consultation between the prospect-
ive drawer and other P a r t i c i p a n t s . I t says: 
"(A) A p a r t i c i p a t i n g country which has need 
to draw currencies from the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary 
Fund, or to seek a stand-by agreement with the Fund 
i n circumstances i n d i c a t i n g that the Supplementary 
Resources might be used, s h a l l consult w i t h the 
Managing Director of the Fund f i r s t , and then w i t h 
the other P a r t i c i p a n t s . " 1 
Paragraph (B) of the same document also speaks of 
the consultations between the Pa r t i c i p a n t s . But the 
consultative arrangements of t h i s Paragraph (B) seem to 
be the -extent of the consultative arrangements of the 
l a t t e r p a r t of Paragraph (A), since i t says:-
" I f the Managing Director makes a proposal f o r 
Supplementary Resources to be lent to the Fund, the 
p a r t i c i p a n t s s h a l l consult on t h i s proposal and i n -
form the Managing Director of the amounts of t h e i r 
currencies which they consider appropriate to lend 
to the Fund, taking i n t o account the recommendations 
of the Managing Director ... The p a r t i c i p a n t s s h a l l 
aim a t reaching unanimous agreement." 
^ e e Appendix I * 
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I f the consultative arrangements of the above Para-
graph (B) i s the extent of consultative arrangements of 
the l a t t e r part of Paragraph (A)., then i t would f o l l o w 
that the provision of Paragraph (C) of 'The L e t t e r 1 i s 
also the extent of consultative arrangements of the l a t -
t e r p a r t of Paragraph (A). This i s so, because Para-
graph (C), w h i l s t r e f e r r i n g to the l a s t sentence of 
Paragraph (B), 1 points out:-
" I f i t i s not possible to reach unanimous 
agreement, the question whether the p a r t i c i p a n t s 
are prepared to f a c i l i t a t e , by lending, t h e i r 
currencies, an (exchange transaction or stand-by 
arrangement ... i n the general order of magnitude 
proposed by the Managing Director, w i l l be decided 
2 
by a p o l l of the p a r t i c i p a n t s ..." 
So f a r * under the Sub-Heading of "Pre-Call Consulta-
t i v e Arrangements of 'The Letter'", we have seen that 
any member State of the Fund who i s i n need of some cur-
rencies, must f i r s t consult the Fund's Managing Director, 
and then,, "the other p a r t i c i p a n t s " , without whose accept-
ance no borrowing arrangement can take place. 
1. That i s , the sentence "The p a r t i c i p a n t s s h a l l aim 
at reaching unanimous agreement." 
2. See Appendix I . 
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Here, i f one attempts a comparison of the consulta-
t i v e arrangements of 'The Decision 1 w i t h those of Para-
graph (A) of 'The Le t t e r ' , one might get the impression 
that the consultative arrangements of Paragraph (A) do 
match the combination of the consultative arrangements 
of Paragraphs 6 and 7(a) of 'The Decision'. I n other 
words, one might t h i n k that no difference can be traced 
between the "Pre-Call Consultative Arrangements of 'The 
L e t t e r 1 " and the "Pre-Call Consultative Arrangements of 
'The Decision'". 1 , 2 
I f , however, one of the indispensable f a c t o r s i n the 
above consultative arrangements i s the i d e n t i t y and num-
ber of bodies contemplated to take part at any one "stage" 
of the above consultative arrangements, then the above 
comparison may be subject to the fo l l o w i n g considerations. 
1. Paragraph 6 of 'The Decision* states that a 
prospective drawer must f i r s t approach the I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Monetary Fund; whereas the former part of Paragraph (A) 
of 'The L e t t e r 1 specifies t h a t a prospective drawer must 
1. That i s to say, one might t h i n k that " I n i t i a l Pro-
cedure" of Paragraph 6 of .'The Decision' could match 
the f i r s t sets of consultations of Paragraph (A) of 
'The L e t t e r 1 ; and the stage of "Calls" of Paragraph 
7(a) of 'The Decision' could match the second sets of 
consultative arrangements of Paragraph (A) of 'The 
Let t e r * . 
2. Cf. " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund - Summary Proceedings", 
1962, pp. 19-20. 
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f i r s t consult the Fund's Managing Director and not the 
Fund i t s e l f . 1 
2. Those taking part i n the second sets of con-
s u l t a t i o n s of Paragraph (A) are (a) the prospective 
drawer and (b) the other P a r t i c i p a n t s . And no ro l e has 
been contemplated therein, to be played by the Fund's 
Managing Director or the Fund's Executive Directors, 
p 
whereas under the pro v i s i o n of i t s counterpart any 
proposal " f o r c a l l s f o r an exchange transaction or f o r 
fut u r e c a l l s f o r exchange transactions under a stand-by 
arrangement" s h a l l be made by the Fund's Managing Direc-
t o r , and s h a l l not be of any.effect unless and u n t i l i t 
3 
has been "approved" by the Fund's Executive Directors. 
Therefore, i n Paragraph 7(a) of 'The Decision', des-
p i t e the l a t t e r part of Paragraph (A) of 'The Lett e r ' , a 
prospective drav/er i s not only expected to consult "the 
other p a r t i c i p a n t s " but i s also expected to consult the 
1 . Cf. " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund, 1945-19651 1, op. c i t . , 
volume I I , p. 375 i n conjunction w i t h A r t i c l e X I I , 
Section 2 (b) of the Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agreement, 
and Section 15 of the F.B.L. 
2. That i s Paragraph 7 (a) of 'The Decision'. 
3. See Paragraph 7 (a) of 'The Decision', A ppendix IV. 
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Fund's Managing Director ( f o r a second time); and the 
r e s u l t of t h e i r consultation must f i n a l l y be "approved" 
by the Fund's Executive Directors. 
J. At the second stage of consultative arrange-
ments of Paragraph A ( i l l u s t r a t e d by Paragraphs (B) 
and (C)) the Participants may see i t necessary to vote 
f o r a "borrowing arrangement", and t h i s voting i s app-
a r e n t l y to take place without the presence of any auth-
o r i t y from the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund, 1; whereas 
no such a voting machinery has been contemplated i n 
Paragraph 7(a) of 'The Decision*. 
4. As we have witnessed, the "Pre-Call Consulta-
t i v e Arrangements of 'The Decision'", would end w i t h the 
consultative arrangements of i t s Paragraph 7; whereas the 
"Pre-Call Consultative Arrangements of 'The Letter' " 
would not, on the face of i t , end w i t h the consultative 
arrangements of i t s Paragraphs (A), (B) and (C). I n 
f a c t the drafters\of Paragraphs of 'The Letter' have con-
templated another set of consultative arrangements which 
i s non-existent i n the series of consultations of 'The 
Decision*. And i n t h i s set of consultative arrangements 
a comparative newcomer would p a r t i c i p a t e , that i s , the 
1. See Paragraph (B) and Paragraph (C) of 'The Letter' 
Appendix I . 
2. See paragraph 7 ( a ) o f , The Decision 1, Appendix IV. 
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Fund's Managing Director. The former pa r t of Paragraph 
(D) of 'The L e t t e r ' , i n t h i s respect says:-
" I f the decision i n Paragraph C i s favourable, 
there s h a l l be f u r t h e r consultations among. the 
p a r t i c i p a n t s , and with the Managing Director, con-
cerning the amounts of the currencies of the resp-
ective p a r t i c i p a n t s which w i l l be loaned to the 
Fund i n order to a t t a i n a t o t a l i n the general 
order of magnitude agreed under Paragraph C ..." 1 
•Here one may get the impression that the consulta-
t i v e arrangements spoken of i n former part of Paragraph 
(D) of 'The L e t t e r ' i s the continuation of consultative 
arrangements of Paragraph (C) of the same document. I n 
other words, one may get the impression that the second 
chain of consultative arrangements spoken of i n the 
l a t t e r p a r t of Paragraph (A) and i l l u s t r a t e d i n Para-
graphs (B) and (C) and former part of Paragraph (D) of 
'The Letter* can match the consultative arrangements of 
Paragraph 7(a) of 'The Decision 1. As such, there exists 
no fundamental difference between the p r e - c a l l consulta-
t i v e arrangements of 'The Let t e r ' and the p r e - c a l l con-
s u l t a t i v e arrangements of 'The Decision 1. 
1. Cf. l a t t e r p a r t of Paragraph (D) of 'The. L e t t e r 1 , 
discussed under the Chapter "Voting Machinery of 
the Borrowing Scheme", i n f r a . 
This impression may, however, be subject to the 
fo l l o w i n g considerations: 
F i r s t of a l l , the former p a r t of Paragraph (D) of 
'The L e t t e r ' , by employment of the expression " f u r t h e r 
consultations" has d i f f e r e n t i a t e d between the consultative 
arrangements of t h i s Paragraph and that of Paragraph (C) 
of 'The L e t t e r ' . 
Secondly, (as we have already made reference t o ) , at 
the stage of consultative arrangements of the former part 
of Paragraph (D) of 'The Le t t e r ' , a comparative newcomer 
(th a t i s the Fund's Managing Director) comes on to the 
scene of consultation; whereas at the stage of consulta-
t i v e arrangements of the l a t t e r part of Paragraph (A) of 
'The L e t t e r ' (as i l l u s t r a t e d by Paragraphs (B) and (C) 
of the same document) the Fund's Managing Director has 
no r o l e to play. 
As such, the consultative arrangement of the former 
part of Paragraph (D) of 'The Le t t e r ' i s not an extension 
of consultative arrangements of the l a t t e r part of Para-
graph: (A), and Paragraphs (B) and (C) of the same docu-
ment; i t i s , i n f a c t , a d i f f e r e n t set of consultative 
arrangement set out w i t h a view to achieving d i f f e r e n t 
objects. And i t s existence, amongst the consultative 
See i n f r a , under the Chapter ^Voting Machinery of the 
Borrowing Scheme". 
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arrangements of 'The Letter* should be regarded as an-
other sign of the differences e x i s t i n g "between those 
consultative arrangements and the consultative arrange-
ments of 'The Decision', because no such consultative 
arrangement has been contemplated i n the Paragraphs of 
'The Decision*. 
Even i f one overlooks the f a c t that the consulta-
t i v e arrangements of the former part of Paragraph (D) 
i s not the continuation of consultative arrangements of 
the l a t t e r p a r t of Paragraph- (A) and Paragraphs (B) 
and (C) of 'The L e t t e r ' , yet t h i s cannot produce the 
necessary s i m i l a r i t y between the consultative arrange-
ments of these Paragraphs and those of Paragraph 7(a) 
of 'The Decision', because, under Paragraph 7(a) of 
'The Decision, one f u r t h e r body, ( t h a t i s the Fund's 
Executive Directors) i s to be consulted w i t h ; whereas no 
such body has been contemplated to be consulted w i t h 
under the p r o v i s i o n of the former p a r t of Paragraph (D) 
of 'The L e t t e r * . I n f a c t , — as we may have noticed — , 
the Fund's Executive Directors have been accorded no role 
to play under the Paragraphs of 'The L e t t e r ' . 
5. Another set of consultative arrangements of the 
"Pre-Call Consultative Arrangements of 'The L e t t e r ' " i s 
that of the l a t t e r part of Paragraph (D) of 'The Let t e r ' . 
According to t h i s l a t t e r p a r t of Paragraph (D) a P a r t i c i -
194 
pant can give notice that i n i t s opinion, based on i t s 
present and prospective balance of payments and reserve 
p o s i t i o n , c a l l s should not be made on i t , or, c a l l s should 
be made f o r a smaller, amount than that o r i g i n a l l y pro-
posed. This would be i n the case where a Partic i p a n t 
has not yet contributed any money, under the borrowing 
arrangement i n question. The l a t t e r p a r t of Paragraph (D) 
of'The L e t t e r ' reads:-
"... I f during the consultations a p a r t i c i p a n t 
gives notice that i n i t s opinion, based on i t s pre-
sent and prospective balance of payments and reserve 
p o s i t i o n , c a l l s should not be made on i t , or tha t 
calls should be f o r a smaller amount than th a t pro-
posed, the p a r t i c i p a n t s s h a l l consult among them-
selves and wi t h the Managing Director as to the 
ad d i t i o n a l amounts of t h e i r currencies which they 
could provide so as to reach the general order o f 
1 2 
magnitude agreed under Paragraph C." ' 
1. Take notice of the term "additional amounts" i n the 
above context. Compare i t with that of "the amounts" 
of former part of the same Paragraph. See Appendix I . 
Cf. "Voting Machinery of the Borrowing Scheme", i n f r a . 
2. Remember that here, under the Sub-Heading of "Pre-Call 
Consultative Arrangements of 'The Letter ' " , we are 
s t i l l i n the process of comparing the p r e - c a l l con-
s u l t a t i v e arrangements of 'The Let t e r ' w i th those of 
'The Decision'. And so f a r , we have observed f o u r con-
siderations concerning the f a c t that the p r e - c a l l con-
s u l t a t i v e arrangements of these two documents do not 
match each other. And now, we are i n the process of 
our f i f t h consideration i n t h i s respect. 
To the contrary, no such a consultative arrangement 
has "been contemplated i n the series of "Pre-Call Consulta-
t i v e Arrangements of 'The Decision 1". 
I t i s true that Sub-Paragraph (d) of Paragraph 7 of 
•The Decision 1 speaks of the cases i n which no more c a l l s 
should "be made on a P a r t i c i p a n t , even though those c a l l s 
have already been accepted by i t under Paragraph 7(a) o f 
•The Decision 1. Yet, so f a r as the wording of Paragraph 
7(d) of 'The Decision* indicates, i t s consultative arrange-
ment has been contemplated w i t h a view to dealing with 
the cases i n which a Pa r t i c i p a n t has p a r t l y contributed 
money under a "borrowing arrangement" and then has i t s e l f 
experienced balance of payments and reserve d i f f i c u l t i e s , 
to the extent that i t i s "no longer" able to contribute 
money under that borrowing arrangement. ^ 
1. Paragraph 7(d) of 'The Decision', i n p a r t , reads as 
f o l l o w s : -
"(d) I f a p a r t i c i p a n t on which c a l l s may be 
made pursuant to Paragraph 7(a) f o r a drawer's 
purchases under a stand-by arrangement, gives 
notice to the Fund that i n the p a r t i c i p a n t ' s op-
i n i o n , based on the present and prospective b a l -
ance of payment and reserve p o s i t i o n , c a l l s should 
no longer be made on the p a r t i c i p a n t or that c a l l s 
should be made f o r a smaller amount, the Managing 
Director may propose to other p a r t i c i p a n t s that 
substitute amounts be made available under t h e i r 
c r e d i t arrangements^ and t h i s proposal s h a l l be 
subject to the procedure of Paragraph 7(a) ••• " 
Take notice of the expression " c a l l s should no longer 
be made" i n the above context, which i s i n d i c a t i v e of 
the f a c t that some cal l s have already been carried out 
by that P a r t i c i p a n t . Compare i t w i t h the expression 
" c a l l s should not be made* of the l a t t e r p a r t of Para-
graph (D) of 'The L e t t e r ' , which i s i n d i c a t i v e of the 
f a c t that no c a l l has yet been car r i e d out by that 
P a r t i c i p a n t . 
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As such, the consultative arrangements spoken of i n 
Paragraph 7(d) of 'The Decision' seem to have no 
s i m i l a r i t y w i t h those of the l a t t e r part of Paragraph 
(D) of 'The Letter'. To put i t another way the consulta-
t i v e arrangements of the l a t t e r part of Paragraph (D) 
seem to have no counterpart i n the consultative arrange-
ments of Paragraphs of 'The Decision 1. 
Here, therefore, we must admit that we have f a i l e d 
to establish any substantial s i m i l a r i t y between the "Pre-
C a l l Consultative Arrangements of 'The Decision'" and the 
"Pre-Call Consultative Arrangements of 'The L e t t e r " 1 . 
Rather, i t seems more accurate to suggest that the "Con-
s u l t a t i v e Arrangements of 'The Let t e r ' have been on a 
d i f f e r e n t l i n e , as compared w i t h the "Consultative Arrange-
ments of 'The Decision'". 
This second suggestion can be supported by the f a c t s 
which we are going to consider under the next Sub-Heading."^ 
1. Cf. "I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund, 1945-1965", op. c i t . , 
volume I I , pp. 576-377 esp. where i t i s said:-
"The question of renewal (of the Borrowing 
Scheme) was discussed i n the Board (of Governors 
of the Fund) on A p r i l 28, 1965 ••• Some s i m p l i -
f i c a t i o n of the method of a c t i v a t i n g the 
Arrangements was ... suggested. As, however, 
i t seemed l i k e l y that such changes would not 
be approved by the p a r t i c i p a n t s , the Chairman 
proposed, and the Board approved, that the Fund 
should seek a continuation of the Arrangements 
without amendments". Parentheses added. 
Cf. also I d . volume I , p. 570; Report by Per Jacobsson. 
to the ECOSOC, "In t e r n a t i o n a l Financial News Survey", 
1962, p. 111. 
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PRB-KBPAYMBNT CONSULTATIVE AlffiANGMvISNTS 
OP 'THE LETTER' 
The authors of 'The Let t e r ' have not apparently-
touched the question of "repayment" of the Fund's indebted-
ness. The reason f o r t h i s may he that the Group of Ten 
have preferred t h i s issue to be dealt w i t h by the Fund's 
a u t h o r i t i e s , and under the Paragraphs of 'The Decision 1. 
One may, however, r e f e r to Paragraph (F) of 'The 
Lett e r ' as the prov i s i o n dealing w i t h the question of 
"repayment" of the Fund's indebtedness, under 'The Le t t e r ' . 
I t a l l depends on the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Paragraph (F) and 
the terra "reversal" t h e r e i n . Paragraph (F) of 'The 
Let t e r ' reads as fol l o w s : -
"F. I f a p a r t i c i p a n t which has lo.aned i t s 
currency to the Fund under i t s c r e d i t arrangement 
w i t h the Fund subsequently requests a reversal of 
i t s loan which leads to f u r t h e r loans to the Fund 
by other p a r t i c i p a n t s , the p a r t i c i p a n t seeking such 
reversal s h a l l consult w i t h the Managing Director 
and w i t h the other p a r t i c i p a n t s . " 
To us, nevertheless, a preferable construction of the 
provisions of Paragraph (F) i s that i t has been formulated 
w i t h a view to dealing w i t h cases i n which a Par t i c i p a n t 
i s no longer able to meet " f u r t h e r loans" under a borrowing 
•II8 
arrangement; and thus i t does not touch the quest-
ion of "repayment" of the Fund's indebtedness to 
the "lending P a r t i c i p a n t s " . ^ 
The reason f o r t h i s suggestion i s that the Paragraph 
(F) does not speak of the "repayment" of any currency 
to a lending P a r t i c i p a n t . I t simply speaks of the r e -
versal of a "loan which leads to f u r t h e r loans to the 
Fund by other participants'", which loan i s , prima f a c i e , 
to be paid to a "drawer" member of the Fund and not by 
2 
a "drawer" to a "lending P a r t i c i p a n t " . 
Moreover, had the drafters of'The L e t t e r ' intended 
to deal w i t h the question of "repayment" of the Fund's 
indebtedness, they would have done so i n an elaborate 
way, as has been done by the d r a f t e r s of Paragraphs of 
'The Decision'. ^ 
1. Cf. l a t t e r p a r t of Paragraph (A) of 'The L e t t e r 1 . 
This comparison may r e s u l t i n that the Paragraph 
(F) by i t s e l f does not constitute any new set of 
consultative arrangements. 
2. Take notice of the word " f u r t h e r loans" i n the 
above Paragraph ( F ) . 
5. See Paragraph 11, of 'The Decision', discussed 
under Sub-Heading of "Pre-Repayment Consultative 
Arrangements of 'The Decision'". 
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Therefore, to us, no "Pre-Repayment Consultative 
Arrangements" have "been envisaged i n the series of con-
s u l t a t i v e arrangements of 'The L e t t e r ' . 1 And, the non-
existence of the "Pre-Repayment Consultative Arrangements 
of 'The L e t t e r ' " can be quoted as another reason f o r the 
f a c t that there exists no fundamental s i m i l a r i t y between 
the consultative arrangements of 'The Let t e r ' and those 
of 'The Decision'. 
Now, l e t us sura up our considerations under the 
present Chapter. A r e c a l l of what we have been considering 
under the Headings of "Consultative Arrangements of 'The 
Decision'" and "Consultative Arrangements of 'The Letter'", 
would reveal more differences than s i m i l a r i t i e s between 
these series of consultative arrangements, so much so 
that one might get the impression that each of these 
series of consultative arrangements has been contemplated 
wi t h a view to achieving a d i f f e r e n t object, and thus i s 
to be abided by separately and indispensably. I n other 
words, one might get the impression that every member 
State of the Fund who i s i n need of some currencies must 
f o l l o w a l l the consultative arrangements of 'The Letter* 
p 
and 'The Decision' i n t u r n . This impression, however,may 
1. Cf. " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund - Summary Proceedings", 
1962, pp. 19 - 20. 
2. Cf. " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund, 194-5^1965", op. c i t . , 
volume I , pp. 512 - 513• 
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a t . f i r s t sight o f f e r a sort of temporary s a t i s f a c t i o n ; 
but i n the long run i t cannot resolve a l l the problems 
involved. 
Rather, i f a prospective drawer i s supposed to 
f o l l o w a l l the consultative arrangements of 'The L e t t e r 1 
and 'The Decision' i n t u r n , t h i s i t s e l f would create 
more l e g a l and p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s . For instance 
1. I t could not be clear, from the provisions of 
'The L e t t e r 1 and 'The Decision 1, which series of these 
consultative arrangements i s to be followed f i r s t . 
2. As we have already witnessed, amongst the ele-
ments necessary to prevent or to stop speculation and 
movement of "hot" money, i s the prompt taking of the 
steps taken by t h 6 Group of Ten. Yet, i f a prospective 
drawer i s to go through a l l the above consultative 
arrangements i n t u r n , i t would then be d i f f i c u l t to 
forecast the end of these series o f consultative a c t i v i -
t i e s , and, at the same time, i t would be too l a t e to see 
any r e s u l t from them. 
3. I f the consultative arrangements of 'The Letter' 
and 'The Decision' are to be followed separately, and 
indispensably, i t would then not be consistent w i t h the 
express provisions of some other Paragraphs of the Borr-
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caving Scheme. For the importance, however, attached 
to t h i s t h i r d issue, we have preferred to consider i t , 
i n t e r a l i a , under the next f o l l o w i n g Heading. 
V I I - CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEIMTS OF THE 
BORROWING SCHEMES FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
Under the present Heading, we begin w i t h the study 
of the provisions of the l a t t e r part of 'The Lett e r ' , 
which provisions may have the e f f e c t of resolving most 
of the problems w i t h which we have so f a r been faced 
under the present Chapter. According to t h i s provision 
of 'The Let t e r ' any consultative arrangement of the 
Borrowing Scheme ( f o r whatever purposes) should have 
the company of " a l l " the Pa r t i c i p a n t s , as w e l l as the 
Fund's Managing Director. 
I t says:-
" I t i s understood that i n the event of any 
proposals f o r c a l l s under the c r e d i t arrangements 
or i f other matters should arise under the Fund 
decision ^ re q u i r i n g consultations among the 
p a r t i c i p a n t s , a consultative meeting w i l l be held 
among a l l the p a r t i c i p a n t s ... The Managing D i r -
ector of the Fund or his representative s h a l l be 
i n v i t e d to p a r t i c i p a t e i n these consultative 
1. 'The Decision', that i s . 
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p 
meetings. 1' 
The above provisions of the l a t t e r p a r t of 'The 
Letter' may be quoted as a sort of solvent provision; 
because i t suggests|th,at whenever the Part i c i p a n t s and/ 
or the Fund's a u t h o r i t i e s are faced with legal and pro-
cedural d i f f i c u l t i e s concerning the consultative meetings 
of the Borrowing Scheme, they can, by r e s o r t i n g to t h i s 
provisions, conclude that the ingredients of any consul-
t a t i v e meeting of the Borrowing Scheme are (a) a l l the 
Parti c i p a n t s and (b) the Fund's Managing Director or his 
representative. 
I n t h i s respect, however, one must be cautious i n 
not stressing too much on the wording of provisions of 
the l a t t e r part of 'The Lett e r ' . This we say i n view 
of the f a c t that the provi s i o n i t s e l f i s not immune 
from contention. And, at l e a s t , the f o l l o w i n g conten-
tions should be considered i n connection therewith: 
1. No conclusive evidence can be produced i n t h a t : 
(A) The provision of the l a t t e r part of 'The L e t t e r ' 
should override a l l other elaborate provisions of 'The 
1. See Appendix I . Cf. " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund -
Summary Proceedings", 1962, pp. 19 - 20. Cf. also 
"National Advisory Council on I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary 
and Financial Problems", op. c i t . , p. 13• 
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Letter', concerning the consultative arrangements of 
the same document. And a d i f f e r e n t , and perhaps pre-
ferable construction here i s that the provision i t s e l f 
may have been d r a f t e d per incuriam. 
i x ui.. rtrn^ttro of ' 1:.. : . i . ' t * : r' h~v, i t i n .ai.-i.l ' : 
to formulate a l l the c o n s u l t a t i v e arrangements of 'The 
._,ett,-r' i n a c o n c i s e way they would have droned a l l 
otter y.roviaionB o f 'The Letter' c o n c e r n i n r i t s con-
s a l t a t i v e a r r a ngements. 
'( 
(B) I t would be more d i f f i c u l t to assume that the 
provisions of the l a t t e r part of 'The L e t t e r ' can over-
rid e the d e t a i l e d provisions of constructive arrangements 
of 'The Decision'. I t i s true that the p r o v i s i o n says 
that " i n the event of any proposals f o r c a l l s under the 
c r e d i t arrangements or i f other matters should arise 
under the Fund decision r e q u i r i n g consultations among 
the p a r t i c i p a n t s " , those consultations should also be 
subject to consultative rules of the l a t t e r p^.rt of 
'The Le t t e r ' , yet one cannot be sure that t h i s statement 
of the drufters of 'The Letter' should have a p r e v a i l i n g 
1. S.'-.t lrt„or p * r t of 'Tho Letter* 
«>. 'The Decision', that i s . 
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e f f e c t over a l l the consultative arrangements of 'The 
Decision'. ^ 
And, as we have seen e a r l i e r , there are some 
wr i t e r s who "believe that so f a r as the provisions' of 
•The L e t t e r ' are concerned the Fund i s res i n t e r a l i o s 
acta. And, to them, the consultative rules of the l a t t e r 
part of 'The Let t e r ' cannot have any e f f e c t on the con-
s u l t a t i v e rules drawn up i n the provisions of 'The 
• 2 
Decision. 
Therefore, here we can r e i t e r a t e that (a) the con-
s u l t a t i v e arrangements of 'The Decision' cannot be recon-
c i l e d w i t h those of 'The L e t t e r ' , (b) the consultative 
1. However, one i n c i d e n t a l inference from the expression 
" i n the event of any proposals f o r c a l l s .. or i f 
other matters should arise under the Fund decision" 
i s t h a t , to the drafters, of 'The L e t t e r ' , there can-
not be envisaged any consultative arrangement of 
both 'The Letter' and 'The Decision' which cannot 
be embraced by the above provision of the l a t t e r 
part of 'The Le t t e r ' . As such, the suggestion that 
each of the consultative arrangements of 'The L e t t e r ' 
and 'The Decision' i s to be followed separately, and 
i n t u r n , cannot be reconciled w i t h the above pro-
v i s i o n of the l a t t e r part of 'The L e t t e r ' . Cf. 
" I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund - Annual Report", 1962, 
P • 35. 
2. See supra, under the Chapter "The Constituent 
Instruments of the Borrowing Scheme". 
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arrangements of 'The Le t t e r ' and 'The Decision 1 cannot 
be undergone separately and i n t u r n ; and (c) the l a t t e r 
p art of 'The Le t t e r ' , so f a r , cannot throw any l i g h t 
on the above le g a l questions. 
Here we may be accused of turning poetry i n t o prose, 
and prose i n t o jargon "S because a f t e r the lapse of a 
long period of time during which the Borrowing Scheme 
has been i n operation, no formidable l e g a l d i f f i c u l t y 
has arisen out of i t s consultative arrangements so much 
so that so f a r not a single formal i n t e r p r e t a t i o n has 
2 
been seen necessary i n t h i s respect. 
This challenge, however, may be answered as follows: 
( i ) . I t seems reasonable to believe that up to now 
a l l the, controversies which have arisen out of the con-
s u l t a t i v e arrangements of the Borrowing Scheme have been 
resolved " i n a f l e x i b l e and p r a c t i c a l manner ... and by 
1. See remarks made by Lord Keynes i n the Closing 
Plenary Session of the United Nations Monetary 
and Financial Conference of 22 July^1944, where 
he said:-
" . . . i I have to confess t h a t , generally 
speaking, I do not l i k e lawyers ... Too 
often lawyers are men who turn poetry i n t o 
orose, and prose into jargon..." 
See U.N. Monetary Documents, pp. 1109 - 1110. 
2. See Appendix XXD- Cf. J. Gold, " I n t e r p r e t a t i o n by 
the Fund", op. c i t . , p. 56. 
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more informal procedures than those established by-
Paragraph 20." yet the very t e x t of the above s t a t e -
ment reveals the f a c t that (a) so f a r , there have arisen 
controversies over the consultative arrangements of the 
Borrowing Scheme; and (b) due to the f a c t that no 
o f f i c i a l steps have been taken to remove those contro-
versies — e i t h e r by way of formal i n t e r p r e t a t i o n under 
Paragraph 20, or by way of amendment under Paragraph 15 
of 'The Decision' — therefore they are l e g a l l y s t i l l 
i n existence; and every now and then they may be resorted 
t o , not only f o r t h e i r own sake, but also f o r the sake 
2 
of achieving some other r e l a t e d objectives. 
( i i ) By reason of the f a c t that no j u d i c i a l body 
outside the Group of Ten has been seen necessary to 
exert a u t h o r i t a t i v e c o n t r o l over t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s , under 
the Borrowing Scheme, therefore they might have devel-
oped, i n the course of time, practices which were unknown 
1. See I b i d . 
2. Cf. statement quoted from Herr Franz Josef Strauss, 
the West-German Finance Minister, i n "The Guardian", 
January 20, 1969, p. 10. Cf. also (1967), 61, A.J. 
I.L., p. 392. 
3. Cf. F. A. Mann, "In t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Co-operation", 
op. c i t . , p. 255. 
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to the drafters, of the Borrowing Scheme. 1 Yet the f a c t 
of non-appearance of any "formal controversy" over the 
a c t i v i t i e s of the Group of Ten cannot be quoted as a 
proof of the f a c t that a l l t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s are being 
2 
kept w i t h i n the framework of the Borrowing Scheme. 
2. I f one could have followed some of the recently 
held consultative meetings of the Group of Ten, one would 
have seen that some of these consultative arrangements 
have not met the requirements of the provision of the 
l a t t e r part of 'The Letter' e i t h e r . y For instance, one 
would have seen that some of these consultative meetings 
took place without the presence of the Fund's Managing 
Director or his representative; whereas h i s presence 
i n any one of the consultative meetings of the Group of 
Ten has been one of the rules set out i n the provision 
of the l a t t e r part of 'The Letter'". 
1. The occurrence of such a development constitutes our 
next consideration under the present Chapter. 
2. -Cf. J.E.S. Fawcett, "The Law of Nations", op. c i t . , 
PP. 95 - 96. 
3. Remember that under the present Heading, we are s t i l l 
i n the process of examining the e f f e c t s of the pro-
v i s i o n of the l a t t e r p a r t of 'The L e t t e r ' on the 
consultative arrangements of the Borrowing Scheme. 
4-. See the process of the recent consultative meetings 
of the Group of Ten, held i n Bonn, i n November, 1968. 
See, f o r instance, "The Times", 22 November,, 1968, p. 
21. Cf. "Communique' of the M i n i s t e r i a l Meeting of 
the Group of Ten","" of July 1966,in the Hague. 
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I t i s true t h a t , according to the provisions of 
some other Paragraphs of the Borrowing Scheme, c e r t a i n 
consultative meetings of the Borrowing Scheme can he 
held without the presence of the Fund's Managing D i r -
ector; but, here we are t r y i n g to see whether the pro-
visions of the l a t t e r part of 'The Letter* have had 
( i n practice )* any power to p r e v a i l over other provisions 
f o r consultative meetings of the Borrowing Scheme. 
Now, i n view of the facts considered under the 
present Heading there seems to be no s p e c i f i c j u s t i f i c a -
t i o n f o r b e l i e v i n g that the provisions of the l a t t e r 
part of 'The Let t e r ' should have a p r e v a i l i n g e f f e c t 
over a l l other provisions of consultative meetings of 
the Borrowing Scheme. 
The t h i n g , however, which should not be overlooked 
i n t h i s connection i s the undermining ef f e c t of t h i s pro-
v i s i o n i n the entire consultative machinery of the Borrow-
ing Scheme. The reason f o r t h i s i s that t h i s p r o v i s i o n 
i s providing that any one of the consultative meetings 
of the Group of Ten should have the ingredients of (a) 
the Fund's Managing Director and (b) a l l the Pa r t i c i p a n t s ; 
whereas the provisions of other consultative arrangements 
1. Cf. A r t i c l e 31 (3 - b) of the "Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties", o p . . c i t . i , p. 12. Cf. also 
(1967), 61, A.J.I.L., pp. 379, 385 - 386. 
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of the Borrowing Scheme are providing (a) different 
"stages" before a borrowing arrangement can be worked 
out and (b) di f f e r e n t bodies to take part at any one 
of these "stages". As such, the provision of the 
l a t t e r part of 'The L e t t e r ' (a) undermines the concept 
of "stages" of consultative arrangements of the Borrow-
ing Scheme and (b) mixes up the ingredients of bodies 
supposed to take part at any one of these different 
"stages", so much so that t h i s provision makes i t super-
fluous to chart the "stages" necessary before a borr-
owing arrangement can be sorted out. 
For t h i s and for some other reasons (which w i l l 
come l a t e r ) i t seems preferable to give up attempts for 
charting (a) various stages necessary before a ''borrowing 
arrangement" can be worked out, and (b) the bodies sup-
posed to take part i n any one of these various stages. 
Instead, i t would be ea s i e r to t r y f o r the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n 
of the bodies supposed to take part i n the consultative 
arrangements of the Borrowing Scheme as a whole, and 
ignore the "stages" contemplated therein. This c o n s t i -
tues our consideration under the next following Heading. 
V I I I - ATTENDANTS AT THE CONSULTATIVE 
MEETINGS OF THE BORROWING SCHEME 
Here again, due to the differences e x i s t i n g between 
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the r u l e s of consultative arrangements of 'The L e t t e r 1 
and 'The Decision', i t i s not easy to discover the 
bodies authorised to take part i n the consultative 
arrangements of the Borrowing Scheme. For instance, 
according to the provision of Paragraph 7(a) of 'The 
Decision', the Fund's Executive Directors are amongst 
the bodies to be consulted before a "borrowing arrange-
ment" can be worked out; whereas they apparently have 
no role to play so f a r as the consultative arrangements 
of 'The L e t t e r ' are concerned. 
However, by reason of the f a c t that the a c t u a l 
sponsors f o r any "borrowing arrangement" have been 
the Fund's Executive Directors therefore i t i s 
d i f f i c u l t to think of any "borrowing arrangement" 
which could be worked out without the consultation 
2 
and "approval" of the Fund's Executive Directors. 
With regard to other bodies auth-
1. I n a sense, scarce currencies are to be borrowed 
f i r s t by the Fund (Paragraph l ( v i i ) of 'The 
Decision'); and then lent to a prospective drawer. 
Cf. A r t i c l e V I I (2) of the Fund's A r t i c l e s of 
Agreement. For the construction of the term 
"Fund" used i n Paragraph l ( v i i ) of 'The Decision' 
see A r t i c l e X I I of the F.A.A. and Section 15 of 
the Fund's By-Laws. 
2. Cf. however, "International Monetary Fund, 194-5-
1965", qp. c i t . , volume I I , pp. 4-57 - 4-58. 
o r i s e d t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n the c o n s u l t a t i v e meetings of 
the Borrowing Scheme, there seems to be no d i f f i c u l t y 
i n i d e n t i f y i n g them. And the p r o v i s i o n s of both 'The 
L e t t e r ' and 'The D e c i s i o n 1 i n t h i s respect have been the 
same. These bodies are (a) The Fund's Managing D i r e c t o r 
and (b) the P a r t i c i p a n t s . 
As a r e s u l t , we can consider t h a t the bodies author-
i s e d to take p a r t i n the c o n s u l t a t i v e arrangements of the 
Borrowing scheme are (a) the Fund's Managing D i r e c t o r , 
(b) the P a r t i c i p a n t s i n the Borrowing Scheme, and ( c j 
the Fund's Executive D i r e c t o r s . And no other body i s 
l e g a l l y a u t h o r i s e d t o take p a r t i n these c o n s u l t a t i v e 
arrangements. This makes the r i s k of any "leakage" 
out of these c o n s u l t a t i v e arrangements l e s s probable. 
However, an examination of one of the recent commun-
iques of the Group of Ten, reveals t h a t many other bodies 
and e n t i t i e s have taken an a c t i v e p a r t i n the c o n s u l t a t i v e 
meetings of the Borrowing Scheme. I f one f o l l o w s the 
r e p o r t s concerning the November 1968'3 c o n s u l t a t i v e meet-
ings of the Group of Ten, he w i l l observe the p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
of Countries and e n t i t i e s such as Switzerland and the 
Commission of the European Communities i n these c o n s u l t a t i v e 
meetings. At the end, one w i l l read t h a t the £ 2,000 m. 
stand-by arrangement ( n e g o t i a t e d f o r the b e n e f i t of France) 
i s t o be p r o v i s i o n a l l y shared by Countries and e n t i t i e s l i k e 
Scandinavian c o u n t r i e s and the Bank f o r I n t e r n a t i o n a l S e t t -
lements. For i n s t a n c e , i n respect of p r o v i s i o n a l sharing of 
the above % 2,000 m. stand-by arrangement, i t was r e p o r t e d 
i n the press t h a t : -
"...Germany, % 600 m-; the United States Federal 
Reserve, 0 500 m^  I t a l y , % 200 m 
2 1 2 
Switzerland and the Scandinavian c o u n t r i e s , 
0 100 in.J- and the Bank f o r I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Settlements, 0 50 m." 2 
/ 
The Communique i t s e l f , i n p a r t reads: 
" 1 . The M i n i s t e r s and c e n t r a l bank governors 
of the 10 c o u n t r i e s p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the General 
Arrangements t o Borrow met i n Bonn on November 20-22, 
1968, under the Chairmanship of K a r l S c h i l l e r , 
M i n i s t e r of Economics, Federal Republic of Germany.. 
Pi e r r e - P a u l Schweitzer, Managing D i r e c t o r of 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund took p a r t i n the meeting, 
which was also attended by the President of the Swiss 
N a t i o n a l Bank, the Deputy Secretary-General of the 
O.E.C.D., the General Manager of the B.I.S., and 
the Vice-President of the Commission of the European 
Communities. 
2. The meeting was c a l l e d by i t s Chairman, 
M i n i s t e r S c h i l l e r , on the proposal of several 
3 A 
member c o u n t r i e s . . . " . 
1. Take ncice of the term "Scandinavian c o u n t r i e s " i n the 
above co n t e x t , which should be d i s t i n c t from the 
"Sveriges Riksbank" the a c t u a l P a r t i c i p a n t i n the 
Borrowing Scheme. 
2. See "The Times Business News", November 23,1968,p.11. 
3. I t i s not c i e a r whether by the expression "The prop-
osal of s e v e r a l member c o u n t r i e s " i n the above context 
i t i s meant ( s e v e r a l ) p r o p o s a l ( s ) f o r ( s e v e r a l ) b o r r -
owing arrangement(s), put forward by ( s e v e r a l ) P a r t -
icipant's)? Cf.Paragraphs 6 and 7(a) of 'The D e c i s i o n 1 . 
Cf. also Paragraphs (A), (B) and (C) of 'The. L e t t e r ' 
4. For the complete t e x t of the above communique, see 
Appendix XIX. 
As t o the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of some other bodies 
such as O.E.C.D., also one may quote the p r o v i s i o n of 
the l a t t e r p a r t of 'The L e t t e r 1 , where i t says:-
" I t i s understood t h a t i n order to f u r t h e r 
the c o n s u l t a t i o n s envisaged, p a r t i c i p a n t s should, 
t o the f u l l e s t extent p r a c t i c a b l e , use the f a c -
i l i t i e s of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i s a t i o n s to 
which they belong i n keeping each other informed 
of the developments i n t h e i r balance of payments 
t h a t could give r i s e t o the use of the Supplemen-
t a r y Resources " 
The above p r o v i s i o n , however, seems t o recommend, the 
use of only " f a c i l i t i e s " of the above i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
o r g a n i s a t i o n s ( l i k e i n f o r m a t i o n and d a t a ) , which could 
w e l l i n f o r m the Group of Ten of the balance of payments 
p o s i t i o n of each other. 
As such, the wording of the above p r o v i s i o n does... 
1. See Appendix I . Of. Report of Per Jacobsson t o the 
ECOSOC, " I n t e r n a t i o n a l F i n a n c i a l News Survey",' 
1962, p.111. Cf. The same survey, year 1961, 
p.154; year 1964.pp. 316 and 401. 
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not go so f a r as to a u t h o r i s e fife'se "bodies t o 
take p a r t i n the c o n s u l t a t i v e meetings of the 
Borrowing Scheme. This l e g a l i s t i c approach t o the 
above p r o v i s i o n , however, does not seem t o be of 
p r a c t i c a l importance; because the co-operation of 
these i n s t i t u t i o n s w i t h the Group of Ten seems t o be 
of v i t a l importance, something which cannot be dispensed 
1 
w i t h . 
Cf. " N a t i o n a l Advisory Council on I n t e r -
n a t i o n a l Monetary and F i n a n c i a l Problems", 
op..cit., p..13; " M i n i s t e r i a l Statement of the 
Group of Ten and Annex Prepared by Deputies", 
P a r i s , August 10, 1964, pp. 1, 5, 6, and 11. 
"Report of" the Study Group on the Cre a t i o n 
of Reserve Assets, Report to the Deputies of 
the Group of Ten", 1 August, 1965, pp.45 and 
74-75; "Communique of M i n i s t e r s and Governors 
of the Group of Ten", September 28, 1965; 
" I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund Summary 
Proceedings", 1965, pp.279-281; "Communique 
of the Group of Ten", the Hague, 25 J u l y 1966, 
Paragraph '2, "Report to the M i n i s t e r s and 
Governors, by the Group of Depii t i e s " , the Group of 
Ten, 17 J u l y , 1966, p.16. Cf. also F.A; Mann, 
"Money i n P u b l i c I n t e r n a t i o n a l Lav/, Recueil des 
Cours, o p . c i t . , pp.28-31. 
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The f o l l o w i n g p o i n t s , i n connection w i t h the above 
communique, seem t o be noteworthy:-
1. I t i s not c l e a r from the context of the above 
communique, whether any one of the r u l e s which we have 
considered under, the headings of "Pre-Call C o n s u l t a t i v e 
Arrangements of 'The Decision' and "Pre-Call C o n s u l t a t i v e 
Arrangements of 'The L e t t e r " have been observed i n the 
above s e r i e s of c o n s u l t a t i v e meetings. 
2. The above c o n t e n t i o n can be extended t o cover the 
bodies and e n t i t i e s p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the above c o n s u l t a t i v e 
meetings. " One o f the a u t h o r i t i e s r e f e r r e d t o i n the 
above communique, however, i s the Presicent of thelci'ational 
Bank of Sw i t z e r l a n d . His p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the above con-
s u l t a t i v e meetings i s , however, j u s t i f i e d on the grounds 
t h a t the Swiss Confederation has become, since 1964, an 
Associate Member t o the General Arrangements t o Borrow. 
1. Take n o t i c e of the term "meeting" used i n the above 
communique i n a s i n g u l a r form. 
2. Cf. ' " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund, 1945-1965", o p . c i t . , i/ol. I I , p.35. 
3. The A s s o c i a t i o n of Swiss Confedera.tion w i t h the General 
Arrangements t o Borrow, took e f f e c t by v i r t u e of the 
"Exchange of L e t t e r s biffween the Ambassador of Switzer-
land t o the United States and the Managing D i r e c t o r of 
of the Fund" on 11 June,1964. See the Fund's Selected 
Decisions, pp.69-72. The question of a s s o c i a t i o n of 
Swiss Confederation w i t h the General Arrangements t o 
Borrow i t s e l f m e r i t s a t r e a t i s e . However, f o r a b r i e f 
e x p l a n a t i o n as t o how t h i s a s s o c i a t i o n has been working 
i n p r a c t i c e , see Appendix X X I I . Appendix X X I I contains 
v a l u a b l e explanatory notes w i t h which the Swiss Nation-
a l Bank has k i n d l y f u r n i s h e d us. C f . " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Fin-
a n c i a l News Survey",year 1961, p.225; year 1962,p.381; 
year 1963,p.89; 111; year 1964- p*:189. " I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Monetary 'Fund - Annual Report",year 1964, p p ^ - I O , 
133-140; year 1968 p.108, J.Gold, "The Fund"and Non-
Member States, Some Legal Effects",op.cit.,pp.33-37. 
"The I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund and I n t e r n a t i o n a l Lav/ -
An I n t r o d u c t i o n " , I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund,Washingt-
on B.C.,1965, p.26; " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund,1945-
1965", o p . c i t . , pp.514-515. 
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For the importance attached to the question, 
we have preferred to consider i t under the following 
independent Heading. 
IX - RESERVATIONS AMD CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENTS 
OF THE BORROWING SCHEME 
The contents of the above communique' (as w e l l as 
the reports released i n the P r e s s ) , reveal the f a c t 
that recent consultative meetings of the Group of Ten 
were presided over by Karl S c h i l l e r , Economics Minister 
of the Federal Republic of West Germany. This f i r s t 
took us by sur p r i s e . Then we t r i e d to re-examine some 
of the "basic instruments'* of "The Letter', with a view 
to finding any evidence i n support of the p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
of the Economics Minister of West German i n the above 
consultative meetings."*" 
1. By the "basic instruments" of 'The Le t t e r ' i n t h i s 
context, we mean: 
(a) A s e r i e s of identical l e t t e r s signed and sent 
by M. Baumgartner, Minister of Finance France, on 15 
December, 1961, to the prospective P a r t i c i p a n t s i n the 
Borrowing Scheme. 
(b) Letters of Confirmation sent by the prosp-
ective P a r t i c i p a n t s to M. Baumgartner, confirming the 
receipt of the above identical l e t t e r s and s t a t i n g that 
they are i n agreement with the contents thereof, and 
f i n a l l y ; 
( c ) Another s e r i e s of i d e n t i c a l l e t t e r s sent by 
M. Baumgartner on 9 January, 1962, to the prospective 
P a r t i c i p a n t s , announcing the f i n a l stage of the 
exchange of 'The L e t t e r ' and adding that 'The L e t t e r 1 
has thus come into e f f e c t , (footnote: For the 
d e t a i l s of procedure as to how 'The Letter* came into 
e f f e c t , see supra under the Chapter "Constituent 
Instruments of the Borrowing Scheme".) 
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After the re-examination of "some samples" of the 
"basic instruments" of 'The Let t e r ' , we argued that 
there seemed to be no provisions under the Paragraphs 
of 'The L e t t e r 1 to the effect that a n y . o f f i c i a l of the 
Economics Ministry of West-Germany (as d i s t i n c t from 
the Deutsche Bundesbank) can. take part i n the consulta-
tive meetings of the Borrowing Scheme. 1 Later on, 
however, we were by chance availed of the English version 
of the Deutsche Bundesbank's "Letter of Confirmation". 
And i t was, a f t e r the receiving of the copy of t h i s 
L e t t e r of Confirmation,that we saw that the Deutsche 
Bundesbank has ref e r r e d to some reservations concerning 
1. Due to the f a c t that the "basic instruments" of 
•The L e t t e r ' constitute more than t h i r t y instruments, 
therefore we v/ere confined to the study of only 
those "samples" of these instruments which were 
available to us. And we must admit that amongst 
those samples were not those r e l a t e d to West 
Germany. We could not, however, see any d i f f i c u l t y 
i n assuming that a l l the instruments exchange at 
any one of the three above stages must have been 
the verbatim of each other. This assumption was 
c h i e f l y based on the f a c t that the most important 
of these three sets of l e t t e r s (that i s 'The L e t t e r ' ) 
has been published by the In t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary 
Fund as one of the Fund's Selected Documents 
(footnote: See the Fund's Selected Decisions, pp. 
67-68). And i n the Fund's Selected Decisions no 
reference has been made to any reservation under 
which any o f f i c i a l from the Ministry of Economics 
of West-Germany could preside over the consultative 
meetings of the Borrowing Scheme. 
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the consultative procedures of 'The Let t e r ' ; which 
reservations could j u s t i f y the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the 
West-Gei?man Minister of Economics i n the consultative 
meetings of the Borrowing Scheme. The Deutsche Bundes-
bank's "Letter of Confirmation",in part, says:-
"... Dear Mr. Minister: (M. W. Baumgartner) 
.... On behalf of the Deutsche Bundesbank, we are 
pleased to confirm .. that we are i n agreement with 
the statement of understandings as set f o r t h i n 
your l e t t e r of December 15 th , 1961 ('The L e t t e r ' , 
that i s ) . As concerns the consultative procedures 
set out i n your l e t t e r on Page 3 , t h i r d and follow-
ing paragraphs, v/e understand that the German 
Government wants to reserve for i t s e l f the r i g h t 
to designate, besides the representative desig-
nated by the Deutsche Bundesbank, a representative 
of i t s own. 
We are attaching, i n accordance with your 
suggestion, t h i s E n g l i s h text of our l e t t e r of 
1 2 
confirmation ...." ' 
1. For the complete text of the above "Letter of Con-
firmation" see Appendix XXVI. Parentheses added. 
2. Here we may point out that we did not see i t necessary 
to re-examine the "basic instruments" of 'The Decision' 
This was mainly due to the f a c t that the most import-
ant of the "basic instruments" of 'The Decision' i s 
the Fund's Decision No. 1289(62/1) as amended. And 
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As such, despite our previous assumption, the p a r t i c i -
pation of West-German Minister of Economics i n the 
consultative meetings of the Borrowing Scheme i s not 
(at l e a s t to the West German a u t h o r i t i e s ) v/ithout any 
contractual j u s t i f i c a t i o n . By th i s we do not intend 
to suggest that the reservations r e f e r r e d to "by the 
Deutsche Bundesbank are immune from argument; because 
so long as such reservations are unknown to other 
interested p a r t i e s , they can hardly be of any l e g a l 
s i g n i f i c a n c e . 
I t i s true that the Deutsche Bundesbank i n i t s 
"Letter of Confirmation" of 27 December 1961, has 
c l e a r l y referred to these reservations. Yet M. 
any e l i g i b l e body that was interested i n adhering 
to this decision could, have done so by depositing 
with the Fund an instrument (known as Instrument 
of Adherence) "setting f o r t h that i t has adhered, 
i n accordance with i t s lav/ and has taken a l l steps 
necessaryvto carry out the terms and conditions of" 
'The Decision' (footnote: See Paragraph 3(c) of 
'The Decision'). And the Deutsche Bundesbank, l i k e 
any other prospective P a r t i c i p a n t , has deposited 
such an "Instrument of Adherence" with the Fund 
without making any reservations as to the contents 
of 'The Decision'. (footnote: See Appendix V. Cf. 
"Inter n a t i o n a l F i n a n c i a l News Survey", 1962, pp. 
189 - 1 9 0 ) . Therefore, there seems to be no evidence, 
amongst the "basic instruments" of 'The Decision' to 
support the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of any o f f i c i a l from 
Ministry of Economics of West-Germany i n the con-
s u l t a t i v e meetings of the Borrowing Scheme. C f i 
( 1 9 6 7 ) , 61, A.J.I.L., p. 327- Cf. also A r t i c l e 
2 0 ( 3 ) of the "'Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Trea t i e s " , op. c i t . , p. 8. 
Baumgartner, i n h i s i d e n t i c a l l e t t e r s of 9 January, 
1962, (sent to a l l the P a r t i c i p a n t s , including the 
Deutsche Bundesbank) has made no acknowledgement of 
these reservations. ^ 
1. Cf. "Report of the International Law Commission on 
the Second part of i t s Seventeenth Session, and on 
i t s Eighteenth Session", (1967) ? 61, A.J.I.L., pp. 
320 - 321 , e s p e c i a l l y where i t i s s a i d : -
"With regard to a l l other future multi-
l a t e r a l conventions concluded under the 
auspices of the United Nations of which he 
i s the depostory, i t (the U.N. General 
Assembly, that i s ) requested the Secretary 
General: 
( i ) to continue to act as depository i n 
connection with the deposit of docu-
ments containing reservations or 
objections, without passing upon the 
leg a l e f f e c t of such documents; and 
( i i ) to communicate the tex.t-';of such docu-
ments r e l a t i n g to reservations or 
objections to a l l states concerned, 
leaving i t to each state to draw l e g a l 
consequences from such communications". 
Parenthesis added. 
Cf. also Section (2) of A r t i c l e 76, and Section 1 
(e) of A r t i c l e 77 of the "Vienna Convention on the 
Lav/ of T r e a t i e s " , op. c i t . , p. 26; A r t i c l e X I I I (b) 
of "Agreement E s t a b l i s h i n g Interim Arrangements For 
a Global Commercial Communications S a t e l l i t e System", 
Cmnd. 2-4-36, p. 16. 
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He simply has stated:-
"You (The prospective P a r t i c i p a n t ) 1 have been 
kind enough to confirm to me your agreement regard-
ing the procedure to be followed i n connection with 
borrowing by the International Monetary Fund of 
Supplementary Resources from the P a r t i c i p a t i n g 
Countries and I n s t i t u t i o n s . 
I have the honour to inform you that I have 
p 
received s i m i l a r confirmations from the Minister 
of Finance of Belgium, the Minister of Finance of 
Canada, ... the President of German Federal Bank 
... the Governor of the National Bank of Sweden ... 
I am notifying the other p a r t i c i p a n t s , as w e l l 
as the International Monetary Fund, of the general 
agreement thus r e a l i s e d with respect to the under-
standings reached during the recent discussions i n 
P a r i s . " ^ 
1. Parenthesis added. 
2. Take notice- of the expression " s i m i l a r confirma-t i o n s " i n the above context. 
3- See Appendix I I I . 
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To t h i s may be added the f a c t that the authors 
of 'The L e t t e r ' have drafted i t i n a form as i f i t was 
a f i n a l arrangement awaiting only f o r m a l i t i e s for i t s 
coming into e f f e c t . For instance, the l a t t e r part of 
'The L e t t e r ' c l e a r l y s tates that:-
" I 1 s h a l l appreciate a reply confirming that the 
foregoing represents the understandings which have 
2 
been reached with respect to the procedure to be 
followed i n connection v/ith borrowings by the I n t e r -
national Monetary Fund under the c r e d i t arrange-
ments ... " ' 
Therefore, i t was perhaps due to the above f a c t s — 
p a r t i c u l a r l y the f a c t that the contents of 'The Le t t e r ' 
was something already agreed upon — that M. Baumgartner 
1. M. W. Bauragartner, as the depository authority, 
that i s . 
2. Take notice of the expression "the understandings 
which have been reached" i n the above part of 'The 
L e t t e r ' . Cf.'Preamble to 'The L e t t e r ' . Cf. also 
the s i m i l a r expression used i n the above l e t t e r s of 
M. W. Baumgartner, of 9 January, 1962. See Appendix 
I I I . Cf,, however, (1967), 61, A.J.I.L., p. 320. Cf. 
also (1968), 62, A.J.I.L., pp. 568-569.; I . M. S i n c l a i r , 
"Vienna Conference on the Law of T r e a t i e s " , op. c i t . , 
pp. 5 6 - 5 8 . • 
3. See Appendix I . Cf. the standard clauses compiled and 
published by the United Nations for the"insertion of 
reservations i n international engagements. See,' the 
"U.N. Handbook of F i n a l Clauses", op. c i t . , pp.40-4-2. 
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did not see i t necessary to r e f e r ( i n his l e t t e r of 
January 9, 1962) 1 to the reservations stated by the 
Deutsche Bundesbank. 
The non-acknowledgement of the above reservations, 
by him, may also be due to the f a c t that the number of 
p a r t i e s to 'The L e t t e r 1 are so l i m i t e d that no reserva-
tion can be expected to be made i n connection therewith. 
And f i n a l l y h i s non-acknowledgement of the above 
reservations may have been due to the f a c t that the 
contents of those reservations would have been incompatible 
with "the objects .and purposes of 'The L e t t e r ' . ^ 
1. See Appendix I I I . 
2. Cf. I . L. S i n c l a i r , "Vienna Conference on the Law of 
T r e a t i e s " , op. c i t . , pp. 56, 60 esp. where, i n 
connection with the r u l e s on reservations of "Vienna 
Convention on the Law of T r e a t i e s " , says:-
"The t r a d i t i o n a l unanimity rule i s 
acknowledged f o r the category of r e s t r i c t e d 
m u l t i l a t e r a l t r e a t i e s , that i s to say, t r e a t i e s 
concluded between a limited number of S t a t e s . " 
Cf. also (1967), 61, A.J.I.L., pp. 323, 325 - 327; 
Section (2) of A r t i c l e 20 of the "Vienna Convention 
on the Law of T r e a t i e s " , op. c i t . , p. 8. 
3 . Cf. Lord McNair, "The Law of Treat i e s " , op. c i t . , pp. 
166 - 168. Cf. a l s o , (1967), 61, A.J.I.L., p. 320, 
et. seq.; (1968), 62, A.J.I.L., p. 569, et. seq.; 
Section_(2) of A r t i c l e 20 of the "Vienna Convention 
on the Law of T r e a t i e s " , op. c i t . , p. 8. 
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The inference here i s that i f no reservation was 
expected to be made to the contents of 'The L e t t e r 1 ^ 
and i f the reservations made by the competent authori-
t i e s of West-Germany have not been conveyed to the 
other P a r t i c i p a n t s i n the Borrowing Scheme, then those 
p 
reservations can hardly be of any legal e f f e c t . 
However, the above inference bring us face to face 
with another l e g a l i s s u e , v i z . , whether there has been 
any other means by which the above reservations have been 
conveyed to the other P a r t i c i p a n t s ; since i t arouses one's 
c u r i o s i t y to see a consultative meeting of the Borrowing 
Scheme being presided over by the Economics Minister of 
o b j e c t i o n . 
West-Germany, and at the same time, no^ Qontcnti-en has 
3 
been made by the interested bodies i n t h i s respect. 
1. Cf. however, Advisory Opinion of I.C.J, on the 
questions concerning Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime and Genocide, 1951> 
discussed by Lord McNair i n his "The Lav/ of T r e a t i e s " , 
op. c i t . , pp. 163 - 1'73• f o r the bearing t h i s Ad-
visory Opinion would have had on the question of 
reservations see "U.N. Handbook of F i n a l Clauses", 
op. c i t . , pp. v i - v i i . 
2. See Lord McNair, "The Lav/ of T r e a t i e s " , op. c i t . , 
pp. 159-160. 
3- See the communique of November, 1968 of the Group 
of Ten, Appendix XIX. 
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And these interested bodies must have been assumed of 
being aware of the e f f e c t s of t h e i r attitude i n t h i s 
respect. I n other words, they must have been aware 
of the f a c t that t h e i r attitude i n t h i s respect could 
have had the effect of acquiescence, i n the question 
of "supposed" reservations entered by West-German 
a u t h o r i t i e s . 1 
Therefore, by reason of the above f a c t s , the ques-
ti o n of reservations here seems to deserve more inv e s t i g a -
t i o n . 
1. Cf. Section (5) of A r t i c l e (20) of the "Vienna 
Convention on the law of T r e a t i e s " , op. c i t . , p. 
8. Gf. also (1967), 61, A.J.I.L., p. 328. The 
attitude of the P a r t i c i p a n t s , i n t h i s respect, 
seems to have passed the stage of acquiescence; 
because, i n t h e i r communique of 22 November, 1968, 
there has twice been reference to Professor K a r l 
S c h i l l e r , i n h i s capacity as the Chairman of the 
consultative meetings of the Borrowing Scheme. 
(footnote: see Appendix XIX. Cf. "The Times", 23 
November 1968, p. 15). And the Chairman of the 
consultative meetings of the Borrowing Scheme i s 
someone to be chosen by the voting of the P a r t i c i -
pants; f o r the l a t t e r part of 'The L e t t e r 1 s t a t e s : -
"... The representative of France s h a l l 
be responsible for c a l l i n g the f i r s t meeting, 
and at that time the p a r t i c i p a n t s w i l l deter-
mine who s h a l l be the Chairman ... " 
Therefore, here, the P a r t i c i p a n t s must have known 
the status of Professor S c h i l l e r , so f a r as the 
consultative arrangements of 'The L e t t e r 1 are con-
cerned, and they must have voted f o r his Chairman-
ship with the knowledge of the implications of such 
a vote. See further Paragraph 4- of the Communique 
of the Group of Ten of September 25, 1966. 
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And therehust have been some other evidence 
j u s t i f y i n g the e n t e r i n g of the above r e s e r v a t i o n s by 
the Federal Government of Vest Germany. 
The existence and the contents of such, evidence, 
however, c o n s t i t u t e our next c o n s i d e r a t i o n under the 
present Heading. But before t h i s can be done we must 
r e c a l l some of the events l e a d i n g t o the coming i n t o 
e f f e c t of the contents of 'The L e t t e r ' . Otherwise i t 
would, perhaps, be d i f f i c u l t t o f o l l o w our l i n e of 
argument i n t h i s respect. 
As we have seen e a r l i e r , t here i s a sharp s i m i l a r i t y 
between the s t a t u s of the Sveriges Riksbank and t h a t of 
the Deutsche Bundesbank so f a r as the Paragraphs of 
the Borrowing Scheme are concerned. But, despit e t h i s 
s i m i l a r i t y , only one i d e n t i c a l copy of M. Baumgartner's 
l e t t e r of 15 December, 1961 ('The L e t t e r ' , t h a t i s ) , has 
been sent t o the Sveriges Riks bank, ; whereas i n the 
Deutsche Bundesbank. Cf. " I n t e r n a t i o n a l F i n a n c i a l 
News Survey", 1962. p . 1 . 
1. See Appendix XXVII. 
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case of the Deutsche Bundesbank, two i d e n t i c a l copies 
of 'The Let t e r 1 ' have been sent —- one to the President 
of the Deutsche Bundesbank, and another to the Minister 
of Economics, of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
The question which s t r i k e s one i n t h i s connection i s : 
what was the reason prompting M. Baumgartner to sign an 
i d e n t i c a l copy of 'The L e t t e r ' and send i t to the Minis-
2 
te r of Economics of the Federal Republic of West Germany? 
Would t h i s not account for the f a c t that the Federal 
Republic of West Germany has had some locus standi for 
the coming into e f f e c t of the contents of 'The L e t t e r ' ? 
The answer to t h i s question seems to l i e i n the travaux; : 
preparatoires and some other r e l a t e d instruments kept 
i n the French Ministry of Finance. 
1. See Deutsche Bundesbank, Mitteilung Nr. 7002/62. 
(4 F o r t s . - B l a t t ) Aussenwirtschaft Auslandszahlung-
sverkehr. 
2. As we may have noticed, M. Baumgartner, the then 
Minister of Finance, France, served as the deposi-
tory authority for the exchange of the copies of 
'The Letter* and i t s r e l a t e d instruments. See l a s t 
paragraph of 'The Le t t e r ' , Appendix I . 
3. As to how f a r travaux preparatoires can stand ag-
ainst the text of an in t e r n a t i o n a l engagement, see 
(1967), 61, A.J.I.L., pp. 358-561? A r t i c l e s 31 and 
32 of the "Vienna Convention on the Law of T r e a t i e s " , 
op. c i t . , pp. 12-13. Cf. S. Rosenne, "The Internation-
a l Court of J u s t i c e " , 1937, Leyden, A. W- S i j t h o f f ' s 
vitgeversmaatschappij, V.M"., p. 223; I . M. S i n c l a i r , 
"Vienna' Conference on the Law of T r e a t i e s " , op. c i t . , 
pp. 61-66. 
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Y/e t r i e d , therefore, to obtain access to some of these 
instruments,- with a view to finding any reason f or thi s 
state of a f f a i r s \ but v/e were unfortunately told that 
2 
these documents are not avail a b l e to the public. 
One thing i s , however, c l e a r , v i z . , one day a f t e r 
the Deutsche Bundesbank sent i t s "Letter of Confirmation" 
to M. Baumgartner, another l e t t e r was sent to him — t h i s 
time from the Economics Ministry of West Germany. ^ And 
i t i s t h i s l e t t e r ( i t i s believed) which has been hinted 
i n the Deutsche Bundesbank's "Letter of Confirmation" 
and which contains the assumed reservations made by the 
Federal Government of West Germany. For t h i s reason, 
1. See Appendix XXIV. 
2. See Appendix XXV. 
3. See l e t t e r of Ministry of Economics of the Federal 
Republic of West Germany sent on 28 December, 1961 
to M. Baumgartner. See Deutsche Bundesbank, 
Mitteilung Nr. 7002/62 (5. F o r t s . - B l a t t ) , 
Aussenwirtschaft Auslandszahlungsverkehr. This 
l e t t e r i s apparently i n reply to the above-ment-
ioned copy of 'The L e t t e r ' sent by M. Baumgartner 
to Ministry of Economics of Federal Republic of 
West Germany. 
4. See the Deutsche Bundesbank's "Letter of Confirma-
ti o n " , Appendix XXVI. 
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t h i s time, we t r i e d to get the copy of t h i s l e t t e r from 
the Ministry of Economics of the Federal Republic of 
West Germany. But, as expected, i n t h i s case also we 
were told that the l e t t e r i s an unpublished one. ^ 
Therefore, i n t h i s way, we f a i l e d to f i n d out the nature 
and scope of reservations e_n.ter.ed by the Ministry of 
Economics of the Federal Republic of West Germany i n 
respect of the consultative arrangements of 'The L e t t e r ' . 
I t i s true that there e x i s t s some reference i n the 
Deutsche Bundesbank's "Letter of Confirmation", as to 
the extent of these reservations; but t h i s reference 
does not seem to be very rewarding; because i t , i n an 
uncircumscribed way, s t a t e s : -
p 
"As concerns the consultative procedures 
5 
set out i n your l e t t e r on page 3» th i r d and 
following paragraphs, we understand that the German 
Government wants to reserve for i t s e l f the r i g h t 
4-
to designate ... a representative of i t s own..." 
See Appendix XXVIII. 
Take notice of the term "procedures" i n p l u r a l i n 
the above context. 
'The L e t t e r ' , that i s . 
See The Deutsche Bundesbank's "Letter of Confirmation" 
Appendix XXVI. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
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Therefore, i t i s not cle a r , from the contents of 
the above "Letter of Confirmation", that what i s meant 
by the expression "page 3, t h i r d and following paragraphs". 
And, to understand t h i s reference required access to the 
very copy of 'The L e t t e r ' to which the Deutsche Bundes-
bank i s r e f e r r i n g . 
However, the only photostat of one of the copies of 
'The L e t t e r ' with which we have been furnished, i s the 
one kindly supplied to us by the Economics Ministry of 
the Federal Republic of West-Germany, and which bears 
the signature of Hi-c Honourable- M. Wilfred Baumgartner, 
Minister of Finance, France. Therefore, i f the copy of 
'The L e t t e r ' sent to the Deutsche Bundesbank i s as 
above, and i f the expression "following paragraphs" 
therein i s intended to mean the r e s t of provisions of 
•The L e t t e r ' a f t e r " t h i r d paragraph on.- page 3»" then 
the above "reservations" would embrace, i n t e r a l i a , the 
following provisions of 'The L e t t e r ' : -
" I t i s understood that i n the event of any 
proposals f o r c a l l s under the c r e d i t arrangements 
or i f other matters should a r i s e under the Fund 
decision 1 requiring consultations among the 
2 
pa r t i c i p a n t s , a consultative meeting w i l l be held.." 
1. 'The Decision', that i s . 
2. See Appendix I . 
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And, i f the reservations supposed to have been 
entered by West-German Government are to the contents 
of the above provisions of 'The Le t t e r ' , i t would then 
be d i f f i c u l t to see what else could remain i n the con-
s u l t a t i v e arrangements of 'The L e t t e r ' , which i s not 
subject to the above reservations; because as we have 
seen e a r l i e r ^ the entire consultative arrangements of 
'The L e t t e r 1 seem to have been compressed i n the above 
provision of the l a t t e r part of 'The Letter'. 
However, the question of reservations, made by the 
Federal Government of West Germany (and i t s extent) i s 
another instance, f o r which an authoritative c l a r i f i c a t i o n 
seems to b,e necessary. 
X - CONCLUSION 
Before any "borrowing arrangement" can be hammered: 
out, a s e r i e s of consultative arrangements, between the 
Group of Ten and the Fund's a u t h o r i t i e s , must take place. . 
These consultative arrangements are mainly contemplated 
with a view to investigating the merit of every "bor-
rowing arrangement"; the amount of currencies to be 
borrowed; and the proportion of contribution of every 
P a r t i c i p a n t . 
1. See under the Heading "Consultative arrangements of 
the Borrowing Scheme — Further Considerations", 
supra,under the same Chapter. 
Due t o the f a c t tha.t (a; the movement of shor t - t e r m cap-
i t a l i s of a q u i c k l y widespread nature and (b) any un t i m e l y 
leakage of the c o n s u l t a t i v e meetings of the Borrowing Scheme 
could cause serious damage, t h e r e f o r e i t seems necessary t o e s t -
a b l i s h ( I ) d i f f e r e n t "stages" of c o n s u l t a t i v e meetings of the 
Borrowing Scheme, and ( i i ) the bodies a u t h o r i s e d t o p a r t i c i p a t e 
i n any one "stage" of these c o n s u l t a t i v e meetings. 
Bu.t, by reason of"- the f a c t t h a t the c o n s u l t a t i v e arrange-
ments of the Borrowing Scheme have been d e a l t w i t h under both 
'The L e t t e r ' and 'The Decision', i t has become extremely d i f f -
i c u l t t o e s t a b l i s h d i f f e r e n t stages of c o n s u l t a t i v e meetings 
of the Borrowing Scheme. 
For t h i s reason, i t i s suggested t h a t attempts should 
be made t o s i m p l i f y , and even t o co n s o l i d a t e the terms and 
c o n d i t i o n s of the c o n s u l t a t i v e arrangements of the Borrowing 
Scheme. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
VOTING MACHINERY OF THE BORROWING SCHEME 
I - INTRODUCTION 
Under the present Chapter we s h a l l study the v o t i n g 
procedure of the Borrowing Scheme. This study would be 
l i m i t e d t o the p r o v i s i o n s of Paragraphs of 'The L e t t e r ' , 
since no v o t i n g procedure has been envisaged i n the Para-
graphs of 'The Decision'. The main p r o v i s i o n s t o be con-
sidered are Paragraphs ( B ) , (C) and (D) of 'The L e t t e r 1 , 
which are r e l a t e d t o the questions of "unanimous v o t i n g " 
and " q u a l i f i e d m a j o r i t y " , and which r a i s e many p o i n t s of 
l e g a l i n t e r e s t . 
F u r t h e r , due t o the f a c t t h a t the above Paragraphs 
a u t h o r i z e P a r t i c i p a n t s who have experienced balance of 
payments and reserve d i f f i c u l t i e s t o a b s t a i n from v o t i n g , 
we s h a l l next consider how balance of payments and reserve 
p o s i t i o n of the P a r t i c i p a n t s can be asce r t a i n e d and what 
are the l e g a l i m p l i c a t i o n s i n v o l v e d . 
Now, l e t us t u r n to the f i r s t of the above issues. 
I I - UNANIMOUS AGREEMENT 
i 
As r e f e r r e d t o e a r l i e r , the prime aim of the Group 
of Ten i s t o reach imrfrual understanding f o r the working 
1. See supra, under the Chapter, !i C o n s u l t a t i v e 
Arrangements of the Borrowing Scheme". 
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out of any "borrowing arrangement", paragraph B of 'The 
L e t t e r ' , w i t h regard t o t h i s p r i n c i p l e , s t a t e s : -
"B. I f the Managing D i r e c t o r makes a proposal 
f o r Supplementary Resources t o be l e n t to the Fund, 
the P a r t i c i p a n t s s h a l l consult on t h i s proposal and 
in f o r m the Managing D i r e c t o r of the amounts of t h e i r 
c urrencies which they consider a p p r o p r i a t e t o lend t o 
the Fund, t a k i n g i n t o account the recommendations of 
the Managing D i r e c t o r . . . The P a r t i c i p a n t s s h a l l aim 
1 
a t reaching unanimous agreement." 
1. Gf. Section I I of the Fund's By-Laws and paragraph C 
(10) of the Fund's Rules and Regulations. Cf. also 
J. Gold, " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary jnmd, 1945-1965", 
o p . c i t . , Vol.11, p.520. For the po l i t i c o - e c o n o m i c 
i m p l i c a t i o n s of adoption of the p r i n c i p l e of ananimity*. 
see Rinaldo Ossola, "On the Creation of New Reserve 
Assets" : The Report on the Study Group of Ten", op. 
c i t . , pp.285 and 286, e s p e c i a l l y where i t i s s a i d : -
"Supporters (amongst the Group of Ten) of unan-
i m i t y consider t h a t t h i s method o f f e r s a sure guar-
antee against i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n f l a t i o n s ; the 
opposite view i s t h a t the c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t s 
between c o u n t r i e s w i t h d i f f e r e n t economic p o l i c y 
o b j e c t i v e s , d i f f e r e n t degrees of development and 
d i f f e r e n t employment l e v e l s , a system based on 
unanimity would not a l l o w of any decision, being 
taken. Others believe t h a t the choice of v o t i n g 
method cannot be made i n the a b s t r a c t ,,, i f out-
side the Fund and w i t h p a r t i c i p a t i o n l i m i t e d t o a 
small group of c o u n t r i e s , then unanimity would not 
be so i l l - c o n t r i v e d an arrangement as i t might be 
i n another I n s t i t u t i o n a l framework and w i t h d i f f e r -
ent p a r t i c i p a t i o n . " Parenthesis added. For a more 
d e t a i l e d study of t h i s question, see "Report of the 
Deputies of the Group of Tern", o p . c i t . , pp.64-66 and 77. 
Cf. A r t i c l e V of ;l Agreement E s t a b l i s h i n g I n t e r i m 
Arrangements f o r a Global Communications S a t e l l i t e 
System", Cmnd. 2456, p.11. 
The above Paragraph ( B ) , however, does not fei' 
]>•'.'•.* *}'•:* 1: suggest whether or not a prosp e c t i v e drawer's view ff. 
\ s h o u l d also be taken i n t o account, f o r the purpose of the 
-;...  above unanimity. This i s , perhaps, due t o the f a c t 
l :':\ t h a t (a) a prosp e c t i v e drawer i s assumed t o have been 
; ".'! i n agreement w i t h the "borrowing arrangement'1!,-, i t 
! I i t s e l f requested; and/or (b) the question could be 
I ' l i n k e d with the p r i n c i p l e Nemo debet esse judex i n fe$ 
i ! propria cause. \t?4 
! • . --^ 
; ; it! m I 
! I 
See Hans A i x f r i c h t , " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary 
j ' Fund; Legal Bases, S t r u c t u r e , Functions", 
| ' o p . c i t . , p.68. Cf. the same w r i t e r , "The fS$fj 
{ { Fund Agreement: L i v i n g Law and Emerging 
; P r a c t i c e " , o p . c i t . , p. 58. [s*1& 
; i H 
1 ] 2. See Bin Cheng, "General P r i n c i p l e s of Lav/ fc^f' 
| as Applied by I n t e r n a t i o n a l Courts and 'ly^i 
T r i b u n a l s " , London, Stevens and Sons., 1953, 
pp. 279 - 280. Cf. however, Paragraph (C) of 
'The L e t t e r ' , discussed under the f o l l o w i n g 
Heading. 
m 
m }•••>• 
—'- 1 tL J ?'v** 
I l l -
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QIJALIFIED MAJORITY 
I f , however, the unanimous agreement cannot he 
reached under Paragraph ( B ) , the question whether a "borrow-
i n g arrangement" i s to take place, w i l l be decided by the. 
votes of a t w o - t h i r d s m a j o r i t y of the P a r t i c i p a n t s , having 
a t h r e e - f i f t h s majorit3r of the weighted votes, Paragraph (C) 
of 'The L e t t e r ' i n t h i s r e s pect, says:-
"G. I f i t i s not p o s s i b l e t o reach unanimous 
agreement, the question whether the p a r t i c i p a n t s are 
prepared t o f a c i l i t a t e , by l e n d i n g t h e i r c u r r e n c i e s , an 
exchange t r a n s a c t i o n or stand-by arrangement of the k i n d 
covered by the s p e c i a l borrowing arrangements..., w i l l be 
decided by a p o l l of the p a r t i c i p a n t s ... h favourable 
d e c i s i o n s h a l l r e q u i r e the f o l l o w i n g m a j o r i t i e s of the 
p a r t i c i p a n t s which take p a r t i n the v o t e . . . 
(1) a t w o - t h i r d s m a j o r i t y of the number of p a r t i c i p a n t s 
v o t i n g ; and 
(2) a t h r e e - f i f t h s m a j o r i t y of the weighted votes of 
the p a r t i c i p a n t s v o t i n g , weighted on the basis of the' 
commitments t o the Supplementary Resources." 
In. the above way, t h e r e f o r e , the d r a f t e r s of 'The L e t t e r ' 
have broken the deadlock which co i i l d have taken place had 
there been a p p l i e d the p r i n c i p l e of unanimity f o r each and 
every "borrowing arrangement". 
1. See Appendix I . For the amount of c r e d i t arrangements 
of the P a r t i c i p a n t s , see Annex to 'The Decision', 
Appendix IV. 
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Here i t i s noteworthy t h a t i n the case of 
Paragraph (C), ( d e s p i t e the case of Paragraph ( B ) ) , 
a p r o s p e c t i v e drawer has been expressly exempted 
from v o t i n g f o r the 'borrowing arrangement" i t 
has put forward. The l a t t e r p a r t of Paragraph (C) 
i n t h i s respect says:-
"The p r o s o e c t i v e drawer w i l l not be 
-i 
e n t i t l e d t o v o t e . . . . . " 
The question here, i s : under what circumstances 
are some of the P a r t i c i p a n t s a u t h o r i z e d t o a b s t a i n from 
v o t i n g , and what i s the l e g a l i m p l i c a t i o n t h e r e o f ? ( i ) 
Would those not a b s t a i n i n g be a u t o m a t i c a l l y o b l i g e d t o 
1. See Appendix I . Cf. Paragraph 7(a) 
of 'The Decision', Appendix IV". Cf. a l s o , 
" I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund, 1945-1965", 
o p . c i t . , V o l . I I , p.456. 
contribute money, and ( i i ) What i s the l e g a l c r i t e r i o n 
f o r abstention? 
( i ) ABSTENTION AND ITS LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 
The l a t t e r part of Paragraph G of 'The L e t t e r ' , 
authorizes the P a r t i c i p a n t s faced with balance of 
payments and reserve d i f f i c u l t i e s , to abstain from 
voting. I t says:-
"... i t being understood that abstentions may 
be j u s t i f i e d only f or balance of payments reasons..." 
The inference here i s that there has been envisaged 
no absolute r i g h t for the P a r t i c i p a n t s to abstain from 
voting or contribution under a "borrowing arrangement" 
suggested by the Fund's Managing Director. I n other words, 
the wording of the above part of Paragraph C, seems to 
suggest that the P a r t i c i p a n t s are, generally, obliged to 
contribute under a "borrowing arrangement" suggested by 
the Fund's Managing Director. And the only exception 
to t h i s r u l e i s where a Part i c i p a n t i t s e l f has been faced 
with balance of payments and reserve d i f f i c u l t i e s i n 
which case i t can abstain from voting (or 
1. See Appendix I . 
2. Cf. "National Advisory Council on International Mone-
ta r y and F i n a n c i a l Problems", op. c i t . , p. 13; " I n t e r -
national Monetary Fund - Press Release", No. 693, 19 
June, 1968. Cf. also J . Gold, "The Reform of the Fund", 
op.cit.,p. 15; "International Monetary Fund, 194-S-65".OT> 
c i t . , vol.II,p.587. ' ? ' p 
g o o fi-o if 
contribution). 
I t would also follow that those who have not been 
authorized to abstain are to contribute under that "borrow-
ing arrangement", i f , of course, i t has attained the nec-
essary majority, spoken of i n the l a t t e r part of Para-
graph C. To put i t i n another way, i f the required maj-
o r i t y for a given "borrowing arrangement" has been attained, 
then the P a r t i c i p a n t s (even those who have voted against i t ) , 
p 
have to contribute thereunder. 
1. The reason f o r the above exemption seems to be an 
economic one, because the currency of countries 
which are not i n a strong balance of payments and 
reserve position, would not be of much help to a 
"prospective drawer". See, e.g., "International 
Monetary Fund - Annual Report", year 1962, pp.37-
39; year 1963 p. 19," year 1969, p. 154* Cf. " I n t e r -
national F i n a n c i a l S t a t i s t i c s " , I.M.F., June. .1970, 
pp.16,59; "International Monetary Fund, 194-5-1965", 
op. c i t . , V o l . 1 , pp .508, 517-519; Vol.II,p.4 5 6 . 
2. The very contemplation of voting procedure of Para-
graph G could have been quoted i n support of the above 
argument. Otherwise, i f i t could be claimed that 
those who have voted a g a i n s t a 'HDorrowing arrangement" 
are no longer expected to contribute thereunder, i t 
would have undermined the ra i s o n d'Stre of the voting 
machinery of Paragraph C. Cf. J. Gold, "Interpreta-
tion by the Fund", op. c i t . , p. 57, where he says:-
"Nothing i s said i n the l e t t e r s ('The Letter/ 
that i s ) , about in t e r p r e t a t i o n . Presumably, the 
rule of unanimity would apply by implication. 
I f t h i s i s correct, the implied r u l e for i n t e r -
preting the l e t t e r (!) i s more severe than the 
rule i n the l e t t e r according to which the p a r t i -
cipants may be bound to lend. Under that r u l e , 
i f c e r t a i n prescribed majority are attained, even 
dissenting p a r t i c i p a n t s w i l l be bound to lend." 
Parentheses added. 
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This, at any rate, may be i n f e r r e d that those who 
have voted f o r a- "borrowing arrangement" are to c o n t r i -
bute /thereunder. Albeit the following may be noticed 
regarding the above inference. 
As we may have noticed, although the authority for 
abstention has been given i n Paragraph C (that i s , before 
a voting could take p l a c e ) , yet i t s actual description 
has been relegated to the provision of the l a t t e r part 
of Paragraph D (that i s , a f t e r the voting for a "borrow-
ing arrangement" has already taken p l a c e ) . This state 
of a f f a i r s might create room f o r contending that a f t e r 
a P a r t i c i p a n t has voted f o r a "borrowing arrangement" i t 
s t i l l can avoid contributing thereunder. 
With a view to studying t h i s contention, l e t us 
f i r s t consider the provision of the l a t t e r part of 
Paragraph D of 'The L e t t e r 1 . I t says:-
" I f during the consultations a p a r t i c i p a n t 
gives notice that i n i t s opinion,"1" based on i t s 
present and prospective balance of payments and 
1. Take notice of the expression " i n i t s opinion" 
i n the above context. 
reserve p o s i t i o n , c a l l s should not be made on i t 
... the p a r t i c i p a n t s s h a l l c o n s u l t among them-
selves and w i t h the Managing D i r e c t o r as to the 
a d d i t i o n a l amounts o f t h e i r c u rrencies 1 which 
they c o u l d p r o v i d e so as to reach the general 
p 
order o f magnitude agreed under Paragraph C.11 
* 
Here a study o f the p r o v i s i o n o f the above p a r t of 
Paragraph D, i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h the p r o v i s i o n of the 
former p a r t o f the same Paragraph, where i t says:-
" I f the d e c i s i o n i n Paragraph C i s f a v o u r a b l e , 
there s h a l l be f u r t h e r c o n s u l t a t i o n s ^  among the 
p a r t i c i p a n t s , and w i t h the Managing D i r e c t o r , con-
c e r n i n g the amounts o f the currencies o f the r e s -
p e c t i v e p a r t i c i p a n t s which w i l l be loaned to the 
Fund i n order to a t t a i n a t o t a l i n the general 
4 
order o f magnitude agreed under Paragraph C..." 
1. Take n o t i c e of the expression " a d d i t i o n a l amounts..." 
i n the above p r o v i s i o n . 
2. See Appendix I . 
3. Take n o t i c e o f the term " f u r t h e r c o n s u l t a t i o n s " i n 
the above c o n t e x t . 
4. See Appendix I . 
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seems to suggest t h a t a P a r t i c i p a n t , though, he has. 
taken p a r t i n the v o t i n g o f Paragraph C, and though he 
has agreed f o r a "borrowing arrangement", can y e t avoid 
c o n t r i b u t i n g thereunder. 
With a view to i l l u s t r a t i n g t h i s , l e t us b r i n g the 
f o l l o w i n g hypothesis. Here, as a matter of convenience, 
we w i l l c a l l the ten P a r t i c i p a n t s i n the Borrowing-Scheme 
as P a r t i c i p a n t s ( a ) , ( b ) , ( c ) , ( d ) , ( e ) , ( f ) , ( g ) , ( h ) , 
( i ) , and ( j ) . Nov/, l e t us assume t h a t P a r t i c i p a n t ( a ) 
i s f a c e d w i t h balance o f payments and reserve d i f f i c u l t i e s , 
and thus i s approaching the Fund (and the P a r t i c i p a n t s ) 
f o r a "borrowing arrangement", of §J 200 m i l l i o n . 
I n such a case, i f the unanimous agreement c o u l d 
not be reached under Paragraph B, r e s o r t i s t o be made 
to the p r o v i s i o n s o f Paragraph C o f 'The L e t t e r ' . . The 
f i r s t step i s to a s c e r t a i n who are the P a r t i c i p a n t s i n 
a st r o n g balance of payments and reserve p o s i t i o n , which 
enables them to c o n t r i b u t e under t h a t "borrowing arrange-
ment". Therefore, a t t h i s stage i t might be r e a l i s e d 
t h a t , e.g., P a r t i c i p a n t s ( b ) , ( c ) and ( d ) are themselves 
fa c e d w i t h balance o f payments and reserve d i f f i c u l t i e s , 
1. Cf. Hans A u f r i c h t , " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund 
Legal Bases, S t r u c t u r e , Functions", op. c i t . , p.69. 
and thus t h e i r currencies would not be o f any r e a l 
help f o r the P a r t i c i p a n t ( a ) . ^  
As such, these three P a r t i c i p a n t s would not take 
p a r t i n the v o t i n g o f Paragraph G. The next step, 
however, i s to a s c e r t a i n the mood o f the r e s t of the 
P a r t i c i p a n t s ( t h a t i s P a r t i c i p a n t s ( e ) , ( f ) , ( g ) , ( h ) , 
( i ) and ( j ) f o r the above $ 200 m. "borrowing arrange-
ment", by p u t t i n g i t to t h e i r v o t e . 
I f the necessary m a j o r i t y has been a t t a i n e d , then 
would come the stage o f the former p a r t of Paragraph D; 
and i t i s , prima f a c i e , a t t h i s stage t h a t the a c t u a l 
c o n t r i b u t i o n of the v o t i n g P a r t i c i p a n t s i s to be hammered 
out , and the borrowing arrangement i n question i s to 
2 
come i n t o e f f e c t . 
So f a r there seems to have appeared no l e g a l d i f -
f i c u l t y as to the nature of the procedure envisaged i n 
1. Cf. " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund - Press Release", 
No. 74-3, June 27, 1969, i n which i t has been r e l e a s e d 
t h a t f o r the $ 200 m. "borrowing arrangement", f o r 
the b e n e f i t of the Uni t e d Kingdom, o n l y f i v e P a r t i c i -
pants took p a r t . Cf. a l s o , " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary 
Fund - Press Release", No. 695, 19 June, 1 9 6 8 ; " I n t e r n a l 
ioha'l.:Financial News Survey", 1970, p. 57 • 
2. See former p a r t of Paragraph D, o f 'The L e t t e r ' , 
Appendix I . Cf. " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund, 194-5-
1965", op. c i t . , V o l . I , P. 513; V o l . I I , pp.4-56-458. 
Paragraph C, and the former p a r t o f Paragraph D. 
Problems, however, seem to s t a r t w i t h the p r o v i s i o n s 
of the l a t t e r p a r t of Paragraph D, where i t i s suggested 
t h a t , a f t e r undergoing a l l the above stages, a P a r t i c i -
pant can s t i l l give " n o t i c e t h a t i n i t s o p i n i o n , based 
on i t s present and pr o s p e c t i v e balance of payments and 
reserve p o s i t i o n , c a l l s should not be made on i t . " 
One e x p l a n a t i o n f o r t h i s s t a t e o f a f f a i r s c o u l d be 
t h a t , i n the above hypothesis, v/hen the v o t i n g of Para-
graph G was t a k i n g p l a c e , a l l the P a r t i c i p a n t s ( e ) , ( f ) , 
(g)> (h)> ( i ) and (3) were i n a balance o f payments and 
reserve p o s i t i o n , enabling them to c o n t r i b u t e under the 
$ 200 m. "borrowing arrangement". But, a f t e r the v o t i n g 
took p l a c e , one o f the v o t i n g P a r t i c i p a n t s , (say P a r t i c i -
pant ( e ) ) , experienced some balance of payments and r e -
serve d i f f i c u l t i e s , to the ext e n t t h a t i t could no longer 
stand ready to c o n t r i b u t e under t h a t "borrowing arrange-
ment". ^ Therefore, as such, the P a r t i c i p a n t ( e ) .had no 
1. See l a t t e r p a r t o f Paragraph D. Take e s p e c i a l n o t i c e 
o f the expressions " f u r t h e r c o n s u l t a t i o n s " , and " I f 
d u r i n g c o n s u l t a t i o n s " , i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t j i the expres-
s i o n . " a d d i t i o n a l amounts" o f Paragraph D o f 'The L e t t e r 1 
which are a l l i n d i c a t i v e of the f a c t t h a t the P a r t i c i -
pant ( e ) > i n the above .hypothesis,has already taken 
p a r t i n the v o t i n g o f Paragraph C. Take n o t i c e also 
o f the term " c a l l s " i n the above Paragraph D, which 
also confirms t h a t the "borrowing arrangement" i n 
question has already been approved by the P a r t i c i p a n t 
( e ) . Gf. Paragraphs 1 ( v i i ) , 6, 7(a) and 7(d) of 'The 
D e c i s i o n 1 , discussed under the Chapter "Consultative 
Arrangements of the Borrowing Scheme". 
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o t h e r a l t e r n a t i v e but t o b r i n g the matter t o the n o t i c e 
o f the o t h e r P a r t i c i p a n t s , and ask them to s u b s t i t u t e 
i t s expected c o n t r i b u t i o n , even though i t has already-
voted f o r t h a t "borrowing arrangement". 
Here, even assuming t h a t the above had been the 
i n t e n t i o n of the d r a f t e r s o f 'The L e t t e r ' , yet i t cannot 
resolve a l l the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n v o l v e d ; because Paragraph 
D does not say, e.g., how long a p e r i o d of time could 
elapse between the v o t i n g procedure o f Paragraph G, and 
the procedure o f the l a t t e r p a r t of Paragraph D, which 
could j u s t i f y the above c l a i m by the P a r t i c i p a n t ( e ) . 
1. Would i t take place a t one and the same s e r i e s o f 
c o n s u l t a t i o n s f o r the above # 200 m. "borrowing arrange-
ment"? I f so, there seems to be no j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r 
the P a r t i c i p a n t ( e ) c l a i m i n g balance o f payments and 
reserve d i f f i c u l t i e s w i t h i n such a s h o r t p e r i o d of time. 
And, i f the balance of payments and reserve d i f f i c u l t i e s 
we r e 
o f P a r t i c i p a n t ( e ) was Aalready e x i s t i n g , i t should have 
abstained f r o m v o t i n g , as d i d P a r t i c i p a n t s ( b ) , ( c ) and 
( d ) . 
2. Would i t then take place v / i t h i n such a long p e r i o d 
of time which, fr o m an economic p o i n t o f view, i t s 
occurrence could be conceivable? 
1. Cf. Paragraphs (E) and ( I ) of 'The L e t t e r ' . 
This second suggestion i s also h i g h l y u n l i k e l y ; 
because i f i t had been the i n t e n t i o n o f the d r a f t e r s 
o f Paragraph D, they would have ex p r e s s l y s t a t e d so; 
and they would also have a n t i c i p a t e d the marginal cases 
i n which had the P a r t i c i p a n t (e) not voted f o r the $ 200 m. 
"borrowing arrangement", i t could not have a t t a i n e d the 
r e q u i r e d m a j o r i t y . I n o t h e r words, they should have also 
a n t i c i p a t e d t h a t , would the above "borrowing arrangement" 
( i n such a marginal case), be s t i l l an o b l i g a t o r y one, or 
there must take place a new set of c o n s u l t a t i v e arrange-
ments; because the previous "borrowing arrangement" has 
l o s t i t s r e q u i r e d m a j o r i t y . 
So f a r , under the above hypothesis, we observed that, 
the P a r t i c i p a n t ( e ) , though v o t i n g f o r a "borrowing a r r a n -
gement", can a v o i d £goia c o n t r i b u t i n g thereunder. By t h i s 
we do not i n t e n d to suggest t h a t t h i s had n e c e s s a r i l y 
been the i n t e n t i o n of the d r a f t e r s o f 'The L e t t e r ' . Yet, 
as the p r o v i s i o n s of Paragraphs C and D now stand, there 
has been l e f t room f o r such a manoeuvring by some of the 
P a r t i c i p a n t s . ^ 
1. Cf. " N a t i o n a l Advisory Council on I n t e r n a t i o n a l Mone-
t a r y and F i n a n c i a l Problems", op. c i t . , p. 13» esp. 
where i t has been r e p o r t e d to the U.S. Congress t h a t : -
"... i n order to provide assurance t h a t a 
d e c i s i o n w i l l be reached promptly, a v o t i n g 
procedure has been e s t a b l i s h e d . . . The pr o s -
p e c t i v e drawer on the Fund w i l l not p a r t i c i p a t e 
i n the vote ... A p a r t i c i p a n t may give n o t i c e 
t h a t , i n i t s o p i n i o n based on i t s present and 
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The f o l l o w i n g , however, may help us i n f i n d i n g 
some way out o f l e g a l d i f f i c u l t i e s concerning the 
d r a f t i n g o f Paragraphs C and D o f 'The L e t t e r ' . 
(A) The f i r s t suggestion i s t h a t the term " a b s t e n t i o n s " 
i n the f o l l o w i n g passage o f Paragraph C, "... i t being 
understood t h a t abstentions may be j u s t i f i e d o n l y f o r 
balance o f payments reason..." be construed as abstentions 
from " c o n t r i b u t i o n " and not abstentions from " v o t i n g " . 
The d i f f e r e n c e t h i s (A) suggestion can make i s i n t h a t 
a l l the P a r t i c i p a n t s would have the r i g h t to vote f o r a 
"borrowing arrangement" i r r e s p e c t i v e o f whether or not 
they thejaselves can c o n t r i b u t e thereunder. I n support 
of t h i s (A) suggestion, i t can be argued t h a t , under the 
new c o n d i t i o n s o f " c o n v e r t i b i l i t y " , the surplus i n balance 
of payments and reserve p o s i t i o n of one or some of the 
member States of the Fund i s i n t e r - r e l a t e d w i t h the 
d e f i c i t i n balance of payments and reserve p o s i t i o n o f 
pro s p e c t i v e balance-of-payments and reserve 
p o s i t i o n , c a l l s should not be made on i t ... I n 
t h i s event the Managing D i r e c t o r and the other 
p a r t i c i p a n t s w i l l c o n s ult f u r t h e r to determine 
how the t o t a l agreed amount can be p r o v i d e d . . . 
there should seldom be occasion f o r any p a r t i c i -
pant subsequently to withdraw i t s e l f from the 
l i s t o f l e n d e r s . " 
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o f some other member States o f the Fund. Therefore, 
as such, i t could have been the i n t e n t i o n of the 
d r a f t e r s of 'The L e t t e r ' t h a t ; 
( i ) The f i r s t q u e s t i o n , whether a "prospective drawer" 
should be helped, be put to the vote o f the P a r t i c i p a n t s , 
i r r e s p e c t i v e o f whether or not they are a l l prepared to 
help t h a t "prospective drawer", because i t would, i n 
any case, a f f e c t t h e i r balance of payments and reserve 
1. Cf. " M i n i s t e r i a l Statement of the Group of Ten", 
August 1, 1964, esp. where i t i s s a i d : -
"There has, a t the same time been 
i n c r e a s i n g r e c o g n i t i o n of the f a c t t h a t the 
way i n which balance of payments d e f i c i t s 
and surplus are f i n a n c e d has i m p l i c a t i o n s 
f o r c o u n t r i e s o t h e r than those d i r e c t l y 
concerned." 
Cf. also Paragraph 3, ox the Communique' of the 
Group of Ten, of Bonn, November 22, 1968. 
Appendix XIX: " I n t e r n a t i o n a l F i n a n c i a l News S u r v e y " , 
1965, pp. 351-352. Cf. f u r t h e r , "Questions and 
Answers on the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund - 10 
June 1944", " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund, 1945-
1965", op. c i t . , V o l . I l l , pp. 173 - 174-; C. H. 
Alexandrowicz, " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Economic Organisa-
t i o n s " , op. c i t . , p. 89; Address by the President 
of the United States of America, J. F. Kennedy, 
" I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund - Summary Proceedings", 
1964, pp. 4 - 5. 
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p o s i t i o n ; 
( i i ) I f i t were voted f o r t h a t the balance o f payments 
p o s i t i o n of a "prospective drawer" i s i n a shape r e q u i r -
i n g a "borrowing arrangement", then there should come 
the stage o f " p r o p o r t i o n i n g " o f cur r e n c i e s necessary 
f o r t h a t "borrowing arrangement". And i t i s a t t h i s 
stage t h a t some of the P a r t i c i p a n t s can " a b s t a i n " from 
c o n t r i b u t i o n i f , of course, they themselves were f a c e d 
w i t h balance o f payments and reserve d i f f i c u l t i e s . And 
t h i s i s perhaps the reason why the qu e s t i o n o f absten-
t i o n from c o n t r i b u t i o n has been r e l e g a t e d to the p r o v i -
sions o f Paragraph D, t h a t I s , where the v o t i n g of 
2 
Paragraph C has already taken p l a c e . 
1. Cf. the p r o v i s i o n of the l a t t e r p a r t of 'The L e t t e r ' 
where i t says:-
" I t i s understood t h a t i n the event of 
any proposals f o r c a l l s under the c r e d i t arrange-
ments or i f o t h e r matters should a r i s e under the 
Fund d e c i s i o n r e q u i r i n g c o n s u l t a t i o n s among the 
participants»a c o n s u l t a t i v e meeting w i l l be h e l d 
among a l l the P a r t i c i p a n t s ..." 
discussed under the Heading of "Consu l t a t i v e Arrange-
ments of the Borrowing Scheme — Fu r t h e r Considera-
t i o n s " . 
Cf. also " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund - Annual Report", 
1962, p. 37. 
2. Cf. " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund - Summary Proceed-
i n g s " , 1961, p. 117. 
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The main d i f f i c u l t y , however, concerning the above 
(A) suggestion, i s t h a t i t has l i t t l e support f r o m the 
sequence of phrases and the wording of i n d i v i d u a l 
phrases o f Paragraph C. And ex antecedentibus e t 
consequentibus f i t optima i n t e r p r e t a t i o . Likewise, 
i t c ould h a r d l y r e c o n c i l e w i t h the evidence so f a r which 
we have considered under the present Chapter. 
(B) The o t h e r a l t e r n a t i v e here i s t o continue w i t h 
the understanding reached under the previous Heading, 
t h a t i s , to consider the " a b s t e n t i o n 1 1 o f Paragraph C 
as a b s t e n t i o n from " v o t i n g " . As such, i n the above 
hypothesis, o n l y P a r t i c i p a n t s ( b ) , ( c ) and ( d ) , which 
from the o u t s e t abstained from v o t i n g , should be 
exempted from c o n t r i b u t i o n under $ 200 m. "Borrowing 
Arrangement". And, the r e s t of the P a r t i c i p a n t s 
( i n c l u d i n g P a r t i c i p a n t ( e ) ) which have taken p a r t i n 
the v o t i n g , must c o n t r i b u t e , whether o r not they have 
1. See Broom, "Legal Maxims", Tenth E d i t i o n , by R. H. 
Kersiey, Sweet and Maxwell, 1939» P« 389. 
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voted f o r or against i t . 
I f t h i s (B) understanding had been the i n t e n t i o n 
of the d r a f t e r s o f Paragraphs C and D o f 'The L e t t e r ' , 
then some a l t e r a t i o n s i n the p r o v i s i o n s o f these two 
Paragraphs would seem to be necessary. That i s to 
say, i f the i n t e n t i o n o f the d r a f t e r s o f 'The L e t t e r ' 
had been f i r s t to a s c e r t a i n the mood o f the P a r t i c i p a n t s 
f o r a "borrowing arrangement", by p u t t i n g i t to the vote 
o f o n l y those P a r t i c i p a n t s i n a s t r o n g balance of pay-
ments and reserve p o s i t i o n ; and i f also t h e i r i n t e n t i o n 
had been to leave the question of " p r o p o r t i o n i n g " o f 
curre n c i e s f o r a l a t e r stage, then they should have put 
1. See " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund, 194-5-1965", op. 
c i t . , V o l . I I , p. 4-56, where, i n connection w i t h 
the U.K.'s "borrowing arrangement" o f December, 1964, 
i t i s s a i d : -
"The s i g n a t o r i e s o f the G A B , however, 
p r e f e r r e d t h a t the Fund should borrow fro m 
each p a r t i c i p a n t except the U n i t e d Kingdom 
i t s e l f , even i f o n l y a token suinwere borrow-
ed. The reason f o r t h i s was p a r t l y ... a 
doubt whether the terms of the agreement be-
tween the p a r t i c i p a n t s which was embodied i n 
Mr. Baumgartner's l e t t e r s ('The L e t t e r ' t h a t 
is,) would p e r m i t a member of the Group o f Ten 
to vote on the proposal to a c t i v a t e the G A B 
i f i t s currency was not borrowed". 
Parenthesis added. 
these ideas i n the same l o g i c a l o r der, v i z . , they 
should have con s o l i d a t e d the p r o v i s i o n s of Paragraph 
C and the l a t t e r p a r t o f Paragraph D i n one and the 
same Paragraph C; and then l e f t the question of the 
"p r o p o r t i o n i n g 1 * o f currencies t o the p r o v i s i o n of the 
former p a r t of Paragraph D, w i t h , o f course, any nec-
essary a l t e r a t i o n s i n the wording o f these two Para-
graphs. Otherwise, the e x i s t i n g p r o v i s i o n o f Paragraph 
C seems to suggest t h a t those who have experienced 
balance of payments d i f f i c u l t i e s should a b s t a i n from 
v o t i n g ; y e t i t r e l e g a t e s the i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t o these 
d i f f i c u l t i e s to the stage of Paragraph D, t h a t i s , 
a f t e r they have already used t h e i r v o t i n g r i g h t . 
QUESTION OF CONTRIBUTION LESS THAN EXPECTED 
One t h i n g , however, should be mentioned here, which 
i s t h i s , t h a t the above suggestion (B) does not remove 
a l l the discrepancies i n v o l v e d . We have p a r t i c u l a r l y 
i n mind another aspect o f the l a t t e r p a r t of Paragraph 
D, i n accordance w i t h which a P a r t i c i p a n t (though t a k i n g 
p a r t i n the v o t i n g of Paragraph C), can request t h a t 
" c a l l s " should be made on i t " f o r a smaller amount than 
t h a t proposed". 
The p o i n t i s t h a t , the above suggestion (B) seems 
to be o f some help onl y i n the case of those P a r t i c i p a n t s 
See Appendix I . 
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who can i n no way c o n t r i b u t e under a given "borrowing 
Arrangement"; and f o r t h i s reason they have been exemp-
te d from v o t i n g thereunder. But i t would not be of much 
help i n the case o f those P a r t i c i p a n t s who c o u l d c o n t r i b u t e , 
but not t o the e x t e n t o f t h a t proposed by the Fund's 
Managing D i r e c t o r . And the d r a f t e r s of 'The L e t t e r * do 
not seem to have a n t i c i p a t e d the p o s i t i o n of those 
P a r t i c i p a n t s who have voted f o r a "borrowing arrange-
ment", but who could f r u s t r a t e the o b j e c t s of Paragraph 
C by reducing t h e i r a c t u a l c o n t r i b u t i o n to an i n s i g n i f i -
cant amount. And i t i s doubted whether the above 
suggestion (B) would be o f any help e i t h e r . 
The f o l l o w i n g suggestion may, however, be considered 
v. i n t h i s r e s pect. T h i s , although not very appealing, 
might serve a u s e f u l purpose, i f , o f course, accompanied 
2 
by"a s p i r i t o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l co-operation". 
1. Cf. " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund, 194-5-1965", op. 
c i t . , V o l . I I , p. 4-56, i n which i t has been suggested 
that - even "a token sum" would a u t h o r i z e a. P a r t i c i p a n t 
to take p a r t i n the v o t i n g . 
2. See the p r o v i s i o n o f the l a t t e r p a r t o f 'The L e t t e r ' , 
Appendix I . Cf. Preamble to 'The Dec i s i o n ' , Appendix 
IV. Cf. also "The Guardian", January 14, 1969, p.35« 
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The f a c t o f t h i s suggestion l i e s i n d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g 
between ( a ) cases i n which a P a r t i c i p a n t i s i n no way 
able to c o n t r i b u t e under a g i v e n "borrowing arrange-
ment"; and ( b ) cases i n which a P a r t i c i p a n t would 
c o n t r i b u t e , but " f o r a sma l l e r amount than t h a t p r o -
posed". Under t h i s l a t e s t suggestion, the above ( a ) 
cases are t o be d e a l t w i t h under the proposed Paragraph 
C, and the ( b ) cases are t o be considered as a f r a c t i o n 
o f the q u e s t i o n o f " p r o p o r t i o n of c u r r e n c i e s " , and thus 
to be d e a l t w i t h under the former p a r t o f Paragraph D. 
The advantage of t h i s l a t e s t suggestion i s t h a t i t 
keeps a l i v e the idea t h a t there must be some nexus be-
tween the v o t i n g and the c o n t r i b u t i o n under a "borrow-
i n g arrangement". ^ 
1. Thus the P a r t i c i p a n t s faced w i t h severe balance of 
payments and r e s e r v e d i f f i c u l t i e s would s t i l l not 
take p a r t i n the v o t i n g of Paragraph C. 
2. Cf. A r t i c l e V I I (2) o f the Fund's A r t i c l e s of Agree-
ment. Cf. also "Questions and Answers on the I n t e r -
n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund - June 10, 194-4", " I n t e r n a t -
i o n a l Monetary Fund, 1945-1965", op. c i t . , V o l . I l l , 
p. 172. 
•2:5.5 
( i i ) HOW BALANCE OF PAYMENTS POSITION OF THE 
• PARTICIPANTS CAN BE ASCERTAINED 
As we r e f e r r e d to e a r l i e r , the whole idea of the 
s e t t i n g up o f the Borrowing Scheme, had been to r e p l e n -
i s h the Fund's h o l d i n g s . o f "hard 1' c u r r e n c i e s . And the 
very employment o f the term " c r e d i t arrangements" f o r 
the' commitments o f the P a r t i c i p a n t s ^ lends support to 
the f a c t t h a t the Fund can, a t any g i v e n time, count on 
p 
the commitments of the P a r t i c i p a n t s . 
The o n l y e x c e p t i o n , however, under which a P a r t i c i -
pant can be released f r o m i t s commitments i s where i t 
i t s e l f has been fa c e d w i t h balance o f payments and r e -
serve d i f f i c u l t i e s . 
The q u e s t i o n we are going t o consider, under the 
present Heading i s , how the balance of payments and 
reserve p o s i t i o n o f the P a r t i c i p a n t s can be ascert a i n e d ; 
because i f i t can be asce r t a i n e d t h a t a giv e n P a r t i c i -
pant has been i n a s t r o n g balance of payments and r e -
serve p o s i t i o n , i t would mean t h a t i t has to r e p l e n i s h 
1. See Paragraph 2 o f 'The D e c i s i o n 1 , Appendix IV. 
2. Cf. " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund - Summary Pro-
ceedings", 1961, p. 54. 
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tlie Fund's hold i n g s of i t s currency. 
The question o f a s c e r t a i n i n g the balance of pay-
ments and reserve p o s i t i o n of t h e - P a r t i c i p a n t s ^ a t 
1. Cf. Keynes Plan f o r C l e a r i n g Union under which a 
country i n balance of payments surplus i s not only -
expected t o extend loans to d e f i c i t c o u n t r i e s but 
i s also t o be pe n a l i z e d i f i t s surplus exceeds the 
degree envisaged i n the Plan. See F. Machlup, "Plans 
f o r Reform of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary System", 
op. c i t . , pp. 26 — 28. See also R. G. Hawtrey, 
" B r e t t o n Woods f o r B e t t e r o r Worse", Longmans, London, 
1946, p. 28. 
2. The term "balance o f payments" has been b r i e f l y des-
s c r i b e d by H^st-Madsen Poul as f o l l o w s s -
"... a r e c o r d o f a country's money 
r e c e i p t s from and payments to abroad, the 
d i f f e r e n c e between r e c e i p t s and payments being 
the surplus or d e f i c i t " . 
See H^st-Madsen Poul, "Balance of Payments - I t s 
Meaning and Uses", I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund, 
Washington, D.C., 1967» P« !• For a more elaborate 
d e f i n i t i o n o f the term see "Balance of Payments 
Concepts and D e f i n i t i o n s " , I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary 
Fund, Washington, D.C., 1968, pp. 14-15, Cf. I d . p. 
4. Cf. a l s o F. A. Mann, "Money i n P u b l i c I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Law", Recueil des Cours, op. c i t . , p. 48. For an 
e x c e l l e n t d e s c r i p t i o n of the term see J. E. Meade, 
"The Balance of Payments", op. c i t . , pp. 3 - 28. 
3. As regards the d e s c r i p t i o n of the monetary reserve, 
E. M. B e r n s t e i n has t h i s to says-
"The concept of what c o n s t i t u t e s i n t e r -
n a t i o n a l monetary reserves i s not a simple one. 
C l e a r l y , monetary reserves i n c l u d e the gold 
h o l d i n g s of o f f i c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s — t r e a s u r i e s , 
c e n t r a l banks, and exchange s t a b i l i z a t i o n funds. 
They also include o f f i c i a l h o l d i n g s o f U.S. 
d o l l a r s , s t e r l i n g , and o t h e r c o n v e r t i b l e cur-
r e n c i e s — t h a t i s , claims on reserve c e n t e r s . . " 
See "Statement of E. M. Be r n s t e i n to the U.S.Congress" 
op. c i t . , p. 108. For the d e t a i l e d d e s c r i p t i o n i n 
t h i s r e s p e c t , see "Report of the Study Group on the 
C r e a t i o n o f Reserve Assets", Group of Ten, 31 May, 1965, 
f i r s t sight seems to be a straightforward one; yet a 
f u r t h e r study thereof would prove that i t i s not always 
as straightforward as i t appears. 
Here, f o r the sake of s i m p l i c i t y , l e t us accept the 
hypothesis that the bulk of convertible currencies and. 
other means of l i q u i d i t y are c o n t r o l l e d by the Group of 
Ten. ^ Let us also accept that the amount of e x i s t i n g 
means of i n t e r n a t i o n a l l i q u i d i t y i s reasonably e s t i -
p 
matable and known to the Group of Ten. Therefore, 
under these circumstances, i t would not be too d i f f i c u l t 
f o r the Group of Ten to trace the movement of means of 
l i q u i d i t y and to ascertain t h e i r whereabouts. I n other 
words, i t would seem to be easy to d i s t i n g u i s h (a) those 
members of the Group of Ten i n balance of payments and 
reserve surplus, (b) those i n balance of payments and 
1 . See " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund — Summary Pro-
ceedings", year 1962* p. 2 1 ; year 1963 p. 64; year 
1965, p. 81. Cf. " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund — 
Annual Report", year 1963 > PP.4-6, 4-8 i n which 
Switzerland has also been added to the Group of Ten 
f o r the purpose of the above c o n t r o l . Cf. also 
"Statement of E. M. Bernstein to the U.S. Congress", 
op. c i t . , pp. 115, 1 2 1 ; Ossola, Rinaldo "On the 
Creation of New Reserve Assets : the Report of the 
Study Group of Ten", op. c i t . , p. 291i 
2 . See F. Machlucp, "Plans f o r Reform "of the Internationa] 
Monetary System", op. c i t . , p. 3; "Statement of E.M. 
Bernstein to the U.S. Congress", op. c i t . , p.108. 
Cf. "Guidelines f o r Improving the I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Monetary System", Report of the Sub-Committee on 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Exchange and Payments of the Joint 
Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, 
U.S. Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , Washington, 1965, 
p. 3-
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reserve d e f i c i t , and (c) those i n a reasonable balance 
of payments and reserve p o s i t i o n . 1 Likewise, i t would 
not be too d i f f i c u l t to work out the magnitude of a loan 
requested by a "prospective drawer", because ( i ) the 
degree of i t s d e f i c i t can .be assessed, and ( i i ) the 
Participants which should stand ready to contribute 
/ under the'"borrowing arrangement" could be distinguished. 
To ascertain the balance of payments and reserve 
p o s i t i o n of the Participants i n pr a c t i c e , however, i s 
not always as simple as t h a t ; c h i e f l y because i t would 
e n t a i l claims and counter-claims i n t h i s respect. And 
i f i t could be ascertained that a given P a r t i c i p a n t i s 
i n balance of payments and reserve surplus, i t could 
mean that i t should r e t u r n i t s surplus to the d e f i c i t 
1. I n the case of t h i s (c) group i t would mean t h a t , 
although they are not i n need of f i n a n c i a l help, 
yet they cannot extend the loan to other P a r t i c i -
pants . 
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conntries. 
To show how d i f f i c u l t i t i s , i n p r a c t i c e , to 
ascertain the surpluses.anddeficits, l e t us bring a 
s p e c i f i c example. 
The world monetary c r i s i s of 1968, which led to 
the Bonn consultative meetings of the Group of Ten, 
and the ""borrowing arrangement"of gf 2,000 m. f o r the 
p 
b e n e f i t of France, was said to be the r e s u l t of 
1 . See Reginald Maudling, " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund -
Summary Proceedings", 1963> p. 67,.. where he says:-
"one nation's reserves i s another nation's d e b i t . . . " 
Cf. I d . p. 285; " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund - Ann-
ual Report", 1962, p. 39; Poul Hptet-Madsen, "Bal-
ance of Payments — i t s meaning and Uses", op.cit.,p 
p. 16, 23-24; Anthony Harris, "The Guardian", Jan-
uary 14, 1969» p. 13« For the importance attached 
to the regular adjustment of the means of l i q u i d i t y 
among surplus and d e f i c i t countries, see " I n t e r -
national Monetary Fund — Summary Proceedings", year 
1963, p. 68; year 1964, p. 2; "Report of the Study 
Group on the Creation of Reserve Assets", op. c i t . , 
pp. 75-78; "Guidlines f o r Improving the I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Monetary Law", op. c i t . , p. 17; " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Mone-
ta r y Fund .— Annual Report", 1963, p.4-8; "Statement 
of E. M. Bernstein to the U.S. Congress", op. c i t . , 
p.112; " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund, 1945-1965", 
op. c i t . , Vol. I , p. 544. The above l i t e r a t u r e 
would, at the same time, reveal the c o n f l i c t i n g 
views e x i s t i n g among the surplus and d e f i c i t 
countries i n connection w i t h the adjustment of means 
of l i q u i d i t y . 
2 . See Communique' of the Group of Ten, of November 1968, 
i n Appendix XIX. 
d e f i c i t i n balance of payments of some of the P a r t i c i -
pants, and surplus i n balance of payments of some other 
p a r t i c i p a n t s , c h i e f l y the Federal'Republic of VJest 
Germany. And i t was c e r t a i n , from the point of view 
of the Participants i n d e f i c i t , that the balance of pay-
ments and reserve p o s i t i o n of West-Germany, had been i n 
a condition which caused the movement of hot money to 
West Germany, and which could have threatened world 
monetary s t a b i l i t y . And as regard the degree of 
West German surplus, i t was reported t h a t : -
"Germany's current balance of payments surplus 
remains obstinately large. At the beginning of 
1968 when the German Government projected a growth 
rate of 6.2 per cent i r i money terms and 4 per cent 
i n r e a l terms, o f f i c i a l forecasters were expecting 
imports to r i s e by about 10 per cent, exports by 
&/z per cent. The surplus on v i s i b l e and i n v i s i b l e 
trade was expected to come down by more than DMP 
1. See Robert Roosa, the former Under-Secretary f o r 
Monetary A f f a i r s of the U.S. Treasury, 'The Times', 
22 November, 1968, p. 21. 
2. Cf^ . P. A. Mann, "Money i n Public I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law", 
Reyeil des Cours, op. c i t . , pp . 4 4 - 4 7 . 
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" b i l l i o n to DM 14 b i l l i o n . Instead, according to 
recent forecasts, t h i s year's imports w i l l be put 
up by j u s t over 11 per cent and exports by almost 
10 per cent, even though the i n t e r n a l growth rate 
of the economy w i l l have been over 8 per cent (6J£ 
per cent r e a l ) . By the end of t h i s year Germany 
should thus have imported DM 2 b i l l i o n more than 
expected e a r l i e r t h i s year, but i t looks as i f i t 
w i l l also have exported a good DM 4 b i l l i o n more 
than expected ..." ^  
Yet, from the point of view of West-Germany, i t 
was notAaj=L" a-loi-ig the same, so much so that on some 
occasions i t was said that West-Germany, f o r some time 
i n 1968, was i n " s l i g h t d e f i c i t " . For instance, i t was 
reported t h a t s -
"Dr. S c h i l l e r (the West German Economics 
Minister) i n f a c t , played rather an enigmatic 
r o l e at the Conference (of Basle) ... i n the f i r s t 
h a l f of t h i s year the basic balance, on the German 
d e f i n i t i o n of such things, was i n s l i g h t d e f i c i t 
and he intimated that the t h i r d quarter showed 
2 
much the same pict u r e ..." 
1. See "The Economist", November 23, 1968, p. 9 1 . 
Cf. "The Times", 23 January, 1969, P- 17-
2 . See "The Economist" October 5, 1968, p. 74. 
Parentheses added. 
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One thi n g , however, should he ref e r r e d to here, 
v i z . , the above d i f f e r e n t statements, and indeed any 
other s i m i l a r ones, should not be taken w i t h too much 
surprise. And most of the complexity of the matter 
l i e s i n the very nature of the balance of payments. 
To chart the balance of payments and reserve p o s i t i o n 
of every i n d i v i d u a l member of the Group of Ten, and 
assess i t s impact on the balance of payments and r e -
serve p o s i t i o n of other members of the Group, i s not 
an easy job, even f o r the experts i n balance of pay-
1 2 
ments and reserve. ' 
1. As to the d i f f i c u l t i e s for.1 ascertaining the balance 
of payments and reserve p o s i t i o n of member States 
of the Fund, esp. the Group of Ten, see Poul B#st-
Madsen, "Balance of Payments — I t s Meaning and Uses'} 
op. c i t . , p.2-3, 14-22; "Balance of Payments Con-
cepts and D e f i n i t i o n s " , o p . _ c i t . , pp.3-14, 23-40; 
(footnote: I n pages 32 and 36 i t i s shown that i n 
some instances only estimate i s possible.); "Annex 
Prepared by Deputies of the Group of Ten", June 
1964, pp.4-14,'esp.pp.5 and 6; "Report of the Study 
Group on the Creation of Reserve Assets", May, 1965, 
pp. 18,19 and 78; "Communique' of the Ministers and 
Governors of the Groiip of Ten", September 28, 1965; 
"In t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund - Summary Proceedings", 
1965, p. 281; "Report to Ministers and Governors by 
the Group of Deputies of the Group of Ten", July, 
1966, pp.4 and 5. See also Rule 1-6 of the Fund's 
Rules and Regulations. 
2. For considering the eff e c t s of "price adjustments" 
on the balance of payments, Meade has s i m p l i f i e d 
the d i v i s i o n of the countries of the world i n t o two. 
And a f t e r d e t a i l e d preparation and explanation i n 
t h i s respect, he says:-
"We cannot examine i n d e t a i l a l l the 
possible combinations of p o l i c y which would 
arise i f i n each case we distinguished 
between monetary p o l i c y and f i s c a l p o l i c y 
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The apparent discrepancies which may be seen, 
from time to time, are not only the r e s u l t of c o n f l i c t 
of i n t e r e s t of the leading member States of the Fund, 
but are also the r e s u l t of v a r i e t y of "concepts M adopted 
by d i f f e r e n t Countries f o r the c a l c u l a t i o n of t h e i r 
p 
balance of payments; as w e l l as depending upon the 
as separate forms of f i n a n c i a l p o l i c y we 
should have no less than s i x t y - f o u r possible 
combinations of ... price adjustment f o r our 
two countries i n ways which would preserve 
i n t e r n a l and external balance f o r both 
countries." 
See J. E. Meade "The Balance of Payments", op. c i t . , 
pp.151-162 at p. 161. The "price adjustments" i s , 
of course, one of several major elements a f f e c t i n g 
the balance of payments p o s i t i o n of countries. Cf. 
Id.pp. 290-291 . 
1 . See Statements of M. W. Holtrpp, the Governor f o r 
Netherlands, "I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund - Summary 
Proceedings", 1961, pp.111-118, esp. p.116; State-
ment of M. W. Baumgartner, Governor of Bank f o r 
France, I d . , pp.63-64; " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund, 
1945-1965", op. c i t . , Vol.1, p.542; "Economic Review 
of the Berliner Handelsbank", c i t e d i n "The Guardian" 
14 January, 1969> P»13; "Views of Professor S c h i l l e r 
the German Minister of Economics", quoted i n 'The 
Economist', 23 November 1968, p.1 1 . 
2 . See J.E. Meade, "The Balance of Payments", o p . c i t . , 
pp.22-24; Zoran, Hodjera, "Basic-Balance, Short-Term 
Capital Flow, and I n t e r n a t i o n a l Reserves of Indust-
r i a l Countries", I.M.F., S t a f f Papers, volume XVI, 
1969, pp.585-586; F r i t z Machlup, "Plans f o r Reform 
of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary System", op. c i t . , p . 2 ; 
Poul H^st-Madsen, "Balance of Payments - I t s Meaning 
and Uses", op. c i t . , pp.12,17-19 and 23 . For the 
concepts accepted by some of the members and not 
accepted by the Fund, see I d . , p.11 . See also 
"Balance of" Payments Concept's and D e f i n i t i o n s " , op. 
c i t . , pp . 9 , 10, 12, 24-27,"32 and 39-44. For the con-
cepts accepted by the Fund and not by a l l i t s member 
States, See I d . , pp.24-25. 
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s k i l l s of s t a t i s t i c i a n s and how these s t a t i s t i c i a n s 
are i n s t r u c t e d to formulate the balance of payments and 
p 
reserve p o s i t i o n of t h e i r Countries. For instance, the 
way i n which the e x i s t i n g gold of a given Country can 
be calculated as 'monetary' or 'non-monetary', ^ or 
whether and to what extent the f o r e i g n exchange held by 
non-governmental banks and i n s t i t u t i o n s can be included 
m the c a l c u l a t i o n of balance of payments ; or how f a r 
1 . See Poul B#st-Madsen, op. c i t . , p. 14.Cf. 'The 
Times', 28 July, 1970, p. 17. 
2 . I n an interview w i t h R. A l f o r d , i n London School of 
Economists, he seemed to suggest t h a t , whenever the 
question of balance of payments arises, everybody 
seems to have h i s own methods and calculations. 
3. See "Balance of Payments Concepts and D e f i n i t i o n s " , 
op. c i t . , pp.12,27-29. Cf. Poul H#st-Madsen, op. 
c i t . , p.7; J. E. Meade, "The Balance of Payments", 
op. c i t . , pp.19, 294-295* For le g a l pronouncements 
on the issue, see F. A. Mann., "Money i n Public 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law", Recueil des Cours, o p . c i t . ,t>r>. 
15-18, Cf. Id.p.14. 
4. See A r t i c l e XIX, Sections, a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h and 
Schedule B, Paragraph 6 of the Fund's A r t i c l e s of 
Agreement; U.N. Monetary Docuemtnss pp.25,628,653-
655,665-666,686,698-700,796-797 and 809. See also 
"Statement' of E.M. Bernstein to the U.S. Congress", 
o p . c i t . , p.108, esp. where he sayss-
"Holdings of f o r e i g n exchange of commer-
c i a l banks are not regarded as part of o f f i c i a l 
reserves, although i t i s possible f o r the mone-
ta r y a u t h o r i t i e s to acquire such balances i n 
time of need". 
The le g a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h i s i n c l u s i o n i s that 
States can ask t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l s to hand over, i n 
time of need, t h e i r f o r e i g n exchange to the Govern-
ment. Cf. "Questions and Answers on the I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Monetary Fund, 10 June, 194-4", op. c i t . , p. 180. 
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the i n f l o w and outflow of "hot" money can be estimated 
and taken i n t o account f o r that purpose, 1 can produce 
fundamental differences i n balances of payments and 
reserve p o s i t i o n of one Country as compared with another. 
1 . See Poul Hpfst-Madsen, "Balance of Payments — I t s 
Meaning and Uses", op. c i t . , p.19* 
2 . See Cecil King, the Director of the Bank of England, 
i n The Daily Mirror, 9 May, 1968, where he has said:-
"We are now threatened w i t h the greatest 
f i n a n c i a l c r i s i s i n our h i s t o r y . I t i s not 
to be removed by l i e s about our reserves, but 
only by a fr e s h s t a r t . . . " 
Cf. then 'The Times', May 10, 1968, where i t i s said:-
'Mr. King's reference to " l i e s about our 
reserves" presumably alludes to the f a c t that 
i t i s usually open to the Bank of England to 
arrange a number of "window-dressing" trans-
actions i n the f i n a l hours of the monthly 
accounting period. By swapping s t e r l i n g f o r 
f o r e i g n currencies, e i t h e r w i t h other c e n t r a l 
banks or w i t h f o r e i g n exchange market dealers, 
the Bank can produce almost any desired f i g u r e 
f o r p u b l i c a t i o n . These well-known conventions 
do not l i t e r a l l y involve f a l s i f y i n g the reserve 
f i g u r e s , although they do e n t a i l some element 
of supressio v e r i . For Mr. King, who i s a... 
d i r e c t o r of the Bank of England to describe 
these time-honoured practices followed under 
a l l recent Governments i n the terms he chose 
i s u n l i k e l y to be accepted i n o f f i c i a l c i r c l e s 
as either constructive or l e g i t i m a t e comment.1 
See also Poul B#st-Madsen, op. c i t . , pp.20-22. Cf. 
"The Sunday Times11, November 22, 1970, p.46. 
And to estimate the movement of "hot" money i s 
said to be i n no way easier than to estimate other 
necessary items f o r c l a c u l a t i o n of balance of payments. 1 
Although the Fund's A u t h o r i t i e s , on one occasion, have 
gone so f a r as to suggesting t h a t : -
" I n connection w i t h large drav/ings, i n p a r t i -
cular when they are associated w i t h short-term 
c a p i t a l movements, i t i s usually f a i r l y easy to 
single out the countries whose reserves have 
benefited from an inflow o f c a p i t a l and to d i r e c t 
drawings more p a r t i c u l a r l y towards the currencies 
p 
of these countries....' 1 
Yet, i t i s generally accepted t h a t : -
"Private short-term c a p i t a l movements are, 
i n general, inadequately reported i n the Yearbook, 
because of the s t a t i s t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s of e s t i -
mating them. They may, however, be an important 
item i n a country's balance of payments, especially 
i n a period of c a p i t a l f l i g h t or of large changes 
i n trade financed by short-term c r e d i t s . Lack 
of information on these movements i s believed to 
1. As we may have noticed, the movement of "hot" money 
i s the p r i n c i p a l concern of the Borrowing Scheme. 
2. See " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund - Annual Report", 
1962, p. 39. 
"be a substantial source of errors and omissions". 
To sum up our considerations under the present 
Heading, we could say that i t seems easy to produce, 
at any given time, data against a Partic i p a n t that i t 
i s i n a balance of payments and reserve surplus. I t 
seems also easy f o r that P a r t i c i p a n t to deny t h i s and 
produce counter-data that i t i s not i n a balance of 
payments and reserve surplus, or else i t i s i n a balance 
of payments and reserve surplus, but not to the extent 
which enables i t to contribute under a given "borrowing 
1 . See, "Balance of Payments Concepts and D e f i n i t i o n s " , 
I.M.F*, op. c i t . , p. 40.- Take notice of the terms 
"errors"and "omissions" i n the above context. For 
the technical d e s c r i p t i o n of these two terms, and 
f o r t h e i r e f f e c t s on accuracy of the balance of 
payments items, see I d . p.23, See also Poul H^st-
Madsen, op. c i t . , p.14, esp. where he says:-
"The entry f o r net errors and omissions 
often r e f l e c t s flows of pr i v a t e c a p i t a l , 
although the conclusions to be drawn from 
them vary a great deal from country to country, 
and even i n the same country from time to time, 
depending on the r e l i a b i l i t y of the reported 
information 1". 
Cf.Id.p.19. Cf. also "National Advisory Council on 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary and Financial Problems", op. 
c i t . , p.5; Zoran, H., "Basic Balance, Short-Term 
Capital Flows, and I n t e r n a t i o n a l Reserves of 
I n d u s t r i a l Countries", op. c i t . , p.583 et seq. 
p.585 footnote 5; " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund -
Annual Report", 1963, p.21; "International F i n -
ancial News Survey", 1970, pp. 15, 257. 
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arrangement". 1 
And the very contemplation of the provisions of 
Paragraphs C and D of 'The Letter' can support the 
f a c t that whether or not a given Pa r t i c i p a n t has been 
faced w i t h the balance of payments and reserve d i f f i -
c u l t i e s , i s not a straight-forward question. Further, 
the f a c t that the balance of payments and reserve 
p o s i t i o n of the Group of Ten has been subjected to the 
so-called " m u l t i l a t e r a l s urveillance" of the Pa r t i c i p a n t s , 
can be regarded as another evidence i n support of the 
1. Cf. Poul H^st-Madsen, op. c i t . , pp. 16-17, where 
he says:-
" I t i s not s u r p r i s i n g , therefore, that 
the d e f i n i t i o n of surplus or d e f i c i t i s by 
f a r the most controversial question i n balance 
of payments methodology. This has been evident 
at meetings of balance of payments experts 
which the Fund has held. When these meetings 
have taken up the concept of a surplus or a 
d e f i c i t , the discussion has become l i v e l i e r 
or even emotional. At the same time- i t has 
usually been inconclusive, being concerned 
w i t h something about which reasonable men can 
forever hold d i f f e r e n t views. The f a i l u r e of 
experts to agree on the d e f i n i t i o n of a surplus 
of a deficit.'", therefore, i s understandable. 
H^st-Madsen was a member of the Fund's S t a t i s t i c s 
Department. 
$6$ 
above argument. 
At t h i s stage i t seems appropriate to revert to 
the provisions of the l a t t e r part of Paragraph D of 
'The Let t e r ' , where i t says:-
" I f during the consultations a p a r t i c i p a n t 
gives notice that i n i t s opinion, based on i t s 
present and prospective balance of payments and 
reserve p o s i t i o n , c a l l s should not be made on 
i t , . . . . the p a r t i c i p a n t s s h a l l consult among 
themselves and w i t h the Managing Director as to 
the ad d i t i o n a l amounts of t h e i r currencies which 
2 
they could provide..." 
1. See, generally, " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund -
Summary Proceedings", year 1964, pp. 166-167; year 
1965, p. 280; "Report of the Deputies of the Group 
of Ten", June 1964, p. 11; "Report of the Study 
Group on the Creation of Reserve Assets", op. c i t . , 
pp.18-19, 33-34, 74-78; "Report to Ministers and 
Governors by the Group of Deputies", op. c i t . , pp. 
3-6, 17-18; " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Financial News Survey", 
1965, p. 3 5 1 . 
2. See Appendix I . Take notice of the expression " i n 
i t s opinion" i n the above context. Cf. Paragraph 
7(d) of 'The Decision', where i t sayss-
"(d) I f a p a r t i c i p a n t on which c a l l s 
may be made pursuant to Paragraph 7(a) f o r 
a drawer's purchases under a stand-by arrange-
ment gives notice to the Fund that i n the 
pa r t i c i p a n t ' s opinion, based on the present 
and prospective"balance of payments and reserve 
p o s i t i o n , c a l l s should no longer be made on 
the p a r t i c i p a n t ..." 
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Here, i f e f f e c t i s to be given to the wording of 
the above Paragraph D, i t can hardly serve any useful 
purpose; because i t has subjected the judgement of 
balance - of payments to the sole d i s c r e t i o n of the 
Pa r t i c i p a n t s . 1 
I n other words, one can hardly construe any r e a l 
undertaking from the above provision of Paragraph D 
i n that i t has v i r t u a l l y subjected the choice of 
co n t r i b u t i o n under a "borrowing arrangements", to the 
d i s c r e t i o n of each i n d i v i d u a l P a r t i c i p a n t . And'at 
any needed time, a Pa r t i c i p a n t can evade i t s commitments, 
under the Borrowing Scheme, by producing some data to 
the e f f e c t that i t has been faced w i t h balance of 
payments d i f f i c u l t i e s . 
1 . The wording of the above Paragraph D seemed to have 
been supported by the Fund's Managing Director, i n 
the eariy days of the work of the Borrowing Scheme, 
where he stated t h a t : -
"On a number of occasions i t s (the Fund's, 
that i s ) own assistance has been supplemented 
by cre d i t s made available from other sources, 
and t h i s has c e r t a i n l y been welcome. But, 
however, useful the Fund's i n i t i a t i v e may be, 
each con t r i b u t o r must form i t s own judement 
of the adequacy of the measures proposed by 
the country concerned, and determine what 
cr e d i t f a c i l i t i e s i t i s w i l l i n g to extend". 
See " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund - S ummary Pro-
ceedings", 1962, pp. 17-18. Parenthesis added. 
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Here, one could perhaps go one step f u r t h e r and 
suggest that the d i f f i c u l t y does not l i e i n only the 
f l e x i b i l i t y of the d e f i n i t i o n of balance of payments 
equilibrium, but also i n the question of amount of 
the "reserves" needed to defend the balance of pay-
ments equilibrium. 1 
And, as we may have noticed, the above pr o v i s i o n 
of Paragraph D speaks not only of the "present balance 
of payments", but also of the "prospective balance of 
payments" as w e l l as "present and prospective reserve" 
2 
p o s i t i o n of the P a r t i c i p a n t s . 
1 . Cf. Isaiah Frank, "The European Common Market", 
London, Stevens & Sons,, 1961, p. 281, where he 
quotes J. E. Meade t h a t : -
"Meade points out that the maintenance 
of o.verall balance|of payments equilibrium 
i s not a precise c r i t e r i o n . Even i f account 
i s taken of both current and c a p i t a l trans-
actions, the aim should not necessarily be 
an exact equality between receipts and pay-
ments, since there may be a need to b u i l d 
up reserves. The general p r i n c i p l e therefore 
i s f o r each member to "avoid a continuing 
d e f i c i t or surplus on i t s o v e r a l l balance-of-
payments which threatens to r e s u l t i n the 
unreasonable accumulation or loss of i t s 
reserves". 
Cf. also " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Financial News Survey", 1966, 
p. 245; F. A . Mann, "Money i n Public I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Law','' Recueil des Cours, op. c i t . , pp.66-67. 
2. Cf. Paragraph B of 'The Le t t e r ' and Paragraph 7(b) 
and (d) and Paragraph 11(f) and (g) of 'The DecisionJ 
Cf. also " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund, 1945-1965",op. 
c i t . , Vol. I I . pp.413-414; " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary 
Fund Summary Proceedings", 1961 , pp.5^-55* 
^ 27 2 
To what extent a given P a r t i c i p a n t i s i n need of 
reserves to defend i t s "present and prospective balance 
of payments" as w e l l as i t s "prospective reserves", i s 
dependent upon many economic f a c t o r s , some of which are 
quite indeterminate and unresolved. 1 And i t i s these 
circumstances which somehow j u s t i f y the surplus countries 
i n taking a precautionary l i n e and i n having as large 
2 
a reserve p o s i t i o n as they can. As such, the 
question of "reserves" would subject the above provision 
of Paragraph D more to the d i s c r e t i o n of the "prospective 
1 . Gf. F r i t z Machlup, "Plans f o r Reform of the 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary System", op. c i t . , p. 8, 
where he says:-
"The size and growth of f o r e i g n reserves 
r e l a t i v e to the needs of domestic l i q u i d i t y 
... i s only one of the possible c r i t e r i a f o r 
judging the adequacy of the ... reserves. 
Many experts prefer to r e l y on an ind i c a t o r 
which "measures" the reserve p o s i t i o n of the 
world as a whole, to w i t , the numerical r a t i o 
between aggregate reserves and imports ... " 
He himself, however, seems to disagree w i t h such 
a proposition; because he then adds:-
"... there i s absolutely no evidence 
f o r the contention that the need f o r reserves 
rises proportionately w i t h f o r e i g n trade .." 
See I d . p . 9 - Cf. Keynes Plan f o r Clearing Union, 
discussed by R. G. Hawtrey. See R. G. Hawtrey, 
"Bretton Woods f o r Better or Worse", op. c i t . , p. 27 . 
2 . Cf. however, " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund — Annual 
Report", 1963, p. 48. Cf. also "The Times11 > 
November 9> 1970, p. 1?. 
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lends", or otherwise could "bring about frequent 
controversy as to whether or not some of the P a r t i c i -
pants could contribute under a given "borrowing arrange-
ment:.:", and i f they could, to what extent. 1 
A more practicable solution here seems to be the 
mediation of some inte r n a t i o n a l body such as the I n t e r -
p 
national Monetary Fund i t s e l f . This i s what a c t u a l l y 
appears to have taken place: The Fund has been forced 
to step i n and i n t e r f e r e i n t h i s respect. The auth-
o r i t y f o r the Fund's interference has, apparently, 
been the so - c a l l e d "informal i n t e r p r e t a t i v e under-
standing" of Paragraph 7(d) of the General Arrange-
ments to Borrow. 
The f a c t i s , that we, for some other purposes, 
asked the Fund's Authorities, whether any authoritative 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n had so f a r taken place i n connection 
with the General Arrangements to Borrow. ^ The "fund 
i n i t s reply of 23 September, 1969, stated:-
1. As we s h a l l see, within the next few l i n e s , there 
has been a prima f a c i e case that there has been 
some controversy i n t h i s connection. 
2. Cf. "International Monetary Fund - Summary Pro-
ceedings", 1962, p. 17* 
J . See Appendix XX. 
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"... The informal "interpretative under-
standings'* r e f e r r e d to on page 56 of Pamphlet 
No. 11; are of an operational or procedural 
nature. An example of such an understanding 
i s the following: 
Paragraph 7(d) has been understood to apply not 
only when a pa r t i c i p a n t on which c a l l s may be 
made i s of the opinion that c a l l s should no 
longer be made on the partic i p a n t , but also 
when the Managing Director i s of that opinion." ^ 
Nov;, i f the above "interpreative understanding" 
can be construed as being of a binding nature, and i f 
i t s compass can be extended to cover the point at issue, 
then the question of ascertaining the balance of pay-
ments and reserve p o s i t i o n of the Pa r t i c i p a n t s seems 
to have f i n a l l y been resolved i n a s p i r i t of co-opera-
t i o n and mutual understanding. The contents of the 
above in t e r p r e t a t i v e provision would, i n the long run, 
secure the p r a c t i c a b i l i t y of the voting machinery of 
the Borrowing Scheme, and would indeed strengthen the 
obligations of surplus countries to help the d e f i c i t 
countries i n time of need. 
1. See Appendix XXI. The very contents of the above "interpreative understanding" are i n d i c a t i v e of d i f f i c u l t i e s which have a r i s e n , i n the course of time, f o r ascertaining the balance of payments and reserve position of the prospective lenders. Cf. "International Monetary Fund", 194-5-1965", op. c i t . , 
V o l . T. i 3 . 511. 
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GENERAL CONCLUSION 
The n e c e s s i t y f o r s e t t i n g up of the Borrowing 
Scheme was an economic one; something had to "be done 
t o cope w i t h the movement of "hot money". The d e f i c i t 
C ountries, on the one hand, were desperate to get s u f f -
i c i e n t assurance f o r the r e t u r n of hot money from other 
members of the Group of Ten. The surplus Countries, on 
the other, seemed t o "be r e l u c t a n t to go so f a r as the 
d e f i c i t Countries were expecting. The r e s u l t was the 
s e t t i n g up of the Borrowing Scheme i n i t s e x i s t i n g form. 
Under some Paragraphs of the Borrowing Scheme, the 
P a r t i c i p a n t s have accepted c e r t a i n commitments t o rep-
l e n i s h the Fund's ho l d i n g s of scarce c u r r e n c i e s ; there has 
yet been envisaged p a r a l l e l p r o v i s i o n s t o the e f f e c t t h a t 
the P a r t i c i p a n t s have committed themselves t o n o t h i n g more 
than pactum de contrahendo. 
One t h i n g , however, seems to "be c l e a r , v i z . , the 
surplus Countries f e e l t h a t they have given what they 
would; and the d e f i c i t Countries seem to have taken what 
they could. We admit t h a t a law student i s not i n a 
p o s i t i o n t o suggest t h a t what the nature of "economic" 
commitments of the P a r t i c i p a n t s should "be. A l l he i s 
expected t o do i s t o see what these commitments have been. 
This i s what we have attempted to do i n t h i s paper. For 
ins t a n c e , we ventured to say t h a t the d e f i c i t Countries 
i n need of Currencies could mostly count on good w i l l of 
the surplus Countries, and not on the p r o v i s i o n s of the 
Borrowing Scheme. 
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Another t h i n g v/hich we could see i n the course 
of a c t i v i t i e s of the Group of Ten, was t h a t theprocedure 
contemplated, f o r "borrowing arrangements" could not he 
f o l l o w e d p r o p e r l y i n p r a c t i c e . This was p a r t l y due t o the 
f a c t t h a t the movement of "hot money" i s of a widespread 
nature; and the steps necessary t o he taken should be 
prompt, secret and w i t h the minimum of procedure. 
Yet, so long as the le n g t h y " c o n s u l t a t i v e arrangements" 
of the Borrowing Scheme have not been co n s o l i d a t e d i n a 
s i n g l e document, they do not seem to be s a t i s f a c t o r y . 
There might come a time when t h e i r w a s t e f u l procedures would be 
invoked, not because of any b i n d i n g e f f e c t , but perhaps f o r 
the sake of achieving some other purposes. i'or t h i s reason, 
the " c o n s u l t a t i v e arrangements" of 'The L e t t e r 1 and 'The 
D e c i s i o n 1 seem t o r e q u i r e s i m p l i f i c a t i o n , and even consol-
i d a t i o n . 
Furthermore, some of the p r o v i s i o n s of the Borrowing 
Scheme ( e s p e c i a l l y those of the v o t i n g machinery of the 
Borrowing Scheme) seem t o r e q u i r e a l t e r a t i o n or a u t h o r i t a t i v e 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . This, we may add, should i n c l u d e the very 
p r o v i s i o n of i n t e r p r e t a t i v e machinery of the Borrowing Scheme, 
t h a t i s , the p r o v i s i o n of Paragraph 20 of 'The D e c i s i o n 1 . 
December 15, 1961 
rv ' . ' • J i** 
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APPENDIX"I 
'The L e t t e r ' 
The Right Honourable 
SELWYN LLOYD, 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
The' Treasury, 
London. 
Dear Mr. Chancellor,.. 
The purpose of t h i s l e t t e r i s to set forth the ' . 
understandings reached during the recent discussions i n 
P a r i s with respect to the procedure to be followed by the 
P a r t i c i p a t i n g Countries and I n s t i t u t i o n s (hereinafter' 
referred to as "the p a r t i c i p a n t s " ) i n connection'with 
borrowings by the International Monetary Fund of Supplementa-
ry Resources under- c r e d i t arrangements which we expect w i l l 
be established pursuant to a decision of the Executive Di-
rectors of the Fund. 
This procedure, which would apply a f t e r the entry 
into force of that decision with respect to the p a r t i c i p a n t s 
which adhere.to i t i n accordance with t h e i r laws, and which 
would.remain i n e f f e c t during the period of the decision, 
i s as follpws:• 
A. A p a r t i c i p a t i n g country which has need to draw . 
currencies from the International Monetary Fund or to, seek a 
stand-by agreement with the Fund i n circumstances indi c a t i n g 
that the'Supplementary Resources might be used, s h a l l consult 
with the Managing Director of the Fund f i r s t and then with 
the other p a r t i c i p a n t s . 
-j? 7 JV 
B. • I f the Managing Director makes a proposal for Supple-
mentary Resources to "be lent to ! the Fund, the p a r t i c i p a n t s 
s h a l l consult on t h i s proposal and info rim the Managing Director 
of the amounts of t h e i r currencies which they consider appro- . 
p r i a t e to lend to the Fund, taking into account the recommenda-
tions of the Managing Director and t h e i r present and' pros-
pective "balance of payments and reserve positions. The p a r t i -
cipants s h a l l aim at reaching unanimous agreement. 
C. I f i t is. not possible to reach unanimous agreement, 
the question -whether the p a r t i c i p a n t s are prepared to f a c i -
l i t a t e , by lending t h e i r currencies, an exchange transaction 
or stand-by arrangement of the kind covered by the s p e c i a l 
borrowing arrangements and requiring the Fund's resources to 
be supplemented i n the general order .of magnitude proposed 
by the Managing Director, w i l l be decided by a p o l l of the 
p a r t i c i p a n t s . . 
.The prospective drawer w i l l not be e n t i t l e d to vote. 
A favorable decision s h a l l require the following m a j o r i t i e s 
of the p a r t i c i p a n t s which take part i n the vote, i t being 
understood that abstentions may be j u s t i f i e d on^y for balance 
of payments reasons as stated i n paragraph D:-
(1) a two-thirds majority of the number of p a r t i c i p a n t s voting; and 
(2) a t h r e e - f i f t h s majority of. the weighted votes of . 
the p a r t i c i p a n t s voting, weighted on the b a s i s of 
the commitments to the Supplementary Resources. 
D. I f the decision i n paragraph C i s favorable, there 
s h a l l be further consultations among the p a r t i c i p a n t s , and 
with the Managing. Director, concerning the amounts of the 
currencies of the respective p a r t i c i p a n t s which w i l l "be 
loaned to the Fund i n order to a t t a i n a t o t a l i n the general-
order of magnitude agreed under paragraph C.. I f during the 
consultations a pa r t i c i p a n t gives notice that i n i t s opinion, 
based on i t s present and prospective balance., of payments and 
reserve position, c a l l s should not be made on i t , or that 
c a l l s should be for a smaller, amount than that proposed, the 
par t i c i p a n t s s h a l l consult among themselves and with the 
Managing Director as.to the additional amounts of t h e i r . 
currencies which they could provide so as to reach the 
general order of magnitude agreed under paragraph C. 
E. When agreement i s reached under paragraph D, each 
p a r t i c i p a n t s h a l l inform the Managing Director of the c a l l s , 
which i t i s prepared to meet under i t s credit' arrangement 
with the Fund. 
F. I f a par t i c i p a n t which has loaned i t s currency to 
the Fund under i t s c r e d i t arrangement with the Fund subsequent-
l y requests a rev e r a l of i t s loan which leads to further 
loans to the Fund by other p a r t i c i p a n t s , the participant, 
seeking such r e v e r s a l s h a l l consult with the,Managing Director 
and with the .other p a r t i c i p a n t s . 
For the purpose of the consultative procedures 
described above, p a r t i c i p a n t s w i l l designate representatives 
who s h a l l be empowered to act with respect to proposals for 
use of the Supplementary Resources. 
I t i s understood that i n the event of any proposals 
for c a l l s under the c r e d i t arrangements or i f other matters 
should a r i s e under the Fund decision requiring consultations 
amont the p a r t i c i p a n t s , a consultative meeting w i l l he held 
among a l l the p a r t i c i p a n t s . The representative of France 
s h a l l be resonsible for c a l l i n g the f i r s t meeting, andafc that •• 
time the p a r t i c i p a n t s w i l l determine who s h a l l be the Chair-
man. The Managing Director of:the Fund or h i s representative 
s h a l l be i n v i t e d to p a r t i c i p a t e ' i n these consultative'meetings. 
I t i s understood that i n order to further the coiisulta 
tiohs envisaged, p a r t i c i p a n t s should, to the f u l l e s t extent 
p r a c t i c a b l e , use the f a c i l i t i e s of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l organiza-
tions to which they belong i n keeping each other informed of-
the developments i n t h e i r balances of payments that could give 
r i s e .to the use of the Supplementary Resources. 
These consultative arrangements,; undertaken i n a 
s p i r i t of international cooperation, are designed to insure 
the s t a b i l i t y of the international payments system. 
I s h a l l appreciate a- reply confirming that the fore-
going represents the understandings which have been reached 
with respect to the procedure to be followed in' connection 
with borrowings by the International Monetary Fund under the 
c r e d i t arrangements•to which I have re f e r r e d . . 
I. am sending i d e n t i c a l l e t t e r s to the other p a r t i -
cipants - that i s , Belgium, Canada, Germany, I t a l y , Japan, 
the Netherlands, Sweden, the United .States. Attached i s 
a verbatim text of t h i s l e t t e r i n English. The French arid 
E n g l i s h texts, and the r e p l i e s of the p a r t i c i p a n t s i n both 
languages s h a l l be .equally authentic. I s h a l l n o t i f y a l l 
of the p a r t i c i p a n t s o:f the confirmations received i n response 
to t h i s l e t t e r . 
BAUMGARTNER. 
: 2M 
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Chief Secretary to the Treasury and Paymaster General to 
the French Minister of Finance. 
Chief Secretary 
to the Treasury .Treasury Chambers, 
•Great George Stre e t , 
S.W..1. 
• 2nd January,-1962. 
Dear Mr.-Minister, 
.This i s i n reply to your, l e t t e r of. 15th December, 
1961 to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd s e t t i n g forth the understandings 
reached during the recent discussions i n P a r i s with respect 
to the procedure to be followed by, the P a r t i c i p a t i n g Countries 
and I n s t i t u t i o n s i n connection with the Borrowingscby the 
•International Monetary Fund of Supplementary Resources under 
cre d i t arrangements which we expect w i l l be established. 
• On behalf-of the United Kingdom, I am pleased to 
confirm that we are. in" agreement, with the statement of 
understandings as set forth' i n your l e t t e r of 15th December, . 
1961. I am attaching, i n accordance with your suggestion, 
the French text o f . t h i s l e t t e r of confirmation. 
Yours, si n c e r e l y , • 
HENRY BROOKE. 
Monsieur Baumgartner, , • • . Ministre. des Finances', P a r i s . 
u o • 
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Dear Mr. Chancellor, 
You have been kind, enough to confirm to- me your 
agreement regarding the procedure to be followed in.connection 
with Borrowing by the International Monetary Fund of Supple-
mentary Resources from the P a r t i c i p a t i n g Countries, and 
I n s t i t u t i o n s . 
I have the honour to inform you that I have recelve.d 
s i m i l a r confirmations from the Minister of Finance of Belgium, 
the Minister of Finance of Canada, the President of the German 
Federal Bank, the- Minister of the Treasury of I t a l y , the 
Minister of. Finance of Japan, the Minister of Finance of the 
Netherlands, • the Governor of the National Bank of Sweden, 
and the Secretary of the.Treasury of the United .States. 
I should also l i k e to confirm to you the agreement 
of the French Government, regarding the terms of my l e t t e r 
of December 15, 1961. 
. I am noti f y i n g the other p a r t i c i p a n t s , as well as 
the International Monetary Fund, of the general agreement 
thus realized, with respect to the understandings reached 
during.the recent discussions i n P a r i s . 
W. BAUMGARTNER. 
The Honourable Selwyn Lloyd 
C.B.E., T.D., Q.C., M.P. 
Chancellor of the Exchequer 
The Treasury 
London,, S.W.I. 
APPENDIX IV. ' 
'The Decision' 
• ARTICLE V I I , SECTION 2 
General Arrangements to Borrow 
Preamble 
I n order to- enable the International Monetary Fund 
to f u l f i l l more e f f e c t i v e l y its'.-role i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
monetary system i n the new conditions of widespread cpnverti-•. 
b i l i t y , including greater freedom for short-term c a p i t a l 
movements, the main i n d u s t r i a l countries have agreed that 
they w i l l , i n s p i r i t of broad and w i l l i n g cooperation, 
strengthen the Fund by general arrangements under which they, 
w i l l stand ready to.lend.their currencies'to the Fund up to 
.specified amounts under A r t i c l e VII', Section 2 of the A r t i c l e s 
of Agreement when supplementary .resources are needed to fore-r 
s t a l l or cope with an impairment of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l mone-
tary system i n the aforesaid conditions. I n order to give 
e f f e c t to these intentions, the following terms and conditions 
are adopted under A r t i c l e V I I , Section 2y of the, A r t i c l e s of 
Agreement. 
Paragraph 1. Definitions 
t • . . . 
As used i n t h i s Decision the. term: 
( i ) . " A r t i c l e s " means the A r t i c l e s of Agreement of the 
International Monetary Fund; 
( i i ) " c r e d i t arrangements" means an undertaking to lend 
to the Fund on the terms and conditions of t h i s Decision; 
( i i i ) "participant"' means a p a r t i c i p a t i n g member oi^ a 
p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n ; 
( i v ) " p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n " means an o f f i c i a l i n s t i -
t ution of a member that has entered into a c r e d i t arrangement 
with the Fund with the consent of the member; 
(v) "participating member" means a member of the Fund 
that has entered, into a c r e d i t arrangement with the Fund; 
( v i ) "amount of a cr e d i t arrangement" means the•maximum 
amount expressed i n u n i t s of i t s currency that a participant' 
undertakes to-lend to the Fund under a c r e d i t arrangement; 
( v i i ) . " c a l l " means a notice by the. Fund to a part i c i p a n t 
to make a tra n s f e r under i t s c r e d i t arrangement to the Fund's 
account; ' '' 1 
( y i i i ) "borrowed currency" means currency transferred to 
the Fund'.s account •under a ciaLit arrangement; 
( i x ) . "drawer" means a member that purchases borrowed 
currency from the Fund i n an exchange transaction or i n an 
exchange transaction under a stand-by arrangement; 
(x) . "Indebtedness" of the Fund means the amount i t i s 
committed to repay under a credit arrangement. 
Paragraph 2. Credit Arrangements 
•. A member of i n s t i t u t i o n that adheres to t h i s Decision under-
takes to lend i t s currency to the Fund on the terms and con-^ 
ditio'ns of t h i s Decision up to the amount i n units of i t s 
currency s e t f o r t h i n the Annex t o . t h i s Decision or established 
i n accordance with Paragraph 3 ( b ) . 
• CO<T> 
Paragraph. 3« Adherence 
(a) Any member or i s n t i t u t i o n s p e c i f i e d i n the Annex 
may adhere to t h i s Decision i n accordance with Paragraph 3 ( c ) . 
(b) Any member or i n s t i t u t i o n not sp e c i f i e d i n the Annex 
that wishes to.become a pa r t i c i p a n t may at any time, a f t e r 
consultation with the Fund, give notice of i t s willingness 
to adhere to t h i s Decision,, and, i f the Fund s h a l l so agree 
and no p a r t i c i p a n t object, the member or i s n t i t u t i o n may ad-
here i n accordance with Paragraph 3 ( c ) . When giving notice 
of it's willingness to adhere under t h i s Paragraph 3(b), a member 
or i n s t i t u t i o n s h a l l specify the amount, expressed i n terms of 
i t s currency, of the cre d i t arrangement which i t i s w i l l i n g 
to enter into, provided that the amount s h a l l not be l e s s 
than the equivalent at the date of adherence of one hundred 
m i l l i o n United States d o l l a r s of the weight and fineness .. 
i n e f f e c t on July 1, 1944. 
(c) A member or i n s t i t u t i o n s h a l l adhere to t h i s Deci-
sion by depositing with, the Fund an instrument s e t t i n g forth 
.that i t has adhered i n accordance with i t s law and has taken 
a l l steps necessary to enable i t to carry out the terms and 
conditions of t h i s . Decision,. On the deposit of the i n s t r u -
ment; the member or i s n t i t u t i o n s h a l l be a pa r t i c i p a n t as of 
the date of the deposit or of the e f f e c t i v e date of t h i s De-
c i s i o n , whichever s h a l l be .later. 
Paragraph 4. Entry into Force. 
This Decision s h a l l become e f f e c t i v e when i t has been 
adHered to by at l e a s t seven of the members or i n s t i t u t i o n s 
included i n the Annex with c r e d i t arrangements amounting i n 
a l l - t o not l e s s than the equivalent of f i v e and one-half 
b i l l i o n United States d o l l a r s of the weight and fineness of 
i n e f f e c t on July 1, 1944. 
Paragraph 5.. Changes in. Amounts of Credit Arrangements 
The amounts of participants.' c r e d i t arrangements may be r e -
viewed from time to time i n the l i g h t of developing circum-
stances and changed with the agreement of the Fund and a l l 
p a r t i c i p a n t s . 
Paragraph 6. I n i t i a l Procedure 
When a p a r t i c i p a t i n g member or a member whose i n s t i t u t i o n 
i s a p a r t i c i p a n t approaches the Fund on an exchange transaction 
or stand-by arrangement and the Managing Director, a f t e r con-
s u l t a t i o n , considers that the exchange transaction or stand-by 
arrangement i s necessary i n order to f o r e s t a l l or cope with • 
an impairment of the int e r n a t i o n a l monetary system, and that 
the Fund's resources need to be supplemented for t h i s purpose, 
he s h a l l i n i t i a t e the procedure for making calls , under Para-
graph 7. 
Paragraph 7. . C a l l s 
(a) The Managing Director s h a l l make a proposal for c a l l s 
for an exchange transaction or for future c a l l s for exchange 
transactions under a stand-by arrangement only a f t e r consultation 
with Executive Directors and p a r t i c i p a n t s . A proposal s h a l l 
become e f f e c t i v e only i f i t is •accepted by pa r t i c i p a n t s 
and the proposal i s then approved by the Executive Director's, 
Each p a r t i c i p a n t s h a l l n o t i f y the Fund of the acceptance of 
a proposal involving a c a l l under i t s c r e d i t arrangement. 
(b) The currencies and amounts to be c a l l e d under one 
or more of the cr e d i t arrangements s h a l l be based on the 
present and prospective balance of payments and reserve, po-
s i t i o n s of p a r t i c i p a t i n g members or members whose i n s t i t u -
tions are p a r t i c i p a n t s and on the Fund's holdings of currencies. 
( c ) Unless otherwise provided i n a proposal for future 
c a l l s approved under Paragraph 7( a ) ) purchases of. borrowed 
currency under a stand-by arrangement s h a l l be made i n the 
currencies of p a r t i c i p a n t s i n proportion to the amounts i n 
the proposal. 
(d) I f a pa r t i c i p a n t on which c a l l s may be made pursuant 
to Paragraph 7(a)- for a drawer's purchases under.a stand-by 
arrangement gives notice to the Fund that i n the pa r t i c i p a n t ' s 
opinion, based on the present and prospective balance of pay-
ments and reserve position, c a l l s should no longer be made on 
the p a r t i c i p a n t or that c a l l s should be for a smaller amount, 
the Managing Director may propose to other p a r t i c i p a n t s that 
substitute amounts be made ava i l a b l e under t h e i r c r e d i t a r -
rangements, and t h i s proposal s h a l l be subject to the procedure 
of Paragraph 7 ( a ) . The proposal as o r i g i n a l l y approved under 
Paragraph 7(a) s h a l l remain e f f e c t i v e unless and .until a pro-' 
posal for substitute amounts i s approved i n accordance with 
Paragraph 7 ( a ) . 
'(e) When the Fund makes a c a l l pursuant to t h i s P a r a -
graph 7, the p a r t i c i p a n t s h a l l promptly make the t r a n s f e r i n 
accordance with the c a l l . . 
Paragraph 8. Evidence of Indebtedness 
( a ) - .The Fund shal .1 i s s u e to a p a r t i c i p a n t , on i t s r e -
quest, non-negotiable instruments e v i d e n c i n g - t h e Fund's. . 
indebtedness tO' the p a r t i c i p a n t . The fo.rm of the instruments 
s h a l l be agreed between the Fund and the p a r t i c i p a n t . 
(b) Upon repayment of the amount of any instrument 
i s s u e d under Paragraph 8 ( a ) and a l l accrued i n t e r e s t , the 
instrument s h a l l be r e t u r n e d to the Fund f o r c a n c e l l a t i o n . 
I f l e s s than the amount of any such instrument i s r e p a i d , the 
instrument s h a l l be r e t u r n e d to the Fund, and a new i n s t r u -
ment f o r the remainder of the amount, s h a l l be s u b s t i t u t e d 
w i t h the same m a t u r i t y date as i n the o l d instrument. 
Paragraph 9« I n t e r e s t and Charges . 
( a ) ' The.Fund s h a l l pay a charge of one-half of one per 
cent on t r a n s f e r s made i n accordance with Paragraph 7 ( e ) . 
( b ) The Fund s h a l l pay i n t e r e s t on i t s indebtedness. 
a t the r a t e of one and one- h a l f per cent per annum. I n the 
event" t h a t t h i s becomes d i f f e r e n t from a b a s i c r a t e d e t e r -
mined as f o l l o w s : 
the charge l e v i e d by the Fund pursuant to A r t i c l e V, 
S e c t i o n 8 ( a ) , p l u s the charge l e v i e d by the Fund pursuant 
to A r t i c l e V, S e c t i o n 8 ( c ) ( i ) , as changed from time to 
time under A r t i c l e V, S e c t i o n 8 ( e ) , during the f i r s t y e a r 
a f t e r a purchase•of exchange from the Fund, minus one-
. h a l f of one per cent, 
the i n t e r e s t payable by the' Fund s h a l l be changed by the 
same amount as from the date.when the d i f f e r e n c e i n the . 
b a s i c r a t e t a k e s e f f e c t , i n t e r e s t s h a l l be p a i d as soon as . 
p o s s i b l e a f t e r . J u l y 31» October 31» January 31» arid A p r i l 30. 
. ( c ) I n t e r e s t and charges s h a l l be paid, i n gold to the 
ex t e n t that t h i s can be e f f e c t e d i n b a r s . Any balance not 
so p a i d s h a l l be p a i d i n United S t a t e s d o l l a r s , 
(d) Gold payable' to a p a r t i c i p a n t i n .accordance w i t h 
Paragraph 9(b) or Paragraph .11. s h a l l be d e l i v e r e d a t any gold 
d e p o s i t o r y of the Fund chosen by the p a r t i c i p a n t at' which the 
Fund has s u f f i c i e n t g o l d ' f o r making the payment. Such d e l i v e 
.ry s h a l l be f r e e of any charges or c o s t s f o r the p a r t i c i p a n t . 
Paragraph 10. Use of Borrowed Currency 
The Fund's p o l i c i e s and p r a c t i c e s on the use of i t s r e -
sources and stand-by arrangements, i n c l u d i n g those r e l a t i n g 
to the p e r i o d of use, s h a l l apply to purchases of currency 
borrowed by the Fund. 
Paragraph 11. > Repayment by the Fund 
( a ) • '•'.' S u b j e c t to the o t h e r p r o v i s i o n s of t h i s Paragraph 11 
the Fund, f i v e y e a r s a f t e r a t r a n s f e r by a p a r t i c i p a n t , . s h a l l 
repay the- p a r t i c i p a n t an amount e q u i v a l e n t to the t r a n s f e r 
c a l c u l a t e d i n accordance w i t h Paragraph 12. . I f the drawer 
f o r whose purchase p a r t i c i p a n t s make t r a n s f e r s i s committed 
to repurchase a t a f i x e d date e a r l i e r than f i v e year's a f t e r 
i t s purchase, the Fund s h a l l repay the p a r t i c i p a n t s a t t h a t 
date. Repayment under t h i s Paragraph 11(a) or under P a r a -
graph 11 ( c ) s h a l l be, as determined "by the Fund, i n the 
p a r t i c i p a n t ' s c u rrency whenever f e a s i b l e , or i n gold, or, 
a f t e r c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h the p a r t i c i p a n t , i n other c u r r e n c i e s 
t h a t a r e c o n v e r t i b l e i n f a c t . Repayments to a p a r t i c i p a n t 
under the subsequent p r o v i s i o n s of t h i s Paragraph 11 s h a l l 
be c r e d i t e d a g a i n s t t r a n s f e r s by the p a r r t i c i p a n t f o r a 
drawer's purchases i n the order i n which repayment must be 
made under t h i s Paragraph 11 ( a ) . 
( b ) Before' the date p r e s c r i b e d i n Paragraph 1 1(a), the 
Fund, a f t e r c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h a p a r t i c i p a n t , may njke r e -
payment to the p a r t i c i p a n t , in. p a r t or i n f u l l , w i t h any 
i n c r e a s e s i n the Fund's ho l d i n g s of the p a r t i c i p a n t ' s c u r -
rency t h a t exceed the Fund's working .requirements, and 
p a r t i c i p a n t s s h a l l " accept such repayment, 
( c ) Whenever a drawer repurchases, the Fund s h a l l 
promptly repay an e q u i v a l e n t amount, except i n any of the 
f o l l o w i n g c a s e s : 
( i ) The repurchase i s under A r t i c l e V, S e c t i o n 7(b). and 
can be i d e n t i f i e d as being i n r e s p e c t of a purchase of 
. currency other than borrowed cur r e n c y . 
( i i ) The repurchase i s i n d i s c h a r g e of a'commitment 
entered i n t o on a purchase of currency o t h e r than borrowed 
currency. 
( i i i ) The repurchase e n t i t l e s , t h e .drawer to augment r i g h t s 
under a stand-by arrangement pursuant to S e c t i o n I I of De-
c i s i o n No.876-(59/15) of the E x e c u t i v e D i r e c t o r s , provided 
t h a t , to the extent t h a t the drawer does not e x e r c i s e . -
such augmented r i g h t s , the Fund s h a l l promptly, repay an 
e q u i v a l e n t amount on the e x p i r a t i o n of the stand-by arrange-
ment. 
(d ) whenever the Fund d e c i d e s i n agreement w i t h a drawer 
t h a t the problem f o r which the.drawer made i t s purchases has 
been overcome, the drawer s h a l l complete repurchase, and the 
Fund s h a l l complete repayment and be e n t i t l e d to use i t s 
h o l d i n g s of the drawer's currency below 75 per cent of the 
drawer's quota i n .order to complete such repayment,. 
.(e) Repayment under Paragraph l l ( c ) and (d) s h a l l be 
made i n the order e s t a b l i s h e d under Paragraph 11 ( a ) and 
i n p r o p o r t i o n to the Fund's indebtedness to the p a r t i c i p a n t s 
t h a t made t r a n s f e r s i n r e s p e c t of which repayment i s b e i n g 
made. 
( f ) Before the date p r e s c r i b e d i n Paragraph 11(a) a parti ,j> 
c i p a n t may give n o t i c e r e p r e s e n t i n g t h a t t here i s a balance 
of payments need f o r repayment of p a r t or a l l of the Fund's 
indebtedness and req u e s t i n g , s u c h repayment. The Fund s h a l l 
g i v e the overwhelming b e n e f i t of any doubt to the p a r t i c i p a n t 1 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ; Repayment s h a l l be.made a f t e r c o n s u l t a t i o n 
w i t h the p a r t i c i p a n t i n the C u r r e n c i e s of other members t h a t 
are c o n v e r t i b l e i n f a c t , o r made i n gold, as determined by the 
Fund. I f the Fund's h o l d i n g s of c u r r e n c i e s i n which repayment 
should "be made a r e not wholly adequate, i n d i v i d u a l p a r t i c l e 
pants s h a l l be requested, and w i l l be expected, to provide 
the n e c e s s a r y ^balance under t h e i r c r e d i t arrangements. I f , 
n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g the e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t the p a r t i c i p a n t s w i l l 
p r o vide the n e c e s s a r y b a l a n c e they f a i l to '.-do so, repayment 
s h a l l be made'to the extent n e c e s s a r y i n the currency of 
the drawer f o r whose purchases the p a r t i c i p a n t r e q u e s t i n g r e -
payment made t r a n s f e r s . For a l l of the purposes of t h i s P a r a -
graph 11, t r a n s f e r s uijider t h i s Paragraph 1 1(f) s h a l l be deemed 
to. have been made a t the same time and for. the same purchases 
as the t r a n s f e r s by the p a r t i c i p a n t o b t a i n i n g repayment under 
t h i s Paragraph 1 1 ( f ) . 
(g) A l l repayments to a p a r t i c i p a n t i n a currency o t h e r 
than i t s own s h a l l be guided, to the maximum ex t e n t p r a c t i c -
a b l e , by the pr e s e n t and p r o s p e c t i v e balance of payments and 
r e s e r v e p o s i t i o n s of the members whose c u r r e n c i e s are to be 
used i n repayment. 
(h) The Fund s h a l l a t no time reduce i t s holdings of a 
drawer's currency below an amount equal to the Fund's i n d e b t -
edness to the p a r t i c i p a n t s r e s u l t i n g from t r a n s f e r s f o r the 
drawer's purchases. ' ' * 
( i ) When any repayment i s made to a p a r t i c i p a n t , , the amount, 
t h a t can be c a l l e d f o r under i t s , c r e d i t arrangement i n accord-
ance with t h i s D e c i s i o n s h a l l be r e s t o r e d pro tanto but not 
beyond the amount of the c r e d i t arrangement. 
Paragraph 12. Rates of Exchange 
( a ) The value of any t r a n s f e r s h a l l be c a l c u l a t e d as 
of the date of the t r a n s f e r i n terms of a s t a t e d number of 
f i n e ounces of gold or of the United S t a t e s d o l l a r of the 
weight and f i n e n e s s i n e f f e c t on J u l y 1, 1944-, and the Fund 
s h a l l be o b l i g e d to repay .an e q u i v a l e n t v a l u e . 
,(b) F o r a l l o f the purposes of t h i s D e c i s i o n , the equi:-'. 
v a l e n t i n cur r e n c y of any number of fine'ounces of gold or 
of the United S t a t e s d o l l a r of the weight and f i n e n e s s i n 
e f f e c t on J u l y 1, 194-4-, or v i c e v e r s a , s h a l l be c a l c u l a t e d 
a t the r a t e 6 f exchange a t which the Fund ho l d s such currency 
a t the date as of which the c a l c u l a t i o n i s made; provided' 
however t h a t the p r o v i s i o n s of D e c i s i o n No .321-,( 54-/32) of the 
E x e c u t i v e D i r e c t o r s on.Transactions and Computations I n v o l v i n g 
F l u c t u a t i n g C u r r e n c i e s , a s amended by D e c i s i o n No. 1245-(61/4-5) 
and D e c i s i o n No. 1283-(61/56), s h a l l determine the r a t e of 
exchange f o r any c u r r e n c y to which t h a t d e c i s i o n , as amended, 
has been a p p l i e d . 
Paragraph 13. T r a n s f e r a b i l i t y 
A p a r t i c i p a n t may not t r a n s f e r a l l or p a r t of i t s c l a i m 
to repayment under a c r e d i t arrangement except w i t h the p r i o r •• 
consent of the Fund and on such terms and c o n d i t i o n s as the 
Fund may approve. 
Paragraph 14-. . No t i c e s 
Notice to or by a participating'member under t h i s D e c i s i o n 
s h a l l be i n w r i t i n g or by cable and s h a l l be given to or by the 
f i s c a l agency of the p a r t i c i p a t i n g member designated i n 
•accordance w i t h A r t i c l e V, S e c t i o n 1 of the A r t i c l e s and 
Rule G-l of the ' R u l e s and R e g u l a t i o n s of the Fund.. Notice 
to or by a p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s h a l l be i n w r i t i n g or 
by cable and s h a l l be given to o r by the p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n s t i -
t u t i o n . 
Paragraph 15. Amendment 
T h i s D e c i s i o n may be amended during the p e r i o d p r e s c r i b e d 
i n Paragraph 19(a) only by a d e c i s i o n of the Fund and with 
the concurrence of a l l p a r t i c i p a n t s . Such concurrence s h a l l 
riot be n e c e s s a r y f o r the m o d i f i c a t i o n of the Dec i s i o n , on i t s 
renewal pursuant to Paragraph 1 9(b). 
.Paragraph 16. Withdrawal of Adherence 
A . p a r t i c i p a n t may withdraw i t s adherence to t h i s . D e c i s i o n 
i n accordance w i t h Paragraph 19(b) but may not withdraw 
w i t h i n the p e r i o d p r e s c r i b e d i n Paragraph 19(a) except w i t h 
the agreement of the Fund and a l l p a r t i c i p a n t s . 
Paragraph 17. Withdrawal from Membership. 
I f a p a r t i c i p a t i n g member or a member whose i n s t i t u t i o n 
i s a p a r t i c i p a n t withdraws from membership i n the Fund, the 
p a r t i c i p a n t ' s c r e d i t arrangement s h a l l cease a t the"same•time 
as the withdrawal t a k e s effect..' The Fund's indebtedness under 
the c r e d i t arrangement s h a l l be. t r e a t e d as an amount due from 
the Fund f o r the purpose of A r t i c l e XV, S e c t i o n .3, and Schedule 
D of the A r t i c l e s . 
Paragraph 18. Suspension o f Exchange T r a n s a c t i o n s and 
L i q u i d a t i o n 
( a ) The r i g h t o f the Fund to make c a l l s under Paragraph 7 
and the o b l i g a t i o n to make repayments under Paragraph l l s h a l l , 
be suspended during any suspension of exchange t r a n s a c t i o n s 
under A r t i c l e XVI of the A r t i c l e s . 
(b ) I n the event of l i q u i d a t i o n of the Fund, c r e d i t 
arrangements s h a l l cease and the Fund's indebtedness s h a l l 
c o n s t i t u t e l i a b i l i t i e s under Schedule E.of the A r t i c l e s . For 
the purpose of Paragraph 1 ( a ) a f Schedule E, the currency 
i n which the l i a b i l i t y of the Fund s h a l l be payable s h a l l be 
f i r s t the p a r t i c i p a n t ' s c u rrency and then the currency of 
the drawer f o r whose purchases t r a n s f e r s were made.by the 
p a r t i c i p a n t . . 
Paragraph 19.' P e r i o d and Renewal 
.(a) T h i s D e c i s i o n s h a l l continue i n e x i s t e n c e f o r four 
y e a r s from i t s e f f e c t i v e date. 
(b) ' T h i s D e c i s i o n may be renewed f o r such p e r i o d or 
p e r i o d s and w i t h such m o d i f i c a t i o n s , s u b j e c t - t o Paragraph 5, 
as the Fund may decide. The Fund s h a l l , adopt a d e c i s i o n .on 
renewal.and m o d i f i c a t i o n , i f any, not l a t e r than twelve months 
before the end of the p e r i o d p r e s c r i b e d i n Paragraph 1 9(a). 
Any p a r t i c i p a n t may a d v i s e the Fund not l e s s than s i x months 
before the end of the p e r i o d p r e s c r i b e d i n Paragraph 19 ( a ) , 
t h a t i t w i l l withdraw i t s adherence to the D e c i s i o n as renewed. 
I n the absence of such n o t i c e , a p a r t i c i p a n t s h a l l be deemed 
to continue to adhere to the D e c i s i o n as renewed. With-
drawal of adherence i n accordance with t h i s Paragraph 19(h) 
by a p a r t i c i p a n t , whether or not i n c l u d e d i n the Annex, s h a l l 
not preclude i t s subsequent adherence i n accordance with 
Paragraph 3 ( b ) . 
( c ) I f t h i s D e c i s i o n i s terminated or not renewed, 
Paragraphs 8 through 14, 1.7 and 18(b) s h a l l n e v e r t h e l e s s con-
t i n u e to apply i n connection w i t h any indebtedness of "the Fund 
under c r e d i t arrangements i n e x i s t e n c e a t the date of the 
t e r m i n a t i o n or e x p i r a t i o n of the D e c i s i o n u n t i l repayment i s 
completed. . I f a p a r t i c i p a n t withdraws i t s adherence to 
t h i s D e c i s i o n i n accordance w i t h Paragraph 16 or Paragraph 
1 9(b), i t s h a l l cease to be a p a r t i c i p a n t , under the D e c i s i o n , 
but Paragraphs 8'through 14, 17' and 18(b) of the. D e c i s i o n 
as of the date of the withdrawal s h a l l n e v e r t h e l e s s continue 
to apply to any indebtedness of the Fund under the former 
c r e d i t arrangement u n t i l repayment has been completed. 
Paragraph 20. I n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
Any q u e s t i o n o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n r a i s e d i n connection w i t h 
t h i s ' D e c i s i o n which does not f a l l w i t h i n the purview of 
A r t i c l e X V I I I of the A r t i c l e s s h a l l be s e t t l e d to the mutual 
s a t i s f a c t i o n of the Fund, the p a r t i c i p a n t r a i s i n g the q u e s t i o n , 
and a l l o t h e r p a r t i c i p a n t s . For the purpose of t h i s P a r a -
graph 20 p a r t i c i p a n t s s h a l l be deemed to i n c l u d e those former 
p a r t i c i p a n t s to which Paragraph 8 through 14, 17 and 18(b) 
continue to apply pursuant to Paragraph 19(c) to the extent 
t h a t any such former p a r t i c i p a n t i s a f f e c t e d by -a q u e s t i o n 
of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t i s r a i s e d . 
ANNEX 
P a r t i c i p a n t s and Amounts of C r e d i t Arrangements 
U n i t s o f 
. P a r t i c i p a n t 1 s 
Currency• 
1. . United S t a t e s of America US# 2,000,000,000 
2i Deutsche Bundesbank •••• DM 4,000,000,000 
3. United Kingdom £. /< 357,14-2,857 
4. • France " NF 2,715,381,4-28 
5.. I t a l y . L i t 343,750,000,000 
6. .. Japan Yen 90,000,000,000 
7... Canada Can 0 216,216 ,000 
8 > Netherlands 724*000,000 
9. . Belgium BF • 7,'50QvOOO,000 
10. S v e r i g e s Riksbank . S k r 517,320,000 
D e c i s i o n No.1289-(62/1)* 
January 5, 19.62 
* As amended,.effective August 1, 1962,. ( D e c i s i o n No. 1362-(62/32), 
•: J u l y , 9 , 1962) and, e f f e c t i v e October 12,.1962 ( D e c i s i o n No. 
14-15-(62/4-7), September 19, 1962). 
The-.General. Arrangements to Borrow entered i n t o f o r c e on October 24, 1962. . . 
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COPY 
L u f t p o s t i E i n s c h r e i b e n l 
The Managing D i r e c t o r 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund 
19th and H S t r e e t s N.W. . 
Washington 25, D.C. 
U.S.A. _ 
J 110 Frankfurt," June 15th, 1962. 
Ref.; Instrument of Adherence 
Dear Mr. Jacobsson: 
We beg to n o t i f y you t h a t the Deutsche. Bundesbank, i n 
accordance w i t h the law concerning the Deutsche Bundesbank 
of J u l y .26, 1957* hereby adheres to D e c i s i o n Bo.1289 (62/1) 
of January 5» 1962 of the Fund.'s E x e c u t i v e D i r e c t o r s on 
General Arrangements to Borrow and t h a t the Deutsche Bundes-
bank has t a k e n ' a l l s t e p s n e c e s s a r y to enable ' i t to c a r r y out 
.the terms and c o n d i t i o n s of t h a t D e c i s i o n . 
Very t r u l y y o urs, 
DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK 
sgd. K a r l B l e s s i n g • Dr. Troeger-
V i c e - P r e s i d e n t P r e s i d e n t 
COPY 
APPENDIX V I . 
Stockholm, June 7, 1962 
S i r , 
Pursuant to the a u t h o r i z a t i o n granted the 
S v e r i g e s Riksbank by the Riksdag "by i t s d e c i s i o n announced 
i n l e t t e r No.178 of 3rd May, 1962, we take p l e a s u r e i n 
n o t i f y i n g you t h a t the Riksbank on b e h a l f of Sweden hereby 
adheres to the D e c i s i o n of the E x e c u t i v e D i r e c t o r s of the 
Fund on General Arrangements to Borrow (E.B. D e c i s i o n n. 
1 2 8 9 - ( 6 2 / l ) of 5th January, 1962) and t h a t a l l s t e p s n e c e s s a r y 
have been taken to c a r r y out the terms and c o n d i t i o n s of 
t h a t D e c i s i o n . 
Yours f a i t h f u l l y , 
SVERIGES RIKSBANK 
Signed Per I s b r i n k 
E . Bergman 
The Managing D i r e c t o r 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund 
19th and H S t r e e t s 
Washington 25, D.C. 
APPENDIX V I I . 
H. Abdulbaql, 
U n i v e r s i t y of Durham • 
G. Nicoletopoulos, Esq.* 
The Deputy General Counsel, 
I.M.F., Washington D.C., 
U.S.A. 
Dear S i r , . 
T h i s . i s to acknowledge w i t h thanks the r e c e i p t of 
your l e t t e r s of.May 21, 1968 and. Nov* 19, 1968. 
1. As regards t he contents of l e t t e r of May 21, 1968 
I s h a l l be very g r a t e f u l i f you could k i n d l y l e t me know 
as to how and on what terms the. approval of German F e d e r a l 
Government, i n - r e s p e c t of p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the Deutsche 
Bundesbank to the G.A.B., has been conveyed to the Fund.. 
The same i n f o r m a t i o n r e g a r d i n g S v e r i g e s Riksbank a l s o w i l l 
be a p p r e c i a t e d . ' 
2. The . Fund E x e c u t i v e ' Board" s D e c i s i o n No. 13.62-C62/32) , 
adopted on J u l y 9» 1962 was not p u b l i s h e d i n the Fund's 
"Summary Proceedings of 1962, I s h a l l be g r a t e f u l i f you 
co>uld k i n d l y f u r n i s h me w i t h a copy 6 f the consents of t h i s 
D e c i s i o n ........ 
Yours s i n c e r e l y , 
( s d . ) H. Abdulbaqi 
APPENDIX . V I I I . " 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 
WASHINGTON,. D.G. 204-31. 
Jan. 16 1969 
Dear Mr. Abdulbaqri:, 
T h i s i s in.response to your l e t t e r of December .3, 
1968. . 
With, r e s p e c t to your q u e s t i o n on the approval of the 
Government of the F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c of .Germany r e g a r d i n g the 
adherence of Deutsche Bundesbank, and the approval of the 
Government of Sweden' regarding the adherence of Sveriges. 
Riksbank, to the G.A.B., the approvals were g i v e n by l e t t e r s 
from th e s e two Governments to the Fund. .'No terms were imposed.,, 
t h a t i s . t o say, the instruments of approval simply s t a t e d 
t h a t the r e s p e c t i v e Governments approved the borrowing by 
the Fund from t h e i r . c e n t r a l banks up to the amounts and under 
the- terms and c o n d i t i o n s s e t out i n the Fund 1s d e c i s i o n on 
the G.A.B. 
The Fund's Decision.No. 1362-(62/3.2), adopted J u l y 9» 
1962, to which r e f e r e n c e i s made-in the footnote a t page 66 
o f S e l e c t e d D e c i s i o n s ( T h i r d I s s u e ) s t a t e d t h a t i n the Annex to 
D e c i s i o n No. 1289-(62/1) " S v e r i g e s R'iksbank" s h a l l be s u b s t i t u t e d 
f o r "Sweden" and t h a t t h i s amendment s h a l l become e f f e c t i v e when 
the consent of a l l the p r o s p e c t i v e p a r t i c i p a n t s ' t o the amendment 
i s g i v e n . -
•• S i n c e r e l y yours, 
rut „ . . . j T, . (sd. ) G. Nico l e t o p o u l o s 
Mr. H. Abdulbaqri Deputy General Counsel 
APPENDIX I X . 
H. Abdulbaqi, 
U n i v e r s i t y of Durham. 
G. Nicoletopoulos., 
Deputy General Counsel, 8th May, 1S$8. 
. I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund. 
Dear S i r , • 
I s h a l l be g r a t e f u l i f you could k i n d l y 
c l a r i f y ' t h e p o s i t i o n of the Fund on the f o l l o w i n g point. ' . 
Sinc e , according to A r t i c l e V I I 2. of A.A.., the Fund 
i s assumed to come to agreement, regarding the General 
Arrangements- to Borrow^ with member S t a t e s of the Fund, and 
s i n c e P a r a . ' l h of the General Arrangements to Borrow.is, on 
the f a c e of i t , d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g b e t w e e n ' P a r t i c i p a t i n g members 
-(by r e f e r r i n g to A r t . V I . of i.'.A.A. and Rule G.I.- of the RR) 
and P a r t i c i p a t i n g I n s t i t u t i o n s (by not r e f e r r i n g to the above -
p r o v i s i o n s ) to the General Arrangements to Borrow. And s i n c e , 
;on the other hand, the Deutsche Bundesbank has adhered to the 
General Arrangements to Borrow- (as an o r i g i n a l p a r t y ) j t h e r e -
f o r e k i n d l y l e t me know of "any d e c i s i o n , made by the Fund under 
the :.-„A.A. f o l l o w i n g which an i n s t i t u t i o n as such can come i n t o 
an agreement (as'an o r i g i n a l p a r t y ) with the Fund,•under A r t i c l e 
V I I , 2 ...... 
. . Thanking you, . • 
Yours s i n c e r e l y , • . 
( s d . ) H. Abdulbaqi. 
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. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 204-31 
May 21, 1968 
..Dear Mr. Abdulbaqri:' 
T h i s i s with r e f e r e n c e to your l e t t e r of May 8, 1968. , 
A r t i c l e VII,- S e c t i o n 2 of the A r t i c l e s of Agreement . 
• o f the Fund permits the Fund to borrow a'members currency 
e i t h e r from the member i t s e l f or, with' the approval of the •; . 
member, from some ot h e r source w i t h i n or o u t s i d e . t h e t e r r i -
t o r i e s of the member. I t was on the b a s i s o f t h a t p r o v i s i o n 
t h a t , with the approval of the German F e d e r a l Government, 
the Deutsche Bundesbank became a p a r t i c i p a n t i n the General' 
Arrangements to Borrow,. I t i s a p a r t i c i p a n t i n i t s own name 
and not a f i s c a l agency f o r Germany. 
Paragraph 14- of the G.A.B. doe& not. c o n t a i n a sub^ 
s t a n t i v e r u l e but simply, s e t s f o r t h a p r o c e d u r a l r u l e d e a l i n g 
w i t h the channels.of communication r e g a r d i n g G.A.B.- m a t t e r s . 
I t r u s t t h a t the foregoing g i v e s you the answer to 
your q u e s t i o n . 
S i n c e r e l y y o urs, 
( s d . ) G. Nicoletopoulos. 
Deputy General Counsel 
Mr. H. Abdulbaqri-
The Graduate S o c i e t y 
U n i v e r s i t y of Durham 
APPENDIX X I . 
Your Ref... J 111,14624,68 
The Deutsche Bundesbank, 
6 Frankfurt 1, F.R. of Germany. 
H. Abdolbaqi, 
The Graduate Society, 
University of Durham 
• . . 10th August, 1969. 
Dear S i r , 
1. A r t . 7(1) of the'"Law concerning the Deutsche Bundesbank11 
of June 26, 57 states: 
"(1) ... More p a r t i c u l a r l y , ' t h e . f o l l o w i n g business s h a l l be 
reserved to the Directorate: ... 3. Foreign exchange 
transactions and transactions w i t h , f o r e i g n countries: ..." 
I s h a l l be g r a t e f u l i f you could k i n d l y l e t me 
know whether the •Deutsche Bundesbank has been empowered with 
the treatyT-making power - under the Constitution of the F.R. 
of Germany. Any other information concerning the l e g a l 
status of the Deutsche Bundesbank, under the Constitution of 
F.R. of Germany would be appreciated. 
.2 And i s there any Parliamentary au t h o r i z a t i o n 
concerning DM 4,000m. the Deutsche. Bundesbank's " c r e d i t 
arrangement" under the G.A.B.? 
Yours sincerely, 
(sd.) H. Abdolbaqi 
.APPENDIX X I*-
DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK 
Deutsche Bundesbank. 6 Frankfurt 1. Postfach 3611 
Mr. H. Abdulbaqi 
The Graduate Society, 
University of Durham 
Frankfurt am Main 
J 11/8060/69 26.8.845 20 August 1969 
Ref.: Your l e t t e r dated Aug. 11* 1969, 
Si r , 
We should l i k e to. answer ..your, questions as follows: 
1. . A r t i c l e : 88 of the Basic Law ('Constitution) of the 
Federal Republic of Germany provides that the Federation 
s h a l l set up a Federal Bank with the functions of a monetary 
a u t h o r i t y and a bank of issue. Accordingly, the "Law•concerning 
the Deutsche Bundesbank" established the Federal Bank as an 
autonomous federal i n s t i t u t i o n and as a leg a l e n t i t y , under-
p u b l i c law ( A r t . 2 ) . 
2. 
3. As the Federal' Bank may engaged i n a l l transactions, i n -
v o l v i n g banking business.with f o r e i g n countries (Art.19 Sec.l 
No.9 and Art.22) i t was e n t i t e l d to j o i n the GAB as a. p a r t i c i -
pant w i t h the approval of the Federal Government' ( A r t i c l e V I I 
Sec. 2 ( i ) , A r t i c l e s of Agreement of the IMF). Consequently, no 
parliamentary authorization was necessary. 
Sincerely ' Yours, 
Deuthsche Bundesbank 
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LOIS, ARRETE3 ROYAUX EI ACTES DU GOUVERNEMEKT " 
MINI ST ERE DES PINANCES 
19 Juin 1962. - Arrete r o y a l . - Adhesion de l a Belgique a l a ' 
decision du Ponds monetaire i n t e r n a t i o n a l en date du 5 Jan-
v i e r 1962., r e l a t i v e au renforcement des #eaiources.-dudit Ponds. 
BAUDOUIN, Roi des Beiges, 
A tous, presents et' a venir, Salut. 
Vu 1 ' a r t i c l e 68 de l a Co n s t i t u t i o n , 
Vu l a l o i du 26 decembre 1945 approuvant l 1Accord i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
consacre par 1 1 A c t e . f i n a l de l a Conference monetaire et f i n a n -
c i e r s de Bretton Woods, creant l e Ponds monet'aire i n t e r n a t i o n a l , 
Vu l ' a v i s de-Hos Ministres qui en ont delibere en Conseil; 
Sur l a proposition de Notre' M i n i s t r e des 'Pinances, 
Nous avbns arrete et arretons.: 
A r t i c l e 1. Notre Ministre des Pinances est autorise a riotifier 
au Ponds monetaire i n t e r n a t i o n a l 1'adhesion de l a Belgique a 
l a decision du Conseil d 1 administration, dudit ponds, en date 
.du 5 Janvier 1962, r e l a t i v e au reinforcement des ressources du 
Ponds monetaire i n t e r n a t i o n a l . 
Art.2. L'acte d'adhesion de l a Belgique a l a decision visee 
a l 1 a r t i c l e precedent ne s o r t i r a son p l e i n et entier e f f e t 
qu'apres r a t i f i c a t i o n s par les Chambres l e g i s l a t i v e s . 
Art.:-35V'• Notre M i n i s t r e des- Finances est charg6 de 1* execution 
du present arrete." 
Donne a Burxelles, l e 19 j u i n 1962. 
BAUDOUIN 
Par. l e Roi: 
Le Min i s t r e des '.Finances, 
A. Dequae . ' • 
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PILE NO. 612X07 
FINANCE CENTRAL FILES. 
MINISTER' OF FINANCE - PRESS RELEASE 
The Honourable Walter L. Gordon, Minister of Finance.,, 
announced today that, on January 21, 1961+,. he informed 
Mr. Pierre-Paul Schweitzer, the Managing Director of the 
Interna t i o n a l Monetary Fund,'that Canada now adheres to the 
decision of: the Executive Directors of the International Mon-
etary Fund on the General'Arrangements to Borrow and, i n 
accordance with i t s lav/, has taken a l l steps necessary to 
enable i t to-..carry out the terms and conditions of the decision. 
By t h i s action Canada joined nine other.ieading Indus-
t r i a l , countries (Belgium, Germany, France, I t a l y , Japan,. 
Netherlands,, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States)' i n under-
taking to provide stand-by credits t o t a l l i n g U.S. $ .6 " b i l l i o n , 
to the Intern a t i o n a l Monetary Fund. 
Canada has agreed to a maximum commitment of ..U.S. 
# 200 m i l l i o n . 
Canada completed the l e g i s l a t i v e steps.necessary f o r 
f u l l p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the.'last.-session of Parliament, with 
the amendment of the Currency Mint and Exchange Fund Act to 
allow the Minister of Finance 'to purchase, out of the 
Exchange Fund.Account, securities of the International Monetary 
Fund maturing not l a t e r than f i v e years from date of issue. 
Such securities would.be issued when a country provided 
loans under the General Arrangements to borrow..'..' 
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DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK 
Deutsche Bundesbank, 6 Frankfurt 1, Postfach 3611 
Mr. H. Abdulbaqui 
The Graduate Society, 
University of Durham, 
38, Old Elvet, 
Durham 
tor: 
Jl10/3889/68 Frankfurt am Main 
A p i r l 10, 1968 
Your l e t t e r dated March 28, 1968 
Si r : 
The enclosure i s a copy of the instrument of adherence to 
the General Arrangements to Borrow, sent to the I.M.F. wi t h 
the approval of our Government on June 15, 1962. 
Our i n s t i t u t i o n being immediate p a r t i c i p a n t i n the General 
Arrangements to Borrow, parliamentary action was not required. 
Youxs sincerely, 
DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK 
- . APPENDIX XVI 
BLT/NI . Paris Le 25 June 1970 
Ministere de I'economie et des Finances' 
D i r e c t i o n du Tresor •-.'•'. 
Service .des A f f a i r e s Internationales. 
Sous-Direction des A f f a i r e s M u l t i l a t e r a l e s 
, Bureau E.2. 
No.14684 . 
Monsieur, ' 
En reponse S..vptre let'tre du 4-juin 1970 dans 
laquel l e vous me demandiez de.vous communiquer divers docu-
ments r e l a t i f - s aux Aceords' (Jeneraux d'Emprunt, j ' a i 1'honneur 
de vous f a i r e savoir. q u ' i l ne m'est malheureuseihent pas 
possible de s a t i s f a i r e votre requete, en raison du caractere 
c o n f i d e h t i e l des documents en question. 
Je l e regre t t e et vous p r i e d'agreer, Monsieur, 
i - ' assurance de rna consideration-distinguee. 
Pour l e Miriistre et par a u t o r i s a t i o n : 
Le Directeur du Tresor, 
. . • Pour l e Directeur 
'. L'Inspecteur des Finances 
charge de Mission. 
Signe Bloch-Laine. 
H. Abdolbaqi 
'i 
SVERIGES RIKSBANK 
Utr. sekr. 
SB/Spr' 
Stockholm, 4th .A p r i l , 1968 
Mr. H. Abdulbaqi 
The Graduate Society •"'• 
University of. Durham 
38 Old Elvet 
Durham. 
England. .. 
Dear S i r , 
:We may add that f o r the implementation of the 
agreement two ', amendments were made i n the Sveriges Riks-
bank Act of 30th June 1934 (furnished you w i t h our l e t t e r 
of 22nd January, 1968). Paragraph g)' was* included .in A r t . 
10 and Art.15 was amended to the.effect that the Riksbank 
may grant c r e d i t s to the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund. 
Yours f a i t h f u l l y , 
SVERIGES RIKSBANK . 
• (sd .) . : E-.. Bergman • 
(sd.) • S. Brinck 
APPENDIX XfflEI . 
Public Law 8 7 - 4 9 0 
87th congress, H.R. 10.162 
• " June 19, 1962 • 
An Act. 
To' amend the Bretton Woods Agreements.Act to 
authorize the United States to p a r t i c i p a t e i n 
loans to the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary .Fund to 
strengthen the i n t e r n a t i o n a l monetary system; 
Be i t enacted by.the Senate and House of 
Representatives of the United States 6-f Ameri-
ca i n Congress assembled, That the Bretton 
Woods Agreements Act, as amended (22 U.S.C. 
286-286 k-1), i s amended by adding at the end 
thereof the following new sections: 
"Sec-. .17. (a) I n order , to carry out the pur 
poses of the decision of January 5, 19.62, of 
the Executive Directors of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Monetary Fund, the Secretary of the .Treasury., 
i s , authorized t o make loans, not to exceed 
#2,000,00.0,000 outstanding at any one time, 
to the Fund under, a r t i c l e V I I , section 2 ( i ) , 
of the A r t i c l e s of Agreement of the Pund• Any 
loan under the a u t h o r i t y granted i n t h i s sub-
section s h a l l be made w i t h due regard to the 
present and prospective balance.of payments 
and reserve p o s i t i o n of the United States. 
"(b) For the purpose of making loans to Appropriation, 
the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund pursuant to 
t h i s section, there, i s hereby authorized to 
be appropriated # 2,000,000,000,. to. remain 
available u n t i l expended to. meet c a l l s by the 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund. Any payments 
made to. the United States by the Interna-*, 
t i o n a l Monetary Fund as a repayment on account 
of the p r i n c i p a l of a loan made under t h i s , 
section s h a l l continue to be available f o r 
loans to the International-,Monetary- Fund. 
"(c) Payments of i n t e r e s t and charges to 
-the United States on account of any loan to 
the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund s h a l l be' covered 
i n t o the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts. .. 
I n a d d i t i o n to the amount authorized i n sub*- • 
section ( b ) , the're-is hereby authorized to be. 
appropriated such amounts as may be necessary, 
f o r the payment of charges i n connection w i t h 
any purchases, of currencies or gold by the 
United States from the. I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary 
Fund. 
3-IS 
"SEC.18. Any purchases of currencies or gold 
by the United States from the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Mo-
netary Pund may be transferred to and adminis-
tered by the fund established by section 10 of • 
the Gold Re.serve Act of 1934» as amended (31 
U.S.C.822a), f o r use i n accordance withnthe 
provisions of that section. The Secretary of 
the Treasury is-authorized t o u t i l i z e the r e -
sources of that fund f o r the purpose of any re -
payments i n connection w i t h such transactions.". 
SEC.2. The l a s t sentence of section 7 (c) of 
the Bretton Woods Agreements Act (22 U.S.C. .. 
286e) i s amended to read.as follows: "The 
face amount of special notes issued to-the-
Puhd under the a u t h o r i t y of t h i s subsection a&d 
outstanding at any one time s h a l l not exceed i n 
the aggregate the amount of the subscription 
of the United States a c t u a l l y paid to.the 
Pund and the d o l l a r equivalent of currencies 
and gold, which the United States shall: have 
purchased from the Fund i n accordance with' the.' 
A r t i c l e s ' of Agreement, and the face amount of •• 
such notes issued to the Bank and. outstanding 
at any one time s h a l l not exceed i n the aggregate 
the amount of the subscription of. the United States 
a c t u a l l y paid to the Bank under a r t i c l e I I , section 
7 ( i ) f of the A r t i c l e s of Agreement of the Bank". 
Approved June 19, 1962. 
Currencies 
or gold 
purchases, 
t r a n s f e r . 
48 Stat.34 
Special 
notes. 
59 Stat. 
514. 
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GROUP OF TEN COMMUNIQUE 
1. The Ministers and centr a l bank governors of the 10 
countries p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the General Arrangements to Borrow 
met i n Bonnonn November 20-22, 1968 ,' under the chairmanship 
of Karl S c h i l l e r , Minister of Economics, Federal Republic of 
Germany. 
Pierre-Paul Schweitzer, ..managing d i r e c t o r of the 
In t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund, took part i n the meeting, which 
was also attended by the President of the Swiss National Bank, 
the Deputy Secretary-General of the O.E.C.D., the general 
manager of the B.I.S. and the Vice-president of the Commission 
of the European Communities. 
2. The meeting was cal l e d by it's, chairman, Minister 
S c h i l l e r , on the proposal of several member countries. The 
ministers and governors had a comprehensive and thorough 
exchange of views oh the basic problems of balance-of-payments 
d i s e q u i l i b r i a and on the recent speculative c a p i t a l movements. 
5. The p a r t i c i p a n t s agreed that i n t e r n a t i o n a l monetary 
s t a b i l i t y i s the j o i n t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of a l l countries i n the 
in t e r n a t i o n a l economic community. Both d e f i c i t . a n d surplus 
countries-expressed t h e i r willingness to contribute e f f e c t i v e l y 
to the . s t a b i l i t y of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l monetary system through 
appropriate and concerted economic p o l i c i e s . They agreed on 
measures to counter speculative c a p i t a l movements. 
*> JL O 
4-. Minister Sc h i l l e r , explained the decision of the Fe-
deral Government of Germany to introduce immediately .tax r e -
l i e f on imports of 4- per cent of t h e i r value and a tax burden 
on exports of 4 per cent-of t h e i r value. 
These measures w i l l s u b s t a n t i a l l y reduce the German 
trade surplus. The German Government also intends to r e s t r i c t 
c e r t a i n short-term transactions of German banks w i t h non-
residents.; and the^ Federal Bank has decided yesterday to raise 
to 100 per' cent the reserve requirements on additions to 
banks'" l i a b i l i t i e s to foreigners. 
5., A f t e r thorough discussion of the German measures 
the ministers and governors agreed t h a t these measures would 
make a . s i g n i f i c a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n to the s t a b i l i t y of the mone-• 
ta r y system and the adjustment process* I n the l i g h t of 
those measures, they endorsed the decision by the Federal 
Government to maintain the p a r i t y of the Deutsche Mark. 
6. The French Economic and Finance Minister explained 
the s i t u a t i o n of the French currency, the measures already 
taken towards a r e s t o r a t i o n of i n t e r n a l and external s 
equili b r i u m , and the problems s t i l l to be solved. 
7* I t was decided to set up a new central bank c r e d i t 
f a c i l i t y f o r France i n the amount of #2,000m (£833m.) 
This i s i n addition to France's substantial drawing f a c i l i t i e s 
i n the I.M.F. 
.8. The decision on the above mentioned c r e d i t f a c i l i t y 
underlines.the determination of monetary a u t h o r i t i e s to 
counter speculation and to o f f s e t the e f f e c t on reserves: of 
• destablishing short-term c a p i t a l flows. For the same•pur-
pose the governors, together w i t h the B.T.S.., w i l l examine 
new central bank arrangements.to a l l e v i a t e the impact on 
' reserves of speculative movements,. 
9« The participants, welcomed the measures taken which 
w i l l make, a major c o n t r i b u t i o n to the r e s t o r a t i o n of i n t e r -
national payments equi l i b r i u m . 
3.1 6 - • H'. Abdolbaqi 
APPENDIX XX. University of Durham, 
' 3rd September, 1969 
\ ' 1 , 
G.. N. Nicoletopoulos, Esq.., 
IMP, Washington D.C., U.SJL. 
1 
Dear S i r , 
I shall.he g r a t e f u l i f you could kindly 
send me copies of 'implementing/agreem&ii;s' concluded 
"between Switzerland^ U.S.A. •and U.K., under paragraph ( 2 ) 
•of M. A. Zehnder's Letter of June ' l l , 196-Uv 
I f the sending of copies of the' 'implementing agreements'* 
I s not possible, could you kindly throw l i g h t on t h e i r status 
and scope, of operation. 
Further, i n your Pamphlet series No.11, at page 11 i t 
i s said: 
"... there have been . occasions on which i n t e r p r e t -
ative understandings of the General Arrangements have 
been necessary." 
I s h a l l be g r a t e f u l i f you-could also send.me the contents or 
reference to the contents of those 'interpretative understandin 
Thank you again and I shall look, forward to the pleasure 
of hearing from you. • 
Yours sincerely,, 
(signed). ' H. Abdolbaqi. ; 
APPENDIX XXI. 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20431 
Sept. 23 1969 
Dear Mr. Abdolbaqri: 
I regret that we cannot make available to you 
co.pies or inform you of the content of the "Implementing 
Agreements" "between Switzerland, on the one hand, and the 
United States and the United Kingdom, on the other. However, 
.you may wish to request copies of these agreements-directly 
from the p a r t i e s to them. 
The informal " i n t e r p r e t a t i v e understandings" r e f e r r e d 
to on page 56 of Pamphlet No.11. are of an operational or 
procedural nature. An example of such an understanding i s 
the f o l l o w i n g : Paragraph 7(d) has been understood to apply 
not only when a p a r t i c i p a n t on which c a l l s may be made i s of 
the opinion t h a t c a l l s should no longer be made on the p a r t i -
cipant, but also when the Managing D i r e c t o r - i s of th a t 
opinion. 
Sincerely yours 
(sd.) G. Nicoletopoulos 
Deputy General Counsel 
Mr. H. Abdolbaqri 
FniXe£s3v1ty J** Durham, The Graduate Society 38 Old Efret Durham, England. J 
APPENDIX XXII . 
SCHWEIZERISCHE NATIONALBANK - BANQUE .NATIONALS SUISSE 
ZURICH - BERN- . 
8022 Zurich, 
November 14, 1968.. 
Mr. H. Adbuibhqi 
University of, Durham , 
The. Graduate Society 
$8 Old Elvet. 
Durham, U.K. 
Dear S i r , ' . . 
We are i n receipt of your l e t t e r of the 29th October 
requesting information on our Bank and on the implementation 
of the Federal Decree of the 4-th October, 1963 on Switzer-
land's p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l monetary measures. 
Before entering i n t o particulars,- we-wish to make j u s t one 
preliminary remark: The quotations contained i n your l e t t e r 
reveal that, the, relevant t e x t s , insofar as they have been 
published, are i n your possession or at least : available to 
you i n the French language. For t h i s reason we abstain from 
enclosing these t e x t s (e.g. the "Message du Conseil f & d f r a l . 
l'AssemblSe ffed&rale eoncernant l a collaboration de l a 
Suisse aux mesures mon&taires Internationales 1'), but are 
of course quite prepared to l e t you have these upon special 
request. 
Now l e t us t u r n to your, specific, questions: • ' 
(1) The Swiss National Bank i s a j o i n t - s t o c k company 
wit h a share c a p i t a l of Sw.fcs. 50 000. 000, of which h a l f 
i s paid-up. Roughly 42 °/o of the-shares are owned by private' 
i n d i v i d u a l s or pri v a t e companies, 58 °/o by cantons, cantonal, 
banks (State banks of the cantons) and other p u b l i c law 
corporations and i n s t i t u t i o n s . The Confederation does not 
own any part of the Bank's c a p i t a l . The Bank i s .a separate 
and d i s t i n c t e n t i t y , but on account of i t s public tasks 
i t i s administered "under cooperation and supervision of 
the' Confederation". I n p a r t i c u l a r , the Federal Council (the 
government of the Confederation) appoints the members of the 
•Board of General Management and the maj o r i t y of the members 
of the Bank Council. The organisation and the f i e l d of a c t i -
v i t i e s of the National Bank are defined i n a special Federal 
Law dated 23rd-December, 1953> a copy of which ( i n French) 
is. attached. ......... 
(2) A l l relevant points concerning Switzerland's p a r t i -
c i p a t i o n i n the General Arrangements to Borrow are contained 
i n the arrangements known to you as w e l l as i n the "Message 
du Conseil fed&ral a.. l'Assembl&e f&d&rale concernant l a 
collaboration de l a Suisse aux mesures mon§taires in t e r n a -
t i o n a l e s " . The contents of Mr. Jacotosson's l e t t e r of the 
14th December, 1961 to the President of the'Swiss Confederation 
are reproduced i n the "Message du Conseil f e d e r a l " on page 
560 at the top. This l e t t e r merely served as a formal basis 
to s t a r t o f f i c i a l negotiations. 
(3) So f a r , there are only two countries - v i z . the 
United States of America and Great B r i t a i n - w ith whom Switzer-
land has concluded implementing agreements, and this, f o r a 
f i x e d period of four years. The agreements lay down the 
p r i n c i p l e of r e c i p r o c i t y , i . e . each of the two contracting 
p a r t i e s may invoke the agreement i n case of need and request 
assistance from i t s contracting partner. Borrowing f a c i l i t i e s 
are granted by each country i n i t s own currency on a swap 
basis, i . e . Switzerland makes Swiss francs available to i t s 
partner country and receives from i t US d o l l a r s , or s t e r l i n g . 
Each swap contract rims f o r a period of three mbi.its; i t may • 
however be renewed by mutual agreement. Repayment i s to be . 
effected p a r i passu i n conjunction w i t h any repayments, made 
by the Monetary Fund t o the members of the Group of Ten. 
Monetary assistance w i t h i n the framework of the implementing 
agreements may also be granted, i n some other form,, i f t h i s 
i s mutually agreed upon. - The implementing; agreements are 
being dealt w i t h as c o n f i d e n t i a l by a l l - p a r t i e s , concerned 
(by the Federal Reserve Bank of New'York, the Bank of England 
and by us), which i s why we regret t h a t we are not i n a posi-^ 
t i o n to make the t e x t available to you. The same applies to 
the i n d i v i d u a l transactions concluded by v i r t u e of the 
implementing agreements. 
We hope that t h i s information w i l l be of some 
use to you;., even though we were unable to meet a l l your 
wishes. 
'Yours f a i t h f u l l y , 
'' BANQUE NATIONALS SUISSE 
Enclosures: '.. 
- Federal Law on the Swiss National Bank 
- Annual Report f o r 1967 
APPENDIX X X I I I . 
SCHWEIZERISCHE NATIONALBANK - BANQUE NATIONALE SUISSE 
BANCA NAZIONALE SVIZZERA 
ZURICH - BERN 
8022 Zurich, 
December 17, 1968 
Mr. H. Abdulbaqi, 
University of Durham 
The Graduate Society 
38 Old Elvet 
Durham, U.K. 
Dear S i r , 
This i s i n reply to your l e t t e r of December 9> 
1968. 
The short-term assistance granted by our I n s t i t u t i o n 
to the Banque de France i s not based on the exchange of 
l e t t e r s of June 11, 1964, between the Swiss Confederation 
and the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund, but i s an autonomous 
operation by our bank pursuant to A r t . 14-, Section 3, of 
the Law on the Swiss National Bank. 
Yours f a i t h f u l l y 
BANQUE NATIONALE SUISSE 
APPENDIX XXIV 6
The Honourable Secretary, H. Abdolbaghi, 
Mi n i s t r y of Finance, 
France. ' ;;.. 
20th August,. 1969. 
Dear S i r , 
The l e t t e r of January % 1962 of M. W i l f r i d Baum-
gartner, Minister of Finance., France, to Mr. Douglas D i l l o n , 
Secretary of the Treasuryi U.S.A.. reads as follows: 
" . . . I have the honour to inform you that I have received 
s i m i l a r confirmations from ... the President of the German 
Federal Bank ... the Minister of Finance of Japan, ... the 
Governor of the National Bank of Sweden I . am n o t i f y i n g 
the other p a r t i c i p a n t s , as well, as the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary 
Fund, of the general :agreement thus realized.with respect to 
the understanding reached during the recent discussion i n 
Paris...." 
I s h a l l be g r a t e f u l i f you could k i n d l y f u r n i s h me 
with copies of English version of M.Wilfrid,: Baumgartner' s 
l e t t e r of December 15 s 1961 to Germany, Sweden and Japan and 
the confirmations His Excellency received thereof and the 
n o t i f i c a t i o n s sent to them t h e r e a f t e r together w i t h copies of 
any correspondence i n t h i s respect, between your M i n i s t r y •> 
and the I.M.F. and Participants - before the Fund's Decision 
No.1289 (62-1) was taken - and also copies of travaux 
preparatoires of the Paris arrangements of 1961 i n respect 
of the G.A.B.; 
•' , Yo>urs . sincerely,, 
signed H. Abdolbaghi 
APP^-lftx XXV. 
. BLT/NP 
MinistSre de L'Eeonomie Et : 
Des Finances Paris, le 24 Oct., 1969 
Dir e c t i o n Du Tresor ., 
Service.des A f f a i r e s Internationales 
Sous-Direction des; A f f a i r e s Multilat§rales 
Be'ureau E...2. 
No .21.038 ' 
Monsieur, 
'Par l e t t r e du 20 aout 1969, vous ayez bien voulu 
me demander de vous communiquer divers documents r e l a t i f s 
' aux Accords Generaux .d VEmprunt. 
Jl.ne m'est malheureusement pas' possible de s a t i s -
f a i r e votre r e q u i t e , en raison du. caractere c o n f i d e n t i a l 
des documents dont i l s'agit. 
Je l e . r e g r e t t e e.t yous.prie d'agreer, Monsieur., 
1'assurance de ma consideration disti'nguSe. 
. ;i Pour le Ministre et par autorisation:. 
• . Le DIRECTEUR du TRESOR, 
Pour l e Directeur 
,L'Inspecteur des Finances 
chargS de MISSION 
. (sing§) BLOCH-LAINE 
Monsieur H. Abdalbaghi, 
The Graduate Society, University of Durham, Durhma, U.K. 
APPENDIX XXVI. 
DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK 
Frankfurt am Main, December 27th, 1961 
Mr. W. Baumgartner 
Minister of Finance . • • ' 
Paris -
Rue de R i v o l i • 
Dear Mr. Minister: 
This i s i n reply to your l e t t e r of December 15th, 1961, 
s e t t i n g f o r t h the understandings reached during the recent 
discussions i n Paris w i t h respect to the procedure to be, 
followed by the P a r t i c i p a t i n g Countries and I n s t i t u t i o n s i n 
connection w i t h the borrowings by the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary 
Fund of Supplementary Resources under c r e d i t arrangements 
which we expect w i l l be established. 
On behalf of the Deutsche Bundesbank, we.are pleased to con-
f i r m - with the approval of the Government of the Federal Re-
public - that we are .in agreement with the statement of under-v 
standings as set f o r t h i n your l e t t e r of December 15th, 1961.' 
As concerns the- consultative procedures set out i n your l e t t e r 
on page 3, t h i r d - and f o l l o w i n g paragraphs, we. understand that 
the German Government wants to reserve f o r i t s e l f the r i g h t 
to designate, besides the representative'designated by the 
Deutsche Bundesbank:, a representative of, i t s own. 
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We are attaching, i n accordance with your suggestion, 
t h i s English t e x t of o u r - l e t t e r of confirmation. 
Deutsche Bundesbank 
.sgd. Blessing .sgd.. Dr.. Troeger 
APPENDIX XXVII. 
SVERlGES RIKSBANK Stockholm; October 29, 1969-
Utr. sekr. 
Sb/Kj 
Mr. H. Abdolbaqi, 
University of Durham- : 
The Graduate Society 
Durham 
Deaf Sir," 
With, reference to your l e t t e r of October 22., 1969 
we wish to inform you that on behalf of. Sweden the Sveriges 
Riksbank i s the. p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n i n the G.A.B., 
not.the M i n i s t r y of Finance as i s the case regarding most 
of the other member coutries. Consequently there has been . 
ho exchange of l e t t e r s .between Mr. M.W. Baumgartner and the 
Swedish M i n i s t r y of Finance. 
Yours sineerely* 
SVERIGES RIKSBANK 
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APPENDIX XXVIII. 
DER BUNDESMINISTER FUR WTRTSCHAFT BONN, den 18 Dezember 
Gesch.-Z.: VI B 6 - 63 00 00/2 1969 
Ferbsprecher: 76 4173 
Per Bundesminister f u r Wirtschaft, 53 Bonn, Postfach 
Mr. H. Abdulbaqui 
The Graduate Society-
University of Durham 
38 Old Elvet 
Durham - Grossbritannien 
Sehr geehrter Mr. Abdulbaqui, 
Ihrem Wunsche entsprechend ubersende i c h Ihnen als 
Anlage die Antwort der Deutschen Bundesbank auf 
das Schreiben des franzosischen Finanzministers 
Baumgartner vom 15.12.1961. Das Schreiben der Bun-
desregierung i s t nich v e r o f f e n t l i c h worden. 
Hochachtungsvoll 
Im Auftrag 
(Dr. Franzke) 
•''•&a4 
APPENDIX XXIX. 
Kungl. Maj&ts proposition nr 102 ar 1962 
W. Baumgartner 
Stockholm,. 22nd December, 1961 
Dear Mr. Minister, 
This i s i n reply to yoair l e t t e r of 15th December, 
1961, s e t t i n g f o r t h the understandings reached during the 
recent discussions i n Paris with respect to the procedure t o 
be followed by the P a r t i c i p a t i n g Countries and. I n s t i t u t i o n s 
I n connection w i t h borrowings by the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary 
Fund of Supplementary Resources under c r e d i t arrangements which 
we expect w i l l be established pursuant to a decision of the 
Executive Directors of the Fund. 
On behalf of the Sveriges Riksbank, I am pleased to 
confirm that we are i n agreement w i t h the statement of under-
standings as set f o r t h i n your l e t t e r of 15th December, 1961.. 
I am attaching, i n accordance w i t h your suggestion, the French 
t e x t of t h i s l e t t e r , of confirmation. 
I am, Dear Mr. Minister, 
Yours sincerely, 
Per Asbrink 
^3 S 
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